



# The Story of The Great War

### History of the European War from Official Sources

COMPLETE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF EVENTS TO DATE. ILLUSTRATED WITH DRAWINGS, MAPS, and PHOTOGRAPHS

Prefaced by

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# The STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

VICTORY WITH THE ALLIES THE AMERICAN ARMY'S BATTLES · VESLE, ST. MIHIEL, MEUSE-ARGONNE · CENTRAL POWERS COLLAPSE · ARMI-STICE · PEACE CONFERENCE



VOLUME VIII

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
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#### PART I-THE WESTERN FRONT

#### CHAPTER I

DESTRUCTION MARKS THE GERMAN RETREAT—
THE FRENCH CAPTURE SOISSONS, FISMES,
AND IMPORTANT POSITIONS—THE BRITISH
WIN GREAT VICTORIES NEAR ALBERT

THE continued advance of the Allies in the first days of August, 1918, along the front from Soissons to Rheims was a decisive blow to the German hopes of gaining Paris; the capital was no longer threatened. The hard-pressed foe was now forced to retreat hurriedly on all sides of the Marne salient, which was rapidly being flattened out by the irresistible pressure of French and British armies.

On August 2, 1918, the forces under General Mangin took Soissons. Southwest of Rheims General Berthelot occupied Ville-en-Tardenois, marking an advance for the day of over three miles. Supported by a French contingent, British troops crossed the Crise River, which joins the Aisne at Soissons, and regained a considerable strip of territory southeast of that city. The German retreat was orderly and in no sense a rout. Their hurried retirement was marked by pillage and incendiarism and the usual devastations according to their settled program.

North of Fère-en-Tardenois French and American forces advanced simultaneously in the early morning of August 2, 1918, the French eccupying Cramaille and Cramoiselle and later Saponay, where forty railroad cars and a number of locomotives fell into their hands. The advance of the Allies was made under heavy barrage; the German artillery replied at times, but it

was feeble and ineffective. Their retreat was in a northward direction through the valley from Saponay and was marked by great fires behind the lines as they destroyed many ammunition dumps before retiring. At a few points there was some sharp fighting, but the Germans made no serious attempt to stem the advance of the Allies and seemed only eager to get away and avoid trouble as far as possible.

French cavalry, with American infantry supporting, operated near Dravegny about two and a half miles to the north of Coulanges. This forward movement was of importance as it brought the Allies within eight miles of Fismes to the southeast, on the railroad between Soissons and Rheims.

It was learned through prisoners that the Germans would make a stand on the line of the Vesle River, where determined resistance might be expected. It was not believed, however, that this effort would prove formidable; for the Allies had only to make a slight advance when their heavy guns would be in a position to shell Fismes and render any other place in the neighborhood untenable.

The Germans had succeeded in extricating the greater portion of their armies from the salient, but it was evident that there was confusion in their ranks and a lack of order. Their retreat was marked by clouds of smoke and many fires and explosions that denoted hurried flight.

Though the Germans were hurrying to escape, they took time to destroy practically everything that was of any value in the towns evacuated. Before leaving Fère-en-Tardenois there was not one house that had not been shelled or dynamited. When the French entered Villeneuve they found twenty-three villagers who had been virtually German prisoners for nearly two months. They all slept in a cellar for mutual protection, subsisting on a stock of flour and canned goods, and vegetables which they had raised themselves. During the day they avoided the Germans, declining to associate with them or to accept the food they offered. In this place the French found twenty-five wounded or dead Germans in the church. Several had died of starvation as result of the hurried retreat.

In another town occupied by the French they found the church was used by the Germans as a storehouse for loot. There were piles of mattresses and boxes containing copper and brass articles, also church vestments ready for shipment to Germany.

The roadways through which the Germans retreated from Fère-en-Tardenois were obstructed by wagons, dead horses and men, and piles of ammunition. Some of the wagons had been abandoned in hurried flight and in some cases drivers and horses were killed by French and American gunners.

Allied forces continued their victorious sweep northward on August 3, 1918, capturing practically the entire Aisne-Vesle front between Soissons and Rheims, which marked an advance of six miles at some points, while more than fifty villages recently held by the enemy were recovered.

The Allies' advance was on a front of thirty miles, and before the close of the day they held the southern banks of the Aisne and the Vesle from Soissons to the important town of Fismes. where American troops occupied positions on the outskirts.

East of Fismes the Allies were on a line north of Courville. Brancourt, Courcelles, and Champigny, towns in close proximity to the Vesle River, while cavalry patrols were operating along the Soissons-Rheims railroad which follows the course of the stream.

To the north British forces operating in the Albert sector were making substantial gains, forcing the Germans to retreat to the east bank of the Ancre River on a frontage of between seven and eight miles and at some places over a mile in depth. This was followed by the capture of Dernancourt by the British, while their patrols entered the outskirts of Albert.

The capture of Fismes, the great ammunition and supply depot, on August 4, 1918, was the most important victory won by the Allies on that date. The brilliant performance of the American troops on this occasion is described in another place.

Northwest of Rheims the Allies had pushed forward to the village of La Neuvillette, about two miles north of the Vesle. East of Fismes at several points in the neighborhood of Champigny bodies of French troops had crossed the Vesle River, and

the result of these advances was the retreat of the Germans from the southern bank.

The inability of the enemy to make a determined stand on an established line was due to the constant pounding which Foch maintained and a constant pressure that never relaxed. The big salient that had loomed so formidable a fortnight before was now almost wiped out. With British and French troops in one corner of it, Americans in the center, and British, French, and Italians in the other corner, the Germans never had an opportunity, harassed as they were on all sides, to establish themselves in positions to check the Allies' advance. So they chose the better part of valor and retreated, leaving a trail of burning villages behind them. But their flight was too hurried for them to destroy all their stores, and goods to the value of millions of dollars fell into the hands of the Allies.

The Vesle River, flooded by recent rains, hampered the retreat of the German rear guards, who, unable to cross the stream, were forced to fight for their lives. Most of them were killed and the rest were made prisoners.

On August 5, 1918, the Germans attempted to make some kind of stand on the Vesle, where their heavy guns were busy shelling the Allies' lines. In spite of this resistance French patrols succeeded in crossing the river at several points between Sermoise, east of Soissons and Fismes, and between Fismes and Muizon. The Germans on the north bank were well supplied with machine guns and bomb throwers, while their aviators, using machine guns, wrought considerable destruction among the French troops. Between Muizon and Rheims, where the French were firmly established on the south bank of the river, there was hard fighting, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the French from their positions.

In the morning of August 7, 1918, Field Marshal Haig delivered a heavy blow at the armies of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria on the southern side of the Lys salient. The British attack was launched on the front of about five miles, advancing their whole line to a depth of a thousand yards. To the south on the front east of Amiens on the Bray-Corbie road British troops recap-


tured positions which the Germans had occupied on the previous day.

Along the Vesle between Braisne and Fismes, where French and American troops held the highway which runs parallel with the river, the Germans made furious counterattacks, but failed to dislodge the Allies. Nor were they able to hinder more than temporarily the French and Americans from crossing the river on hastily constructed bridges which their engineers had thrown over the stream protected by a heavy barrage.

At daybreak, August 8, 1918, Field Marshal Haig attacked the German lines from near Albert south to Braches, on the Avre above Montdidier, with forces that included not only British, French, and Australian troops but also Canadians who had been brought up suddenly from the vicinity of Lens. The enemy, taken by surprise, were thrust back along almost the entire front of twenty-five miles, and this resulted in the capture by the Allies of over a hundred guns and more than 10,000 prisoners. The advance was between four and five miles, and at one point seven miles.

The British launched their attack in a mist, after only a few minutes of artillery preparation, and the Germans were overwhelmed in the first onrush. The British won their objectives with only nominal losses. Of an entire army corps only two officers and fifteen men of the ranks were reported as casualties. The heavy mist in the early morning when the Allies advanced favored their plans, for not until 8 o'clock did a German aeroplane appear over the line and by that time the Allies had already made important progress. In the advance, tanks and armored cars accomplished wonders, striking dismay in the ranks of the enemy as they plunged through the mists, spouting fire and destruction, sweeping on heedless of obstacles and of the concentrated attack of German guns. By noon the Germans were making desperate efforts to escape with their transports.

The quick and complete victory of the Allies on this day, August 8, 1918, proved that Foch's counteroffensive had turned the scale in their favor. From this time on, the Allies attacked and the Germans retreated.



ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES ON THE AMIENS FRONT, AUGUST 8, 1918

Moreuil and the territory adjoining Villers-aux-Erables were taken by the French while the British captured the Dodo and Hamel Woods and Marcelcave after hard fighting and occupied territory to a considerable distance beyond. Four German divisions were badly cut up in course of the struggle, while the Allies' casualties were unimportant. It was only around Morlancourt that the Germans made a determined stand. Here fighting continued throughout the day, and though the enemy launched a number of counterattacks they failed to gain or recover any ground.

Along the French front after an artillery preparation of forty-five minutes the troops made a dashing advance, and by 8 o'clock in the morning had gained their first objectives. Their advance was in the direction of Demuin and Aubercourt, while at the same time the British were thrusting forward toward Cerisy-Gailly on the south side of the Somme.

After the capture of Moreuil, where the French met with stout resistance, they crossed the Avre, a difficult operation, as they were constantly under the fierce fire of enemy guns. Once across the river their difficulties increased, for they had to advance up steep slopes from the river edge in the face of heavy German fire. They had had no help from the tanks to lead the way and break down the enemy's resistance.

Somewhat later when bridges were thrown across the stream the tanks got over, but by that time the French had succeeded in winning the top of the slopes and the enemy had fallen back.

After the Germans had been forced out of the Moreuil region their resistance became steadily weaker. The French captured all the heights together with the villages of Braches and La Neuville on the eastern bank of the Avre. On the northern portion of the battle area, where the German opposition was feebler, the advance was more rapid.

While the French and British were engaged in smashing the German forces in the west, the American and the French (as described elsewhere in these pages) were keeping up an irresistible pressure along the Vesle River.

War St. 8-B

The Allied advance east of Amiens continued on August 9, 1918, with the Anglo-French forces in possession of a line running through Pierrepont, Arvillers, Rozières, and Morcourt, marking an advance since the previous night of about five miles. Beyond this newly established line Allied cavalry and tanks had succeeded in penetrating within a mile of the important Chaulnes railway junction. In this advance the Allies captured over 17,000 prisoners and 300 guns, including railway guns of the heaviest caliber. In the Lys sector of the Flanders front the British were also successful in carrying their line forward between the Bourre and the Lawe Rivers to a maximum depth of 2,000 yards and taking possession of Locon and four other villages.

It was evident everywhere in the battle areas that the Germans were retiring in great haste, for as the Allies drove forward they found on the battle ground abandoned guns, stores, and even artillery maps and military documents. Allied observers reported streams of enemy transports and men hurrying eastward in full retreat.

A joyous spirit pervaded the ranks of the Allies as they moved victoriously forward, their cavalry rounding up villages, while tanks and armored cars overran the country clearing a way for the advance of the troops, or destroying the enemy transports. The performance of one tank is especially worthy of record, since it shot up a German corps headquarters.

Running into an enemy-held town, where the German corps headquarters staff stationed there was having luncheon, the tank opened fire through the windows, killing a number of Germans and wounding others, while a few managed to make a hurried escape. Inside the German lines a group of armored cars halted a German supply column and destroyed it. At Framerville a train loaded with Germans was attacked by a group of cars and finally set on fire.

All along the line enemy snipers were active, and isolated gun billets were a source of trouble, but these were silenced one by one as the Allies swept on. The Germans tried to destroy all their ammunition dumps and stores in their hasty flight,

but had not time to make a complete job of it, and consequently were forced to abandon vast quantities of military supplies, most of which the French and British found immediate use for. The towns captured from the Germans were inhospitable places for the most part.

The enemy had tried to destroy everything before the retirement, but the Allies' advance was so rapid that all the houses could not be dynamited. In and around most of the towns were found small holes covered with curved iron slabs where the German gunners had lived before they were killed or forced to run for their lives.

The result of the Allied advance had an important effect on the strategical situation, for the Germans were now in an uncomfortable salient with only one line of railway to supply them, and that was under fire of the Allied guns. The advance had also freed for the use of the Allies the main Paris-Amiens railway. Previous to the German retirement this line was under easy range of their guns and the Allies were unable to use it freely.

August 10, 1918, was a notable day for the French forces when Marshal Foch threw his First Army against the apex of the German salient southeast of Amiens. Montdidier was captured, and the salient was smashed in to an average depth of six miles on a thirteen-mile front, reaching a line extending from Andechy to the northeast of Montdidier to Elincourt, ten miles to the southeast. From Albert to the southern side of the Montdidier salient the whole Allied line was pushed eastward, reaching a maximum distance in the direction of Chaulnes, the principal railroad center of the Germans west of the Somme River.

The French launched their attack without any artillery preparation in the sector east of Montdidier between Courcelles-Epayelles and the Matz River. The Germans were on the alert, but the dash and suddenness of the French attack overcame their most determined efforts. In one hour after the French went forward their first objective, Ressons-sur-Matz, was won, and in the succeeding two hours they had captured Mor-

temer, Cuvilly, and Marqueglise. At some points the advance was five miles. By noon on August 10, 1918, the Germans in Montdidier found that they had been caught in the jaws of a trap. Converging French attacks from the north and south had succeeded in practically encircling the town. The French drive had also deprived the Germans from using the Montdidier-Chaulnes railway, which was the only line that supplied food and material to their fighting front at the bottom of the Montdidier pocket.

By the capture of Faverolles, which was stormed by the French the morning of August 10, 1918, the Lermans were hampered in their withdrawal of troops from Montdidier. The day closed with Von Hutier's forces in hurried retreat from the Montdidier-Noyon line.

The Allies had made their great advance with only moderate losses. The casualties including killed, wounded, and missing numbered less than 6,000, or not more an fourth of the number of prisoners taken. In the course the fighting eleven German divisions had been defeated and so badly up that a long time must elapse before they would be in a condition to be re-formed and ready for serious work.

North of the Ancre River the British had firmly established their positions and were pushing out patrols in the direction of Bray. In their advance south of the Somme they captured Warvillers, Vrely, Folies, Rozières, and Vauvillers. To the north of the Somme, where they were aided by the brilliant fighting of the Americans, Chipilly Spur was the scene of a determined struggle. After winning the Spur the Allies pressed on, driving the Germans before them. An interesting feature of the day's advance was the capture at Lihons of a complete German divisional headquarters and staff.

The Germans showed more than common ingenuity in devising traps to hinder the advance of the Allies. In many instances a large number of shells would be placed in pockets under the roads so arranged that the weight of a passing wagon or motor lorry would explode them. They also arranged barbed-wire entanglements so that attacking troops would explode mines.

but the Allies had learned through bitter experience the gentle ways of the enemy, and took effective means to render the German traps ineffective. Poisoned food and poisoned water marked the enemy's backward trail, but the Allies had long before concerted measures to protect the troops from such Teutonic pleasantries.

The Allies continued to fight their way forward during the night of August 10, 1918, and on the following day the armies of Von Hutier and Von der Marwitz were in full retreat in the direction of Péronne, Nesle, and Ham. Important rear guards were sacrificed by the Germans to secure the safety of their main armies, and it became increasingly evident that they were running out of reserves.

The Allied line on the front from Albert south to the Oise was carried forward, especially to the south, where the French were operating by themselves. During the night Haig's troops advanced their line on the high ground between Etinehem and Dernancourt. Farther south on the other side of the Somme the Germans, having received reenforcements, delivered powerful attacks against the British positions at Lihons and succeeded in making a temporary breach in the British line. In a fierce counterattack the British drove them back with heavy losses and the line was completely restored.

The capture of the Massif of Lassigny by the French on August 12, 1918, was of first importance to the Allies, for the heights command a broad sweep of difficult country and when in German hands were a formidable obstacle to the Allied advance.

German positions at Roye were now threatened on three sides—north, west, and south—as the Allies pushed their lines forward. The British gained ground to the east of Fouquescourt, while the French captured the village of Armancourt, and Tilleloy and the Bois des Loges.

The heavy guns of the Allies continued to shell the Somme bridges in the Chaulnes region which the Germans would have to cross if they were forced to evacuate this territory. South of the Somme Haig's troops captured the village of Proyart and linked up their positions east of Mericourt with those to the east of Etinehem, which is on the northern bank.

While the Allies' advance had slowed down owing to the increasing number of reserves which the Germans threw into the battle line the enemy was gradually being thrust out of the strongest positions which he had held so long.

Since the beginning of the Allied counteroffensive which began on July 18, 1918, they had captured over 70,000 prisoners, about 1,000 guns and over 10,000 machine guns.

On August 12-13, 1918, French forces under General Humbert resumed the offensive between the Matz and Oise Rivers and a drive forward was made into the German lines. East and north of Gury good progress was recorded, increasing the menace to Lassigny two miles to the northeast. The French also advanced two kilometers north of Cambronne, and eastward in the valley of the Oise, owing to continued pressure, the Germans were forced out of their trenches to the west of Bailly.

The Allied artillery had now full control of the converging roads in and out of Noyon, near the southern end of the line, notably that running northward to Ham. Under these conditions any attempt of the enemy to carry out a retrograde movement was greatly hampered.

August 13-14, 1918, the Germans began the evacuation of a five-mile front north of Albert, extending from Beaumont-Hamel northward through the villages of Serre and Puisieux-au-Mont to Bucquoy. On the French front the town of Ribécourt, six miles from Noyon and on the road to that city, was wrested from the Germans as the result of a further thrust between the Matz and Oise Rivers.

General Humbert's advance had made the French position on the southern part of the Thiescourt plateau secure. The Germans now occupied Plemont, which they captured early in the June fighting, and reoccupied their old trenches, which were still organized with wire entanglements. Here as elsewhere the Germans had the advantage that they were falling back on their supplies while the French were forced to bring theirs up through a very difficult country. General Humbert and his men had been fighting now continuously for four days, a great part of the time in gas-drenched sectors and against strongly held positions which the Germans had deemed impregnable. The French now held possession of two important crests, Claude Farm and Ecouvillon, and were within a hundred yards of Le Monolithe, another high plateau commanding a wide sweep of territory to the north and east.

All the German positions between the western outskirts of Bray and Etineham were captured by the Australians, giving the British control of the river banks southwest of Bray. The Australians after a hard and brilliant fight drove the enemy from the Cateau Wood.

On the southern end of the Picardy battle line General Humbert's army continued to press the advance toward Noyon. The desperate defense maintained by the Germans on the Chaulnes-Roye road for a time delayed French storming operations which were impending. General Rawlinson's army, which held the line to the north of the French positions, was subjected to fierce German attacks on the whole front. The enemy seemed determined to maintain his hold on the Chaulnes heights regardless of the cost. The French advance was made against a line that was thinly held, but which bristled with machine guns so numerous that there was one to every two men, it was reported. Moreover, the battle area traversed by the French troops was deluged with mustard gas, so that there were days in which they were forced to wear their masks even when snatching a few hours of repose. Yet the French continued to win dominating positions and forced the Germans back in spite of all attempts to hinder their progress.

On August 15, 1918, Australian troops under Marshal Haig made a drive against the German defenses on the center of the Somme battle front between Chaulnes and Roye and captured the villages of Parvillers and Demery. Progress was also made south of the Somme, southeast of Proyart, and to the northwest of Chaulnes. North of Albert, in the sector where the Germans were forced to evacuate their positions which projected into

the British line between Beaumont-Hamel and Bucquoy, Haig's troops continued to push forward. On General Humbert's front east of Montdidier his tireless fighters conquered two strongly fortified farms to the northwest of Ribécourt.

Albert was still strongly held by the Germans, and British patrols entering the town were fired upon from the cathedral. The steady advance of the Allies, however, so seriously menaced the German positions in and around the town that it was only a question of time when they would be forced to retire from every point of defense.

On August 16, 1918, British and French troops, operating together, made a drive against the strongly held German positions between Chaulnes and Roye. Advancing on an eight-mile front from a point west of Fransart to the neighborhood of Laucourt, they made substantial progress and reduced a number of important German strongholds. Forward movements were also made by the British in the Ancre sector in which the Germans were forced to withdraw their first-line positions, and Haig's men pushed ahead on the three-mile front between Beaucourt on the Ancre and Puisieux-au-Mont.

The capture of Ecouvillon, which made easy the capture of Ribécourt, by General Humbert's indefatigable troops, was followed by the occupation of Monolithe Farm. This gave the Third French Army a strong position from which to threaten the German line of retreat along the road to Noyon. Hardly less important was the capture by the French of "Z" Wood and Demery Wood, two heavily timbered tracts where the Germans had been holding out for days with grim determination, because of the great value of these strong positions. They commanded a wide stretch of ground, and the Allied positions for some miles on either side of the two woods were considerably strengthened by their capture. They were indeed the last of the more important positions on the new front held by the enemy. The Germans made an ineffectual attempt to recover Demery, but were driven back in disorder with heavy losses.

The Allies' plans had now made such favorable progress that a German retreat on a large scale was anticipated. The appointment of General von Boehn to the command of the German army group in the center of the present battle front strengthened this belief. For this officer was known as a "retreat specialist" who had won a deserved reputation in the art of concealing the movements of great masses of troops. It was he who had concentrated a great army and in absolute secrecy in the forests of the Laon region where he launched the surprise attack over the Chemin-des-Dames. To Von Boehn also belonged the credit of extricating the battered armies of the Crown Prince from the Aisne-Marne salient after Foch's mighty blow of July 18, 1918. Von Boehn's appearance on the Somme-Oise front was almost proof that a great German retirement was soon to begin.

#### CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES—THE FRENCH VICTORIOUS BETWEEN THE OISE AND THE AISNE—THE BRITISH WIN MILES OF TERRITORY DAILY

WITH almost monotonous regularity the daily record was now of continued Allied advancements and enemy defeats. The Germans at times offered stout resistance and launched desperate counterattacks, but they were unable to delay more than temporarily the mighty forward sweep of the Allies, while their losses in men and material reached enormous figures.

The French forces continued to fight with a dash and ardor that carried everything before them. Day and night with few chances for repose they fought on over the most difficult ground that was constantly flooded with poisonous gases.

On April 16-17, 1918, Foch's men carried out a successful attack northwest of Soissons in the Autrèches region, and operating on a three-mile front smashed through enemy positions to the depth of a mile. They won in this advance the important plateau to the north of the village of Autrèches, which gave

them command of the country extending northward, south of the Oise River. Further local actions at other points on the front greatly strengthened the grip of the Allies on the approaches to Roye to the west, north, and south. The Germans in that region maintained an incessant artillery fire, but the only effect it had was to delay for a time the Allies' advance. The French were now within a mile of Roye on two sides. British troops under Marshal Haig meanwhile were not idle. Good progress was made on the 17th to the north of Proyart, just south of the Somme. Farther to the south, troops operating north of Lihons, which lies about two miles to the west of Chaulnes, pushed their line forward to the depth of a mile. More progress was also made in the Amiens-Roye road region and to the north of the Ancre River.

West of Armentières British troops drove the Germans back on a front of four miles between Bailleul and Vieux Berquin in the Lys sector. They also captured the village of Outersteene, a mile east of Merris and took 400 prisoners. The German positions around Roye continued to be threatened by the British pressure, and on August 18, 1918, Marshal Haig's men pushed their line forward to the north of that place between Chilly and Fransart.

To the south of the Avre River the French, as they fought their way forward, captured over 400 Germans, overcoming some important enemy strongholds.

From the positions captured by the French north of the Aisne River the Allies could now dominate the German batteries of big guns at Chavigny and Juvigny, north of Soissons. These batteries were formidable, commanding not only the city of Soissons, but a wide region around. The Allies were now able to exert such pressure on the Germans here that they must soon be forced to retire and the city of Soissons would be relieved of the danger of bombardment.

Allied operations on two widely separated fronts—the British on the north of the Lys salient, and the French between the Aisne and the Oise—had increased the difficulties of the Germans in these areas.

Lassigny was seriously threatened by the capture of Fresmières (on the Roye highroad two and a half miles to the north) by the advance of Foch's troops to the western outskirts of the town, and the occupation of the Thiescourt Wood.

On the night of August 18, 1918, the French launched an attack on a front of about fifteen miles east of Ribécourt and across the Oise to Fontenoy, six miles west of Soissons. The fighting, vigorously pushed on the following day, resulted in notable gains for the Allied arms. The capture of the village of Rimprez, on the west bank of the Oise on the Noyon-Compiègne road, was followed by an advance of two miles northward to the southern edge of Dressincourt. Equally important gains were made at other points in the line of attack. The plateau west of Nampcel and Morsain and several other villages were carried by storm. In the course of the fighting the French captured over 2,000 prisoners, including several battalion commanders.

In the Lys salient the British continued the irresistible drive forward. Marshal Haig's advance was on a front of nearly six miles. His line was carried up to the town of Merville and to the north-and-south road through the town from Les Purebecques on the north to Paradis to the south.

The victories of the French troops between the Oise and the Aisne gave them possession of the Oise Valley as far as Mont Renaud. General Mangin, who carried out these successful operations, was now in a position to force the enemy to resort to desperate measures to escape a serious defeat. His artillery now commanded all roads of importance, and the only exit available for the Germans from the region of Noyon and Lassigny was a narrow-gauge line running north to Ham by way of Guiscard and the highroad running in the same direction. Von Hutier had either to check Mangin's advance, or choose this narrow outlet for extricating his troops and material. Rather than face this alternative, the Germans were offering a desperate resistance in an endeavor to hold on to their present lines, hoping against hope that something might occur that would enable them to shake off the Allies' strangle hold.

General Debeney's advance on Lassigny and Roye had slackened up owing to the stout opposition offered by the enemy, but he continued to make steady progress.

In the early morning of August 20, 1918, General Mangin began an operation between the Aisne and the Oise southeast of Noyon and northwest of Soissons that achieved a splendid success. Striking on a fifteen-and-a-half-mile front he smashed into the German line to an average depth of two and a half miles, capturing seven towns and over 8,000 prisoners.

By these operations General Mangin wrested from the Germans at Cuts and Mont de Choissy all the heights remaining south of the Oise in that region. The French batteries now commanded a wide sweep of territory and most of the important roads. General Mangin's right, firmly established on the heights around Fontenoy, now began to drive the enemy from the elevated ground south of the Oise, leaving them no option but to cross the river, or retreat toward the east. The Germans fought desperately to hold their ground, relying principally on their vast number of machine guns. During the night, in anticipation of General Mangin's attacks, they had received reenforcements brought up from the Soissons front in motor lorries to help meet the shock of the French troops. They fought with dogged determination, but from the start their position was hopeless. Their artillery fire was of the feeblest and they had practically no help from airplanes.

Continuing their attacks in the region northwest of Soissons, General Mangin's troops captured Lassigny. The advance, made over a front of fifteen miles, smashed the German lines at some points to the depth of five miles. To the southeast of Lassigny, by winning a foothold in Plemont, the French menaced the Germans' grip on the valley of Divette. Across the Oise and farther east, Mangin's men had reached the river from the south between Sempigny and Pontoise. In the conquered territory, won in less than twenty-four hours, the Germans were driven from twenty villages.

While the French were driving the Germans before them and winning wide stretches of territory, the Third British Army under General Sir Julian Byng was adding to the glory of British arms. Under cover of a heavy fog, General Byng attacked on a ten-mile front from the Ancre River to the neighborhood of Moyenville, driving back the enemy along the whole line and gaining at some points ground to the depth of two miles. General von Below's Seventeenth Army, which the British fought against, was badly cut up; their losses in guns and men were so heavy as to suggest that the German morale was crumbling, and that their fighting power was rapidly disintegrating.

It was just at daybreak that the British big guns began the overture that preceded the attack. The fog was so dense that the men in the tanks could not see more than a hundred feet ahead, but it was favorable to the assaulting formations as it served to shield their movements from the enemy observers. The German guns replied only feebly, showing that they were short of heavy cannon, a fact that had been noted before in recent fighting in this region. Their chief dependence on this occasion was in machine guns, with which they seemed to be exceedingly supplied. Situated in isolated posts, these did effective work, and there was sharp fighting at various points. The German garrison occupying the shell-shattered ruins of what had been the village of Courcelles, near the center of the battle front, made a stubborn resistance, and for a time the advance of the British infantry was held up at this point. With the arrival on the scene of a drove of tanks. German resistance broke down. The machine-gun nests were quickly smashed, and the gunners killed or made prisoners; and wherever there was resistance the tanks quickly crushed out all desire of the enemy to continue the fight.

Engaged in this advance were tanks of various types, and all found their work cut out for them. The big tanks smashed in the enemy defenses, dipped in and out of shell holes and performed all the heavy work, while the small whippet tanks and armored cars dashed around at high speed attacking gun nests from the rear and clearing the way for the advance of the infantry. Despite the vigorous resistance offered by the Ger-

mans at some points, the British losses in casualties were comparatively small, and some formations met with none at all. The village of Beaucourt was won with only three casualties.

When the fog lifted about noon, and the sun shone out, the Germans attempted several counterattacks, but were unable to force the British to relinquish a foot of the territory they had gained.

In the morning of August 22, 1918, the British delivered a new attack on a six-mile front between Albert and Bray on the Somme, which was entirely successful, all objectives being won and an advance made of two miles. The important town of Albert was captured and 1,400 prisoners and a large number of cannon. North of the Ancre the battle raged throughout the day, and the Germans were forced to fall back all along the line. Isolated counterattacks were attempted, but they crumbled beneath the hammer blows of the British armies. There was hard fighting along the Arras-Albert railway embankment for the valuable positions that overlook the flat country around. To the south from Achiet-le-Grand to the Ancre the opposing armies swept back and forth in attacks and counterattacks again and again renewed. At Achiet-le-Grand and Miraumont, where the Germans launched their most ambitious counterattacks, they employed fresh troops that had been rushed forward from other sectors to relieve Von Below's hard-pressed Seventeenth Army.

During August 21-22, 1918, the French Third and Fourth Armies under General Mangin continued to press their advance night and day along the front from Lassigny to the north of Soissons. At some points an advance of seven miles was made, and there was evidence that the Germans were so badly mauled that their retreat amounted practically to a rout.

The French push toward the roads leading to Chauny menaced the enemy's line of retirement and explained his hurried retreat. By the capture of Bouguignon, St. Paul-aux-Bois, and Quincy the French had won command of the valley of the Ailette from the region of Coucy-le-Château to the Oise. General Humbert's troops also made notable gains and wrested important

positions from the enemy. By the occupation of the height of Plemont and the capture of Thiescourt the French now held all the kills known as the Thiescourt Massif, thus giving them the strongest points overlooking the region around.

It was evident in different parts of the fighting area that the Germans were in a confused and even panic-stricken state of mind. The French advance guard was so close to them when they crossed the Oise that they had not time to destroy the bridges over the river. Allied observers noted streams of enemy transports in wild confusion back of the fighting front, and all discipline and order seemed to have been lost. Upon the Allette front the sudden attack of the French caused the hasty retreat of a division of German reserves which had been brought forward to launch a counterattack. Falling back, this division precipitated a panic in the ranks of another division which had intended to support the first division's attack, and the result was a confused and disorderly retreat.

Marshal Foch's plan to give the enemy no rest day or night, and to follow up each blow by another, a plan which had resulted in great victories for the Allies and constant demoralization of the forces of the enemy, continued to be the order of the day. The British, operating on a thirty-mile front, unceasingly hammered Crown Prince Rupprecht's armies, striking suddenly at different points, and always advancing in spite of the most determined opposition. The Third and Fourth British Armies under Generals Byng and Rawlinson made important gains on August 22-23, 1918. It was a day of disaster for the Germans, whose desperate attempts to check the British advance resulted only in frightful losses of men and accomplished nothing. Prince Rupprecht sacrificed his troops recklessly in an effort to stave off the inevitable. The British gums swept the Germans from the field, or crushed them as they tried to force their way forward. One entire German battalion was annihilated during the fighting. General Byng made an advance of two miles to the neighborhood of Grandcourt, east of the Ancre. Gomiecourt and four other villages were carried by storm. To the north the British captured Achiet-le-Grand,

which is on the Arras-Albert railroad, and for the possession of which Germans and British had been fighting for some days past.

Field Marshal Haig's armies continued to deal the German forces staggering blows as they drove forward. Bray, on the northern bank of the Somme, was captured on August 23, 1918. Thiepval, a strong position on high ground and which dominated miles of territory, was occupied by British forces after a hard struggle and against the concentrated fire of countless machine guns. Miraumont, in the center of the battle front and to which the Germans clung with desperate energy, was now surrounded on all sides and its fall was only a question of a few hours. The British were now driving ahead in the direction of Bapaume, and on the 28d occupied a small town on the outskirts. Croisilles, north of Mory, some miles east of the Arras-Bapaume road, was also won, marking the extreme point of the British advance for the day in the northern battle zone.

North of the river Scarpe the fighting was intense. The British, despite stiff opposition, penetrated the old German line and made important gains when they attacked Givenchy. The Germans fought bravely, contesting every yard of ground, but it was a losing battle, and the field was littered thickly with their dead. They had brought up new divisions that were thrown into the fight, but the reenforcements were unable to check, except temporarily, the Allies' continuous push forward.

On the French front General Mangin's troops had crossed the Oise and reached the outskirts of the village of Morlincourt, a mile and a quarter from the railway station of Noyon. The fall of that place within a short time was inevitable.

The French advance on the Soissons end of the battle front proceeded more slowly, but the forward movement was not arrested. Their operations in this region threatened the turning of both the Chemin-des-Dames and the German positions on the Vesle. On August 23, 1918, General Mangin's troops had won the greater part of the Juvigny Plateau, which brought them to the edge of the battle field of 1917. To the north lay



Admiral Sir David Beatty (at the right) the British naval commander who received the final German surrender. He is chatting with Admiral Sir Hugh Evans, just knighted by the King



the Ailette Valley. Eight miles eastward was Laffaux Mill and the beginning of the Chemin-des-Dames, familiar landmarks and the scene of intense fighting in the previous year.

On the battle front north of the Somme the British armies continued to advance in the face of heavy resistance from the Germans, who had been strongly reenforced in the course of the past twenty-four hours (August 24-25, 1918). Haig's troops had captured a dozen villages and carried their new front within a thousand yards of the old Hindenburg Line. From Albert to Bapaume, the whole length of the highroad was now in British hands. East of Bray Australian troops carried important heights in possession of the enemy. North of Bapaume the villages of Sapignies and Behagnies, which formed part of the defenses of the town, were taken by British troops. The Germans, as they retired, left great quantities of stores, equipment and military supplies on the field. They destroyed what they could, but a vast amount fell to the victors.

Since August 21, 1918, the British had captured over 17,000 prisoners and a great number of cannon and machine guns.

The British advance owed much of its success to the wonderful service performed by the motor cars, which did scout work far in advance of the infantry. They continued throughout the fighting to harass the enemy and strike confusion in his ranks, falling upon transport columns and inflicting terrible damage. They attacked retreating bodies of Germans and mowed them down with machine guns, and were everywhere active factors in the demoralization of the enemy. The tanks cooperating with the armored cars were no less effective. Breaking the way for the advancing troops they rolled into the towns and cleaned out the strong points under floods of fire. The Germans never lost their fear of the tanks and it was not unusual during the British advance for large bodies to surrender as soon as one of the grim-looking monsters lumbered into view.

An interesting incident in connection with the capture of Thiepval Ridge is related, when a British detachment was saved by an aeroplane. This detachment, pressing forward too fast, found itself out of touch with the main body and was War St. 8—C

suddenly surrounded by Germans. An observer in the air noted their predicament and dropped a message "Stick it out." He then notified the British command and troops were rushed to the rescue, and the Germans were driven off.

German prisoners captured when Miraumont fell said that they had been three days without food. All seemed happy that they were out of the war, especially the Alsatians who had been placed in German regiments.

"If any of us are caught deserting," said an Alsatian prisoner, "his family is punished, and even his female relatives are sent to dig in the front-line and other trenches."

In the course of this British drive forty-two German divisions had suffered heavy losses; 40,000 soldiers and several hundred officers in prisoners alone.

On August 25, 1918, the troops of the Third French Army, fighting in water up to their waists in the marshes along the Avre, captured two of the strongest defenses of Roye. The first attack was made on the village of Fresnoy, two and a half miles to the north of Roye, where the Germans had restored their old fortifications of 1914-17, and had filled the neighborhood with machine-gun nests. After a brief artillery preparation the French stormed the concrete blockhouses and killed the gunners serving their pieces. Fresnoy was a notable stronghold and one of the centers of German resistance around Roye from which they had launched their counterattacks in attempts to check the advance. The Germans had orders to hold the place at any cost, but the French attacking from the north and south simultaneously bore down all resistance. Four hundred prisoners, including sixteen officers, were captured in the town. Another strong outpost of Roye, the village of St. Mard in the marshes of the Avre, was won by General Debeney's men in the afternoon after a violent struggle. The Germans had surrounded their concrete blockhouses with water let in from the Avre and through the floods in the face of intense machine-gun fire the French had to force their way to capture the position.

Roye was now invested from the north, west and south, and the German hold on the place was slowly weakened. North of Soissons, on the far right of the French line, the Germans renewed their efforts against the line from Pont-St. Mard to Juvigny. They were thrown back everywhere, the French making new gains and occupying Domaine Wood.

On the same day, while the French were making progress against heavy odds, British troops were in battle on a thirty-mile front, from the river Scarpe at a point east of Arras to Lihons south of the Somme, crossing the Hindenburg line on the northern sector of their attack. Canadians captured the villages of Wancourt and Monchy-le-Preux which formed part of the famous German defense, and they continued to make progress in an easterly direction. Scottish troops, driving forward on the north bank of the Scarpe, reached the outskirts of Roeux, north of Monchy-le-Preux.

General Debeney's First Army, after crushing the Germans in their battle positions around Roye, captured the town and continued pursuing the enemy who were retreating on a line from Hallu to the region south of Roye. The French advance was made on a twelve-mile front, and territory was gained to a depth of two and a half miles, the Germans being forced back on both sides of the Avre River.

By encircling tactics the French smashed the numerous machine-gun nests that were the backbone of the defense. One after another heavily fortified positions were turned and the Germans were forced to surrender the first and then the second line of defenses of 1914, to which they had retreated after being driven out of Montdidier.

The second German line was broken in the morning of August 26, 1918, when the French infantry, after repulsing a counterattack at St. Mard, encircled Roye and drove the enemy back some miles east of the town.

The British continued their attacks eastward along the southern bank of the Scarpe, occupying a considerable portion of the Hindenburg line and Chérisy, Vis-en-Artois, and the Bois du Sart, an advance of nearly four miles. In the night Canadians and Scottish troops carried Roeux and Fontaine-les-Croisilles, and the slopes around. North of the Scarpe,

Gavrelle was occupied, and farther south between Croisilles and Bapaume New Zealanders and English, crushing heavy attacks by German reenforcements, continued to make good progress.

Bapaume was now farther threatened by this extension of the British attack to the north. The Germans had been forced back to the north of the city and their counterattacks on the south had utterly broken down. The capture of Montauban by the British marked an advance of two miles in twenty-four hours. Bazentin-le-Grand, southwest of Bapaume, was also occupied by Marshal Haig's men. This place lies a little to the west of the highroad from Bapaume to the Somme and its capture made the German hold in the region increasingly difficult. Bapaume was now being gradually surrounded by the Allies, and its fall was only a question of time.

During August 27-28, 1918, the French continued to drive the Germans before them on the whole front from Chaulnes to the Oise. In less than twenty-four hours General Humbert's troops made an advance of eight miles through a difficult country of woods, hills, and ravines west of Noyon. Mont Renaud, a famous stronghold commanding the Oise Valley, was carried by storm. Pushing on to the gates of Noyon the French surrounded the last bastion, Poqueri-Court Hill.

The capture of Chaulnes further precipitated the German retreat north of the Avre River. The French engaged in close pursuit of the foe, whom they continued to harass with mustard-gas shells the Germans left behind, and which were being fired from German guns by French gunners. In the course of the night General Debeney's troops advanced four and a half miles, and by morning were on the outskirts of Nesle, close on the heels of the retreating foe.

After the fall of Chaulnes, Gomiecourt to the north and Sept Fours and a score of other villages were captured.

The territory abandoned by the Germans in the retreat presented scenes of desolation and ruin unsurpassed since the war began. The names of towns had no longer any significance but as geographical designations. As places of habitation they had

ceased to exist, and even their sites were difficult to recognize. The cemeteries were blown up and ruined and the contents of the graves scattered. At Roye and other towns the Germans had carefully filled the ruins with mustard gas which for a time prevented the Allies from occupying these places.

Croisilles, the strong German position to the north of Bapaume, which had long held out against British attacks, was captured by a flanking movement by Haig's men on August 27, 1918. Further gains were made at all points on the battle line between Bapaume and the river Scarpe. North of the Arras-Cambrai road the Canadians captured the villages of Boiry and Pelves. On the north bank of the Somme British troops occupied Curly and Hardecourt, and drove forward in the direction of Maurepas. South of the river, Australians in an advance of between four and five miles were on their way to the crossings of the Somme at Péronne and Brie, encountering hard resistance from the Germans as they pushed on.

A large German force was brought up to attack the British positions east of Monchy. According to the statements of prisoners, some of the German companies at the last moment refused to fight, and the others were forced to go ahead without them. For tactical reasons the British withdrew a few hundred yards and then organized an attack that drove the Germans from the field, and they were seen no more that day. According to an eyewitness the ground in this region was in parts literally carpeted with bodies in field gray.

The total captures of the Allies on the western front since July 18, 1918, were now over 120,000 prisoners and over 2,000 guns. The British captured between August 21, 1918, and August 26, 1918, more than 21,000 prisoners of all ranks, and their own losses in killed, wounded, and missing during this period was only slightly in excess of this number. Since August 8, 1918, the British captures exceeded 47,000 officers and men, and over 600 guns.

It was evidently the purpose of the Germans at this stage to retire to a shorter line on the western front where they could obtain better defensive positions against the Allies' blows, and so economize their forces. The rapid advance of the British on both sides of the Scarpe, which threatened to flank the entire Hindenburg position, was a serious obstacle in the way of the Germans carrying out their plan.

## CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH TAKE NOYON—THE BRITISH
BAPAUME AND PERONNE—THE ALLIES
CONQUER ON EVERY FRONT

NOYON, the important German stronghold at the peak of the Oise Canal du Nord salient, was captured by General Humbert's troops after heavy fighting on August 29, 1918. Continuing to drive forward, French forces obtained a grip on the southern slopes of Mont St. Simeon to the east, the strongest German position remaining in that sector. About the same time another French army under General Mangin had forced a crossing of the Oise at Morlincourt and captured Landrimont. North of Noyon a third French army under General Debeney took Quesnoy Wood, which narrowed the pocket from the western side and brought the French within shelling distance of the main road leading out of it in the direction of Ham.

The attempt of the Germans to stem the French pursuit by fighting rear-guard actions with machine-gun sections was only locally successful. On favorable ground it succeeded in delaying the advance, but the fast drive of the French advance guard forced the enemy to risk an engagement with strong forces, or hasten his retreat. The Germans chose the latter alternative and fled along the road leading to St. Quentin, La Fère, and the Hindenburg line.

The continued pressure of Humbert's army from the west, and Mangin's troops which crossed the Oise from the south and took Morlincourt while another French contingent was entering Noyon, further added to the difficulties of the enemy, and threatened General von Hutier's army with disaster.

Bapaume, which for several days had been surrounded by British forces, was occupied on August 29, 1918, and the Germans were in full retreat, trying to get away behind their rear guards before they were caught and annihilated. North of the Scarpe River, beyond Arras, and across the old Somme battle fields by Ginchy, Guillemont, and Morval, British troops were pushing on, and in the Australian fighting zone by Feuillières and Belloy above the Somme the enemy was fleeing in wild haste, leaving vast stores of guns and ammunition behind. The German rear guards maintained at times a fierce resistance to gain time for an orderly retreat and delay the capture of Péronne until the enormous stores there could be removed. From Bapaume and Bullecourt to the north of the Arras-Cambrai road the German army was swiftly disappearing from all the country west of the Somme and from the battle fields beyond Delville Wood. The same British soldiers now driving forward on the heels of the retreating foe were in March falling back over the same ground when the Germans had overwhelming numbers in their favor.

The French armies during August 29-30, 1918, continued to make important strategic gains. Among the most notable was the occupation of Mont St. Simeon, a height which protected the German flank, a great natural rampart on which the enemy relied for protection during his retreat before the attacks of Generals Debeney and Rawlinson.

East, and northeast of Bapaume, the British forces continued to go forward and gain ground. At Bullecourt on the Hindenburg Line and at Hendecourt to the east of the line the advance was held up by the strong German counterattacks. These places, which had been captured by the British on August 29, 1918, became untenable under the enemy assaults and Marshal Haig's troops were forced to withdraw to the west of them.

At other points good progress was made, the British capturing several villages on the Arras-Bapaume front while they

advanced their line both on the Arras-Cambrai and the Bapaume-Cambrai roads. Farther to the south the British to the north of the Somme went forward in the direction of Péronne, taking Combles and Cléry. By these operations they had completely freed the country south and west of the Somme of the Germans. The last of the enemy were driven behind the river in the morning of August 30, 1918.

On the last day of the month Australian troops in a valorous charge stormed Mont St. Quentin and Feuilleucourt to the north of Péronne, capturing 1,500 Germans by the operation. The seizure of an important height near St. Quentin village gave the British a commanding position to threaten Péronne, and it was inevitable that the fall of that place could not be long delayed.

While the Australians were closely engaged near Péronne a contingent of English troops on the left captured Marrières Wood and high ground farther north of the Péronne-Bapaume road. At various points between Kemmel and Béthune the Germans were in retreat, and the British gained considerable ground. Bailleul was now in British hands, and their patrols had gained a foothold on Mont de Lille. Advances were also made to the east of La Couture and Veille Chapelle, and on the Scherpenberg from southwest of Ypres the British crossed old enemy trenches without meeting any opposition.

Péronne, the German stronghold on the great bend of the Somme River, was captured in a brilliant attack made by the Australians on September 1, 1918. It was inevitable after the occupation of Mont St. Quentin on the day before by these same valorous troops that the town must soon be abandoned by the Germans, but it was owing to the quick action of the Australians that they were forced out so soon. Owing to the admirable work performed by English engineers at the river crossings the Australians were able to move their guns forward over the Somme and fire at close range on the enemy. Cooperating with the Australians, London troops captured Bouchavesnes, four miles to the north of Péronne, and Rancourt, both villages on the road to Bapaume. Over 2,000 prisoners were

taken in these operations. Farther to the north the Germans fled before the British approach, evacuating several villages to the south of Bapaume.

To the northeast of this place, astride the Hindenburg line, the enemy offered strong opposition, but the British crushed every attack and won the much-fought-over ruins of Bullecourt and Hendecourt.

In the Lys salient it was much the same story, the Germans continuing to retreat and the British to pursue. In the course of twenty-four hours' fighting Haig's troops gained about two miles on a front of twenty miles. The British had now reached the outskirts of Lens, where large fires were seen burning, an indication of further German retirement.

The British had every reason to feel proud of their achievements in August, 1918, for in addition to the large territory won from the enemy they captured in that month 57,318 prisoners, 657 guns, more than 5,790 machine guns, and over 1,000 trench mortars, besides a vast quantity of stores and war material of every description.

North and south of the Aillette River, General Mangin's troops made further advances, on the first day of the month capturing Crécy-au-Mont on the southern bank, and gaining a firm hold west of Coucy-le-Château. A few miles to the south the French stormed the town of Leury and took more than 1,000 prisoners. Two miles northeast of Nesle, Rouy-le-Petit was occupied, and other French forces crossed the Somme Canal at Epénancourt seven miles south of Péronne.

One of the most notable achievements of the British advance was carrying the famous Quéant-Drocourt "switch line" on September 1-2, 1918. This strongly fortified stretch of trenches was won by English, Scottish, and Canadian troops on a front of about six miles. The Germans considered this one of their strongest positions and made desperate efforts to hold it, but were unable to hold back the impetuous drive of the British forces, which were in high spirits over their almost continuous victories. The fighting became fast and furious, and the Germans rushed forward reenforcements, but it was a losing game

for them from the first and their losses were appalling. The British captured thousands of prisoners; the roads to the rear of the fighting front were jammed with them. In parts of the battle field bodies in field-gray lay in piles.

The Canadians, whose attack was made astride the road from Arras to Cambrai, captured the villages of Dury, Cagnicourt, and Villers-les-Cagnicourt, the last place being four miles beyond the point from which the attack was launched.

The left wing of the attacking forces, composed of English troops, drove a wedge in the German defenses northeast of Eterpigny, while the right composed of English and Scottish troops driving forward in the direction of Quéant captured a string of strongly fortified positions including the village of Noreuil. Southward to a point beyond Péronne the tide of battle swept, the British capturing towns and villages and always advancing. On the Lys front it was the same story, the Germans in retreat, the British in close pursuit. They took Neuve Eglise, a place not forgotten in former fights, and pushed their line forward to the east of Estaires.

American troops after the capture of Voormezeele in Flanders advanced from that village and linked up with the British in close pursuit of the German rear guards. The French, pushing forward north of Soissons, noted great fires in the direction of Vauxaillon, indicating that the enemy was burning his supplies previous to retirement. They had now completed the conquest of the Soissons Plateau and the Germans were forced to retire to the Chemin-des-Dames, which was already threatened by the French advance toward Vauxaillon.

Field Marshal Haig's troops continued their victorious advance on September 3, 1918, gaining Baralle, eight miles from Cambrai, crossing the Drocourt-Quéant line and forcing the Germans to retire in haste to the Canal du Nord. They carried by storm Quéant, and thirteen other villages were taken on a twenty-mile front, which attained a maximum depth of six miles. In the course of these operations the British took over 10,000 prisoners. Their outposts had now been pushed forward to the outskirts of Lens.

On the following day the eastward sweep of British troops north of Péronne continued. On a front of about fifteen miles northward from Moislains they forced a crossing of the Canal du Nord and made substantial progress eastward.

Meanwhile north of the Vesle on a front of nearly twenty miles the German armies were in full retreat before the advance of Franco-American armies.

Simultaneously the French were making important gains northeast of Noyon, and were driving the Germans before them in the territory between the Canal du Nord and the Oise.

French armies continued to drive the Germans before them in southern Picardy, cooperating with the Americans in the territory between the Vesle and Aisne Rivers. At some points the French advanced their line seven miles and captured on the way some thirty villages. They crossed the Somme Canal and pressed forward in the direction of Ham with its roads leading to St. Quentin and La Fère. By the capture of Coucy-le-Château to the south and neighboring towns they threatened the German defenses of the Chemin-des-Dames. North of the Vesle, where the Americans were taking part in the advance, the Allied line was pushed to the southern bank of the Aisne on a front of more than eight miles.

On September 5-6, 1918, the French, with the Americans cooperating, continued to press on at the heels of the retreating Germans. From the posts of the Americans on the Aisne to the breaches in the Hindenburg line north of Cambrai, on a front of more than ninety miles, the Allies pushed the advance. The drive southeast from the Somme resulted in the capture of the important juncture point of Ham and Chauny. North of the Aisne they occupied all the old trenches along the front and threatened the German hold on the Chemin-des-Dames.

The British armies, linking up with the French advancing on Ham, and into the territory to the south, continued their forward movement eastward from the Somme. From this river, south of Péronne, the troops of Field Marshal Haig had penetrated German positions about seven miles on a twelve-mile front and occupied six important villages.

Vast supplies of coal and road-building material were captured during this advance, which offered conclusive proof that the Germans had planned to hold all winter the line from which they had been driven.

Sporadic attempts were made by the enemy to hold up the British drive, but their troops developed no staying power and their attacks generally broke down after the failure of the first fierce onslaught. Haig's warriors had now entered the old defense system which they had held before the beginning of the great German offensive in March, 1918.

The French continued to make good progress in their advance along the banks of the St. Quentin Canal north of the Somme, capturing Hamel and three other villages to the west of it. South of the Somme they encountered heavy resistance. The village of Avesnes which they had won was retaken by the Germans, but after a hard struggle it remained in French hands.

Progress was also made on both sides of the Oise, the French advancing within two miles of La Fère to the northern edge of the forest of St. Gobain, which forms the western defense of the Laon region. The Massif of St. Gobain formed the pivot of the German system, whose importance was only comparable to that of Cambrai for British operations.

One great factor which aided materially in the advance of the Allies was the great increase in their engines of offense, whether in armored cars, tanks, Stokes guns, or great cannon, that could smash whole blocks of defense at one shot. The French were now supplied with howitzers of twenty-one inch caliber whose shell, over six feet long, could wreck a dozen batteries in a protected ravine, or wipe out an entire regiment hidden in an apparently impenetrable cave.

So far the first part of Marshal Foch's program had been accomplished. The Germans had been driven back along the whole line from Arras to Rheims, and had practically lost all ground won in their four great drives which began on March 21, 1918, and ended on July 18, 1918, when Foch dealt a smashing blow on their flank between the Marne and the Aisne.

During September 9-10, 1918, in spite of heavy rainstorms which halted Haig's men to provide shelters on recovered ground, the British advanced their line nearer Cambrai, fighting off strong German attacks in that region. Meanwhile the French gained three and a half miles, and occupied positions near St. Quentin on three sides. This new dash brought them nearer the flanking of La Fère on the north and south.

September 12, 1918, was a memorable day in the history of the American Army in France when under command of General Pershing they launched an attack from all sides of the St. Mihiel salient that resulted in the capture of the town of that name and over 13,000 prisoners. (A detailed description of this operation will be found in another place.)

All day, September 12, 1918, and far into the night, the fight was continuous on the British front, when the heights of Avrincourt were stormed and positions won that overlooked the German defenses for many miles. Further progress was made in the Havrincourt region during September 13-14, 1918, where to the southeast of Cambrai the British established posts east and north of the village of Havrincourt. General Pétain meanwhile had launched an attack on an eleven-mile front on both sides of the Ailette River between the Aisne and the Vesle, advancing his line to a distance of two miles at the farthest point and capturing over 1,000 prisoners. This French drive was of special importance, for it threatened to turn the flank of the German defensive positions on the Chemin-des-Dames, and weakened the enemy's hold on Laon. South of the Ailette the French won the famous Mont des Singes, and the villages of Allemant and Sanoy.

In the morning of September 14, 1918, General Mangin's troops struck a new blow at the German salient north of Soissons. The French advance was so rapid that at one point a German colonel and his entire staff were captured. The taking of Laffaux Mill, a point of vital importance to the enemy, meant the gain of a valuable portion of the Hindenburg line. The Germans made a desperate effort to maintain their hold on this position, but in spite of their employment of strong reserves

they were unable to delay more than a short time the French advance. On General Mangin's right, the Mennejean Farm was the scene of the most stubborn fighting during the day. The Germans had transformed every shell crater into miniature forts and machine-gun nests which had to be overcome one by one by grenade fighting of the fiercest description. But the Germans failed everywhere to check the French, who by noon had carried the entire position and bagged over 2,500 prisoners.

After the capture of Havrincourt and neighboring towns by the British, followed by counterattacks which were everywhere repulsed, there was no important infantry action attempted and the Germans settled down to shelling the line.

British and French troops in coordinated operations on a twenty-two-mile front advanced their lines on the outlying defenses of St. Quentin on September 18, 1918. The British attack was made by English, Irish, Scottish, and Australian troops on a sixteen-mile front to the northwest of the city and resulted in the capture of over 6,000 prisoners and the occupation of ten villages and outer defenses of the Hindenburg line in wide sectors. The push was made in the midst of a pouring rain and the Germans offered strong resistance, but the British, elated with victory, drove forward and crushed all opposition.

While the British were driving ahead, the French on their immediate right attacked and advanced their lines a mile and a quarter on a six-mile front, reaching the western outskirts of Francilly-Silency, three miles west of St. Quentin, and the southern edge of Contescourt, four miles southwest of that city, marking their nearest approaches to the German base. During the night of September 18, 1918, the British continued to drive forward into the Hindenburg outposts northwest of St. Quentin, repturing the village of Lempire and Gauche Wood. In the course of two days' fighting in this region the British captured 10,000 prisoners and over sixty guns.

Late in the day of September 18, 1918, the Germans counterattacked on a wide front west of Cambrai between Gouzeaucourt and the Arras-Cambrai road. Starting off with a bombardment of great intensity they launched an infantry attack northward from Trescault, but were repulsed at all points with heavy losses. North of Mœuvres, the Sixth German Division, under cover of a heavy barrage, and while forty German batteries were at work, made a determined attack on the British positions. Though their lines were torn and formations shattered by the British field batteries and the steady machine-gun and rifle fire, they still pressed forward, climbing over the bodies of their dead. At a tragic cost of life a few of the advanced British positions were penetrated, but before the end of the day after a stubborn struggle they were expelled and the British reoccupied the positions.

The fighting here had been costly for the British as well as for the foe. The Germans displayed complete disregard for life and demonstrated a spirit of initiative that was quite unusual. German machine gunners established themselves in some derelict British tanks which they transformed into forts, sweeping the area around with machine-gun bullets that wrought considerable destruction. Groups of German machine gunners in other parts of the field, and aided by some infantry, established themselves in wrecked villages, in woods, and earthworks, and in old trench systems, where the British line of advance passed just beyond them. Other British troops following the first waves suffered considerably from the attacks of these independent fighters. It was necessary to mop up each isolated post before the advance could be continued.

The French meanwhile had been pushing their lines closer to St. Quentin from the south and the southwest. During the night of September 18-19, 1918, they fought their way into Contescourt, which lies four miles to the southwest of St. Quentin, and in the morning occupied Castres, about half a mile to the northeast. Farther east and south they advanced to the outskirts of Benay, a town six miles south of the city.

The strongly fortified village of Mœuvres, seven miles west of Cambrai, which had been the scene of intense fighting for some days, was captured by the British in the morning of September 20, 1918. The Germans fought stubbornly to hold the village, which with its covering positions consisted of a solid

mass of trenches and dugouts covering a square mile of ground. It was the junction of the main and support Hindenburg line and the most formidable obstacle that the British encountered anywhere in that defensive system.

The occupation by the British of a series of redoubts around the Malassise Farm brought their line nearer to the St. Quentin Canal at Vendhuile. Only three fortified villages now remained in German hands on the battle front between Villers-Guislain and the defenses of St. Quentin. With the capture of Ronssoy by English County troops, Lempire, a village one mile to the north, was completely cleared of the enemy. The Germans were now clinging to strong positions in ravines, quarries, and ditches between Lempire and Villers-Guislain, but they had suffered so severely in recent counterattacks that they attempted no more.

In the course of operations on September 21 and 22, 1918, advances were made by English troops east of Epihy, and the Australians near Hargicourt made new inroads into the outer defenses of the Hindenburg line northwest of St. Quentin. The most extensive gain was made north of the Scarpe River, where the Germans were thrown back on a two-mile front.

South of Villers-Guislain, and to the right of this sector, the Germans launched a powerful counterattack which was crushed by the British, who flung the enemy back and took advantage of the opportunity to carry forward their line.

On the French front in spite of increased enemy resistance substantial gains were made daily. By the capture of the woods north of Lys-Fontaine the Germans were forced to evacuate Vendhuile to escape being cornered there with their backs to the river Oise. General Debeney's troops now held all the west bank of the Oise for more than half the distance from La Fère to Moy. The French had now reached the heavy, marshy country south of the valley of the Oise, which offered great difficulties to any troops that might attempt a crossing north of La Fère.

Debeney's men continued to advance all day September 22, 1918, toward the La Fère road south of St. Quentin, and as they

approached nearer the Hindenburg line around that place the Germans made determined efforts to keep them from it. North of the Somme they were hurriedly organizing a defensive system on a line of heights running parallel to the Hindenburg positions from east of Holnon to Hill 23, and thence through Hill 138 east of Savy Wood to Dallon Height on the road from Ham to St. Quentin.

South of the Somme the French advanced into a defense line parallel to the Hindenburg positions, by winning a height northeast of Castres, the line of ridges connecting Urvillers and Cerizy and the spur that dominates Mayot from the west.

British and French troops on September 24, 1918, attacking on adjacent fronts totaling about seven miles, made advances that tightened their grip on St. Quentin from the northwest, west, and southwest.

By the capture of Pontruet, Marshal Haig's troops had now advanced within three-quarters of a mile of important defenses of the Hindenburg line at the bend of St. Quentin Canal. On the right wing of the British, the French took Francilly-Silency, Dallon, and other villages which, with the British occupation of the high ground west of Fayot, gave the Allies a line of positions lying in a five-mile arc of a circle with a radius of less than three miles from the center at St. Quentin.

General Gouraud's troops attacking the German positions in the Champagne on September 26, 1918, won their first objectives within a few hours, and took Serven which had been in the hands of the enemy since 1914. Gouraud's troops also occupied the high ground positions of the Butte de Mesnil and the Navarin Farm. The abandonment by the Germans of strong positions which they had held for a long time, and had made as impregnable as human ingenuity could devise, demonstrated that they were in a panicky and nervous state of mind.

The Third and Fourth British Armies under General Sir Henry Horne and Sir Julian Byng made an attack before daybreak on September 27, 1918, on a wide front toward Cambrai, and were successful in carrying all their objectives. The principal attack was on a front of fourteen miles, and resulted in War St. 8—D

the winning of German positions of great strength. On the north of the main attack the British captured Beaucamp, and drove the enemy from the ridge toward Marcoing. Arleuxen-Gohelle on the extreme left was occupied, and in operations north and south of the Sensée and Scarpe Rivers the towns of Sauchy-Lestrées and Sauchy-Cauchy were captured.

The troops of General Haldane on the right center carried out a successful operation, breaking through the German defenses east of Havrincourt, capturing Flesquières and a long spur running eastward from that village toward Marcoing. In the direction of Fontaine Notre Dame the British in this region had pushed forward to within three miles of Cambrai. In the course of these operations over 6,000 prisoners were captured. The Germans had engaged on this battle front nine divisions, or about 122,000 men.

The British were now in a good position to capture Cambrai. Even at this stage of the struggle the Germans could not use the town, for the roads, railway, and junction were all under the fire of the British guns.

French troops on the battle line east of Rheims continued their advance on September 27, 1918. In the two days' fighting on this front they took over 10,000 prisoners, enormous quantities of war material, and had moved their line ahead at some points a distance of five miles.

On the first day of the battle Gouraud's men recaptured all the positions abandoned July 15, 1918, and then stormed the Hindenburg line on a length of nineteen miles. They were now on the front of the second Hindenburg line along the Py River, marking the successful termination of the first phase of the attack which the French continued to press with irresistible valor despite the frantic efforts of the enemy to check their advance.

## CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH CLOSE IN ON CAMBRAI—FRENCH OCCUPY ST. QUENTIN—THE GERMANS FIRE CAMBRAI AND RETIRE—THE ALLIES'
GREAT VICTORY IN FLANDERS

THE Allies continued to strike on every front on September 27-28, 1918. Between the sea and St. Quentin, Champagne, and Verdun the whole German military machine was tottering and nearing the breaking point.

Belgian and British troops attacking on a front of about ten miles between Dixmude to a point north of Ypres made an advance of three and a half miles, the Belgians alone capturing over 4,000 prisoners. The occupied territory included the first and the second line of the German defenses.

Field Marshal Haig's troops operating in the Cambrai region continued their advance on the town whose fall was imminent. With the capture of Sailly the British were now within two miles of Cambrai, and still forging forward. To the northwest a number of villages including Epinoy and Oisy-le-Verger were occupied and to the north of the Sensée Canal the village of Arleux.

During the night of September 27, 1918, the Germans made a desperate counterattack southwest of Marcoing, and near Beaucamp, but they were thrown back with heavy losses and the British pressed on two miles beyond Beaucamp Ridge, where they occupied high ground known as the Highland and Welsh Ridges.

Between the Ailette and the Aisne General Mangin's troops continued their irresistible advance, penetrating the ravine between Jouy and Aizy and capturing these villages. The principal victory of the day was the winning of Fort Malmaison, one of the strongholds southeast of Laon. Here the Germans had prepared a deadly trap for the French troops, but owing to the precautions taken the explosion did no damage.

In the Champagne General Gouraud's forces continued to operate with the accuracy of a finely adjusted piece of mechanism. At Somme-Py, where the German defensive works were of the most elaborate description and included a system of trenches and underground works to an extent of five miles, after hot fighting in the streets with grenade and bayonet the French took the entire system and advanced their line to the north of the town.

There was no harder struggle on any Allied front at this time than the French were engaged in north of Grateuil and Fontaine-en-Dormois. The Germans in this region displayed intense energy in the defense of the valleys, bringing up reserves and employing countless machine guns in their determination to stem the tide of the French advance which was constantly hurling them backward. Again and again the Germans counterattacked, only to be crushed by Gouraud's troops, who immediately proceeded to press onward. The German infantry fought well at times, but there was something lacking; they displayed nervousness and had no staying powers. And their gunners too showed that their nerves were shaken, wasting ammunition without reason and laying down barrages where they could serve no possible purpose.

September 29, 1918, was a big day for the British and American troops when Field Marshal Haig launched a new offensive movement on the thirty-mile front from St. Quentin to the Sensée River. The Americans attacking the Hindenburg line on a front of nearly three miles captured Bellicourt and Nauroy.

On the extreme British right the Twentieth Corps struck across the Scheldt Canal from Bellenglise northward. The Forty-sixth Midland Division, equipped with mats, life belts, rafts, and bridging material, stormed the main Hindenburg defenses running along the eastern bank of the canal. In spite of the depth of the water, and the width of the canal, and the strong German defenses, consisting of numerous tunnels and concrete works, this division captured the entire enemy position opposed to them. After this master stroke the division with

great bravery drove ahead up the slopes beyond the canal, capturing many prisoners on the way. Bellenglise, Lehaucourt, and Magny-la-Fosse were now in British hands.

In the center of the attack English troops captured Villers-Guislain while New Zealand troops broke up a hostile attack, and pressing on took La Vacquerie and high ground in the neighborhood.

Meanwhile the Sixty-ninth Division, having forced the crossing of the Scheldt at several points, continued to advance. After stiff fighting in the western outskirts of Masnières and Les Rues Vertes they took both of these villages and carried the defensive system covering Rumilly, driving on to the western outskirts of the village. North of the Bapaume-Cambrai road Canadian troops gained possession of the defense system known as the Marcoing-Masnières line as far north as Sailly.

On the French front as the result of General Mangin's advance on this date the entire Malmaison Plateau and the western end of the Chemin-des-Dames were won. For weeks the Germans had been fighting to hold the approaches to the massif of St. Gobain and Laon which they were now forced to abandon. For four years this group of heights formed the central pillar of the German line in France. Marshal Foch's strategy forced the enemy, as on the Marne, to withdraw his center before the Allied attack to the north and the east and compelled him to move back on the wings. This retreat was one of the first direct results of the French, American, and British offensive of the past three days.

On the last day of September, 1918, the British continued to drive forward into the outskirts of Cambrai, capturing the suburbs on three sides of the city. Toward St. Quentin the villages of Thorigny and Le Tronquoy to the north and east of that town were won. In the course of the fighting north of St. Quentin the British captured over 4,000 prisoners and forty guns.

In Flanders the Belgian and British advance was pushed to an average depth of five and a maximum depth of eight miles. The British had won the famous Messines Ridge and Cheluwe, while the Belgians had advanced beyond Dixmude and taken Roulers.

Fighting of the fiercest description continued throughout October 1, 1918, all along the Cambrai-St. Quentin front, the British winning positions on the greater part of the line. The Germans, anticipating the speedy capture of Cambrai, had fired the city at different points. The British, continuing to close in, stormed in the night Proville to the west and Tilloy on the north. Farther south toward St. Quentin they captured the villages of Vendhuile and Lavergies. To the north of Cambrai they made notable progress in spite of the presence in the enemy fighting line of fresh German reserves thrown in between the city and the Sensée River.

During the month of September, 1918, the British had captured on the western front 66,000 prisoners and 700 guns. In four days' fighting up to October 1, 1918, General Haig's troops had engaged and defeated thirty-six German divisions, or approximately 432,000 men.

French troops entered St. Quentin in the afternoon of October 1, 1918. Heavy fighting continued along the whole Franco-American front from St. Quentin to the Meuse. The British on the north and the French on the south drew an arc around St. Quentin well to the rear of the city. Toward the Aisne the French had pushed on beyond Revillon. In the center the Germans continued to cling stubbornly to the wooded height of St. Thierry, where they had established a line of positions stretching from Cormicy to the Vesle, flanking Rheims on the northwest and enabling them to maintain their hold on a semicircle of strong points around Rheims.

Cambrai having been mined by the Germans, the occupation of the city was delayed by the British, but their patrols penetrated the burning city. Canadian troops held the suburbs of Neuville St. Remy on the north and Crèvecœur and Rumilly on the south.

The rapid advance of the Allies in Belgium on the north and the British thrust past Cambrai on the south forced the Germans to begin a retreat on a wide front on both sides of the La Bassée Canal.

In the night of October 1-2, 1918, General Berthelot's forces on the French front completed their conquest of the St. Thierry Massif, the important height west of Rheims, occupying Pouillon and the fort of St. Thierry.

These great gains enabled the French to dominate the plain from the east and threaten all the German positions along the Aisne-Marne Canal from Bethany to the north, including the fort of Brimont, where the guns were posted that wrought most of the destruction to Rheims. General Gouraud and Berthelot by their advances threatened to make of the Rheims salient another pocket from which the Germans would have great difficulty in extricating themselves.

In the Champagne desperate efforts were made by the enemy to hold back Gouraud's forces on the line of Monthers-Orfeuil-Liry. Steep cliffs and deep ravines furnished the Germans with excellent positions for defense, but the French crushed every counterattack and drove ahead. South of Orfeuil and Liry General Gouraud broke through heavy wire defenses, and won a powerful position by assault.

East of Liry in the wooded valley of the Aisne there was hard fighting which ended in the occupation of the most important positions by General Gouraud's men. Farther east where the Germans had flooded the region of Challerange the French displayed the same intrepidity as at other points on the battle front, gaining ground and occupying the railroad at Autry.

On October 3, 1918, Field Marshal Haig's forces shattered vital German defenses between St. Quentin and Cambrai. Attacking with infantry and tanks on the eight-mile front from Sequehart to the Scheldt Canal the British broke through the strong Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line west and southwest of Beaurevoir.

On the left of the attack English and Irish troops forced the passage of the Scheldt Canal at Gouy and Le Catelet and captured both villages. At the farthest point of this advance the British penetrated German positions to a depth of about five miles. Over 5,000 prisoners were taken by the British during the drive.

In Flanders the Germans were in retreat on the twenty-mile front between Armentières and Lens, which the British now occupied. Between these strongholds the British had advanced their line three miles eastward through Avion, Vendin, Wieres, and Herlies.

St. Quentin was completely cleared of German troops by October 2, 1918. Not one of its original 56,000 inhabitants remained. All were carried away by the Germans. As it was believed the enemy had mined the town with time fuses the French did not occupy the town, but remained outside waiting for developments.

From St. Quentin to the Argonne the French armies continued to gain ground all along the line. They were closing the only avenue of escape for the Germans on the west side of the Argonne Forest, and clearing the region north and west of Rheims.

General Gouraud on the eastern side of the line by the occupation of the important railway town of Challerange now controlled the western exit from the Grand Pré Gap through the forest. Southeast of Orfeuil the French held a wooded area, their guns dominating the only railway which was available to the Germans north of that position. The French also enlarged their gains north of Somme-Py in the Champagne, capturing Mont Blanc with the Americans and the Medeah Farm.

Around Rheims the Germans had been forced back so far that the city must soon be freed from the menace of bombardment. Cormicy, northwest of the city, was captured by the French and Loivre to the north, while the Aisne Canal was reached between Concevreux and La Neuvillette.

Debeney's indomitable troops north and east of St. Quentin continued to drive forward. He broke the Hindenburg line from Le Tronquoy to Lesdins and gained a hold on the railway east of St. Quentin. Progress was also made at Neuville St. Armand and Itancourt. Continuing their pressure on the Ger-

mans seeking to repair the gap torn in the Hindenburg defenses northeast of St. Quentin, British troops on October 4-5, 1918, pushed on toward Fresnoy-le-Grand in the face of determined and powerful enemy counterattacks.

The Germans continued to retreat on the Lens-Armentières front. The British lines were advanced over two miles to Erquinghem and Wavrin west and southwest of Lille.

In the Champagne the entire enemy front was crumbling before the hammer blows of the French army under Berthelot and the Franco-American legions under Gouraud. North of Rheims the capture of Fort Brimont and strong mountain positions to the east gave the French enormous advantage over the enemy, of which they were not slow to avail themselves. The entire massif of Moronvilliers was conquered; by the afternoon of October 5, 1918, the French had reached Bethenville, three miles to the north. In the course of the advance the Germans were forced to evacuate many positions which they had held since 1914.

Threatened by the British thrust toward Lille the enemy began the evacuation of the city. Farther south, in the crucial area north of St. Quentin, British forces again broke through the Hindenburg system of defenses. They crossed the Scheldt Canal on the eight-mile front between Crèvecœur and Le Catelet and won a section of the famous line on the plateau of La Terrière in this sector, the Germans hurriedly retiring from the high ground east of the canal.

French victories in the Champagne continued with clockwork regularity every day, and it might be said with truth every few hours of the day. German resistance was broken on a front of about twenty-eight miles in the Rheims salient, where as the result of pressure east and west the enemy was compelled to surrender his strongest positions.

The French continued in pursuit through the night of October 5-6, 1918, the whole front along the river Suippe. Other French troops having crossed the Aisne Canal had advanced to the outskirts of Aiguilcourt and pressing on north of Rheims captured a number of villages to the northeast of the city, reaching

the Suippe River at Pont Faverger, which was conquered and occupied.

In the fighting on the British front on October 6, 1918, the village of Fresnoy, ten miles west of Douai, was won. Between Cambrai and St. Quentin after the capture of Abencheul-au-Bois the British established themselves in strong positions on the high ground toward Lesdain. Montbregain and Beaurevoir, villages to the northeast of St. Quentin which had changed hands several times in the recent fighting, were won by the British at a late hour in the day.

During the night Marshal Haig's troops established a post at the crossing of the Scheldt Canal, five miles northwest of Cambrai, and advanced their lines south on the west and southwest. By the advance north of Wez Maquart the British were now within about five miles west of the city.

At times during the British pursuit the enemy's rear guards attempted to make a stand, but in every instance they were annihilated. The Germans seemed to have become panic-stricken, for, while they could maintain a stubborn defense, there was no method in their fighting; it was the desperate struggle of men who know they are playing a losing game.

The continued French pressure in the Champagne yielded daily results. On October 7, 1918, Berry-au-Bac at the junction of the river Aisne and the Aisne Canal on the left wing of the offensive was captured. On the rest of the Champagne front the French held their gains, and pushed on to the north and east of the Arnes River.

Early in the morning of October 8, 1918, British and American troops with the French cooperating on the right launched an attack on a twenty-mile front from Cambrai southward, shattering the remains of the Hindenburg system to a large extent, and advancing along the whole fighting line a distance of three miles.

The British artillery fire, which began to shell the enemy through the night and in the morning, was of the most unprecedented violence, the guns being massed wheel to wheel. Such a destructive fire was poured into the enemy lines that when the attack was made the Germans were generally too panic-stricken to fight with either courage or method.

The brilliant operations of the Americans northeast of St. Quentin at this time are described in detail on other pages.

South of the American fighting line the French, starting from Rouvroy, captured the hills to the eastward and the villages of Essigny and Fontaine. South of Cambrai, where the Germans counterattacked heavily with reserves, they made temporary gains of ground from which they were afterward driven out. Large numbers of German gunners who attempted to check the Allied onslaught were killed.

On the following day the Allies struck again on a front of more than thirty miles from north of Cambrai to the south of St. Quentin and completed the breaking through of the entire Hindenburg defensive system from Arras to St. Quentin. The German retreat now became almost a rout, involving thirty divisions.

At 4 o'clock in the morning with only the light of the stars and flares to guide them Canadian and English troops pressing forward from the north and south joined up in the chief square of Cambrai. The Germans were in retreat behind their rear guards, and the whole city was in Allied hands, but the enemy had mined it, and there were constant explosions that reduced many fine buildings to ruins. It was a great day for the Allies, and especially for the British, for in exactly two months they had fought their way back to their old front lines and were now far into the country beyond, which they had never penetrated before. Cambrai, a prize, was won, and the Germans, defeated and broken, were scuttling away with all the speed they could muster.

During October 8-9, 1918, the battle in Champagne continued with increasing violence from the Aisne in the region of Vaux-le-Mouron, which the French captured, to the Suippe River at Bazancourt, which was also won. North of St. Etienne on the Arnes River the Germans made powerful attacks on the positions won by General Gouraud's men, but were unable to regain a foot of ground, while their casualties were enormous. The

determined fighting here and on the Suippe River by the Germans was evidently for the purpose of gaining time for a wide retreat. For the persistence and vigor of the Allied pressure had evidently disarranged all their plans, as up to this time they had been unable to prepare a stable position to which their shattered formations could retire in security.

In the Cambrai-St. Quentin sector the Anglo-American forces continued to advance during October 9-10, 1918, the greatest progress being made east and southeast of Cambrai, where Marshal Haig had pushed his lines to the banks of the Selle River, capturing the important German base of Le Cateau. This marked an advance of about ten miles east and fifteen miles southeast of Cambrai in the face of determined resistance by the enemy's rear guards. During this forward sweep many French civilians were found in the captured villages, 2,500 being liberated in Caudry alone.

Farther to the north several villages southeast of Lens were occupied. The French, on the south of the British and Americans, continued to carry out dashing attacks and wrested from the enemy a number of villages northeast of St. Quentin. North of the Aisne they gained possession of the Croix-sans-Tête plateau. In Champagne Liry was occupied.

The Germans began on October 10-11, 1918, the withdrawal from their strong positions north of the Sensée River before the far-reaching advance of the British south of that stream. North of the Scarpe the British pressed on in the direction of Douai, which the Germans were preparing to abandon. From every front came the same story of German retirement, though here and there they continued to hold on to a strong position to hinder the advance of the Allies and secure the safety of their fleeing forces. On the whole front from the Soissons-Laon road to Grand Pré north of the Argonne Forest their hosts were on the backward move. In Champagne, where General Gouraud's army captured Machault after a four-mile advance, they were retreating toward Vouziers, and under pressure of the converging attack west and south of the Chemin-des-Dames were gradually forced off of that famous height, relinquishing

some of their strongest positions. In the Laon area the Germans were facing the utmost difficulties, where the Hunding in between the rivers Serre and Sissonne had been turned by the French.

In the night of October 11, 1918, French advance guards occupied Vouziers, which the Germans had burned and looted before retiring. The highroad running west from Vouziers to Pauvres was now entirely in French hands, and German resistance seemed weakening through this sector. West of Pauvres the French held the slopes above the marshy wooded valley of the Retourne.

On the left, General Berthelot's army captured the dominating height of Cæsar's Camp and advanced beyond Mauchamp Farm to the north. Still more important progress was made in the loop of the Aisne River, where French cavalry aided by armored cars took Asfeld-La-Ville, thus creating a new salient between them and the advance to the westward which occupied the greater part of the Chemin-des-Dames.

General Mangin's troops meanwhile were encountering strong opposition as they forced their way forward into the wooded heights that constituted the outer bastion of the St. Gobain Forest. This operation, taken in conjunction with the advance of Generals Debeney and Gouraud on the flanks, rendered the position of the German forces holding the Laon salient increasingly dangerous.

On October 12, 1918, General Mangin seized the greater part of the St. Gobain Massif. La Fère, the outpost to the north on the Oise, was also won. Laon, the last of the great natural obstacles forming the keystone of the German defenses in France, yielded without a fight.

The British had now invested Douai, and the fall of that place was only a question of hours.


All these important achievements were less spectacular than the great battle in Flanders which began on October 14, 1918, and was fought by the combined Belgian, French, and British troops under the command of King Albert. The whole Allied line advanced on an irregular front of about twenty-five miles from the region of Courtemarck to that of Courtrai, penetrating enemy positions six and seven miles.

The British Second Army under General Sir Herbert Plumer captured the villages of Gulleghem and Heule and advanced as far as the outskirts of Courtrai, having taken nearly 4,000 prisoners and fifty guns. The Belgians and French bagged over 7,000 and eighty guns.

In French Flanders the British carried their lines forward in the neighborhood of Haubourdin about three miles west of Lille, and farther south crossed the Haute Deule Canal and took a number of villages northeast of Lens.

So fast were the Germans retreating that the British, French, and Belgian infantry in the center of the battle front had lost sight of them. The victory was especially memorable because it was a triumph for the gallant little Belgian army, which with the assistance of French and British had driven the despoilers of their country from a large territory which the Germans had occupied since the first days of the war. Moreover, they had gained in this battle such strong positions that the Germans must soon be forced to abandon the entire coast of Belgium.

The sweeping advance of the Allied infantry, preceded by French cavalry which performed wonderful work in carrying out charges, left Lille and the mining and manufacturing districts of Tourcoing, Roubaix, and Tournai in a salient that was growing deeper every hour and which the Germans could not possibly hold for long. In the region of Thourout the Allies encountered intense opposition. The struggle was here from house to house and street to street, and the casualties were heavy on both sides. The Germans had posted machine guns in the windows of the dwellings and in the cellars, firing streams of bullets into the advancing Belgians, but were unable to force them back. The troops of King Albert fought with a fierce determination to wreak revenge on the despoilers of their country, and nothing could withstand the cold fury of their onslaught. To the northeast of Courtrai they stormed and captured Bavichove and on the north Andove and Cachten.



HELD BY THE ALLIED ARMIES OF OCCUPATION

The capture by the British of Linselles along the Lys placed the Germans in the salient in a highly precarious position as the Allies pressed forward, and it was inevitable that they must soon retire to save themselves.

Outside Courtrai the infantry made an advance of about three miles. Here they were forced to crush stubborn enemy attacks, the Germans having received orders to hold on to the last. Very few of their machine gunners who tried to hold up the Allied advance managed to escape.

From the Thielt positions, where the French cavalry, owing to the hardness of the ground and roads, were able to operate freely and consequently worry the Germans, the Holland border was less than twenty miles. It was through this gap that the Germans throughout the whole Belgian coast system must retire if they were to save themselves, provided that the Allies continued to advance. Every yard of ground gained by the Allies in this area lessened the Germans' chances of escape by narrowing the gap through which they must go.

The Allied offensive in Flanders did not spend itself for nearly three days, the German retreat becoming more and more disorderly so that at some points it was a veritable rout. The entire Belgian front from the south was in constant movement. From Ostend and that section of the Belgian coast the Germans fled precipitately. British naval forces and Belgian aviators entered Ostend on October 17, 1918, where they were received with cheers and tears of joy by the inhabitants.

The Allied infantry made rapid progress on October 17-18, 1918, while the Germans were hurrying eastward through the passage between Bruges and the Holland border. There was only one good road that they could take and consequently this was crowded with transports and by troops in flight continually harassed by the Belgian guns. The whole of the German army under General von Arnim, comprising seventeen divisions, was in retreat from the north to the region of Lille. King Albert of Belgium and Queen Elizabeth entered Ostend in the afternoon of October 17, 1918.

#### CHAPTER V


THE GERMANS RETREAT ON ALL FRONTS -BRITISH CAPTURE VALENCIENNES-THE ARMISTICE-THE WAR OVER

THE Allies continued to be masters of the situation on the I Flanders front. October 17-18, 1918, Zeebrugge, the only submarine base on the coast remaining to the Germans after they were driven out of Ostend, and Blankenberghe, a port four miles to the southwest, were occupied. The French gained possession of Thielt and advanced a mile east of the town. Southeast of Douai the British occupied a number of villages. Roubaix and Tourcoing were entered in the afternoon of October 18, 1918. Southeast of Cambrai, on the Bohain-Le Cateau front, where Anglo-American forces were operating, over 4,000 prisoners were taken in the space of twenty-four hours. From the Oise River eastward to the Argonne Forest French troops made important advances and gained fifteen villages, many of which had been heavily fortified by the enemy.

All that remained now of the important German conquests in France was the somewhat narrow frontier tract between Valenciennes and Metz. Here were two small salients around which there was intense fighting that continued almost without cessation October 17-18, 1918.

The Americans and General Gouraud's troops on the east were hammering at the strong German positions on the Grand Pré heights, a northern extension of the Argonne Forest. Here the Germans had some of their best troops stationed, who held on with grim determination, for a break through between the Aisne and the Meuse would cut off their retreat into Luxemburg and force them back to the forest of the Ardennes. The other salient between Le Cateau and Rethel was so fraught with danger to the troops holding it that early in the morning of October 18, 1918, the Germans began to abandon their positions under pressure of the advancing French troops.

War St. 8-E



THE "HINDENBURG LINE," THE LINE OF FARTHEST GERMAN ADVANCE AND THE BATTLE LINE WHEN THE ARMISTICE BEGAN, NOVEMBER 11, 1918

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On the west of the Oise General von Hutier was fighting desperately to hold back the advance of General Debeney toward Guise. The French stormed Petit Verey and Marchavenne, and continuing to push on captured Mennevret in the morning of October 18, 1918.

The Germans were favored by two important obstacles, the group of hills east of Berneville and the mass of Andigny Forest lying before Wassigny. They might attempt to make a stand on the Oise near Guise and along the Oise-Sambre Canal, but their forces had been so badly cut up by the French that their plight had become increasingly desperate. In less than a day they had lost more than 5,500 men and a vast amount of military supplies.

The British army, operating in conjunction with the Belgians, attacked on October 20, 1918, to the north and advanced past Courtrai. The recovery of Ghent had now become inevitable if the push could be maintained. For the Allied guns were pounding the Germans on all sides, while their cavalry patrols, leading the infantry, pressed on closer and closer to the city.

Meanwhile the British Third Army pushed its way eastward to the south of Valenciennes, endangering all the German forces northward to Flanders and southward to the Oise Canal behind which the enemy had begun to retreat before British and Americans. This thrust upset the German plan of trying to hold the line east of the Scheldt.

The British Third Army encountered the heaviest fighting in carrying out this operation, for the Germans realized the importance of delaying here their advance. Smashing all resistance the British gained the high ground to the east of the line from which they were advancing in the face of a torrential hail of machine-gun bullets. The destructive gun nests were rapidly cleaned up, and the German losses were very heavy. Fighting was especially bloody in the region of St. Python, where the enemy fought behind barricades. South of Le Cateau the British and Americans continued to make steady progress. American patrols pushing out from the Mazinghien area had now reached

the banks of the Oise Canal. In this region German guns were constantly active and all villages around were heavily shelled. It was necessary to remove the civilians from some of these towns to places of safety. The Germans entirely disregarded their presence.

Every hour now France and Belgium were recovering precious soil and cities, and thousands of their people were being liberated from German bondage. Especially grateful to the Belgians was the recovery of the ancient city of Bruges which Belgians and British won on October 20, 1918, though German rear guards were in the neighborhood. War had not changed greatly the grand old city built in the middle ages, or injured the beauty of its quaint architecture. The inhabitants massed before the Hotel de Ville were celebrating their liberation from the Germans' yoke. Everyone had a flag or banner—British, Belgian, or French—and the British troops were received with the wildest enthusiasm and hailed as saviors.

Throughout the night of October 20-21, 1918, and during the day the Allied troops were everywhere driving the Germans eastward. In Belgium they were now within three miles of Eecloo and along the whole forty-mile stretch between Courtrai and the Dutch border British, French, and Belgians were hustling the enemy backward and closing in around Ghent. In the center the British were on the west bank of the Scheldt, north of Tournai, before which the Germans were making a determined stand with countless machine guns. Frontally the British held positions near Valenciennes, and to the northwest had penetrated the great Viccigne-Raismes Forest. Northwest of Lille they were driving on toward Le Quesnoy and fighting every foot of the way.

The great battle had now entered into the second phase. The first was the wiping out of the Lille salient, when the Germans were driven out of western Belgium. This accomplished, the Allies on the north started a sweeping movement on October 20-21, 1918, pivoting on a point east of Courtrai, the purpose of which was to clear the Germans from their front in northern Belgium and at the same time threaten their right flank.

In the center of the fighting area the British were pushing forward toward the west bank of the Scheldt. The Germans took advantage of the width of the stream and its marshy borders, where they found some protection from the Allied pressure. They were hiding in shallow trenches; their artillery in the rear, sadly depleted in numbers, afforded them very little help. In their hurried flight the Germans had little time in which to remove their artillery and vast stores of ammunition. They destroyed some material, but a great deal fell into the hands of the Allies, especially guns. These were promptly turned toward the east, and shells made in Germany were hurled at their former owners as they fled in panicky retreat.

October 21-22, 1918, on the twenty-five-mile front from Ponta-Chin northwest of Tournai to Thiant, southwest of Valenciennes, British troops engaged along the western bank of the Scheldt won ground at many points. South of Tournai they captured the villages of Hollain and Bruyelle and drove into the western suburbs of Valenciennes.

In northern Belgium troops under King Albert gained the Lys Canal on the whole of their front and had pushed across the stream. The Second British Army, advancing on a front of about a mile between the Lys and the Scheldt under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire established a bridgehead on the river to the east of Pecq.

The Third and Fourth British Armies began a new drive on October 23, 1918, to the south of Valenciennes, smashing through strong German defenses to a depth of three miles and capturing many important villages, several thousand prisoners and numerous guns. This attack resulted in the driving of a wedge into German positions at a point considered the most vital of the lines which the Germans were holding. The enemy fought courageously, the gunners holding out to the last.

The British First Army to the north continued to harass the foe by continued attacks, and gained positions well to the north-east of Valenciennes whose fall was imminent. The British were now only three miles from Le Quesnoy and still forging ahead toward the town. Catillon was carried early in the fight-

ing, and later the British occupied Ors. Before retreating, the Germans destroyed all the bridges over the canal between these places.

The heaviest fighting in this battle was in Leveque Wood, where the Germans had cunningly hidden machine-gun nests that were difficult to overcome. But the wood was cleared after a time and the British pressed on to the great Mormal Forest on the edge of which the Germans were concentrating troops to make a stand.

The British continued to make gains on the following day south of Valenciennes, capturing several villages and strong points. On the north the Germans were cleared from the Raismes Forest. Advances were made along the whole front between the Sambre Canal and the Scheldt (about seventeen miles), and the forward pressure continued without relaxation, though the Germans attempted by counterattacks to gain time. Since the fighting began on the previous day over 7,000 prisoners and 100 guns were captured by the British.

In order to check the advance on Valenciennes the Germans broke down the banks and opened the sluice gates northeast and southwest of the city and flooded vast stretches of country. The British, however, continued to drive ahead, and fighting their way into the city from the west, there were spirited fights in the streets between patrols. During the night of October 23-24, 1918, artillery duels increased on the battle front south of the city.

The British gunners wrought fearful damage in the trafficcrowded roads to the rear of the German line. The advance of the British in the moonlight, protected by flocks of night bombing airplanes, offered a strange and moving dramatic spectacle. At Pomereuil they were held up for a time by a heavy concentration of machine guns. Waiting until the advance had made progress north and south of them, they swept around on both sides of the gun nests. They found the German machine gunners occupying positions around a triangular space that had been cleared. The British, ignoring the invitation to enter the clearing, passed the gunners and captured Pomereuil Wood behind the triangle, and thus surrounded the enemy. Then they stormed and carried the position.

Continuing their attacks upon the German lines south of Valenciennes, the British on October 25, 1918, advancing on a front of between six and seven miles, reached the Le Quesnoy-Valenciennes railway, capturing several villages on the way. Simultaneously with this operation the French armies, striking on the Serre and Aisne Rivers over a front of about forty miles, advanced their lines at all points, capturing villages and positions and taking over 3,000 prisoners. East of Courtrai, in the direction of the Scheldt, the British and French troops made further progress, wresting a number of villages and positions from the enemy.

The climax of the French attack was General Guillemat's drive east of Laon against the Hunding position, the elaborately prepared line protecting the German center. Here was a quadruple trench system backed by concrete shelters, five lines of barbed wire each twenty feet deep, and the ground between planted with antitank mines, yet the indomitable French soldiers broke through it on a ten-mile front between St. Quentin-le-Petit and Herpy, and held their ground against deluges of gas and high-explosive shells.

On the center of the great offensive General Mangin's army took Mortiers, on the south bank of the Serre, and gained a bridgehead north of the river.

Farther north the British continued to press forward toward Valenciennes, and on their right General Plumer's troops under command of King Albert continued to cooperate in the drive against the German line on the Scheldt.

On the whole forty-mile front of the offensive which the French began on October 25, 1918, great gains of territory were made. The Germans lost Crecy-sur-Serre in the center, and were forced to abandon a good part of the Hunding position. In two days Generals Debeney and Guillemat captured more than 6,000 prisoners, twenty cannon, and hundreds of machine guns. On October 27, 1918, General Debeney had pushed on to the outskirts of Guise. The Germans on this date launched three

fierce attacks against three different points on the British front southeast of Valenciennes, all of which ended for them in disaster and heavy losses.

The British forward movement south of Valenciennes slowed down on October 28, 1918, but the French between the Oise and the Serre drove the Germans back two miles at the apex of their attack in the region of Bois-les-Pargny. On the Aisne front west of Château Porcien they drove forward to the north of Herpy.

In Belgium the Allies' positions became daily more favorable, while the difficulties of the Germans increased proportionately. The Allies were now within five miles of Ghent, and it was only owing to the delay in bringing up artillery that the city had not already fallen. In the hope of destroying the Allies' lines of communication with Bruges the Germans kept Stroobrigge under continuous fire. Maideghem and Aldeghem were also subjected to incessant artillery attacks.

The retirement of General Ludendorff, formerly chief of staff and really generalissimo of the German armies at this time, was an event of the highest importance. As the persistent advocate of war to the bitter end, and which he had never failed to assert would result in the defeat of Germany's enemies, his throwing up the sponge at a time of crisis in his country's destiny could only mean one of two things: he had all the effective power of the empire against him, or he foresaw the triumph of the Allies and was eager to seek cover before the German armies were forced to surrender.

On the last day of the month the Allies wrested from the Germans a big slice of territory in Belgium between Deynze on the north and Avelghem on the south on a battle front of about fifteen miles. The attack in which Belgian, French, British, and American troops were engaged, was launched before 6 o'clock in the morning, and by noon the British had broken their way through to a depth of 400 yards while on their left their allies were encountering strong opposition, but winning high ground between the Lys and Scheldt Rivers. Many towns and hamlets were liberated during this drive, including Pergwyk,

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Tierghein, Anseghem and Winterken. The front of this attack was about twelve miles, and German positions were penetrated to a depth of three and four miles.

The Allies resumed the offensive on this battle front on the following day and won an advance of more than five miles, which brought them to the Scheldt from Berchem to Gavere, ten miles south of Ghent. South of Valenciennes an advance of two miles resulted in the capture of Alnoy and Preseau. This forward drive carried the British to the southern edge of the flooded territory around Valenciennes. They captured during the advance between 3,000 and 4,000 prisoners.

The city of Valenciennes which the Germans had held so long and so tenaciously was captured by the British in the morning of November 2, 1918. The Canadian troops under General Currie encountered strong resistance from the enemy in the outskirts, and after a hard struggle crushed all resistance and entered the city. Other British contingents pressing on beyond Valenciennes occupied St. Saulve to the northeast on the road to Mons. West of Landrécies in the Mormal Forest region the British advanced their lines and took a number of prisoners.

The Germans by opening the Scheldt sluice gates had flooded the northern side of the city, and their only way of escape was to the southeast, where they had concentrated all their available forces. These fought with stubborn energy, but they failed to more than delay for a time the advance of the Canadians and English, who were supported by an immense concentration of artillery. The enemy's counterattacks were made with the help of tanks, but they all broke down, and the British captured the tanks and thousands of prisoners. Valenciennes, though in British hands on November 2, 1918, was still an uncomfortable place for the inhabitants, who were in a confused state of mind twixt joy and fear. There was joy that they had been liberated and fear because of the shells that were falling around them and passing over the houses. The way from Douai to Valenciennes was a scene of ruin and desolation as the British and Canadians had fought their way through the villages along these roads, and most of the houses were smashed by German shells.

An interesting souvenir left by the Germans in Valenciennes was a poster on the walls which the inhabitants of the city could now afford to laugh at. This was an order for the mobilization of all the men between the ages of 15 and 35, who must present themselves to the German commandant in order to be evacuated through the German lines. In case any disregarded this order severe penalties were to be exacted. This order was dated October 31, 1918, and the day of mobilization was to take place on November 1, 1918, the day before the British entered the city. Twenty thousand people were expelled by force on October 3, 1918, and driven in the direction of Mons. Only about 5,000 remained in the city and these were employed by the Germans in city work, such as maintaining the fire and water supplies, cleaning the streets, washing, and in various menial offices. Among those in the city when the British took possession were many who after the expulsion on October 3, 1918, were too feeble to continue the march and had dropped out, encumbering the German line of retreat. There were others who had escaped from their German captors, and also a number of young men who had hidden themselves and lived in cellars for days.

During the last week of the German occupation only one regiment was allowed in the city and this was chiefly to pillage, as the troops defending the place were holding positions outside. Many houses were looted, especially on the night before the British stormed the outskirts.

The German officers were especially eager for souvenirs which took the form of valuable paintings cut from the frames, and which they found in houses of the better class. The German Government had been hard, and there were fines for the slightest infraction of rules, which increased in severity as the enemy needed money. Trivial offenses at first were punished by a hundred marks fine, but in the last days of German occupation it was raised to two thousand marks.

While the British were driving forward on the Valenciennes front the American army was winning laurels north of Verdun, where they smashed the Freya Line and put the Germans to rout. (Details of this American victory will be found on other pages of this work.)

On the left of the Americans the French Fourth Army was in hot pursuit of the Germans who were fleeing across the Argonne Forest. The French smashed the enemy's rear guards. who attempted to delay the advance, and made important progress along the whole line of attack. On the left Semuy was taken and the French lines were carried as far as the southern bank of the Ardennes Canal. To the south Bois Vandy and the village of Balay were cleared of Germans, who fought desperately but were unable to delay for more than a few hours the irresistible advance of the French troops. On the right Longwe and Primat were occupied. North of the last-named place the French pushed on past Chêne Pâté and despite that formidable obstacle, the Argonne Forest, continued to pursue the Germans, whose retreat was so hurried that they left large quantities of material on the field which they had not found time to destroy. In the course of this advance the French captured over 1.400 prisoners.

South and east of Valenciennes, where the Germans had established positions, the British on November 2-3, 1918, were fighting their way forward, driving back the enemy rear guards and taking prisoners.

Field Marshal Haig's troops won another notable victory on November 4, 1918, when attacking on a thirty-mile front between the Scheldt and the Oise-Sambre Canal, with the French cooperating on the right, a drive was made into enemy positions and over 10,000 Germans and 200 guns were captured. The British drive, in which troops of the First, Third, and Fourth Armies participated, resulted in the capture of Landrécies south of the Mormal Forest, Catillon, and a considerable number of smaller towns, and advanced the British lines more than three miles to the east of the Oise-Sambre Canal. North of this stream, in the great Mormal Forest, the British won strongly fortified positions and advanced to the center of the wood.

To the south the Fifth French Army under General Debeney, linking up with the British, forced the passage of the canal and

made an advance to a depth of two miles beyond it, driving the Germans from a number of villages of great strategic importance. In this advance the French bagged 30,000 prisoners and a large number of cannon.

King Albert's army in Belgium continued to gain victories and to press the German retreat. He had completed the work of forcing the enemy across the Terneuzen Canal, which runs northward from Ghent and is close to the suburbs of the city on two sides. South of Ghent the west bank of the Scheldt was now in the hands of the Allies.

British and French armies in Belgium continued to crush and overrun the German positions. In the morning of November 5, 1918, the British forced their way through the greater part of the Mormal Forest, the infantry being east of a line through Locquignol and Les Grandes Pâtures. They had overcome the formidable defenses on the western fringe of the forest and had now confronting them only hastily improvised machine-gun posts. The French continued to drive the Germans before them between the Sambre Canal and the Argonne Forest, clearing the enemy out of wide stretches of territory and carrying their line forward more than six miles. The towns of Guise and Marie were captured during this advance and 4,000 Germans and 60 guns.

On November 6, 1918, a German delegation left Berlin for the western front to conclude an armistice with Marshal Foch, representing the Allied armies. The negotiations which led to a cessation of hostilities are fully dealt with in another place.

The victorious sweep of the Allies continued undiminished from the Scheldt to the Meuse, where the Germans were being driven back along the whole front. On November 6, 1918, the British, advancing east of the Mormal Forest, occupied a number of villages and the important railway junction at Aulnoye. The French armies made a bound of from five to seven miles along the whole front. Vervins, Rethel, and Montcornet, all important places, were occupied and the advance continued.

Crossing the Belgian border north and east of Hirson, French cavalry occupied a number of villages and the important fortress

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of Hirson, advancing their line nine miles at some points. Along the entire thirty-mile front from the junction of the French and British armies to the Meuse east of Mézières, now strongly invested, the French pushed on with irresistible ardor. The water barriers of the Thon and the Aure were forced, and the plateaus to the north occupied. On the British front the same story of victory was repeated. Field Marshal Haig's troops completed the capture of Tournai, and Antoing, to the south of that Belgian city, was occupied. On November 9, 1918, the British had driven forward to the outskirts of Renaix, twelve miles northeast of Tournai. The Second and Fifth Armies meanwhile had gained the east bank of the Scheldt throughout their entire front. These operations took place north of the Mons-Condé Canal, along the line of which the British were advancing on Mons. South of the Belgian frontier they took the important town of Maubeuge, and pressed on toward the Belgian frontier on both sides of the Sambre, meeting with only feeble resistance from the disorganized enemy.

The remaining inhabitants of Tournai, which the British entered on November 8, 1918, received their liberators with wild demonstrations of joy such as only a people were capable of who had lived for years under the tyrannic rule of the Germans. For three weeks before the British captured the town the inhabitants had been living in cellars in hourly fear that the furious gunfire would smash the buildings above their heads and that they would be buried in the ruins. There was also the dread that asphyxiating gas would creep into their hiding places and destroy them with its fumes. A month before British occupation the Germans had carried away all the able-bodied men in the place, numbering more than 10,000, leaving their womenfolk to weep for them. For a week previous to the British entry Tournai was under bombardment day and night. Then fortyeight hours before the Germans were driven out more terrible sounds were heard by the frightened people hiding in the cellars, explosions that shook every building as by an earthquake. The Germans were blowing up the bridges over the Scheldt Canal, and their retreat from Tournai had begun.

Though German delegates were on their way to the French front to arrange for an armistice, the Allies continued to fight and advance with the same irresistible ardor as if there had been no question of a cessation of hostilities. In southern Belgium the British continued to carry their lines forward, reaching on November 10, 1918, the Franco-Belgian frontier south of the Sambre. North of the Mons-Condé Canal they pressed on beyond the Scheldt, capturing Leuze, while British cavalry advanced to Ath, which lies sixteen miles east of Tournai.


Farther to the north the British captured Renaix and carried their line to a point four miles to the east of that place.

While the British were sweeping on in southern Belgium the French were engaged in repulsing strong attacks launched against them as they crossed the Meuse. Numerous villages along the whole line were freed from the enemy. Here, as at other places, the haste of the German retreat was emphasized by the abandonment of vast stores of war material, cannon, and even railroad trains, which fell into the hands of the French.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 10, 1918, General Gouraud made his official entry into Sedan; a thrilling hour for the French as they recalled the German triumph here in the war of 1870.

Slowly, but surely, French territory occupied by the enemy along the Belgian frontier was diminishing in size. The French troops everywhere were now within a short day's march of the border line, and but for the congested roads encumbered with traffic, and by the booty which the Germans left behind, the liberation of French soil could have been completed in less than a day's advance.

Though it was known among the troops of the Allies as well as by the Germans that an armistice might be declared at any moment, there were no changes in the attitude of the combatants. The Germans fought when they had to, sullenly and determinedly, but most of their efforts were concentrated in making all haste they could to reach the border. To the last they showed a savage spirit, and nowhere more so than at Mézières, where throughout the morning of November 10, 1918, their batteries deluged the



THE GERMAN TERRITORY OCCUPIED UNDER THE ARMISTICE TERMS

city with high explosives and poison gas. There 20,000 civilians—men, women, and children—were shut in, with no hope of escape. Incendiary shells fired a hospital, and it was necessary to evacuate the wounded to the cellars near by, where the panic-stricken inhabitants were crouching. There was some protection from shells in the cellars, but none against the heavy fumes of poison gas with which the Germans proceeded to flood the city. There were no gas masks and no chemicals that would enable the people to improvise protective head coverings.

The British captured Mons during the night of November 10-11, 1918, after a stiff fight outside the town. For the British the war ended at Mons as it had begun there. Since early morning their troops knew that the armistice had been signed, and that hostilities would cease at 11 o'clock. All the way to Mons British forces were on the march with bands playing, and nearly every man carried on his rifle a little flag of France or Belgium.

Ghent was the last Belgian town which was rescued from the Germans before the armistice. They held the canal in front of it by machine-gun fire until 2 o'clock in the morning of November 11, 1918, when they made a hurried retreat.

A dozen Belgian soldiers, led by a young lieutenant, were the first to enter the city, and a few minutes later the streets were thronged with people wild with joy, who embraced the troops and each other, shouting and cheering. After four years of oppressive German rule Ghent of historic memories was free.

Hostilities ceased on all the battle fronts at 11 a. m. on November 11, 1918. The machine guns and great cannon that had rattled and thundered for fifty months were silent. On the front lines, when the last shot was fired, the British, Americans, and Belgians gave free vent to their feelings of joy that the war was over, the victory won. The soldiers of France were less demonstrative and seemed unable at first to realize that the long-drawn agony was ended; but though they did not express themselves in wild cheering, every face was aglow with pride and happiness. Back of the lines, among the ruined villages, there were more evidences of the gladness that filled every war-weary

Ich verzichte bierfubch für alle lukunft auf die Rechte au der Erone Preuenen und die damit wesbundenen Sechte an der dentschen Knimerkhone

Zugleich enthinde ich alle Beauten des Deutschen Reicher und Preussens sowie alle Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannnohaften der Narine, des Preussischen deeren und der Truppen
der Bundeskontingente des Traueides, des ein Mir als ihrem
Tainer, König und Obersten Refehlshaber geleistet haben. Ich
erwarte von ihnen. Asse sie bis zur Neuerdaung des Deutschen
Beiche des Inhabern der tätuüchlichen Gewalt in Deutsch) und
holfen, das Deutsche Volk gegen die drohendes Gefahren der
Anarchie, der Hungerinct und der Frendherrschaft zu schützen.

Urkundlich unter Unserer Höchsteigenhändigen Unterschrift und beigedruckten Kaiserlichen Insiegel.

Gegeben Ameringen, den 26. November 1918.

Milyarind :

Reproduction of the typewritten document in which William II of Germany abdicated: By these presents, I renounce forever my rights to the crown of Prussia and the rights appertaining to the imperial crown of Germany. At the same time I release all the officials of the German Empire and of Prussia, all the officers, noncommissioned officers and mer of the Navy and of the Prussiar. Army, and the contingents from the confederated states, from the oath of fidelity they took to me as their emperor-king and commander in chief. I expect of them that, as soon as the new organization of the German Empire shall be effected, they will aid those who govern and will protect the German people against the threatening dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign domination. Original copy, signed with our hand, and sealed with the imperial seal.

WILLIAM.



heart, and while church bells rung out a joyous peal the songs of victory, which had cheered the poilus through the long conflict, resounded again with a deeper feeling and more triumphant note.

According to the terms of the armistice the Germans yielded over to Allied occupation "the countries on the left bank of the Rhine," together with surrender to Allied control of the crossings of the Rhine at Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne, including bridgeheads of thirty-kilometer radius on the eastern bank of the river and the establishment of a neutral zone on that bank from thirty to forty kilometers in breadth and running from the frontier of Holland to the Swiss frontier.

On November 17, 1918, the Allied armies of occupation began the march to the Rhine. The American army, consisting of six divisions under General Dickman, was the first to start, moving in a northeasterly direction on a front of fifty miles from Mouzon on the Meuse to beyond Fresnes. At Montmédy, the first important place reached by the Americans, they were received with wild acclamation by the inhabitants and the Stars and Stripes waved from the Hôtel de Ville. At Longwy and Briey, the great industrial centers, it was the same story. Lorraine and Luxemburg were crossed and Coblenz was reached on December 12, 1918, where headquarters of the army of occupation were established.

On the same date the British Second and Fourth Army under Generals Plumer and Rawlinson began their advance to Cologne. In conjunction with their allies, a French army under General Mangin set out for Mayence, while General Pétain, now a marshal of France, entered Metz. Throughout Belgium and France the armies of the Allies received the most enthusiastic reception in which there was no discordant note. It was only when they crossed the border and entered Germany that they met with veiled hostility. There were crowds and bands, but no enthusiasm. But, if this was lacking, there were no aggressive manifestations of hatred toward the invaders of the Fatherland. A sense of joy and relief that the war was over vanquished for the time at least every other feeling.

War St. 8-F

### PART II—RUSSIA

#### CHAPTER VI

## COUNTERING THE GERMANS IN FALLEN RUSSIA

WITH the complete surrender of Bolshevist Russia to the Germans, through the notorious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, there was presented to the Allies the problem of supporting those elements in the country still disposed to resist the Teutonic invasion. Military intervention, by way of Siberia, with the active assistance of the Japanese, was proposed, but met with the determined opposition of President Wilson, whose strong democratic principles deterred him from interfering with the internal affairs of Russia under any pretext whatever. Subsequently he modified his views on this point, being largely influenced by the Czecho-Slovak movement, one of the most remarkable and picturesque features of the entire war.

As already stated in previous installments of this work, the Czecho-Slovaks were Slavic soldiers of the Austrian armies who had been taken prisoners by the Russians, and who, after the fall of the Czar, volunteered to fight against the Central Powers with the Allies because of their desire to obtain independence for Bohemia and Slovakia, parts of the dominions of the Austrian empire. They took a leading part in the offensive which Kerensky attempted against the Teutons, and which failed so disastrously on account of the broken morale of the Russians. When the Bolsheviki seized the reins of government, the Czecho-Slovaks refused to lay down their arms and asked that they might be permitted to retire from Russia by way of Vladivostok,

whence they hoped to be transported to France and allowed to take their place with the Allies on the western front. To this arrangement the Bolsheviki agreed, and the Czecho-Slovaks began at once embarking on trains over the Trans-Siberian Railroad. But before even the first contingents had safely reached Vladivostok, friction broke out between them and the Bolsheviki, which presently took on the aspect of an armed conflict, with remarkably successful results for the Czecho-Slovaks, who gained almost complete possession of the railroad and large areas of Siberia.

The Bolsheviki maintained that Allied intrigues had caused the Czecho-Slovaks to turn on them, while the Allied representatives laid the blame to German pressure applied to the Soviet Government. Captain Vladimir Hurban, an officer of the Czecho-Slovak Army, who came to Washington to report to Prof. Masaryk, President of the National Council of the Czecho-Slovaks, supplies details which are not only of vivid interest in themselves, but assist in fixing the responsibility for the bloodshed which resulted in such advantages to the Allied cause.

"When the Bolshevist Soviet Government signed the peace treaty in the beginning of March, 1918," says Captain Hurban, in his personal narrative, "our army of about 50,000 was in Ukrainia, near Kiev. . . . The Germans advanced against us in overwhelming numbers and there was danger that we would be surrounded. . . . The Bolshevist Red Guards had seized the locomotives and were fleeing east in panic. Under these circumstances Emperor Charles sent us a special envoy with the promise that if we would disarm we should be amnestied and our land should receive autonomy. We refused to negotiate with the Austrian emperor.

"As we could not hold a front, we began to retreat to the eastward. . . . When we arrived at Bachmac the Germans were there waiting for us. There began a battle lasting four days, in which they were badly defeated and which enabled us to get our trains through. The commander of the German detachment offered us a forty-eight hour truce, which we accepted, for our duty was to leave Ukrainia. The truce was canceled by

the German chief commander, Linsingen, but too late; our trains had already got away. We lost altogether about 600 men in dead, wounded, and missing, while we buried 2,000 Germans in one day.

"In this manner we escaped from Ukrainia. Our relations with the Bolsheviki were still good. We refrained from meddling in Russian internal affairs, and we tried to come to an agreement with the Bolshevist Government with respect to our departure. or passage through Russia. But already signs were visible that the Bolsheviki, either under German influence or because we then represented the only real power in Russia, would try to put obstacles in our way. It would have sufficed to order one of our regiments—our army was then, in March, near Moscow to take Moscow, and in half a day there would have been no Bolshevist Government: for then we were well armed, having taken from the front everything we could carry, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Germans. . . . To prove indisputably our loyalty we turned over to the Bolsheviki everything, all our arms, with the exception of a few rifles (ten rifles to each 100 men). The equipment we turned over to the Bolsheviki, including arms, horses, automobiles, aeroplanes, etc., was worth more than a million rubles, and it was legally in our possession, for we took it away from the Germans, to whom it had been abandoned by the fleeing Bolsheviki. This transfer of the equipment was, of course, preceded by an agreement made between us and the Moscow Government by which we were guaranteed unmolested passage through Siberia, to which the Government pledged to give its unconditional support. . . .

"Under such circumstances we began our pilgrimage east. I was in the first train—there were then eighty trains of us—which was to prepare the way. We were determined to leave Russia without a conflict. Notwithstanding that we kept our word, that we surrendered all arms except the few necessary, our progress was hindered, and unending negotiations had to be repeated in every seat of a local soviet. We were threatened by machine guns, cannon, but we patiently stood it all, though the Bolsheviki Red Guard could have been disbanded by a few

of our volunteers. After fifty-seven days of such tiresome travel our first train arrived at Vladivostok, where we were enthusiastically received by the Allied units stationed there.

"When the Germans saw that we, notwithstanding all their intrigues, were nearing Vladivostok, they exercised a direct pressure on Lenine and Trotzky; for the things that were committed by the Soviets cannot any further be explained away on the grounds of ignorance. The trains were stopped at different stations, so that they were finally stopped at a distance of fifty miles from each other. Provoking incidents of all kinds were the order of the day. The arming of the German and Magyar prisoners was begun on a large scale. One of the orders of Tchitcherin, Bolshevist foreign minister, reads: 'Dispatch all German and Magyar prisoners out of Siberia: stop the Czecho-Slovaks.' Three members of our National Council, who were sent to Moscow for an explanation of the stopping of our trains. were arrested. At the same time our trains were attacked at different stations by Soviet troops, formed mostly of German and Magyar prisoners.

"I will recall the Irkutsk incident. Our train, with about 100 men, armed with ten rifles and twenty hand grenades, was surrounded by a few thousand Red Guards, armed with machine guns and cannon. Their commander gave our men ten minutes in which to surrender their arms, or be shot. According to their habit, our leaders began negotiations: Suddenly there was heard the German command, 'schiessen!' and the Red Guards began firing at the train. Our men jumped off the train, and in five minutes all the machine guns were in their possession, the Russian Bolsheviki disarmed, and all the Magyars and Germans done away with. The Siberian Government, which resides in Irkutsk and which, as it appeared later, ordered this attack, can thank only the intervention of the American and French consuls that it was not destroyed by our embittered volunteers.

"To what extreme our loyalty was carried is shown by the fact that, although perfidiously attacked, and although we disarmed the Red Guard in Irkutsk, we still began new negotiations, with the result that we surrendered all our arms, on the condition that all German and Magyar prisoners would be disarmed and disbanded, and that we would be allowed to proceed unmolested."

As narrated in a previous volume of this work, the Czecho-Slovaks were thus compelled to engage in military operations against the Bolsheviki, and in doing so obtained possession of large areas in Siberia, including large cities, where they were welcomed by the populations and dissolved the Soviets. On the other hand, however, many large units of them found themselves isolated and unable to proceed on their way to Vladivostok. It was to assist them to extricate themselves from these positions that the United States finally agreed to dispatch a limited military force to Russian territory. Late in July, 1918, an arrangement to this effect was made with Japan. And on August 3, 1918, an official announcement was issued at Washington, in part as follows:

"In the judgment of the Government of the United States a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of saving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all. would not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own, or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

"As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia

now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

"With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of cooperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as it may be, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

"In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia, in the most public and solemn manner, that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny."

The Japanese issued a similar declaration a few days later, also disclaiming any desire for territorial aggrandizement at the cost of Russia.

During the first week of August, 1918, about 7,000 American soldiers, most of them regulars from the Philippines, were landed at Vladivostok, the United States Government announcing, on August 7, 1918, that Major General William S. Graves, former assistant chief of the Army General Staff, would have command of the American expedition. The Japanese landed a similar force, under General Kikuzo Otani, president of the famous military technical school of Toyama Gakko, and who, on account of his senior rank, would assume command of the entire Allied force. The French and British landed smaller forces each, the former being native troops from Tonkin and the British being local garrisons from India.

Meanwhile the Czecho-Slovak Army in the interior of Russia continued its operations. On July 26, 1918, they reported the capture of Simbirsk, 600 miles east of Moscow; on the last day of the month they gained possession of a large railroad bridge at Syzram, in the Volga region, and on the following day they took the city of Ekaterinburg, where the czar had been executed by order of the Ural regional soviet. In western Siberia they ordered the mobilization of the classes from 1912 to 1920, at Omsk. It was also reported that they were being joined by thousands of Rumanians and Italians who had formerly been soldiers in the Austrian armies and had later been taken prisoners by the imperial Russian armies. By this time it was generally recognized that the original plan of the Czecho-Slovaks, to withdraw from Russia by way of Vladivostok, had been changed to one whereby they were to remain and from the nucleus about which the anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia and the Allies might reconstruct an eastern front against the German forces.

The Japanese, being the first to land at Vladivostok, were the first to advance into the interior, and they immediately took up their position along the Ussuri River, which forms the eastern boundary of Manchuria with Siberia. The Americans, as soon as they arrived, occupied the railway toward Nikolsk.

At this time, in the middle of August, 1918, the main forces of the enemy, Russian Bolsheviki and German and Magyar ex-

prisoners, were located near Chita, in Transbaikalia, numbering about 50,000. Others occupied positions along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, north of Vladivostok.

On August 24, 1918, the first serious fighting took place, when the Japanese, supported by their allies, drove the Red Guards fifteen miles north from the Ussuri. Here the enemy numbered about 8,000, consisting of infantry and some artillery. Four days later the Japanese occupied Krasnoyarsk and Blagovyeshchensk. On September 7, 1918, the Bolshevist naval base at Khabarovsk was taken by Japanese cavalry, the booty including seventeen gunboats, four other vessels, and 120 guns.

One of the objects of the expedition was to establish communications with the Czecho-Slovaks far in the interior of the country, and this was quickly accomplished by an unexpected success on the part of the Allied forces. The isolated Czecho-Slovak army near Lake Baikal, under Colonel Gaida, had been endeavor ing to advance toward Chita. General Semenov, the Russian anti-Bolshevist leader, with a force of Cossacks supported by Japanese, had been coming out of China and was also advancing toward Chita. A delayed dispatch from the American Consul at Irkutsk, dated August 13, 1918, brought word that the Bolsheviki army east of Lake Baikal had been destroyed, and on September 4, 1918, telegraphic communication between Irkutsk and Vladivostok was reopened. On the same day it was announced that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Cossacks and Japarese under Semenov had joined hands at Chita and that that main stronghold was taken. This gave the Allied forces entire control of the railways in Siberia as far west as Samara, on the Volga River, a few hundred miles from Moscow.

During this period the anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia were cooperating with these efforts in their behalf. On August 5, 1918, the Russian embassy in Washington announced the formation of a new government in Siberia, whose chief purpose was to oust the soviets and bring Russia back in line with the Allies against Germany.

"The United Siberian Government," said the statement in part, "states that it was elected on January 26, 1916, by the

members of a regional Siberian Duma-representative assembly. The point where this government has temporarily transferred its center is Vladivostok, the other members of it remaining at Omsk. A message from those at Omsk has just been received, stating that, owing to the combined efforts of the Czecho-Slovaks and the military organizations of the Siberian Government itself, the following cities have been liberated from the Bolsheviki: Mariinsk, Novo Nicolavevsk, Tomsk, Narim, Tobolsk, Barnaul, Semipalatinsk, Karkarlinski, Atchinsk, and Krasnoyarsk. . . . The 'Temporary Government of Siberia' adds a public statement of its political aims, which are: the creation of a Russian army, well disciplined, in order to reestablish, in cooperation with the Allies, a battle front against Germany. Siberia, being an inseparable part of United Russia, the Temporary Government of Siberia believes it to be its first duty to safeguard, in the territory of Siberia, the interests of the whole of Russia, to recognize all the international treaties and agreements of Russia with friendly nations which were in force until October 25, 1917, the moment of the Bolshevist uprising. . . ."

#### CHAPTER VII

# ALLIED INTERVENTION IN THE NORTH OF RUSSIA

As recounted in the previous installment of this work, the Allies and the United States had already, in July, 1918, landed troops in the Murmansk Peninsula, in northern Russia, primarily to ward off a German invasion through Finland, secondly to guard those military supplies and stores which the imperialist Government had purchased in Great Britain and America, though they were still not paid for. These supplies were largely stored in Kola, and there was fear that the Germans, either directly, or through pressure applied to the Soviet Government in Moscow, might obtain possession of them.

The first Allied forces had been landed on July 15, 1918, and included some American marines. On the following day, in declaring the object of this act of intervention, Rear Admiral Kemp, of the British Navy, had announced that the Allied forces would advance southward "in accord with the local soviet authorities, and at the request of the local population for help."

On August 4, 1918, another force was landed at Archangel, on the south shore of the White Sea, and had taken control of the coast northward to Murmansk. Included in this force were some American troops and members of the Russian Officers League. An anti-Bolshevist revolution had already taken place in Archangel, and when the Allies landed they were greeted with much enthusiasm by the population.

Under the protection of the Allied forces in this region a Provisional Government of the Country of the North was at once organized, largely made up of Socialistic elements: Social Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, the minority party of the Social Democrats. The leaders were members of the Constituent Assembly which the Bolsheviki had dispersed in Petrograd, on its attempt to hold its first session. The president of the new republic was Nicholas Tchaikovsky, the noted Russian revolutionist of early days and colleague of "Grandmother" Breshkovskaya. On August 7, 1918, Tchaikovsky's Government issued a proclamation of its purposes, in which, after denouncing the Bolsheviki as traitors to Russia, it was declared that the Government of the North Country desired to defend the country against German invasion, to reestablish the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and to maintain law and order in the interests of all the people.

"The Government," continued the manifesto, "counts on the Russian, American, and British peoples, as well as those of other nations, for aid in combating famine and relieving the financial situation. It recognizes that intervention by the Allies in Russia's internal affairs is not directed against the interests of the people, and that the people will welcome the Allied troops who have come to fight against the common enemy. . . ."

The Allied forces landed in Archangel, in cooperation with those already established on the Murmansk coast, and Russian White Guards and volunteers began to advance toward the south, in the direction of Vologda, with the purpose of joining hands with the extreme western wing of the Czecho-Slovaks, and thus establish a complete chain through Russia from the White Sea to the Pacific. On August 31, 1918, an attack was made on Obozerskaya, seventy-five miles south of Archangel, and taken.

On September 8, 1918, Tchaikovsky's Government was overthrown by elements opposed to it, though still in favor of Allied intervention, but four days later these counter-revolutionary forces were persuaded to retire from the field and permit Tchaikovsky to reestablish himself. On September 11, 1918, more American troops were landed to augment the Allied forces, these Americans being men picked for their special fitness for standing the rigors of a northern Russian winter. In the middle of September, 1918, the first really serious contact with the enemy took place and, as admitted by Pravda, the official organ of the Bolsheviki in Moscow, the Soviet forces were seriously defeated and driven southward. Many Bolshevist officers, said Pravda, had deserted to the enemy.

### CHAPTER VIII

# THE BOLSHEVIKI RESENT ALLIED INTERVENTION

THE first landing of Allied soldiers, on the Murmansk Coast, had brought forth a strong protest from the Soviet Government in Moscow, and though the Allied Governments, and especially the United States, were still inclined to hold friendly relations with the Bolshevist Government, these relations now began undergoing a decided change. On July 29, 1918, Lenine, at a closed meeting of the executive committee of his Government.

had declared that Russia was in a state of war with the Entente nations, but when the Entente diplomats sought further details regarding this statement, the Foreign Minister, Tchitcherin, replied that this was merely a private utterance on the part of the Bolshevist premier and had not been made in his official capacity; that, at any rate, it was meant only to imply that Russia was defending herself against foreign invasion. At the time he urged the American ambassador and the other Allied representatives, who were then in Vologda, to return to Moscow. But instead of complying with this request Mr. Francis and his colleagues removed to Archangel, where they would be under the protection of the Allied forces of occupation. In a final message to the Russian foreign minister. Mr. Francis stated that he had no intention of quitting Russia, and that at any rate he would only be absent temporarily. The Allied consuls, he added, would remain. Tchitcherin, on the other hand, said that, even if they did depart, the absence of the Allied diplomats would not affect the situation, and that there was no reason why the consuls and citizens of the Allied nations should not remain in Russia.

On August 10, 1918, the Bolshevist authorities arrested the British acting consul general in Moscow, together with six of his staff and several French diplomatic agents. The reason given was that the Bolshevist forces had been fired upon by the Allies on landing in Archangel. Great Britain immediately responded by arresting the Bolshevist representative in London, M. Litvinov. A few days later the Britishers arrested in Moscow were released. Nevertheless, De Witt C. Poole, American consul in Moscow, fearing that he might be arrested next, destroyed his private codes, turned over the archives of the consulate to the Swedish consul, then applied for a passport to leave the country.

Hitherto the Soviet Government had shown some discrimination in favor of the United States in dealing with foreign diplomats, its members recognizing the disinterestedness of the United States Government and showing appreciation of President Wilson's reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

But after Washington's announcement of its decision to participate in the Siberian expedition together with Japan, this attitude underwent a change. After that announcement had been made, the Soviet Government at Moscow issued a reply to the Japanese and American statements (of August 3, 1918), which was published in the "Tageblatt" of Berlin on August 20, 1918. The following is a translation of this German version:

"The American and Japanese Governments have addressed a message to the Russian people in connection with the landing of their forces on Russian territory. Both Governments declare their armed intervention was dictated by the desire to come to the aid of the Czecho-Slovaks who, it is alleged, are menaced by Germans and Austrians.

"The Russian Federal Republic feels compelled to make this declaration:

"The statement made by the American and Japanese Governments is not based on accurate information. The Czecho-Slovak detachments are not menaced by either Germans or Austrians. On the soil of the Soviet Republic the battle continues between the Red Soviet Army, created by peasants and workers, on the one hand, and Czecho-Slovak detachments, in concert with landowners, the bourgeoisie, and counter-revolutionaries, on the other.

"'In this battle the workmen and peasants are defending the revolution, which is endangered by the counter-revolution, aided and abetted by the Czecho-Slovaks. The Soviet Government is convinced that its enemies are only attempting to blind proletarian elements of the population and they seek to deceive them by fostering in them the belief that Germans and Austrians are menacing the Czecho-Slovaks.

"'Should, however, the grounds of this attack on the Soviet Republic be really those stated in the Japanese-American message, the Soviet Government suggests that the Governments exactly formulate their wishes in the matter.

" 'TCHITCHERIN.'"

Of this and similar protests the Allied Governments took no notice beyond a communication which Minister Francis addressed to Foreign Minister Tchitcherin, in which he said that the pro-German activities of the Soviet Government were the cause of the animosity shown to the Bolsheviki by the Allies.

Toward the end of August, 1918, the British Government had released Litvinov, the Bolshevist representative in London, and the Soviet Government had freed the British subjects under arrest in Moscow, by mutual agreement; relations seemed about to improve. But on August 31, 1918, occurred an incident in Moscow which rendered the situation worse than ever, rousing very strong feeling against the Bolsheviki in Great Britain.

On the evening of August 30, 1918, Premier Lenine, while returning from a public meeting at which he had been a speaker, was shot by a woman and severely wounded. Lenine's place was immediately taken by Leo Kameney, vice president of the Petrograd Soviet. The would-be assassin, a girl student by the name of Dora Kaplan, was a member of the Social Revolutionary Party, which had long since declared war against the Bolsheviki, but the Soviet officials apparently believed that the initiative for the attempt on Lenine's life came from outside sources.

On the following day, August 31, 1918, a search was ordered of the British embassy in Petrograd. One of the Bolshevist commissioners was instructed to conduct the search, it being reported that the Socialist Revolutionists, Savinkov and Filonenko, were hiding on the premises of the embassy. Accompanied by a detachment of Red Guards, the commissioner, Hillier, went to the embassy and, proceeding to the first floor, was met by shots which killed one of his escort and wounded another. A fight ensued in the corridor, in which Captain Francis Cromie, the British military attaché, was killed. The police then entered the embassy and arrested forty persons. As soon as the news of the attack reached London the British Government sent the following protest to the Soviet Government:

"An outrageous attack has been made on the British embassy in Petrograd, its contents have been sacked and destroyed, Captain Cromie, who tried to defend it, was murdered, and his body barbarously mutilated. We demand immediate reparation and the prompt punishment of anyone responsible for or concerned in this abominable outrage.

"Should the Russian Soviet Government fail to give complete satisfaction, or should any further acts of violence be committed against a British subject, His Majesty's Government will hold the members of the Soviet Government individually responsible and will make every endeavor to secure that they shall be treated as outlaws by the governments of all civilized nations. and that no place of refuge shall be left them. You have already been informed through M. Litvinov that His Majesty's Government was prepared to do everything possible to secure the immediate return of the official representatives of Great Britain and of the Russian Soviet Government to their respective countries. A guarantee was given by His Majesty's Government that as soon as the British officials were allowed to pass the Russo-Finnish frontier, M. Litvinov and all the members of his staff would have permission to proceed immediately to Russia.

"We have now learned that a decree was published on August 29, 1918, ordering the arrest of all British and French subjects between the ages of eighteen and forty, and that British officials have been arrested on trumped-up charges of conspiring against the Soviet Government.

"His Majesty's Government has therefore found it necessary to place M. Litvinov and the members of his staff under preventive arrest until such time as all British representatives are set at liberty and allowed to proceed to the Finnish frontier, free from molestation."

The protest had its effect, in so far that the subjects of the Allied Governments were gradually released and allowed to leave Russia, and late in September, 1918, the British Government allowed the Bolshevist representative, held under arrest in London, to proceed to Russia.

## CHAPTER IX

#### THE REIGN OF TERROR IN RUSSIA

FOLLOWING the assassination of Mirbach, German ambassador to Moscow, on July 6, 1918, the Bolshevist authorities had begun very repressive measures against the Socialist Revolutionists, who, formerly their allies, had turned against them on the issue of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Empires. It was reported that over two hundred leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party had been executed.

It was not until the attempted assassination of Lenine, however, that the real reign of terror began. On the day after the attack on Lenine, August 31, 1918, a more successful attempt was made on the life of Moses Uritzki, Chairman of the Commission Extraordinary for Combating the Counter-Revolution, by a youth who gave the name of Leonid Kannegiessers. Uritzki died of his wounds. Two attempts were also made on the life of Dr. Karl Helfferich, Mirbach's successor as German ambassador to Moscow, with the result that he left the Russian capital hurriedly and took up his post at Pskov on August 13, 1918. Commenting on this circumstance, the "Vossische Zeitung" of Berlin said:

"The state of affairs Dr. Helfferich found in Moscow may best be judged from the fact that the Soviet Government of its own accord relieved him of the duty of paying the customary visit on his arrival to deliver his credentials."

To combat these terroristic acts, and inspired by a rage which they had aroused, the Soviet authorities initiated a reign of terror of their own. The Commission Extraordinary for Combating the Counter-Revolution issued the following decree:

"The criminal adventures of our enemies force us to reply with measures of terror. Every person found with a weapon in his hand will be immediately executed. Every person who agitates against the Soviet Government will be arrested and war St. 8—G

taken to a concentration camp, and all his private property will be seized."

Within a few days after Uritzki's assassination the repressive measures had become so severe that the neutral diplomats in Moscow, on September 3, 1918, protested to Commissary Zinoviev, without effect. Later the neutral states, through the Swiss minister, addressed a formal protest to the commissary of foreign affairs, in which they said, in part:

"Imbued only with the desire to vent their hatred on a whole class of citizens, and without being provided with any authority, armed men break in day and night into private dwellings, steal and plunder and arrest and throw into jail hundreds of unfortunates who have nothing to do with the political struggle, and whose only guilt consists in belonging to the bourgeois class, the uprooting of which the communist leaders urge in their newspapers and speeches. The anxious relatives of these people are refused all information as to where they are, and are not permitted either to visit them or bring them necessary food. Such deeds of terrorization and force on the part of men professing a desire to realize human happiness are incomprehensible. They call forth the indignation of the whole civilized world, which now has knowledge of the events in Petrograd. The diplomatic corps has found it necessary to announce its shocked feelings to the people's Commissary, M. Zinoviey. It protests with the utmost energy against the arbitrary deeds that are occurring every day."

To this protest the Soviet Government replied as follows, in part:

"When the representatives of the neutral nations threaten us with the indignation of the entire civilized world, and protest against the Red Terror in the name of humanity, we respectfully call their attention to the fact that they were not sent to Russia to defend the principles of humanity, but to preserve the interests of the capitalist state. We would advise them further not to threaten us with the indignant horror of the civilized world, but to tremble before the fury of the masses, who are rising against a civilization that has thrust humanity into the

unspeakable misery of endless slaughter... The Russian working class will crush without mercy the counter-revolutionary clique that is trying to lay the noose around the neck of the Russian working class with the help of foreign capital and the Russian bourgeoisie."

On September 21, 1918, the United States Government sent an appeal to all the Allied and neutral nations, urging them to express their condemnation of conditions in Russia, in the following terms:

"This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources revealing that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without any form of trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity, and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacres of untold innocents.

"In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to be friend the Russian people and lend them all that is possible of assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon the principles of democracy and self-government, and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this Government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this state of terrorism. Furthermore, it believes that in order to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

"You will inquire, therefore, whether the government to which you are accredited will be disposed to take some immediate action, which is entirely divorced from the atmosphere of belligerency and the conduct of war, to impress upon the perpetratrators of these crimes the aversion with which civilization regards their present wanton acts."

Most of the countries addressed indorsed this note, and the diplomatic representatives of Norway and Holland in Moscow joined in the protest.

The German and Austrian Governments also protested against the Bolshevist methods, thereby evoking the following reply:

"Germany, which violated the neutrality of Belgium and holds the populations of invaded countries under a brutal yoke, is not qualified to intervene in this question."

Like the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution, the mad oppression and persecutions of the Soviet were directed against a class; not only against the aristocrats, but against all of the property class, the so-called bourgeoisie. Anonymous letters, written by personal enemies denouncing them, were sufficient to cause the arrest and imprisonment of persons belonging to this class. During the two months following the attempt on Lenine's life, September and October, 1918, sixty-eight hostages, including five priests, were shot by the Soviet authorities. According to a Petrograd dispatch, Vladimir Kokovtzev and Prince Shoikhovskoy, former ministers of state, were among those executed. Said Norman Armour, secretary of the United States embassy, on his return to this country:

"Words are inadequate to describe what I saw in Russia during the reign of terror, misery, want, and wholesale murder."

The following extract from telegraphic instructions sent to the local soviets by Petrovsky, commissary of home affairs, will prove that much of this terroism was under official sanction:

"All Socialist Revolutionists of the Right, known to the local soviets, should be arrested immediately, numerous hostages taken from the bourgeois officer classes, and at the slightest attempt to resist or the slightest movement among the White Guards, the shooting of masses of the hostages should be begun without fail. The initiative rests especially with the local executive committees. Through the militia and the extraordinary commissions all branches of the Government must take measures to seek out and arrest persons hiding under false names and shoot without fail anybody connected with the White Guard. All the above measures should be put into immediate execution. Indecisive action on the part of local soviets must be immediately reported to the People's Commissary of Home Affairs. Not the slightest hesitation will be tolerated in the using of mass terror."

Meanwhile Petrograd and Moscow suffered immeasurable misery from lack of food. Infant mortality was said to have increased to fifty per cent, while school statistics showed an absence of children sometimes amounting to eighty per cent. One returned Red Cross worker expressed the opinion that few children would survive the coming winter.

# CHAPTER X

## FURTHER TREATIES WITH GERMANY

EARLY in September, 1918, the German papers published the text of three supplementary treaties signed between the Russian Soviet Government and Germany on August 27, 1918, and ratified by the central executive committee of the Soviet on September 2, 1918. The following are the outstanding features of these instruments:

In Clause I of the first of these treaties, known as the German-Russian Supplementary Treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. arrangement is made for German-Russian commissions to fix the lines between the armed forces of the two respective governments, allowing neutral zones in between. These commissions are also to fix points at which trade traffic is to take place. In Clause III Germany guarantees that no attack shall be made on Russian territory if the Russians will make determined efforts to expel the Entente forces beyond their frontiers. Clause IV dealing with the Baltic provinces, says: "Russia, taking account of the position at present existing in Esthonia and Livonia, renounces sovereignty over these regions, as well as interference in their internal affairs. Their future fate shall be decided in agreement with their inhabitants." The clause then sets forth arrangements to facilitate Russian commerce via Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania, providing that Russia shall receive free harbor zones at Reval, Riga, and Windau, where the storage of goods imported from or consigned to Russia can

take place without hindrance, and exports and imports from Russian customs districts can be regulated by Russian officials. Clause V provides that Germany will evacuate Russian Black Sea territory, with the exception of the Caucasus which she occupied, when the peace treaty between the Ukraine and Russia has been ratified. In Clause VI Russia agrees to recognize the independence of Georgia. Russia agrees to give Germany a fourth of the products of the Baku oil fields. In Clause VII Germany agrees to return the warships seized in the Black Sea.

The big feature of the second treaty, called the Russo-German Finance Agreement, is an indemnity to be paid to Germany by Russia, amounting to \$1,500,000,000, or six milliard marks. Of these six milliard marks one and a half milliard marks will be paid by a remittance of 245,564 kilograms of fine gold and 545,440,000 rubles in bank notes, the remaining sum to be paid in a similar manner in later remittances, on fixed dates.

In accordance with another agreement arrived at between the Soviet Government and Germany on September 15, 1918, the German troops were to begin evacuating the country east of the Berezina, each of the five sections to be vacated as soon as an installment of the Russian indemnity was paid to Germany. The conditions in the territories evacuated, or to be evacuated, were described in the following Russian official dispatch, dated October 30, 1918:

"From all regions now in German occupation it is reported that the German military authorities are carrying off everything that it is possible to take to Germany. They are devastating the country. In White Russia there are no horses and no cattle, because the Germans have taken them all. In the regions where evacuation is pending the fields remain unsown, because the Germans have left no seed. Children are dying of starvation. Milk cannot be obtained. Household furniture, telegraphic and telephonic instruments and appliances from many towns have been sent to Germany. The railroad lines have been stripped, only wrecked and useless cars being left behind."

Russia paid the first and second of the installments of the indemnity agreed upon, then suspended payment.

# CHAPTER XI

## THE BALTIC PROVINCES

N September 10, 1918, a consular report received in Washington stated that the German Government had finally completed a plan for dividing the Baltic provinces of the former Russian empire into administrative districts, all to constitute a single military administration of the Baltic provinces, with headquarters in Riga. They were to be placed under the authority of the commanding officer of the town and of Von Goesler. the administration chief, who had been at the head of the German administration in Courland. The administration of the provinces included a provincial administration for Courland, with its seat at Mitau; an administration for Livonia, with a seat at Riga; and another for Esthonia, with a seat at Reval. The town of Riga constituted in itself a special administration district, placed under the authority of the captain of the town. Lithuania constituted the military administration of Lithuania. the seat being at Vilna.

Since the defeat of the German armies the peoples of all these provinces have been looking anxiously toward the Allies for some indication of the policy to be pursued regarding disposition of their territories. Early in November, 1918, Esthonia declared itself an independent republic. The Government consists of President Constantine Paets, former mayor of Reval, and a cabinet of eight ministers, the capital being at Reval. The proclamation declared that Esthonia wished to preserve absolute neutrality, and that the Esthonian soldiers in the Russian Army would be recalled and demobilized.

In the middle of October, 1918, the Lithuanians addressed to Prince Maximilian, German chancellor, a note demanding the immediate evacuation of Lithuanian territory. The National Assembly decided to set up a national government and to create an army and a police force. Plans were also announced for the convocation of a permanent national assembly.

# PART III-THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

# CHAPTER XII

#### THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT

THE disastrous, abortive attempt of the Austro-Hungarian Larmies, made at the behest of the German high command as a blind to cover the operations planned for midsummer 1918 on the western front, has been described in detail in the last volume. It will be recalled that it consisted of two distinct phases: The Austrian offensive, begun on June 15, 1918, and resulting during the week following in considerable gains along the Piave: and the Italian counteroffensive, setting in on June 22, 1918, and resulting in the loss to the Austrians of all the newly gained ground, as well as of positions which they had held for quite some time. This counteroffensive had reached its end practically on July 6, 1918. From then on, for some three and one-half months, General Diaz employed his Italian armies, ably supported by various Allied detachments, carefully but continuously for the purpose of securing certain well-defined positions from which to land a powerful offensive move ment against the Austro-Hungarians, a movement that had been planned months earlier by the now combined Supreme Command of the Allies at the head of which had been placed General Foch.

How far the new pooling of all Allied military resources had progressed by August, 1918, is, perhaps, most typically illustrated by the appearance on the Italian front of a regiment of United States infantry. Its reception and its review by King Victor Emmanuel of Italy on August 1, 1918, is graphically

described by the London "Times" correspondent attached to Italian Headquarters.

"The American infantry," he says, "that have arrived on the Italian front marched past King Victor Emmanuel to-day. Signor Orlando, the prime minister, and Mr. Nelson Page, the American ambassador to Italy, were with the king. A cardinal-archbishop in his scarlet robes was a brilliant figure among the group of gray-clad generals and drab civilians who were waiting to pay their respects to the king.

"The unusual height and bigness of frame of the individual man was what struck one most as the long khaki column moved by. These Americans are comparatively young soldiers, but their review discipline was thoroughly steady. Looking them over, one had the feeling that in the American army the individual as such counts for more than in most European armies. The highly trained amateur, brought to the climax of personal perfection—that is the aim of American training, rather than the production of the machine-made professional soldier.

"The Italian peasants watched the Americans with admiration and delight. 'What a life I have had!' said an old dame, who served me with coffee in a wayside inn. 'I was here as a girl when the French and Piedmontese defeated the Austrians at Solferino. I remember the battle in 1866, when the Italians beat the Austrians again. Then in this war I have seen Italian, British, and French troops pass by, and at last here I am watching the Americans.'"

A stirring manifesto was issued to the Italian army recalling the close relations existing between the United States and Italy before the war and the important part Italians in recent years had been playing in the development of the New World.

Military operations on the Italian front on August 1, 1918, were of minor importance and, in this respect, were quite typical of what was to take place during August, September, and the first three weeks of October, 1918. There was moderate artillery activity along the whole front. At Alano Italian patrols forced advanced Austrian posts to withdraw, inflicting losses and taking

some prisoners. A captive balloon and six hostile aeroplanes were brought down.

The Austrian activity moderated somewhat on August 2, 1918. Italian and Allied artillery effectively bombarded Austrian lines of communication at Asiago. Along the whole front Italian patrols were extremely active.

South of Nago, on August 3, 1918, an Italian assault detackment captured by a surprise attack Hill 173 on Dosso Alto, which the Austrians had taken on June 15, 1918. In spite of determined resistance four officers and 172 men were taken prisoners after many had been killed or wounded. During the preceding night French detachments in a series of brilliant surprise attacks had penetrated deeply into the Austrian lines at Zocchi, east of Asiago, capturing some 125 men and considerable material. West of Asiago British troops broke into Gaiga, making some prisoners. In the Tasson region and in the Alano Basin Italian reconnoitering patrols gathered in considerable booty and took some prisoners.

Between Asiago and the Brenta Italian patrols on August 6, 1918, effectively harassed the enemy's advanced lines, inflicting losses and capturing prisoners.

The largest operation that the British, fighting in Italy, had yet carried out was put through between midnight and 4 a. m., August 8, 1918. It was not an attack so much as a simultaneous series of about a dozen raids along the whole of our front. To blow up dugouts, destroy machine-gun emplacements, and take prisoners were the objectives and in realizing them the British troops reached the southern fringe of Asiago town, the first Allied troops to touch its outskirts since 1916.

Like a stroke of noisy magic the British barrage burst out in the silence of the mountain night exactly at 12 o'clock. The Asiago Plateau, a natural stage for warfare, five miles or so across, with barriers of black pine-grown hills to north and south, was for the next three hours ablaze with red, bursting shells, dazzling Verey flares of different colors, solo searchlights, and the dull glow of fires. One could imagine the commotion in the Austrian lines at that sudden interruption of the peace of

the summer night. Hungarians, Croats, Bosniaks, tumbling pell-mell from their dugouts; staff officers behind the front, two hours abed, rushing half-dressed to the telephones. For three hours, while the British were about their work, the din went on, until at 3 o'clock they came back, bringing at a small cost 360 prisoners with them, and leaving many enemy dead in their ruined works.

On the same day in the Giudicaris region Italian parties forced the Chiese River. In the Daone Valley other Italian troops surprised a party of the enemy on the southern slope of Dosso del Morti and took twenty-one prisoners. This was a period of raids on a large scale. For several nights Italian or Allied guns spread their fire over the plain of northern Italy. Following on the successful British invasion of the enemy's front line, the French during the night of August 9, 1918, took five officers and 238 men in a surprise attack. On the Sisemol sector, and between there and the Brenta, the Italians brought in sixty prisoners from the enemy front lines.

Again on August 10, 1918, French troops penetrated deeply into the enemy's strong points in Monte Sisemol, destroying part of the garrison and forcing the remainder to surrender. Two hundred and fifty prisoners and eight machine guns were taken.

From their positions on Monte di Valbella, Col del Rosso, and Col di Chele Italian troops succeeded at various points in passing the enemy lines and inflicting heavy losses. They took fiftynine prisoners, suffering only slight losses themselves.

During August 10 and 11, 1918, the fighting activity along the whole front was very moderate. North of Col del Rosso Italian patrols forced back an advanced Austrian outpost. Five hostile aeroplanes were brought down.

Fighting occurred during the next few days in the Tonale region and in the Lagarina Valley. On the Piave an Italian detachment crossed the western branch of the river, made a surprise landing on an islet west of Grave di Papadopoli and occupied it. Thirty-six prisoners and four machine guns were captured.


In the Tonale region Austrian reactions against advanced Italian positions were repulsed on August 15, 1918. On the Piave, southwest of Grave di Papadopoli, three hostile attacks against the Italian garrison were driven back with heavy losses. Four hostile aeroplanes and a captive balloon were brought down.

There was lively activity by both artilleries during August 16, 1918, on the Asiago Plateau, northwest of the region of Monte Grappa, and on the middle Piave. In the upper Zebru Valley one of the Italian patrols attacked an enemy advance post at an altitude of over 11,000 feet and drove it back. Two hostile aeroplanes were downed.

On August 17, 1918, there were isolated artillery actions from Stalvio to Asiago, in the Grappa region, and on the lower Piave. After violent artillery preparation the enemy attempted, by strong encircling attacks, to retake the Piave Islet, captured by the Italians a few days earlier. After suffering heavy losses, abandoning machine guns and material, and leaving twentynine prisoners in Italian hands, the Austrians were forced to retire.

Still another Austrian attack, made the next day, August 18, 1918, against the same position broke down under Italian fire. On the whole front there were artillery duels and considerable activity by reconnoitering patrols.

Early in the morning of August 19, 1918, after violent artillery bombardments, numerous enemy troops attacked from west and from north the Italian lines on the Cornone, forming southern slopes of the Sasso Rosso, on the Asiago front. The Italian garrison stopped the enemy after a brisk hand-to-hand struggle. Reenforcements quickly arrived, counterattacked the enemy, repulsed him with heavy losses, and captured prisoners. Austrian attempts to attack Italian advanced lines north of the Ledro Lake and to surprise protection patrols north of the Col del Rosso were hindered by Italian fire. British reconnoitering parties captured a few prisoners on the Asiago Plateau. Allied batteries had been very active from the Lagarina Valley to Astico Valley. An unusual enemy artillery activity in the Asalone area provoked effective concentrations of fire on the part of the Italian batteries.



TRALY'S SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE, OCTOBER, 1918

These local minor engagements and artillery actions were typical of the fighting on the Austro-Italian front during the next ten days, indeed, with few exceptions one might say, almost during the next two months. Day by day fights between advanced posts were reported. Thus Italian reconnoitering patrols captured prisoners on August 27, 1918, as they did, indeed, on almost every day, in the Posina Valley, in the Val di Assa, and in the Grappa region. An Austrian motor boat, maneuvering on Lake Garda in the Grentino sector, was sunk by Italian artillery.

In the Concei Valley enemy attacks were averted on August 28, 1918, by Italian fire. Advanced posts were driven back with losses. Prisoners were taken on the northern slopes of Altissimo, and north of Col del Rosso hostile reconnoitering parties were dispersed.

On the following day, August 29, 1918, in the Brenta Valley, Italian infantry parties, in a successful surprise operation, captured the village of Rivalta. Successively other detachments, with the cooperation of the artillery, occupied the village of Sasso Stefani, after having overcome in a lively fight the stubborn resistance of the enemy. Thirty-eight prisoners, including one officer, were captured. In the region to the north of Col del Rosso, on the Asiago Plateau, two enemy thrusts were again completely arrested by Italian fire.

Italian artillery carried out concentrations in the mountain area on September 1, 1918. On the Piave some boats, containing Austrian troops attempting a surprise attack, were upset. At Stelvio and on the Asiago Plateau Austrian patrols were repulsed with heavy losses to them.

Along the mountainous front Italian artillery on September 6, 1918, effectively shelled the enemy's front lines and rear areas. In the Concalaghi, Pesina, and the Assa Valley Italian patrols engaged enemy exploring and drove them back. North of Monfenera an attempt to raid the advanced lines was arrested by the garrison, which afterward, by a counterattack, put the Austrians to flight with lesses. On the lower Piave Austrian scouts attempting to cross the river in small boats were driven back by rifle fire.

During the night following the French carried out a raid which was typical of the work the Allied troops accomplished on the plateau of Asiago. The two companies that made the attack had a mile and a half of no-man's-land to cross. The ground was most difficult—cut up into ravines, pitted with flooded shell holes, densely overgrown with tall grass, and littered not only with old trenches, ruined dugouts and tangles of torn barbed wire, but also with Austrian dead, who still lay there unburied since the big attack in June.

It was at night and in a dense fog that the French started out. It took three hours for the half battalion to grope its way toward the Austrian line, but shortly before 5 o'clock they were ready to attack, and at 9 minutes to 5 a fierce French box barrage—in front and behind the enemy trenches and from the flanks—was opened on the enemy trenches, and the Italian and British artillery on either side started a distracting bombardment. At 5 o'clock precisely the barrage lifted and the French infantry rushed forward to find a smashed trench in front of them, fuming with smoke and dust and strewn with dead and wounded men. Some of the stouter redoubts and machine-gun posts held out for a little while, but with bombs and fire boxes their garrisons were smoked or blasted into silence, and then with fifty prisoners the two French companies came back, having to pass, indeed, through the Austrian barrage, but losing only a few men on the way.

Austro-Hungarian patrols which attempted on September 13, 1918, to approach the Italian lines on Monte Corno, in the Grappa region of the mountain front, were repulsed by the Italian fire.

Italian infantry and ardoti parties after a short but effective artillery bombardment, and assisted by low-flying aeroplanes, in the morning of September 14, 1918, attacked and captured the whole of an Austrian defensive system on the Grovella, south of Corte. Three hundred and fifty prisoners, a number of machine guns, some hundreds of rifles, and much other war material fell into Italian hands.

In the region north and northwest of Grappa, on the northern Italian front, Italian detachments in the morning of September 15, 1918, raided the enemy lines and improved at some points the positions already occupied. The Italians took 321 prisoners and captured numerous machine guns. On the remainder of the front there were artillery duels and patrol activity.

On either side of the narrow and precipitous gorge of the Brenta River, at the point where it leaves the Austrian lines and enters the Vallian, an eyewitness of some of these attacks says, there has existed since last winter a formidable barricade of wire and a complex system of enemy trenches. Wire fills the whole valley with an impassable tangle. It lies half under water in the rushing stream itself and writhes up each wall of the steeply sloping rock on either side. Moreover, on the ledges and in the caves and crannies of those high cliffs were hidden Austrian machine guns to sweep the narrow gorge below.

Yet with a sudden attack at dawn of September 16, 1918, Italian infantry rushed the whole of this barrier system and captured nearly 350 prisoners. The fighting was severe, but short, in the dark ravine, and the Italians' victory was aided by their aeroplanes, which dived one after another into that gap between the high mountains, dropping bombs and emptying drums of machine-gun bullets upon the Austrian garrison below. Shortly afterward another sector close at hand, to the north of Mount Grappa broke into activity. A series of little raids and rushes were carried out there to improve the line in several places. At once, here too, the Italians made good their intentions, and took over 300 prisoners and a number of machine guns.

Along the whole front there were artillery actions of a harassing nature during September 10, 1918. Italian batteries caused fires at Melette, in the Asiago Plateau region and blew up an ammunition dump near Grisolera, on the lower Piave River. Attempts of hostile assault parties failed in front of the Italian lines south of Mori, at Mont Corno, and Val Arsa, to the north of Grappa and east of Salettuol.

On the other hand, Italian reconnoitering parties attacked and drove back in the Ledro Valley a small observation post of the enemy, who left dead and prisoners. Ammunition and





# AMERICAN WAR MEDALS

The Congressional Medal of Honor (Army). The Congressional Medal of Honor (Navy). Star and Oak Leaves.
The oak leaves are used on the ribbon to indicate repeated citations.

The silver star indicates that the citation is before a force commanded by a general officer.

The Distinguished Service Cross.
The Distinguished Service Medal.




EUROPEAN WAR MEDALS

4. The Serbian Cross of Karageorge. 5. Italian Medal of Miliary Valor (sometimes called the Silver Medal). The French War Cross (Croix de Guerre). The Victoria Cross. (British)
The French Military Medal (Medaille Militaire).

3 % F

British Distinguished Service Order. Belgian War Cross (Croix de Guerre). Rumanian Order of the Star of Rumania. 9.7.8



various material were brought back from reconnoissances at Tonaleselle and on the islets in the Piave in the Montello region. One hostile aeroplane was brought down. West of Feeri, and in the valley of Jenioa, there were patrol encounters with the capture of some prisoners by the Italians.

Among the Allied troops fighting with the Italians was a Czecho-Slovak unit. On September 21, 1918, an action occurred between these troops and German and Hungarian forces on the Trentino front. It was the first in Italy in which the Czecho-Slovaks operated as a unit in their regular formation. The enemy launched the attack, prepared with greatest secrecy, east of Lake Garda. It appeared from the dispatches that the Germans and Magyars had no definite territorial objective, but planned the stroke in the hope of gaining support for the Austrian claim that the Czecho-Slovaks would give way voluntarily when faced by the army of the country that so long had held them in subjugation.

It was believed in Rome and by officials of the Czecho-Slovak Headquarters in Washington that if the Austrians had achieved even a local success they would, after executing as traitors any Czecho-Slovaks taken prisoners, have again affirmed that the Czecho-Slovaks did not wish to fight against Austria.

The assault was begun at daybreak by picked detachments composed exclusively of Magyars and Germans under General Schiesser. It followed a destructive artillery fire in which thousands of gas shells were used. The Czecho-Slovaks went over the top to meet the foe, and the first column was forced to retire. The second column, after desperate hand-to-hand fighting, succeeded in occupying a part of the Czecho-Slovak position, but was driven out after a bloody battle. No prisoners were taken by either side.

Premier Orlando of Italy paid homage to the valor of the Czecho-Slovaks by a telegram of congratulation to the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris.

For the next few weeks this continuous struggle on the part of the Italians to secure the positions necessary for their men was maintained without change.

War St. 8-H

# PART IV—BEGINNING OF THE END

# CHAPTER XIII

# THE INTERNAL COLLAPSE OF GERMANY

In spite of the decisive and continuous defeats which the Allies administered to the German armies on the western front in midsummer 1918, the German Government maintained in its public utterances its usual confidence in a victorious outcome of the war. Apropos of the fourth anniversary of the war the German emperor issued one of his typical, high-sounding addresses to the army and navy in which he said:

"Serious years of war lie behind you. The German people, convinced of its just cause, resting on its hard sword, and trusting in God's gracious help, has, with its faithful allies, confronted a world of enemies. Your vigorous fighting spirit carried war in the first year into the enemy's country and preserved the homeland from the horrors and devastations of war. In the second and third years of war you, by destructive blows, broke the strength of the enemy in the east. Meanwhile your comrades in the west offered a brave and victorious front to enormously superior forces.

"As the fruit of these victories the fourth year of war brought us peace in the east. In the west the enemy was heavily hit by the force of your assault. The battles won in recent months count among the highest deeds of fame of German history. You are in the midst of the hardest struggle. Desperate efforts of the enemy will, as hitherto, be foiled by your bravery. Of that I am certain, and with me the entire Fatherland.

"American armies and numerical superiority do not frighten us. It is spirit which brings a decision. Prussian and German history teaches that, as well as the course which the campaign has hitherto taken.

"In comradeship with the army stands my navy. In the unshakable will to victory, in the struggle with opponents who are often superior, and despite the united efforts of the greatest naval powers of the world, my submarines, sure of success, are tenaciously attacking and fighting the vital forces which are streaming across the sea to the enemy. Ever ready for battle, the high-sea forces in untiring work guard the road for the submarines to the open sea and, in union with the defenders of the coast, safeguard for them the sources of their strength.

"Far from home, a small heroic band of our colonial troops is offering a brave resistance to a crushingly superior force.

"We remember with reverence all who have given their lives for the Fatherland. Filled with care for its brothers in the field, the people at home is in its self-sacrificing devotion placing its entire strength at the service of our great cause. We must and we shall continue the fight until the enemy's will to destruction is broken. We will make every sacrifice and put forth every effort to that end. In this spirit the army and the homeland are inseparably bound together. Their united stand and their unbending will will bring victory in the struggle for Germany's right and Germany's freedom. God grant it!"

It was not long, however, before signs appeared that this spirit of confidence was gradually, but surely waning. During the latter part of August and the early part of September, 1918, no opportunity was permitted to pass by the leading men of the German Government that they did not use to indicate to the Allies that German demands had been extensively pared down. The emperor, the crown prince, Von Hindenburg, the chancellor (Von Hertling), Dr. Solf, the foreign minister, and a large number of minor lights continuously expressed in their speeches at every possible occasion how eager they were for peace and how willing they were to come to an understanding.

Early in September, 1918, it became known that General von Linsingen had placed the city of Berlin and the province of Brandenburg in a state of siege and had announced that heavy penalties would be imposed on persons inventing or circulating untrue rumors calculated to disquiet the populace. About the same time a proclamation of considerable length was issued by Field Marshal von Hindenburg warning the German people to resist the "poisonous" propaganda by which the Allies were attempting to undermine their morale. A few days later the emperor made a remarkable speech to the workers of the Krupp works at Essen, remarkable for its unusual moderation as well as for the plea it contained to support the army. Never before in the history of the German emperor had he addressed an assembly of workers in a similar tone of appeal and with as little of the spirit of command.

Momentous events now began to happen in Germany in quick succession. On September 29, 1918, Chancellor von Hertling, Vice Chancellor von Paver, and Foreign Minister von Hintze tendered their resignations, which the emperor accepted. They were succeeded respectively by Prince Max of Baden, Mathias Erzberger, and Dr. W. S. Solf. The first of these was the heir presumptive to the grand ducal throne of Baden, a man about fifty years old and with comparatively moderate and progressive views. The second was a leader of the Centrist (Catholic) party and had frequently expressed his opposition to indemnities and annexations. The third, the former Colonial Secretary, also could be considered as a man of moderate political views. At the same time a number of Socialists entered the Cabinet. Dr. Eduard David became Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Herr Bauer, Secretary of State of the Labor Office, and Philipp Scheidemann, Majority Socialist leader, Secretary of State without Portfolio.

No time was lost by the new chancellor in starting a new drive for a peace by negotiation. On October 4, 1918, he sent through the Swiss Government his famous note appealing to President Wilson for immediate institution of peace negotiations, based on the President's message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and on his speech of September 27, 1918, involving the "Fourteen Points." This was followed by an exchange of notes between the German Government and the President, which will

be found in another chapter, and which, in a way, may be considered the beginning of the end.

The day after Prince Max had sent his first note he made a speech in the Reichstag which perhaps was the most moderate utterance made by any member of the German Government since the start of the war. In it he declares his agreement with the program of the majority parties in the Reichstag which, according to the "Berliner Tageblatt," involved:

- "(1) Adherence to the Imperial Government's reply to the papal note of August 1, 1917.
- "(2) Declaration of readiness to join the League of Nations in accordance with the following principles—namely, that the league shall comprise all states, and be based on the idea of equality for all peoples, its aim is to safeguard a lasting peace. independent existence and free economic development for all peoples; the League of Nations, with all its resources, protects the states which join it in the rights guaranteed to them by the league, which recognizes their possessions and excludes all special treaties opposed to the aims of the league; the foundations of the league are comprehensive, and comprise the extension of international law, reciprocal obligation of states to submit to peaceful treatment every conflict which is not solvable by diplomatic means, the carrying out of the principle of freedom of the seas, the understanding regarding all-round simultaneous disarmament on land and water, the guaranteeing of an open door for economic, civil, and legal intercourse between nations, and international extension of social legislation and protection for workers.
- "(3) An unequivocal declaration regarding the restoration of Belgium and an agreement regarding indemnification.
- "(4) The peace treaties hitherto concluded must form no hindrance to the general conclusion of peace. In the Baltic provinces of Lithuania and Poland, popular assemblies are to be created at the earliest possible moment on a broad basis. These states, where civil administration is to be introduced at the earliest possible moment, are to settle their own constitutions and their relations to neighboring peoples.

- "(5) Provides for the establishment of an independent federal state of Alsace-Lorraine, with full autonomy corresponding to the demand of Alsace-Lorraine for a popular assembly.
- "(6) The carrying out without delay of electoral reform in Prussia; likewise the endeavor to bring about such reform in those federal states which are still without it.
- "(7) Aims at coordination of the Imperial Government and the summoning of Government representatives from Parliament to carry out a uniform Imperial policy. The strict observance of all constitutional responsibility. The abolition of all military institutions that serve for the exercise of political influence.
- "(8) Says that with a view to the protection of personal liberty, right of meeting, and the freedom of the press, prescriptions regarding the state of siege shall immediately be amended and the censorship restricted to questions of relations to foreign governments, war, strategy, and tactics, troop movements, and the manufacture of war material. The establishment of a political control department for all measures taken on the ground of the state of siege is also demanded."

During the next two weeks a number of constitutional reforms were instituted. The Prussian Diet passed an equal franchise law. The emperor's prerogative to make war and peace and to make treaties with foreign nations was abridged and required the consent of the Federal Council and the Reichstag.

Day by day now the signs of internal collapse became more evident. On October 24, 1918, Dr. Karl Liebknecht was released from prison. Three days later the emperor accepted the resignation of General von Ludendorff, considered generally the head and leader of the militarists and junkers. On the same day a meeting of the Crown Council and of many dignitaries of the entire empire took place. Abdication of the emperor and crown prince became one of the principal topics of discussion, even though the emperor on November 3, 1918, in a manifesto expressed his full support of all reforms.

On November 7, 1918, the German fleet revolted. Kiel was seized by the Soldiers' Council. The emperor's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, was reported to have fled. On November 8,

1918, the chancellor resigned, but his resignation was not accepted. On the same day Bavaria was declared a republic. The revolution broke out in many other parts of the empire. On November 9, 1918, the chancellor published the following decree:

"The kaiser and king has decided to renounce the throne.

"The Imperial Chancellor will remain in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the kaiser, the renouncing by the crown prince of the throne of the German Empire and of Prussia, and the setting up of a regency have been settled.

"For the regency he intends to appoint Deputy Ebert as Imperial Chancellor, and he proposes that a bill shall be brought in for the establishment of a law providing for the immediate promulgation of general suffrage and for a constitutional German National Assembly, which will settle finally the future form of government of the German nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the empire.

THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR."

The new German chancellor, the Socialist Deputy Friedrich Ebert, announced these momentous events in the following manifesto, dated November 10, 1918:

"Citizens: The ex-Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, in agreement with all the secretaries of state, has handed over to me the task of liquidating his affairs as chancellor. I am on the point of forming a new Government in accord with the various parties, and will keep public opinion freely informed of the course of events.

"The new Government will be a Government of the people. It must make every effort to secure in the quickest possible time peace for the German people and consolidate the liberty which they have won.

"The new Government has taken charge of the administration, to preserve the German people from civil war and famine and to accomplish their legitimate claim to autonomy. The Government can solve this problem only if all the officials in town and country will help.

"I know it will be difficult for some to work with the new men who have taken charge of the empire, but I appeal to their love of the people. Lack of organization would in this heavy time mean anarchy in Germany and the surrender of the country to tremendous misery. Therefore, help your native country with fearless, indefatigable work for the future, everyone at his post.

"I demand everyone's support in the hard task awaiting us. You know how seriously the war has menaced the provisioning of the people, which is the first condition of the people's existence. The political transformation should not trouble the people. The food supply is the first duty of all, whether in town or country, and they should not embarrass, but rather aid, the production of food supplies and their transport to the towns.

"Food shortage signifies pillage and robbery, with great misery. The poorest will suffer the most, and the industrial worker will be affected hardest. All who illicitly lay hands on food supplies or other supplies of prime necessity or the means of transport necessary for their distribution will be guilty in the highest degree toward the community.

"I ask you immediately to leave the streets and remain orderly and calm."

On the same day the emperor and the crown prince fled to Holland, where they were promptly interned. Not until some time later did the actual text of their abdications become known; that of the emperor was published on November 30, 1918, and that of his eldest son on December 6, 1918. The former read:

"I hereby for all the future renounce my rights to the Crown of Prussia and my rights to the German Imperial Crown. At the same time I release all officials of the German Empire and Prussia, as well as all the noncommissioned officers and men of the Navy, of the Prussian Army, and of the Federal contingents, from the oath of fealty which they have made to me as their Kaiser, King, and Supreme Commander. I expect of them that until the reorganization of the German people they will

assist those who have been entrusted with the duty of protecting the nation against the threatening danger of anarchy, famine, and foreign rule.

"Given under our own hand and our Imperial Seal, Amerongen, November 28, 1918.

"(Signed) WILHELM."

One by one the kings, grand dukes, dukes, and princes of the various German states abdicated and, finally, the last autocratic monarchies of the western world had disappeared.

# CHAPTER XIV

# THE LIBERATION OF THE HOLY LAND-

TERUSALEM surrendered, it will be recalled, to General Allenby, commander in chief of the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force, on December 9, 1917. Two days later he entered, at the head of his victorious army, the Holy City, at last again in the hands of Christendom. From then on the British advance continued steadily, even if slowly, toward the north across the whole breadth of Palestine. Jericho fell on February 21, 1918. There was much fighting during March and April. 1918, but after that a period of comparative inactivity set in which was utilized by the British to repair the damages which war had wrought in the Holy Land and to carry through sanitary and administrative reforms which laid a sound foundation for bringing back some of the glory of past centuries. Not until September, 1918, did any military operations of importance occur. Then, however, a new British offensive set in, described in the following pages, which was to drive the Turks forever out of Palestine, Syria, and Arabia.

Much the same story is to be told about the British operations in Mesopotamia, along the Tigris and Euphrates. There, it will


be remembered, General Maude had captured Bagdad, the ancient capital of the Caliphs, on March 11, 1917, and had then followed up his success by a steady advance in a northwesterly direction until he fell a victim to cholera on November 19, 1917. He had been succeeded in the command in chief of the Indian Expeditionary Force by General Marshall, who, with the same tenacity as his lamented predecessor and as his companion in arms in Palestine, continued to push the British advance during the balance of 1917 and the first half of 1918. The ancient city of Hit was captured in March, 1918, and from then on the Turks were driven back without let-up.

A considerable share of the victory in Palestine was due to the Arabs who had rebelled against the Turk and, under the king of the Hedjaz, had allied themselves with the British. As early as February, 1918, the Arab and British fronts had been joined at the Dead Sea, and from then on had cooperated in the closest possible manner against the common enemy whom even German support was to avail nothing.

During the early summer of 1918, comparative inactivity ruled along the Palestine front. In August, 1918, only a few minor operations were reported. Thus, on the morning of August 8, 1918, an extensive bombing raid was carried out by Royal Air Force and Australian units against the Turkish camps and establishments in the vicinity of Amman railway station, on the Hedjaz Railway, twenty-five miles east of the Jericho bridgehead.

On the same day Imperial Camel troops, cooperating with the Arab forces of the king of the Hedjaz, seized Mudawara railway station on the Hedjaz Railway, sixty-five miles south of Maan, killing thirty-five and capturing 120 of the enemy, with two guns and three machine guns.

During the night of August 12, 1918, British troops carried out a series of successful raids at various points on a frontage of ten miles astride the Jerusalem-Nablus (Shechem) road, killing some 200 of the enemy and capturing seventeen Turkish officers and 230 of other ranks, with fifteen machine guns.



THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE, SYRIA, AND MESOPOTAMIA BY THE BRITISH ARMIES

Then again there was a month of inactivity, ominous by its very quietness. And, indeed, before long the storm broke. Soon after the middle of September, 1918, a carefully planned offensive was started by General Allenby, an offensive which was destined to free the Holy Land from Turkish domination.

During the night of September 18, 1918, British troops commenced a general attack on the front between the Jordan and the sea. To the east of the Jerusalem-Shechem road British and Indian troops advanced and successfully intercepted the Turkish road communications leading southeast from Shechem.

Early in the morning of September 19, 1918, the main attack, in which French troops participated, was launched, after a short bombardment, between Rafat and the coast.

The Allied infantry made rapid progress, overrunning the entire hostile defensive system on this frontage by 8 a. m., and penetrating to a maximum depth of five miles before swinging eastward. Tul Keram railway junction was occupied in the course of the afternoon, while a brigade of Australian Light Horse had reached the main Tul Keram-Messudieh railway and road in the vicinity of Anebta, cutting off large bodies of the retreating enemy, with guns and transport. Meantime a strong cavalry force of British, Indian, and Australian troops, moving northward in the coastal plain, seized the road junction of Hudeira, nineteen miles from the point of departure, and twenty-eight miles north of Joppe, by midday.

East of the Jordan, a strong detachment of the Arab troops of the king of the Hedjaz, descending on the Turkish railway junction of Deraa, severed the rail communications leading north, south, and west from that center. Naval units cooperated with the advance of the land troops, clearing the coastal roads with gunfire.

By 8 p. m. on September 19, 1918, over 3,000 prisoners had passed through corps cages, many more being reported, but not yet counted. Large quantities of material had also been taken.

By 8 p. m. on September 20, 1918, the enemy resistance had collapsed everywhere, save on the Turkish left in the Jordan

Valley. The British left wing, having swung round to the east, had reached the line Bidieh-Baka-Messudieh Junction, astride the rail and roads converging on Shechem from the west. The right wing, advancing through difficult country against considerable resistance, had reached the line Khan Jibeit-Es Sawieh, facing north astride the Jerusalem-Shechem road. On the north, cavalry, traversing the Field of Armageddon, had occupied Nazareth, Afuleh, and Beisan, and were collecting the disorganized masses of enemy troops and transport as they arrived from the south.

All avenues of escape open to the enemy, except the fords across the Jordan between Beisan and Jisr-ed-Damieh, a distance of twenty-seven miles, were thus closed. East of the Jordan, the Arab forces of the king of the Hedjaz had effected numerous demolitions on the railways radiating from Deraa, several important bridges, including one in the Yarmuk Valley, having been destroyed.

By 9 p. m. on September 21, 1918, the infantry of the British left wing, pivoting on their left about Bir Asur, five miles east by north from Tul Keram, had reached the line Beit Dejan-Semaria-Bir Asur, shepherding the enemy on and west of the Jerusalem-Shechem road into the arms of the cavalry operating southward from Jenin and Beisan.

Other enemy columns vainly attempted to escape into the Jordan Valley, in the direction of Jisr-ed Damieh, southeast of Shechem, which was still held by enemy troops. These columns suffered severely from British aircraft, which constantly harassed them with bombs and machine-gun fire from low altitudes.

In the vicinity of Lake Galilee British cavalry detachments held Nazareth and the rail and road passages over the Jordan at Jisr el Mujamia.

Having seized the passages off the Jordan at Jisr-ed Damieh, twenty-three miles north of the Dead Sea, on the morning of September 22, 1918, the last avenue of escape open to the enemy west of the river was closed. The Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies virtually ceased to exist. Their entire transport was in British hands.

By September 22, 1918, 25,000 prisoners and 260 guns had been counted, but many prisoners and much material remained to be enumerated.

East of the Jordan the enemy was reported on September 24, 1918, withdrawing toward Amman, on the Hedjaz Railway, twenty-four miles east of the Jordan, pursued by Australian, New Zealand, East Indian, and Jewish troops, which had reached Es Salt, eleven miles east of the Jordan, capturing guns and prisoners. In the north cavalry had occupied Jaifa and Acre, after slight opposition.

The Arab forces of King Hussein had occupied Maan, about seventy miles south of the Dead Sea and were harassing the bodies of the enemy retreating northward toward Amman along the Hedjaz Railway.

Operations against Amman were begun at dawn of September 26, 1918, by the Anzacs. By 2 o'clock that afternoon this ancient stronghold of the Turks, in the defense of which they were assisted by German forces, had been rushed by New Zealand troops.

On the north affairs were progressing equally favorable to the British forces. During the night of September 27, 1918, the cavalry of General Allenby's Army swam and forded the Jordan north of Lake Tiberias, and on the day following captured the high ground to the east. Early that morning they were astride the Damascus road at Dar Ezaras and later that day they had advanced to El Kuneitrah, forty miles southwest of Damascus.

On the same day other cavalry detachments of General Allenby's Army joined hands with the Arab Army at Deraa, in Gilead. From then on, both from the Jordan crossing and from Deraa, British cavalry and armored cars pushed forward to Damascus, either route being about fifty miles in length. The Arabs were cooperating on the Deraa-Damascus line, which is that of the Hedjaz Railway. In their pursuit the advancing columns crossed both the Pharpar and the Albana, "the rivers of Damascus." By the evening of September 30, 1918, British cavalry had established themselves on the north, west, and south of Damas-

cus. From the enemy rear guards, which disputed the advance throughout the day, 1,000 prisoners and five guns were taken. Finally, troops of the Australian Mounted Division entered Damascus during the night of September 30, 1918. At 6 a. m. on October 1, 1918, the city was occupied by a British force and and by a portion of the Arab Army of King Hussein. Over 7,000 prisoners were taken. After the surrender, with the exception of necessary guards, all the Allied troops were withdrawn from the city, and for the time being the local authorities remained responsible for its administration.

Damascus has a population of from 230,000 to 300,000. It is the starting point of the Hedjaz Railway, built by Abdul Hamid, nominally for the benefit of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, but in reality to increase the Ottoman hold on western Arabia. This line connects southward with the railways to Palestine, while westward a railway runs to the important seaport of Beirut. Northward a railway runs to Homs and Aleppo, fifty miles distant, where it connects with the Bagdad Railway.

During the next few days there was no change in the general situation. To the north and west of Damascus, on the Aleppo and Beirut roads respectively, British cavalry were clearing the country, and took over 15,000 prisoners in that area.

Since the commencement of operations on the night of September 18, 1918, over 71,000 prisoners and 350 guns had been captured, besides some 8,000 prisoners claimed by the Arab Army of King Hussein. Included in these figures are the Turkish commanders of the Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, Fifty-third, and composite divisions, the commander of the Maan garrison, and German and Austrian troops numbering over 200 officers and 3,000 of other ranks.

In the afternoon of October 6, 1918, Zahleh, at the foot of Mount Lebanon, and Raysk, respectively thirty-three and thirty miles northwest of Damascus, were occupied by British cavalry. Raysk is the point at which the enemy broad-gauge railway from the north joins the 1.05-meter gauge system of Palestine. The latter system was now, therefore, entirely in British hands. 'A considerable quantity of rolling stock, ammunition, and engi-

neer stores were captured. The railway station and aerodrome had been burned by the retreating enemy prior to evacuation.

In the coastal area the enemy evacuated Beirut and retired northward. Saida (Sidon) was occupied by British troops on October 7, 1918, without opposition. French and British warships entered the port of Beirut on October 6, 1918, finding the town evacuated by the enemy.

On October 7, 1918, British armored cars, preceding cavalry and infantry columns, arrived, and on October 8, 1918, advanced detachments of British and Indian infantry occupied the place, being received enthusiastically by the inhabitants.

The number of prisoners taken by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, exclusive of those taken by the Arab Armies, had risen to over 75,000, and it was estimated that of the entire strength of the Turkish Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies not more than 17,000 in all had escaped, this figure including about 4,000 effective rifles. Many of the prisoners captured were in a lamentable state of exhaustion. The prisoners taken by the Arab forces numbered 8,000, so that the total captures by the Allies in Palestine and Syria since September 18, 1918, amounted to over 83,000. Of these over 3,200 were Germans or Austrians.

In occupying Beirut the British captured sixty Turkish officers and 600 men. Baalbek was entered by armored car batteries on October 9, 1918, after a force of some 500 Turks had surrendered to the inhabitants. Advanced British cavalry and armored cars occupied Tripoli thirty-five miles north of Beirut, on October 13, 1918, and Homs, on the Damascus-Aleppo Railroad, about eighty miles distant from either of these two cities, on October 15, 1918.

In Mesopotamia British troops continued to pursue the Turks on both banks of the Tigris. On October 25, 1918, British columns moving up the eastern bank forced the passage of the Lesser Zab near its mouth in conjunction with cavalry, which had crossed this river on the previous evening seven miles farther upstream. The latter movement turned the left flank of a Turkish force holding the angle formed by the junction of the Lesser

Zab with the Tigris, and assisted the main body to drive the enemy across the Tigris to the western bank.

Meanwhile other British troops advancing up the right of western bank of the Tigris over a difficult country, much cut up by ravines, forced the Turks from a hill position which they were holding in prolongation of their forces on the left bank. The enemy, after burning their stores, retired about four miles farther up the river.

On the Kirkuk road, the main Bagdad-Mosul highway, lying east of the Tigris, British patrols entered the southern outskirts of Kirkuk. The Turks appear to be occupying in strength the high ground to the north of the town, which is about 100 miles southeast of Mosul.

On October 26, 1918, the Turks still held a strong position on the Jebel Hamrin, west of the mouth of the Lesser Zab. But on the previous day British armored cars, moving by the desert track farther to the west, had struck in on the Turkish line of communications in the neighborhood of Kalet Shergat, where they attacked the enemy's convoys.

At the same time British cavalry, moving up the left bank of the Tigris, threatened the enemy's line of communication from the east. The pressure of British troops in front, combined with attacks on their communications, compelled the Turks to retreat twelve miles to the north during the night of October 26, 1918, to a position three miles south of Kalet Shergat.

By October 27, 1918, the British main body was in touch with Turkish troops covering the crossing of the Lesser Zab.

All that day Turkish reserves tried to break through the Eleventh Indian Cavalry Brigade, who barred the road to Mosul, but without success, though the arrival of Turkish reenforcements from Mosul forced that brigade to draw back its right in order to cover its rear.

On the night of October 27-28, 1918, the Seventh Indian Cavalry Brigade joined the Eleventh, and the Fifty-third Indian Infantry Brigade, moving up the east bank after a march of thirty-three miles, was able to support the cavalry in preventing any Turks from breaking through northward. On October 28, War St. 8—I

1918, the Seventeenth Indian Division successfully assaulted the Turkish Shergat position, and on the 29th, though exhausted by their continuous fighting and marching through the rugged hills, pushed forward and attacked till nightfall the Turks who were now hemmed in.

On the merning of October 30, 1918, the Turkish commander surrendered his entire force, consisting of the whole of the Fourteenth Division, the bulk of the Second Division, and portions of two regiments of the Fifth Division, with all their artillery trains and administrative services, amounting to some 8,000 men.

In the meantime, British advanced cavalry and armored cars had occupied Aleppo on the morning of October 26, 1918, after overcoming slight opposition.

British cavalry immediately renewed their advance and by October 28, 1918, they were fifteen miles north of Aleppo, having occupied Muslimie station, the junction of the Bagdad and Damascus-Aleppo Railways.

That evening British cavalry, moving up the east bank of the Tigris, forded the river north of Kalat Shergat, joined the armored cars which approached from the west, and established themselves astride the Turkish communications with Mosul.

There they were heavily attacked by the Turks on October 29, 1918, and, though the right flank had to withdraw, they succeeded in defeating all attempts to drive them off the road. In the evening they were reenforced by troops from the eastern bank, which enabled them to restore the situation completely.

The same day other British troops advanced up the western bank of the Tigris after a long and difficult march, attacked and drove the Turks from their positions three miles south of Kalat Shergat, and captured the village.

On October 30, 1918, the pursuit continued. The Turks were heavily engaged five miles north of Kalat Shergat, where they put up a stubborn defense in broken ground and ravines. By nightfall the British had penetrated deeply into the enemy po-

sitions, and a portion of his force, which attempted to escape to the northwest, was cut off by cavalry from the north, who captured 1,000 prisoners and much material.

## CHAPTER XV

#### COLLAPSE OF AUSTRIA

ON October 24, 1918, indications that a new Allied offensive was about to be started on the Italian front were officially confirmed. An intense artillery fire broke out that morning at dawn along the Italian line. The fire was especially violent in the region of Monte Grappa. Brisk infantry actions occurred on the highlands of the Seven Communes, the Italian troops obtaining considerable success.

At the same time French sections attacked the enemy positions at Monte Sisomel, forcing the defenders to give way and capturing three officers and about 800 men. British troops attacked the Austrian positions south of Asiago and captured six officers and about 300 men.

Violent actions were being carried on by the Italian troops south of Assa and north of Monte Val Bella. A considerable number of enemy troops were captured during this operation.

It soon became evident that this was to be an offensive, carefully prepared and planned on a large scale, but no one then dreamed of the final results it was destined to have, though military officials in Washington apparently had high hopes from the very beginning. They were quoted in newspapers as early as the second day of the offensive as stating that the place selected for the attack indicated that the present operations might be preliminary steps to a major offensive. If the high ground between the Brenta and Piave Rivers were carried in sufficient force, it was believed that it might be possible for the Italian army, supported by French and British units and artil-

lery, and possibly by American troops, to reach the valley of the upper Piave and outflank the whole Austrian position on the lower stretches of the river, running from the Monte Grappa Plateau to the sea. Immediate withdrawal of the Austrian forces on this line would appear to be the certain result of any striking Italian success on the lines under assault.

The Piave forms a great loop, flowing down toward the plateau from the northeast, then swinging sharply southeast to reach the sea. West of the Monte Grappa Heights, that deflect the river's course, the Brenta flows down from the northwest and bends sharply south about the eastern face of the rugged plateau. It was in the territory between the two rivers that the new attack had been launched.

Aside from its military significance, the operation in Italy was being watched closely by officials as a test of the spirit of the Austrian army. Reports of disorders and disaffections in the Dual Monarchy had been persistent for months, and it was regarded as quite within the range of possibility that the war weariness at home would show itself decisively at the front. In that case, it was felt, the early capitulation of Germany's chief ally might be expected.

The second day's news, indeed, supported these high hopes. Bitter fighting occurred during the morning of October 25, 1918, in the Monte Grappa region. Parties of Italian troops resolutely attacked some portions of the formidable enemy positions and succeeded in wresting from him and maintaining possession of the important supporting points in the western and southern area of the massif. They established themselves on the northern bank of the Ornic Torrent in the Alano Basin. The enemy, who offered stubborn resistance, suffered considerable losses.

A few small islands were occupied at Grave di Papodopoli, in the Piave River. The hostile garrisons were captured. In the Posina-Altico sector and in the Assa Valley enemy advanced posts were destroyed. On the Asiago Plateau, Italian and Allied patrols carried out a small surprise attack with success. The total number of prisoners captured from midnight of October 23 to midnight of October 24, 1918, was four officers and 2,791 men of other ranks.

Again on October 26, 1918, in the region northwest of the Monte Grappa massif, fighting began at dawn and continued the whole day on the terrain carried by the Italians on the preceding day. The struggle was fierce and with varying fortune, but finally the stubbornness of the Fourth Italian Army overcame the desperate attacks of the enemy and the Italian positions were maintained and extended at some points. The Aosta Brigade, with remarkable élan, took Monte Valderoa, to the northwest of Monte Spinoncia.

Aeroplanes bombed and dispersed columns of troops and transports in the Augana Valley, the Cismon Valley, and the Arten Basin. During that day forty-seven officers and 2,002 of other ranks were captured.

The Pesaro Brigade and the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Assault Detachments carried out the difficult conquest of Monte Pertica, which had been formidably fortified by the enemy.

The attack of the Tenth Italian Army across the Piave in the area of the island of Grave di Papodopoli commenced at 6.40 a.m., October 7, 1918. The Italian troops on the right met with strong resistance. After heavy fighting, this resistance was overcome and the advance successfully commenced. On the right of the Eleventh Italian Corps, commanded by General Paolino, British troops advanced east of the river and reached the line from the neighborhood of Roncadelle to a point halfway to Cimadolino and St. Pelo di Piave, where they came in touch with the Fourteenth British Corps, under Lieutenant General Sir U. Babington, who had captured Tezze and Borgo Malamotte. Later in the day the Italians, in conjunction with Allied contingents, crossed the Piave River by force of arms, engaging in bitter battles the enemy, who strove desperately to bar the way.

Between the slopes and heights of Valdobbiadene and the mouth of the Soligo Torrent Italian infantry assault troops had passed, during the night, under violent fire to the left bank of the river, broken into the enemy's front lines, and carried them.

Supported by the fire of the artillery on the right bank, they gained ground and repulsed enemy counterattacks throughout the day.

To the south the Tenth Army, taking advantage of the successes of the British at Grave di Papodopoli, compelled the enemy to retire, and repulsed two counterattacks in the direction of Borgo Malanotte and Roncadelle. The prisoners taken during the day aggregated more than 9,000. Fifty-one guns were captured. Allied aircraft, with extreme daring, again attacked the enemy troops from low altitudes.

In local fighting on Monte Grappa 150 prisoners were taken. The enemy heavily attacked on Monte Pertica and obtained a foothold in the Italian positions, although at great sacrifices. Later the Italian infantry, in severe fighting, drove out the enemy and regained the lost positions. By the end of the day the line of the Tenth Army was reported to run south of Stabinzzos, Polo di Piaveborgo, Zanettiborgo, Malanotte, Lasegac, and Tonon.

The next day the battle was continued with equal success by the Italians and their allies. The Twelfth Army took the heights of Valdobbiadene. French infantry captured in assault Mont Pionar. The plain of Sernaglia was occupied. Italian troops carried the heights of Colfosco and had entered Susegana. Advance guards pushed to the left of the Monticono. On the left bank of the Ornic River the Italians had occupied the village of Alano di Piave, taking several hundred prisoners. Aeroplanes daringly carried supplies to advanced troops on the left bank of the Piave.

On the same day it also became officially known that Americans were standing on reserve behind the British and Italian forces now driving across the Piave.

The news, according to a Washington dispatch to the New York "Times," was considered significant not because of the size of the American contingent in Italy or the direct effect it might have on the battle, but because it indicated that the Italian drive was a definite part of the great offensive that was rapidly bringing complete defeat to the Central Powers.

So far as official announcements showed there were but two regiments of infantry and necessary auxiliary troops in the American force in Italy. These units and any others that may have been sent probably were expected to operate as a part of one of the Italian or British organizations when the time had come to throw them into the line. The same practice was followed in France, where two Italian divisions had been employed at various times on the front as units of a French army corps.

The sending of American troops to Italy was not with the idea of adding military strength but to demonstrate the unity of command and purpose on all fronts. For that reason the force detached by General Pershing for this purpose was believed not to have exceeded a brigade of infantry at most. The artillery support contributed by the Allies to the Italian front was largely British. Some American air units were in Italy and had participated in the work at the front.

It became known on October 28, 1918, that American troops were fighting in Italy. On that day the offensive extended southward from the middle Piave. A third army had entered the struggle. On the front from the Brenta to the sea three-quarters of the Italian army were fighting in union with a French division and the 332d American Infantry Regiment.

Between the Brenta and Piave Rivers the bitterness of the resistance and the aggressiveness of the enemy, supported by fresh reserves had, for six days, given the struggle particular fierceness. East of the Piave the enemy was yielding to Italian troops' pressure and the Italian troops were overcoming successive lines.

In the Grappa region the Italian Fourth Army gained advantages. In the region of Pertice and Col del Orso, the Twelfth Army had reached the outskirts of the village of Quero, taken Sequisine, and carried Monte Cesen.

The Eighth Army occupied the defile of Follina and reached Vittorio. There was fighting north of Conegliano. The Italian Tenth Army was beyond the Conegliano-Oderzo road. The Third Army had crossed the Piave to San Dona Piave and east of

Zenson. The prisoners captured so far numbered 802 officers and 32,198 men. Of guns several hundred had been taken.

On October 30, 1918, the Italian and Allied armies were continuing to rapidly advance after the retreating enemy, who attempted in vain to retard them. Heads of columns had reached Serravalle, Orsago, Gajarine, and Oderzo. Cavalry divisions were advancing in the plains and some squadrons entered Sacile.

In overcoming strong resistance between the Piave and the Monticano, the Third Army fought brilliantly. The river crossing at Ponti di Piave was carried in a fierce action. The enemy was obliged to evacuate Asiago, which was promptly occupied.

During the rush of the advance it had been impossible to keep count of the thousands of prisoners and many guns. Besides the populations of towns and villages, there had been liberated numbers of Italian prisoners who had been in Austrian hands.

The success of the Italian forces was rapidly assuming great proportions. The routed enemy was retreating east of the Piave, unable to withstand the close pressure of Allied troops on the mountain front. In the Venetian plains and the Alpine foothills the Italian armies were irresistibly directed on the objectives assigned to them. Hostile masses were thronging into the mountain valleys or attempting to reach the crossings on the Tagliamento. Prisoners, guns, material, stores, and depots almost intact, were being left in Italian hands.

The Twelfth Army had completed its possession of the massif of Cison and was now fighting to carry the gorge of Quero. The Eighth Army had captured the spur between the Follina Basin and the Piave Valley. Other forces had occupied the defile of Serravaile and were advancing toward the high plain of Cansiglio and toward Pordenone. Czecho-Slovaks had been in the action throughout the entire week.

In the Grappa region the attack was renewed in the morning. Col Caprile, Col Bonatto, Asolone, Monte Prassaolan, the Solarolo salient, and Monte Spinocia had been carried. On the Asiago Plateau the harassed enemy maintained an aggressive fire.

By then it had been ascertained that the prisoners taken exceeded 50,000. More than 300 guns had been counted.

The advance of the Tenth Army, with which British and American troops were fighting, continued without check throughout the day. British cavalry detachments, in close touch with Italian cavalry, had reached the western outskirts of Sacile. Troops of the Fourteenth British Corps had reached the Livenza River at Francenigo. Farther south the Eleventh Italian Corps had occupied Oderzo. This advance had been gained throughout practically the entire length of the objective assigned to the Earl of Cavan, British Commander on the Piave, by General Diaz when plans were first formed early in October, 1918. The energy and determination of the infantry had been beyond all praise.

The difficulties of bridging the Piave led at first to an inevitable shortness of supplies. In spite of lack of food and sleep and in the face of constant fighting the Thirty-seventh Italian Division and the Seventh and Twenty-third British Divisions had advanced without relief to their final objective. British and Italian troops operating on the Asiago Plateau entered Camporovere (northeast of Asiago) and captured the heights of Mocatz. The number of prisoners taken by the Tenth Army alone had increased to more than 12,000.

The battle continued to expand. The enemy maintained intact his resistance from Stelvio to the Astico, but he was vacillating on the Asiago Plateau and in full retreat along the remainder of the front. He was protected more by interruptions in the roads than by his rear guards, who were irresistibly overwhelmed. Italian batteries, brought forward quickly with captured enemy artillery, were intensely shelling the adversary, firing to the extreme extent of their range. Cavalry divisions, having destroyed the enemy resistance on the Livenza and reestablished crossings, were marching toward the Tagliamento.

The Sixth Army, on October 31, 1918, entered into action with a brilliant advance by the Ancona Brigade at the end of the Brenta Valley, and in the morning it attacked the adversary along the whole front.

On the Grappa, under the impetus of the Fourth Army's thrust, the enemy front had collapsed. It was impossible to estimate the prisoners coming down the mountain in flocks. All the hostile artillery here was captured. The Italians forced the gorge of Quero, passed beyond the spur east of Monteresen, and were advancing in the Piave Valley. Overcoming the enemy rear guards at the Passo di St. Buldo, Italian troops were descending into the Piave Valley toward Belluno. Other parties were engaged in fighting in the hollow of Fadalto, which was still occupied by the enemy. Cavalry and cyclists, following the road to the foothills, were opening the way to Aviano.

By the end of the day the Fourth Army was master of the' Fonzaso Valley. The Bologna Brigade entered Feltre that night.

The Twelfth Army, having gone through the Quero defile from the mountains, was joining up on the Piave course with the Eighth Army. The latter had descended the valley of the Mave to the south of Belluno, and had detachments engaged in the Fadalto Valley, which light columns were encircling by way of Farra d'Alpago.

The right wing of the front of the Third Army had been prolonged toward the coast by a marine regiment, which had occupied all the intricate coastal zone, which the enemy in part flooded. A patrol of sailors had reached Caorile. The Third Army by nightfall had reached the Livenza. Advanced guards entered Motta di Livenza and Torre di Mosto. British infantry and mounted troops occupied Sacile. The troops of the Tenth Army reached the line of the Livenza from that place as far south as Brugnera. The number of prisoners was continually increasing, and the various armies captured more than 700 guns. The booty taken was immense, its value being estimated in billions of lire.

As the Italian army prosecuted its victorious advance, most deplorable evidence was coming to light of atrocities by the enemy during the period of invasion. In Italy, as in France, the fury of the barbarians was intense against things and persons. Such fury was witnessed not only by Italian soldiers, but by representatives of the Italian and Allied press accompanying

advancing columns. Everywhere there were tokens of willful, useless destruction and brutal robberies. Terrified eyewitnesses narrated horrible scenes. The Italian Government, the military authorities, and the Allies stated that they would not fail to carry out rigorous inquiry regarding abominations committed, of which the enemy must give an account. Italians found in freed zones were in a terrible state. They lacked everything because the enemy during a year of occupation had destroyed, burned, sacked, and carried off everything.

The utter collapse of the Austrian forces and the fierceness of the fighting are well illustrated by a special dispatch sent under date of October 31, 1918, from Italian headquarters east of the Piave and published in the New York "Times" the following day. It said:

"At many points east of the Piave there are so many Austrian prisoners that they block the roads over which they are being marched to the rear. The Venetian plain immediately east of the Piave is a scene of desolation. Houses and villages have been ruined by shell fire. When the advancing Italians reached Sacile they were received as saviors, and the women and children of the town fell on their knees before them. During a recent influenza epidemic in the town the Austrians are said to have brutally rejected appeals from mothers for food for their sick children.

"Every bridge in the path of the advancing Allies has been the scene of fighting. One railroad bridge near Conegliano was lost and retaken thirty times. In the storming of Monte Cismon, which gives to the Allies command of the valleys of the Brenta and Cismon—and the domination of the Brenta virtually means possession of the Trentino—an Austrian battery of six guns which had been shelling the city of Bassano was captured. The morning before it was taken fifty persons were killed in Bassano."

By November 1, 1918, more than 1,000 square miles of Italy's invaded provinces had been reconquered, but the greatest importance of the daring movement conceived by General Diaz was his success in separating the Austrian army occupying the

Monte Grappa and Trentino regions from that on the Venetian plains. At the same time he was threatening the Austrian contingents holding the section southeast of the Piave, which, it was expected, would be enveloped or cut off by the Italians advancing toward Pordenone.

Allied troops had reached the Gringo, five miles north of Monte Lisser. They had cut off the retreat of the Austrians in Trentino, except over mule paths in the mountains. On the Asiago Plateau the Sixth Army and two Allied divisions carried formidable positions which the Austrians had held for many months. Monte Mosciavi, Monte Baldo, Monte Longara, La Meletia di Gallio, Sasso Rosso, Monte Spitz, and Lambara were taken. Three thousand prisoners and 232 guns were captured on the Asiago Plateau alone.

Enemy resistance at Fidalto defile was overcome by Italian troops who entered Belluno. The Third Cavalry Division reached the plains north of Pordenone. The Second Cavalry was fighting hostile rear guards in Meduna. The infantry of the Tenth and Third Armies passed the Livenza River between Sacile and San Stino.

East of the Brenta the pursuit continued. On the Asiago Plateau the enemy was resisting to gain time for the masses in the rear to retire, but the troops of the Sixth Army crossed by force of arms the pass between Rotzo and Roana, carrying in a bitter struggle Monte Cimone and Monte Lisser, and were advancing in the valley of the Nos.

The Fourth Army occupied the heights north of the hollow of Fonzaso, and pushed forward columns into the Sugana Valley. The old frontier was passed in the evening. Alpine groups, having crossed the Piave with improvised means in the neighborhood of Busche, spread out in the area between Feltre and San Giustina. Italian troops who the day before won in heavy fighting at the Passo di Boldo the hollow of Fadalto were going up the Cordevole Valley. They had passed beyond Ponte nelle Alpi and were marching toward Longarone.

On the plains an Italian cavalry division under the Count of Turin, having overcome the resistance of the enemy at Castello d'Aviano, Roveredo-in-Piano, San Martino, and San Quirino, occupied Pordenone and passed the Cellima-Meduna. Italian and Allied aviators were complete masters of the air and continued without pause their daring activities. An Italian airship bombarded the railway stations in the Sugana Valley at night.

It was not possible to calculate the number of guns abandoned on the lines of battle, now distant from the fighting fronts, and on the roads. More than 1,600 had been counted so far. More than 80,000 prisoners had been counted. Italian soldiers had liberated also several thousand prisoners from captivity.

British troops of the Tenth Army crossed the Livenza River between Motta and Sacile and established a bridgehead east of that stream. The Northamptonshire Yeomanry Regiment captured twelve mountain guns and fifteen machine guns. The Forty-eighth Division, operating on the Asiago Plateau, was reported to have advanced its line two kilometers northward, but was meeting with machine-gun resistance in the neighborhood of Monte Interrotto.

The First Army on November 2, 1918, captured Monte Majo and attacked Passo della Borcela. In the Posina sector Italian troops took Monte Cimone, on the Tonezzo Plateau, and, after ascending the Assa Valley, occupied Lastebasse.

On the Asiago Plateau the Allies captured a great number of prisoners and guns. Still the advance continued. There were lively rear-guard combats west of Castelnuovo, in the Sugana Valley, and at Ponte della Serra, in the Cismon Valley. In the Cordevole Valley Italian advance guards reached Mis. Italian cavalry occupied Spilimbergo and Pordenone, and the fighting reached the east bank of the Tagliamento, across which patrols had been thrown.

In the plains the heads of the Italian columns reached the line of Azzanodecimo, Portogruaro, Concordia, and Sagittaria

On the same day Allied troops broke through the enemy's fortifications at Celadel. The Tonale Pass was forced and the Val Arsa taken from Col Santa to the north of Pasubio.

The advance was continuing irresistibly on the Tonezza, the Asiago Plateau, in the Sugana Valley, the valleys of Cismon and Cordevole, and along the Piave and on the plains.

On the Tagliamento, cavalry, supported by mounted batteries, Bersaglieri, and cyclists, was winning bitter combats against the adversary, who, surprised on his side of the river, was fighting with great stubbornness. The Second Brigade, with the regiments from Genoa and Italian and Allied airmen, brilliantly maintained exceptional activity. The total of prisoners had reached 100,000 and the guns captured more than 2,000.

The bridging of the Livenza River was being rapidly carried out by British troops, some of whom were well east of that river. The number of prisoners captured by the Tenth Army alone could not at that time be accurately given, but it was known to be considerably over 15,000, with 150 guns. Of these more than 10,000 prisoners and more than 100 guns had been captured by the Fourteenth British Corps. The booty taken at Sacile included among the vast amount of other material an ordnance workshop complete and a pontoon park. In their operations on the Asiago Plateau the Forty-eighth British Division captured nearly 200 prisoners. The British air force continued throughout the day to bomb the dense masses of retiring Austrians with visibly good results.

In the meantime Austria-Hungary had appealed for an armistice on October 29, 1918. After careful deliberations on the part of the Allies, during the process of which the Italian forces had continued their victorious advance without abatement, the terms on which the Allies had agreed were submitted to the Austrians, who accepted them on November 3, 1918, and hostilities were suspended on November 4, 1918, at 3 p. m. The details of the negotiations for and the signing of the armistice will be found in another chapter.

Before the armistice became operative the Italian columns, having passed every obstacle and overcome every resistance, had advanced with great impetus and had firmly established themselves behind the enemy in the Adige Valley, closing the openings of all the roads convergent to it. The Seventh Army, by rapidly

taking the region to the west of the Adige, became master of the Passo della Mendola, and had pushed patrols on the river in the direction of Bolzani. The First Army, which, with the advance made on November 3, 1918, by its Twenty-ninth Corps, had crowned its brilliant maneuver for the taking of Trento, occupied Monticelli, dominating the confluence of the Adige Noce. Early in the afternoon of November 4, 1918, the headquarters of this army were established at Trento.

The landing at Trieste began at 11 o'clock a. m., November 3, 1918. The first to land was a battalion of the Royal Italian Marines, which was received by the population assembled on the embankments with great jubilation. The city was bedecked with Italian flags, and in a short time Bersaglieri were marching through its streets, enthusiastically acclaimed by the population.

From then on the Italians extended their successes toward the south along the Dalmatian coast. Within a few days Austria-Hungary lost all her ports and her end as a maritime power seemed assured.

Lissa was occupied by naval forces on the same day. On November 4, 1918, Italian vessels occupied Abbazia, Rovigno, and Parenzo on the Istrian coast, the neighboring island of Lussin, and in the middle Adriatic, Lagosta, Meleda, and Curzola. Other ships entered the port of Fiume. Small parties of sailors landed at Riva.

Thus the liberation of "Italia Irredenta" was practically completed.

# PART V—THE UNITED STATES AS A BELLIGERENT

#### CHAPTER XVI

## RONCHERES TO FISMES

AFTER the storming of Sergy and Seringes, recorded in the last volume, the American troops continued to hew a very thorny path in striking through the center of the Soissons-Rheims salient on their way to Fismes, the keystone of the German position on the Vesle. Before that objective was reached a series of battles had to be fought in now familiar woods, though forest warfare became none the easier for being familiar. By the beginning of August, 1918, four-fifths of the salient, which was wholly held by the Germans on July 18, 1918, was in the possession of the Allies; but the Vesle had yet to be reached in the center. Hard and persistent blows by the Americans, flanked by the French and British, finally cleared the way and precipitated a German retreat to the Vesle, and it is these actions that must now be described.

The bitter fighting on this American front attracted an attention in the Entente countries that was perhaps out of proportion to its scope. There was an impression of tremendous effort with little headway; but the fighting, though vital to the Allied advance, was on a comparatively small scale as battles were measured on the western front, and did not suggest that the Allied command was forcing the pace to reach the destination in view. Though the American progress was slow—controlled as it was by the stiff German resistance—Marshal Foch's purpose was apparently not speed, but complete expulsion of the




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At the left is Newton Diehl Baker, the American Secretary of War; at the right, Josephus Daniels, American Secretary of the Navy. While the War Inspartment directs the activities of the army, the Navy Department provides for war on the sea, defence of coasts and shipping and transportation of troops



Germans from the woods step by step. Otherwise, more guns would be needed; but compared with past fighting the operations might almost be called gunless, so large was the rôle of the infantry. The scale of fighting, however, did not warrant the expectation of any greater progress than was made, nor, indeed, more than a mere folding up of ground. The course of the fighting proved that the terrific struggle was not producing inadequate results.

The German retreat began on July 30, 1918, when the American division entered a sector which led from Ronchères to Fismes. progressing nearly parallel to the route which ran through Colougnes, Cohans, Longeville Farm, and Saint Gilles. American advance struck two German strongholds on either end of their line, one in the Forêt de Nesle and the other in the Bois de Meunière. It was useless to advance in the center with these end points in enemy hands. Storming the Nesle and Meunière positions occasioned several days' hard fighting On the left the Americans fought gradually forward till their front ran in the fields before the southern end of the Forêt de Nesle. Their right movement fell a little below their left, a situation which turned their attention to the Meunière Woods, as the German line along the southern edge of the woods made a deep dip in the American line from Cierges to the front of Ronchères. This south end of the woods had been successfully held by the Germans with heavy artillery, machine-gun fire, and shock troops against the American attacks.

Flanking operations were determined on, frontal attacks alone in the woods having proved too perilous. The first movement was aimed to advance the American line beyond Cierges to the west of the Cierges Woods in order to get the Germans into a pocket, and then to storm the woods. The Americans' hold on Cierges was precarious. Their line was threatened by the German occupation of Hill 200, which lay in the Bois de Cierges to the south of the village itself. The latter was a stumbling-block to the American advance, and it was recalled that the village and Meunière Woods formed strong centers of opposition during the first German retreat from the Marne to the Aisne,

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the havoc wrought during the two retreats having curiously intermingled. One stately château, whose towers had been freshly damaged by German shells, had in the banqueting hall big bushes of elderberries which evidently had seeded there when the roof was blown off in 1914.

The village lay in a bowllike center of sloping fields, and its actual area was unoccupied by either side, neither having any desire to hold it, its deep hollow being steeped in gas ten feet deep, a legacy of the Germans. So it remained, and did remain while the still summer weather lasted, a village of the dead, of dead cats, rats and mice, with all its herbs and flowers burned and blighted.

The Americans skirted this morgue and strengthened their forces round it, thereby menacing the Germans on Hill 200 from the northwest and south. The latter held their ground in face of the imminent danger of attack, refusing the opportunity of retiring into the Meunière Woods. Violent machine-gun fire met every tentative attack of the Americans, so that it was necessary to shell the woods crowning the hill before making a real onslaught. Batteries of seventy-fives poured projectiles on the hill for an hour and a half; then followed a bayonet charge.

As the Americans ascended the slopes they noticed a heliograph tower on top of the hill, one of those built by Napoleon, A big Red Cross flag waved from it, and kept the Americans from directing their artillery and machine-gun fire to the summit. But the flag proved to be a characteristic German ruse and a violation of acknowledged customs of civilized war. When the attacking party was close to the top a number of Americans were cut down by machine-gun fire from the flag-protected tower. American snipers thereupon made the tower their target and killed the crews of the machine guns ambushed there. When the attackers mounted the stairs of the tower they found the German gunners dead beside their weapons.

There were only about three hundred Germans on the hill, but their fighting qualities were such that they were easily equal to ten times that number in the open field. They were distributed in groups of twelve to a machine gun, five serving as gunners and seven as infantrymen to protect the gunners. They were ordered to hold their ground, and they did. It needed the thrusts of American bayonets to force them to cease shooting.

The taking of Hill 200 cleared the Cierges Woods of an obstacle in the American path, but there remained another to be overcome in the Bois de Crimpettes before the movement on Meunière Woods could be attempted. The Americans assailed the second-named wood with considerable relish, according to an onlooker, Junius B. Wood, who told of their having to submit to insulting messages which the Germans in the little forest wigwagged across the valley to them. For two days the Americans had lain patiently in the wheat fields under a hot sun, with little to eat or drink, enduring the German shells scattered among them while waiting for the order to attack.

After a morning of desultory sniping from both sides a telling bombardment was opened by the Americans on the Germans, who had been spending a week building dugouts and equipping a permanent camp in the wood. The bombardment soon changed to an encircling box barrage. Five minutes later the barrage returned to the waiting Americans, who advanced fifty yards every two minutes. They pierced the woods and bayoneted in hand-to-hand fighting the dazed Germans as they rushed out of their dugouts. The latter fought bitterly despite their being surrounded on all sides and the terrific barrage to which they had been subjected. Some were hidden in tree tops and under rocks, with even their steel helmets camouflaged in red, green and yellow shades. This disguise made it difficult for the Americans to locate their antagonists among the flickering shadows in the dense foliage. The barrage, which entirely circled the woods, prevented the enemy from escaping on the far side, and this enabled the Americans to sweep the woods of Germans, either by killing or capture. The prisoners numbered seventy, including several officers, and over three hundred German dead were counted. The material captured comprised forty-Maxim machine guns, three 77-caliber guns, and an extensive amount of ammunition and other supplies. The prisoners were mostly captured in the fighting from tree to tree.

The clearing of the wood only took about an hour, and the Germans remaining were dead. According to one officer, some were found chained in the dugouts, as though their superiors feared that they might attempt to escape. One group chained to machine guns included two boys of fifteen and a man of seventy, who said they had not fired a single shot, and showed a belt full of cartridges in proof of their statement.

The Bois de Meunière was the next objective. There the Germans had excellent defenses of great strength. Instead of trying to rush the woods, the Americans, by infiltration, and by moving along the sides, first gained control of the southern part of the forest. The advance was not effected easily; the Americans charged the southern approaches six times, and were beaten back each time. This temporary check was lustily exploited in the German communiqués; but the undaunted Americans persisted, defying machine guns, seeking the foe up trees, in holes, behind sandbags. Charging up an open slope, they encountered a machine-gun nest every sixty yards. Lumberjacks, farmer boys, and Indians were these Americans, and they fought obstinately; but nightfall found them about where they started.

Their abortive charges were followed by a bombardment in the small hours of August 1, 1918. Scores of American guns were trained on the southern edge of the woods, which received thousands of high-explosive shells. Two hours later there was a simultaneous infantry movement from the west and the south of the woods. It was a stealthy advance with fixed bayonets until the edge of the woods and the screened machine gunners were reached.

"Then," as Edwin L. James described the action in the New York "Times," "the Indians yelled, the lumberjacks shouted, and the farmer boys cheered.

'They were where they could mix it at close range with the Germans, and that was what they wanted. Their yells could be heard a mile away. They were up against two of the kaiser's

redoubtable divisions, the 200th Jaegers and the 216th Reserve Division. They fought with vim and joy.

"The bayonet is a good weapon against gun nests on the ground and infantrymen, but the German machine gunners in trees gave lots of trouble. Lads who back home had learned to shoot squirrels put their training to good advantage, hiding behind trees and shooting down the monkey fighters.

"On the ground things went better. The Germans were fresh and the Americans in good trim. Our boys fought like madmen. They had lost their comrades at the hands of these Germans and now were to avenge them."

The fight continued for six hours through the woods, on a front four kilometers long. Little artillery was used when the battle raged at close quarters, and no gas. By 9.30 in the morning the Americans had succeeded in gaining a position along the northern end. Away to the right the French had made headway, which further jeopardized the Germans' retention of the woods.

A movement to the east did not advance as quickly as those in progress elsewhere. The Germans availed themselves of this check and by some means swung round and got behind the advancing Americans. It was a sensational turn in the situation; but the Americans, turning about, succeeded in trapping the Germans by chasing them into a clearing. There they were attacked on all sides with the bayonet, and only three prisoners, it was reported, remained to tell the tale of their compatriots' temerity.

Farther west of the Forêt de Nesle, where the Germans were strongly intrenched, remained to be overcome, now that the seventh attack on the Bois de Meunières had borne fruit. An American division had been vainly attacking the Nesle Woods for six days; hence, as heretofore, drastic forces had to be utilized to oust the resisting Germans. The attack seemed to have no features that distinguished it from others. Early on the morning of August 2, 1918, the Americans prepared to attack, then moved cautiously forward over a sloping field to the edge of the woods, meeting the German machine-gun fire without

recoiling, and rushing forward in all directions. This time the Germans did not resist and abandoned their task of holding the woods. It was a symptom of the retreat proceeding farther behind their lines.

The American troops holding the northern end of the Bois de Meunières were notified that the German hold on the Forêt de Nesle had been broken, and accordingly began to advance. Within three hours they had reached Colougnes, four kilometers from the north end of the woods. The Germans could be seen retreating over the hills in the distance. Blazing villages and farmhouses marked their retreat; but rain stopped many of their destructive fires, especially the kindling of ammunition dumps, and immense stores of heavy ammunition fell into the hands of the advancing Americans.

The American movement from Ronchères to Fismes was the subject of a report to the French quartier general by the French army command under which the Americans fought. This report may aptly be quoted here in summarizing the further movement of the Americans toward Fismes:

"On August 1, 1918, the Americans had a new series of obstacles ahead of them, the most important being Reddy Farm and Hill 230. During the previous day's fighting they already had shown a keen sense for infantry maneuvering, employing tactically the gains which were most sure of accomplishing their purpose, and giving evidence of fine qualities of initiative and imagination. In addition they showed excellent knowledge of the use of the machine gun, automatic rifles, and light mortars. They were able again to reduce the German positions Hill 230 was taken in a superb manner, and seventy prisoners were counted.

"From that moment the enemy fled, and only weak rear guards were left to oppose the advance of the Americans, who swept these obstacles before them on their route and took without much difficulty Chamery, Moncel, and Villome. At Cohan the Germans hung on several hours, but had to give it up, and at the end of the day United States troops had attained the heights north of Dravegny. Consequently, progress of six or seven kilo-

meters was made on the day of August 2, 1918. For seventy-two hours straight the infantry had fought, despite the difficulty of procuring food, caused by the fact that only a narrow road afforded the convoys an opportunity of coming up, and the hard rains had soaked the road.

"In spite of fatigue and privations, the advanced unit's pursuit was taken up again at dawn on August 3, 1918. The line which runs by Les Bourleaux was reached easily enough, but then the enemy turned and faced the Americans with many sections of machine guns and a strong artillery fire which rained down on the villages of the valley, on the crossroads and ravines."

"It became necessary to retire methodically and maneuver on the strong points of the adversary. This permitted the United States troops to reach the slopes north of Mont St. Martin and St. Gilles. The division had thus added to its gains seven kilometers. One last supreme effort would permit it to attain Fismes and the Vesle.

"On August 4, 1918, the infantry combats were localized with terrible fury. The outskirts of Fismes were solidly held by the Germans, where their advanced groups were difficult to take. The Americans stormed them and reduced them with light mortars and 37s. They succeeded, though not without loss, and at the end of the day, thanks to this slow but sure tenacity, they were within one kilometer of Fismes and masters of Villes Savoye and Chezelle Farm. All night long rains hindered their movements and rendered their following day's task more arduous. On their right the French had, by similar stages, conquered a series of woods and swamps of Meunière Woods, to the east of St. Gilles, and were on the Plateau of Bonne Maison Farm. To the left another American unit had been able to advance upon the Vesle to the east of St. Thibaut.

"On August 5, 1918, the artillery prepared for the attack on Fismes by a bombardment, well regulated, and the final assault was launched. The Americans penetrated into the village and then began the task of clearing the last point of resistance. That evening this task was almost completed. We held all the southern part of the village as far as Rheims road and patrols were sent in the northern end of the village. Some even succeeded in crossing the Vesle, but were satisfied with making a reconnoissance, as the Germans still occupied the right bank of the river in great strength. All that was left to be accomplished was to complete the mopping up of Fismes, and the strengthening of our positions to withstand an enemy counterattack.

"Such was the advance of one American division, which pushed the enemy forward from Ronchères on July 30, 1918, a distance of eighteen kilometers and crowned its successful advance with the capture of Fismes on August 5, 1918."

General Pershing, in announcing on August 4, 1918, the arrival of the American forces at Fismes, said:

"The full fruits of victory in the counteroffensive begun so gloriously by Franco-American troops on July 18, 1918, were reaped to-day, when the enemy, who met his second great defeat on the Marne, was driven in confusion beyond the line of the Vesle. The enemy, in spite of suffering the severest losses, has proved incapable of stemming the onslaught of our troops fighting for liberty side by side with French, British, and Italian veterans. In the course of the operations 8,400 prisoners and 133 guns have been captured by our men alone."

A few Americans had entered the town on Saturday afternoon (August 3, 1918), and remained all night, but on Sunday morning they had to retire. The Germans threw gas shells into the southern part of the town, and the little party, having completed their reconnoissance, which materially aided the staff officers in planning the major attack, were ordered to fall back.

On the crest of the hills one or two kilometers to the north the Germans had placed guns in positions from which they poured a flanking fire into the town. American and French artillery had meantime been brought up and under a sweeping barrage and gas the infantry advanced. There were German machine guns to the south and east of the town, but the Americans quickly silenced them. The main body of Germans had already retreated to the northern heights across the Vesle, but had not completed crossing the river before the Americans were at their heels. They had left groups of machine gunners, called "sacrifice crews" at little clusters of woods on the southern outskirts of the city. The sole duty of these crews was to fight till they were killed or captured in order to obstruct the advance. Martyrs to duty, they were set upon by the Americans and fell at their posts. They were mainly on the American right, and had waited for the Americans to pass, so that when the attack on Fismes began, the assailants had to contend with an enfilading fire. Further penetration into the town disclosed the presence of more enemy detachments who had been also left behind to perform the thankless task of rear guard fighting.

The battle for Fismes went on with varying intensity for seven hours under strong artillery firing, the Germans on the hills shelling the American advance and rear lines, while the Franco-American guns showered their projectiles on the enemy positions. It began in the afternoon of August 4, 1918, and the town was taken late that day by the Americans, supported by the French.

The Germans fought desperately in the streets for some time, but finally broke and ran. American machine gunners punishing them severely as they fled down the slopes to the Vesle, though groups of German snipers and machine gunners actually remained in some of the houses after the Americans had been in Fismes for twenty hours.

Meantime the enemy, on the high ground beyond the Vesle, challenged the Allied forces to pursue him across the river. The Germans furnished abundant evidence of their intention to take full advantage of the more favorable terrain. The character of their fire indicated the emplacement of a greater number of guns, including those of heavy caliber, than they had been able to operate for some time, having so far had no rest to enable them to establish strong artillery positions. The symptoms, however, notwithstanding their seemingly extensive preparations for a stand, pointed merely to an attempt to offer a stiff temporary resistance to gain sufficient time to withdraw to the Aisne.

General Foch's armies had slowed down in the mass on the southern bank of the Vesle, not because of inability or unwillingness to advance but to afford time for troops who had been outdistanced in the pursuit to come up. There were, moreover, steady rains for several days, which equally hampered the Germans in their retreat by preventing them from taking their huge supplies with them. The nightly glow of ammunition dumps, dampened by the rains, testified to their abortive efforts.

Notwithstanding the German concentration on the northern bank, American and French patrols succeeded in crossing the river at several points in the face of heavy fire from the lower slopes and from heights in the rear. They established strong footholds on the northern bank, which hindered the Germans from organizing certain advantageous positions. East of Fismes the Germans were back to the Vesle in the main, though small detachments of machine gunners still lingered in the southern woods and had to be cleared out by the Americans and French as they were discovered.

The Vesle was crossed both west and east of Fismes. Some American parties waded it where it was narrow. At other points American engineers threw bridges across, defying heavy German fire from the north bank. Bridge construction was therefore effected under the greatest difficulty. Infantry fighting was proceeding almost at their backs while the engineers built their bridges, working on both sides of the river. Shells would destroy their work in the early stages, and they would go over the task again undaunted by failures and casualties. One detachment of twenty bridge builders was reduced to fifteen, then to ten, and when relief came five remained, who continued working obstinately undeterred by German fire.

"Several American officers," said an Associated Press account, "had thrilling experiences. Lieutenant E. F. Mail of California, on Tuesday (August 6, 1918), was under cover with sixty men on the south bank, awaiting a lull in the German shelling in order to build a bridge. It was intended to build a footbridge on the foundations of a bridge destroyed by the Germans and then to put up a larger structure. Rather than ex-

pose his men, Lieutenant Mail, carrying two planks, started out on an exploration trip by himself.

"The lieutenant reached the southern pier just as the German machine gunners began a heavy fire. This did not stop him. He tossed one plank into a temporary position, and then put the other in place from the south pier to the pier in the middle of the river. The enemy fire becoming warmer, Lieutenant Mail jumped into the river and took cover on the north bank. Afterward he recrossed to the south bank and rejoined his command amid cheers from the soldiers.

"At another point farther west of Fismes, Major Francis R. Newcomber and Captain James P. Growden, during daylight, felled a tree across the Vesle and crossed to the north bank. There they chopped down another tree, which fell toward the southern bank. Soon afterward they had completed a footbridge, with the tree trunks as stringers. Newcomber and Growden had gone ahead of the bridge-building gang to the position, and when the gang arrived they found the work well started. The enemy discovered the footbridge soon afterward, and subjected it to a lively fire."

One bridge location on the south bank of the Vesle west of Fismes was the scene of a crushing fight between American machine gunners and a force of German infantry and machine gunners. The latter were getting into position to attack a group of American bridge builders who were approaching the location, where bridge material had already been gathered. The Germans discovered these preparations and sent troops to a hill position to prevent the American engineers from building the bridge. Their movements and purpose were detected. A detachment of crack American machine gunners, bent on protecting the bridge location, had previously taken an elevated position commanding the bridge site, and opened fire on the Germans. Not a single German was seen to escape from the leaden hail, nor did any stretcher bearers approach the scene. The German reply was so feeble that there were no American casualties, and the indications were that the entire detachment had been wiped out.

For some time Fismes proved to be a hornets' nest to the occupying Americans. After the open street fighting had ended by the flight of the Germans, the impression left was that they had abandoned the town. But they had left nests of machine gunners and snipers behind, which the Americans encountered in unexpected places on taking possession. German snipers, hidden in garrets, picked off Americans on the streets. No quarter was given them once the snipers were located; but it took several days to clean the town of these concealed foes.

From the ridge they occupied between the Vesle and the Aisne the Germans kept rear-guard contact parties ranging down to the northern bank of the Vesle. With these the small groups of Americans holding positions on the north bank were in constant touch. Only when the Americans, after crossing to these points, reached the foot of the hills to the north did they realize the character of the German opposition. German machine guns were hidden in the heights above. The guns could not be approached, as they had a clear field of fire, and as they were invisible they could keep the Americans from a thousand to fifteen hundred yards away. The Americans lay on the hillside virtually in the open, the targets of big shells from heavy howitzers, but nevertheless watching every movement from the dark belt of trees above. Their gunners kept peppering the enemy with shell and gas without sensibly diminishing the latter's fire.

In fact, with the lull in infantry activities on any scale other than local forays, came a period of intense artillery fire on both sides after the occupation of Fismes. On Tuesday (August 6, 1918), through a steady downpour of rain, thousands of shells screamed back and forth over the stream. The Germans heavily shelled strategic points behind the American lines; the American gunners, now in the thick of the heaviest artillery engagement they had undertaken, raked enemy areas back to the Aisne, ranging on roads and lines of communication. The gun duel became so violent that observation was difficult, and maps had to be utilized, the Americans picking out German positions which had been observed before the prospect became blurred. The Germans shelled forests, crossroads, highways, clumps of trees

and all other places where troops or supplies could be concentrated.

Their evident intention was to discourage the Americans and their French supports from further aggressive operations. The weather handicapped their efforts; when it was not raining, it was misty. German observation balloons had no trustworthy sight by which to discern accurately Franco-American activities. The German gunners sought another means of getting the range for their heavy guns by throwing shells which emitted dense black smoke on exploding. The shells were aimed in the direction of crossroads and other objectives, the enemy thus seeking to get the range for these points from the smoke clouds which arose. The mist, however, hampered accuracy in observation of these shells, which were of the time variety, and after numbers of them had been wasted the attempt was abandoned.

These demonstrations to prevent supports from coming up to reenforce the Franco-American occupation of Fismes and the southern bank of the Vesle, as well as to make the newly occupied territory too sultry for retention, were followed by gas waves. Mustard gas, sneeze gas, and chocolate gas (so named from its odor) spread in clouds over the hills bordering the Vesle, the gas shells being directed at the roads leading to Fismes and other points where the Germans thought there might be an assembling of Allied forces for a massed crossing of the river. The gas shells sometimes fell on roads in a continuous line only thirty feet apart. The Americans, however, were familiar with the German gas tricks. Their masks protected them, as well as the wind, which chose to blow from the south and sent the gas fumes back across the Vesle to the senders. Mine throwing and machine gun showers supplemented the gas shelling, these smaller weapons being kept active in the hope of keeping clear the south banks of the river. Darkness came, and with it more rain and the Germans kept pounding in the gloom. Altogether it was a busy day for the Germans; but the Allied positions were undisturbed by the artillery deluge.

#### CHAPTER XVII

#### ON THE VESLE

THE Americans, on their part, aimed to establish strong attacking positions on the north bank of the Vesle and drive the Germans from the commanding heights beyond by artillery fire. Both the Americans and French guns kept up a constant pressure on the enemy posts established between the Vesle and the Aisne. The Germans held a line along the ridge some thirty kilometers long between the two rivers. Their infantry strength was considerable, and they had many small guns, with rearguard outposts of machine gunners and snipers on the wooded slopes reaching down to the Vesle bank. Their big guns were not greatly in evidence, which led to the belief that most of them were well behind at the Aisne. The Americans were strong in artillery, which gave the Germans no rest.

Infantry activity in force had abated. The Allied command apparently had no disposition to employ man power to gain an object which might be as readily achieved by gunnery alone. So no serious effort was made to take territory between the Vesle and the Aisne. The troops already on the north bank of the former river were infiltration parties sent more to test the German positions than to drive him back in a general attack. On a ridge of hills south of the Vesle stood the main American line, supporting the groups who had established positions on the north side. In front of the main line lay the narrow valley of the Vesle; beyond that, northward, were the hills occupied by the Germans, and behind them was the ridge of the Chemindes-Dames, the Germans' eventual destination, by all the indications.

The intensive artillery fire recorded was followed by a dash across the river on August 6, 1918, on a more extensive scale than those undertaken by the patrolling parties already there. This infiltration, if it can be so called, put the German positions on the lower slopes to a severe test, for it extended on a front

from Braisne to Fismes. The passage was successfully forced under an inferno of shrapnel, machine-gun fire and waves of gas. The Americans also secured a grip of the highway paralleling the river in the face of furious German counterattacks. French troops on the American left helped by gaining positions, the joint movement straightening the line from a point west of Bazoches to Fismes, about three miles.

The attack started between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and lasted till the next morning (August 7, 1918). Artillery fire preceded the infantry advance, while under cover of a barrage engineers threw light bridges across the river. The American guns got an immediate response from the Germans, and the gunfire, which had been intermittent, presently emerged into one deafening roar. Meantime officers chosen to lead the dash across the river placed their men in position, directing them down the slopes to where the bridges were known to be. Once on the other side, the men mainly rushed forward in open formation, meeting stubborn resistance from the Germans. The troops forming the American right fought their way along the chosen routes, some floundering across through the water, others crossing by the bridges which survived the German fire. midnight they had reached their objective, the main highway extending along the foothills north of the river and forming a series of terraces to the Aisne. The men on the American left were delayed, failing to make headway, and a second barrage had to be obtained to aid them. Under its cover they rallied and struggled forward to their chosen positions, which they reached the next morning.

The Germans tried a counterattack. One of their detachments, rather more than a company, ventured to move forward into the open, only to be caught by American machine gunners, who, with a hail of bullets, almost destroyed them to a man. At another point a German detachment waited till the Americans were upon them. Then ensued a hand-to-hand fight, the only one of the battle, in mud and darkness, where the combatants could barely see one another. They fought it out, and the Americans won.

In another counterattack—the Germans attempted several they aimed to strike a disconcerting blow at the Americans when the latter had been established about two hours at their new positions. A considerable force of Germans appeared and plunged down a ravine leading to the river. Their path had been cleared by their artillery, and they might have succeeded in reaching the Americans had not the movement quickly become known to the artillery stations south of the Vesle. A shower of American shells suddenly fell upon the advancing column and broke its formation. The American troops who had escaped this surprise charge also took a hand in dispersing the column. Among them was a machine-gun unit who had their deadly little implements ready for any emergency. So the Germans received withering fire at close quarters as well as shells, and instead of rushing the American machine-gun nests, which they probably intended, they had to fall back with heavy losses. Despite the counterattacks, and a harassing fire from guns of 77 and 105 caliber and minenwerfers, which the Germans had fixed on the higher ground, considerably to the rear of the battle line. the Americans were able to push more troops across the river. and to consolidate the positions they had won.

The next day they struggled forward to positions slightly better under an incessant shell fire. There were no organized attacks, but here and there sharp minor engagements took place, when American gunners covered the movements of infantry and engineers. The new line was stabilized on the north side, having been considerably reenforced during the night and early morning. It now ran securely along the Rouen-Rheims road from near Bazoches, which remained in German hands, to a point well east of Fismes. The American grip on Fismes itself was sustained, though the village of North Fismes (the Vesle runs through Fismes at its northern end) was so difficult to overcome that American guns pouved a heavy fire upon it to make it untenable for the Germans holding on there. That small obstruction removed, the line would run straight toward the east.

The suburb fell into American hands on August 9, 1918. It had been virtually reduced to a bare ruin by the American guns

the previous day, and because of the crushing artillery fire the German force left there could not retreat to their own lines beyond. The dash into North Fismes was typically American when the order to advance came after the devastating guns had played their part. The men rushed across the river, leaping, darting, and crawling over the débris of a heavy bridge blown up by the Germans, its piers and other timbers, however, so falling as to make the ruins available as a crossway. They encountered a very weak resistance in the village. A hundred prisoners readily surrendered, most of them wounded by American gunfire.

These excursions on to the north bank of the Vesle form examples of the nibbling operations of the Americans at various points to obtain a footing there. The changes made were not extensive enough to affect materially the main American line, which remained stationary for the time being. No attempts were made to mount the slopes on the north side, where the Germans were intrenched. Apparently it was not the American plan as yet to advance into the region between the Vesle and the Aisne. Determined German resistance would make the assault too costly, and the larger Allied strategy aimed at forcing the Germans back by imperiling the life arteries of their line elsewhere.

The Germans, however, were not left alone to their temporary security on the Vesle heights. The artillery thundered night and day, the American fire, guided by aviators, being directed in particular to the region of Longueval, where the Germans were using an old rock quarry, large enough to conceal two regiments as a refuge for resting troops. French as well as American gunners shelled the cave for a whole day, having got the range of the cave's entrance. Their shells battered the cave so unmercifully that it became untenable and the Germans abandoned it as a hiding place.

The German gunners on their side repeatedly searched the American positions, especially in the neighborhood of Fismette, to the north of Fismes, where the opposing lines were close, the Americans occupying the southern end, and the Germans War St. 8—K

the northern. Against that position a couple of violent counterattacks were launched, embracing six hours of hot fighting, the net result leaving the line exactly where it was before. One attack of a local nature came just before dawn on August 12, 1918. It chanced that an American force had set out to make a little attack for a local objective, and at about 5 o'clock, after moving forward for about a kilometer, they encountered German troops advancing to attack in force on a predetermined plan, as the artillery fire gave evidence. It was, in fact, disclosed that they had been ordered to retake Fismes. The force the Americans met was superior in numbers, and the Americans retired to their starting point. Perhaps this encouraged the Germans, for they continued their shelling on a large scale, which was plainly premonitory to renewed action. At 10 o'clock came a second counterattack in force, directed against the line between the Devil's Wood and Fismette, and augmented by gas waves and flame projectors. The Americans by this time were reenforced and ready.

The German onset swept the attackers well into the American lines. There they suffered such losses that they had to fall back, leaving 192 dead behind. The fighting was intense and bloody while it lasted, and left the Americans where they were.

Elsewhere on the American line the activities on both sides assumed the character of stabilized warfare, mainly featureless. The forays in Fismette differed in the latter respect, but did not change the situation of the combatants. Fismette stood out, however, as a hot spot, due to the close proximity of Germans and Americans, who shared the village between them, neither budging the other from their positions. The houses afforded excellent vantage points for snipers and machine-gun nests, which commanded streets occupied by either foe. An exposed German or American instantly set a street ablaze with machine-gun fire. Within sight of a vigilant sniper the venturesome soldier's life hung on his quickness in seeking cover from the equal quickness of the other's rifle. It was a place, as the Americans put it, for "the quick and the dead." The Germans seemed to have the advantage in machine guns, while the Americans

bettered them in sniping. Under cover of darkness each assembled their reliefs and supplies, and spent the day making the village as uncomfortable as possible for the other. Neither were disposed to relinquish their half of the village and forbore to use artillery lest it hit their own men. The Germans appeared willing for the Americans to make a sortie and drive them out, but the latter were content to let them remain in their roosts, with their nerves on edge.

German heavy artillery meantime bombed the American rear lines, evidently still thinking that the Americans were concentrating for a massed attack on the Vesle positions to the north. The firing was directed at crossroads and other points of communication, the villages escaping damage. Behind the lines American engineers were busy restoring the territory from which the Germans had retreated before the Franco-American advance. They found hundreds of infernal machines of all types concealed in a variety of places, chiefly in the path of advancing troops. Their discoveries led to an official warning to the soldiers on this front to guide their movements in subsequent occupation of country abandoned by the enemy. Many were the ruses, traps, and other devices employed by the Germans during their retreat. In dugouts, strings attached to branches, apparently used to camouflage the entrance, were attached to hidden mines. Detonators were found in charcoal and rubbish heaps. Stoves or fireplaces had fixed to them fuses connected with explosive charges. Protruding nails in floors, when stepped on, exploded mines underneath. Shovels, picks, etc., apparently driven at random into a heap of earth, set off a mine when removed. A like explosion was also touched off by stepping on a loose board on a house doorstep or stairway. Along roads, a slight depression or pocket caused by the passage of vehicles would explode a detonator in a mine gallery under the road, where 150 or 200 shells were located, while barbedwire entanglements were concealed in grass to explode mines. Troops were warned that intact houses, remaining among others which had been destroyed, should be approached or entered with the greatest circumspection. Hay, fodder, manure, etc., in farms

were also danger spots, mines being frequently found under bricks or tiles covered by hay or manure. Last, but not least, the Germans, in abandoning food and water supplies, poisoned them.

The Germans shelled their abandoned trails, where they had left these tokens of their methods of warfare. The Americans and French responded by ranging their heavy guns on the Aisne bridges, well behind the German lines. Aviators had reported that much traffic was proceeding over these bridges, and the Franco-American gunners were bent on destroying as many as they could. Southward-bound trains, bearing ammunition, had been noticed, while the northbound traffic over the bridges were infantrymen, and trucks loaded with goods taken from villages. The crowded roads leading to the Aisne and to the Aisne bridges were particularly marked by the Allied gunners. Aerial observation revealed that their fire caused a congestion and confusion of German transport at several bridgeheads. A party of twelve American airmen on August 16, 1918, set out to observe the effects of the gunfire on the bridges. All the bridges for some twelve miles, between Pont Arcy and Genicourt, were seen to be in a complete or ever-recurring condition of demolition. The airmen themselves took a hand in harassing German traffic, and despite a lively encounter over the Aisne with enemy planes, they succeeded in dropping a number of bombs on roads jammed with traffic, and safely returning to their own lines.

The Franco-American gunners, without abating their fire on the roads and bridges, turned their marksmanship to a target at closer range. Air observers had reported nests of machine guns located along the hills northwest of Fismes, and steps were taken to wipe them out. All the morning of August 16, 1918, these guns had been peppering American units established on the low-lying ground on the north bank of the Vesle. At night the Americans turned a box barrage on the machine gunners, after which nothing more was heard of them. A prisoner taken in the night, as well as observers and patrols the next morning, reported that twelve machine guns had been destroyed, and few, if any, of the crews had escaped alive.

The Germans retaliated savagely by a midnight fire of high intensity, furiously sustained, upon the entire American front. Not a little gas was thrown. This burst of wrath continued until dawn, when the Americans were on the aggressive again.

The activities along the Vesle front, with the lines definitely stabilized for the time being, might be termed trivial, measured by the major movements proceeding elsewhere. But though of a minor order, they were none the less fruitful. The Americans, running true to form, remained keyed up, constantly on the aggressive, harassing the enemy with patrols, artillery, and aircraft. A succession of incidents, such as those described above, provided outlets for their energies in the absence of more ambitious enterprises. Taken alone, none of the events had either magnitude nor any decisive outcome; but in the aggregate they represented, day by day, an important stage in the development of the American army in the field. Hardy soldiers and veterans were produced by each event, ready for the greater task of vanquishing the German hosts by heavier blows.

The Vesle front had acquired the more or less quiescent character of the early occupation of the Lorraine sector to the east when the unfledged Americans were carefully feeling their way in trench warfare. Nothing occurred on any scale; little occurred that was deemed worthy of record officially; yet something occurred daily, especially in gunnery.

The Americans and French on one occasion increased their grip on the north bank by slight infantry advances at various points without encountering any Germans. On another occasion a detachment set out to tackle some German machine gunners near Fismette whose positions had been reported by a prisoner. They found sixty Prussians, the remnant of a company which had been in line less than a month, waiting to surrender. Not a shot was fired upon the Americans, who declined to take any credit for the capture. They considered that the Prussians had deserted their posts. The latter confessed that they had agreed among themselves to surrender at the first opportunity.

The artillery activity, which at times rose above the normal for a stabilized front, was marked by the bombardment of a

deserted hamlet, the Germans wasting some 700 shells in the belief that it was billeted by Americans, but it had been vacated twelve hours previously.

Toward the close of August, 1918, a series of violent local attacks by the Germans broke the quiet without effecting any material change in the line. An American raiding party brought back fourteen prisoners north of the river. Two hours later three battalions of German infantry attacked one American battalion west of Fismes. The Americans recoiled, then recovered, and held their own against superior numbers. An hour or so later the Germans launched an attack against the Americans to the east of Fismes. It was prolonged, occasioning the use of much ammunition, but gained the Germans little. American heavy artillery continued to rain high-explosive shells on the German back areas beyond the Aisne, while smaller guns kept up a harassing fire on the line between that river and the Vesle. Snipers were as busy as heretofore around Fismes, making that vicinity more dangerous than ever.

The Germans began display activities apparently without any object save that of keeping the Americans engaged. In the last week of August, 1918, bitter local combats were fought continuously for two days along the American line on both sides of Fismes. The Germans did not attack heavily enough to drive the Americans back. Fifty hours of fighting yielded little change on either side. The Germans acquired a little terrain in their first attack, only to lose it when the Americans countered, while the Americans forced the Germans, making it untenable, from a large tannery east of Bazoches, used as a machine-gun nest.

The German tactics were soon understood. To the American left, north of Soissons, a French army under General Mangin was swinging eastward and rapidly forming a line that ran almost at right angles to the Vesle front across the western end of the plateau between the Vesle and the Aisne, where the Germans had established positions. Beyond the Aisne was another German position on a plateau ridge, and in the rear of that lay the Chemin-des-Dames, the enemy's third line. General Man-

gin's movement threatened all three, notably a flanking of the Chemin-des-Dames. Plainly there was a withdrawal in view, to be guarded, as customary, by crack troops fighting strong rear engagements. So it seemed that the Germans, in attacking the Americans, believed they could thwart any massed assault the latter might intend as a joint movement with General Mangin's advance, and thus protect the withdrawal of their main forces between the Vesle and the Aisne. Reports, in fact, came that they were retreating north of the Vesle owing to French and British pressure elsewhere, while local actions proceeded on the Vesle banks. The German plan of thus keeping the Americans engaged during this retiring movement was disclosed by prisoners caught to the west of Fismes, who said they had been ordered to keep in constant contact with the Americans along the Vesle.

The situation changed at last, but not by direct actions. General Mangin's forces to the west had proceeded far enough for their guns to menace the rear of the German artillery supporting the Vesle line from a limestone buttress northeast of Soissons. This buttress was a vital defense, not only to the Vesle line, but as a flank protection to the western end of the Chemindes-Dames. The German guns in the rear were thus occupied both on their front and flank.

Operations on their flank were presently to assume proportions which left the Vesle front virtually inactive, so marked became the relaxed pressure there, foreshadowing the general withdrawal of which there had already been so many symptoms. But before the Vesle front receded from the battle map the Americans and Germans locked horns in bitter tussles. One attack was on Bazoches, held by the Germans. Another attack was on the portion of Fismette held by the Americans. In each case the Americans and Germans secured their object, though later the Americans had to retire from Bazoches. They were concurrent actions, starting on Tuesday, August 27, 1918, and lasted all the next day. As the last conflicts fought for possession of Vesle points, they must be counted as German successes, of which Berlin made much, but the ground won was

not worth the cost, as it was soon abandoned with the whole Vesle front.

Bazoches had all along been held by the Germans. Some days before, Americans had advanced upon its outskirts, whereupon the Germans retired to the Haute Maison, a wooded stronghold, leaving small detachments in the cellars to harass the Americans should they enter. The latter approached Bazoches from the west in daylight under a stiff barrage, to which the German guns vigorously responded. A conflict ensued on the outskirts, and there was some hand-to-hand fighting, in which the Americans at first kept the upper hand. The Germans tried to reenforce their infantry fighting from the Haute Maison, but French and American guns from the hills on the south of the Vesle prevented relief columns coming in large numbers. The appearance of any reenforcements brought such augmented deluges of shells from the Franco-American batteries that the Germans raked their hill positions with 77's in an effort to cripple them. Fighting continued all night. By the next morning the Americans had gained a foothold on the eastern outskirts of the town, as well as making headway from the south. German snipers and machine gunners stubbornly clung to the northern side, firing from cellars and behind the walls of houses. Notwithstanding the progress of the Americans, however, further German attacks, according to General Pershing's communiqué, forced their outlying detachments to retire from Bazoches.

The retirement from Fismette was due to the same cause, but not before the Germans had met a spirited resistance from the Americans. First came heavy shells and aerial bombs, the latter thrown to drive Americans from houses in Fismette so that German machine gunners in the adjoining foothills could pick them off. These gunners had dug themselves into the hill slopes in line with the streets in order to cover exposed Americans. The latter succeeded in holding their positions the first day, but all-night fighting in the town, with numerous hand-to-hand encounters, resulted in the Germans gaining a footing, and the Americans retired.

# CHAPTER XVIII

#### JUVIGNY

THE unexpected appearance of Americans in force north of Soissons, brigaded with the French, added to the nervous attention which the Germans gave to their right Vesle flank by reason of the menace of General Mangin's Tenth French Army. American troops had been fighting all along with the French in reducing the Marne salient from the west toward Soissons. They had now been augmented by others, dispatched from another part of France in camions under cover of darkness to relieve French troops. Three hours after reaching the sector, that is, at 7 o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1918, a small unit of them engaged in a local attack, sandwiched between two French shock units.

There had, of course, been intense artillery preparation, lasting throughout the previous night. Meantime the new American force was quartered in a big cave of a quarry, unknown to the Germans, a few kilometers behind the line. The cave was damp and dark, dimly lit here and there by faint electric bulbs, and its sides rang with the reverberation of American guns barking some thirty feet above while the men slept waiting for the order to proceed to the firing line. It came at midnight; the cave stirred with activities for the advance; and the men duly streamed forward to the firing line under the redoubled roar of artillery.

It was a little operation, aiming at obliterating a dent in the line before a more extended advance was made on the Germans' key position, north of Soissons, on the Juvigny Plateau. By 9 o'clock the operation was over. A number of prisoners were taken in the course of the movement, which ended by the Americans digging in and bettering the new positions, from which they were to advance on a more extensive scale.

The movement was eastward toward the ruined village of Juvigny, across a little railroad which ran north and south. It

began early next morning (August 29, 1918), under a heavy artillery barrage. Throughout the night the German positions were vigorously shelled by heavy guns, mortars and light pieces, as well as by long-range naval guns, which searched the enemy's locations far and near.

Accompanied by a fleet of tanks, the Americans and French swept forward toward the German lines, which slowly and reluctantly fell back over the Juvigny Plateau. In doing so the Germans adopted the tactics of similar retirements, leaving their rear defended by lines and clusters of machine guns hidden behind every clump of brush, promontory, and woods that could be utilized. A stretch of forest-Couronne Wood and another little wood-stood sentinelwise between Juvigny and the approaching Americans, and from it the Germans poured a deadly cross fire. The situation of Juvigny, along the side of a hill, presented good defensive ground, which discouraged frontal attacks. The advancing forces therefore moved into positions from which their operations would make the village untenable by the Germans. The wisdom of such tactics was especially evident in assailing a little plateau in the midst of the protecting woods, strongly fortified by machine guns. Perhaps the Germans there looked for a frontal attack, for they had disregarded their rear, from which they were startled to find Americans, who had filtered through the wood by a turning movement, suddenly leaping upon them from behind. A crop of prisoners was the result of this maneuver.

The Americans advanced and receded in the swaying battle before Juvigny on a front some two miles long, flanked by the French. A dramatic tank drive marked the first day's operations outside the village. Along both sides of a path leading to it, light French tanks, under artillery protection, smashed one machine-gun nest after another, defying a new tank gun, a sort of super-Mauser, employed by the Germans. This weapon poured bullets designed to pierce oncoming tanks and injure some vital part of their engines; but the tanks, sweeping on, passed untouched, and scores of antitank guns were broken or crushed into the earth in their path.

The advancing troops made rapid headway in the morning, but were retarded as the day wore. The battle developed into a strong artillery duel, in which the guns of both sides often fired at direct targets and at unusually close range. Recovering from the shock of the morning attack, which forced a retirement, the German command brought up crack troops to reenforce the menaced positions. The retention of the Juvigny Plateau was vital to the whole Vesle line farther east. The Germans knew that once the Franco-American forces got to the eastern ridge line of the plateau, along which ran the Soissons-St. Quentin road, they would be able to get within gun range of the German batteries on the long hill line which lay between the plateau and the Vesle Valley. Facing artillery fire from the south, southeast, and west, those German gun positions would have to be abandoned.

From every hillside, ravine, and wood hundreds of machine guns crackled whenever they were approached; but in the face of their destructive offense the Americans and French nevertheless kept moving. At night the sky was splashed with flashes of shells exploding amid the roar of a ceaseless barrage and counterbarrage.

An American detachment escorted by tanks reached Juvigny (which appeared deserted but was not), and had spread over a mile beyond it. The occupation of the town seemed effected; but German determination to contest the American advance resulted in the repetition of the experience familiar to American divisions engaged in the Marne advance, when town after town was alternately held by Americans and Germans before the latter were finally expelled. The outcome was that by night the German line was again behind the railroad to the west of the town.

It needed hard fighting the next day (August 30, 1918), before the Franco-American movement succeeded in its object. The Americans especially encountered a stout-hearted and skillful enemy, who showed no signs of a lowered morale. Every foot of the way into Juvigny was contested by machine gunners who fought till the last. Little fighting took place in Juvigny itself. The conflict mainly raged in the neighboring valleys, where the Americans slowly gained ground, their grip on which the heaviest shelling with high explosives and clouds of gas failed to weaken. The fighting in the valleys resolved itself into general infantry work, and there the Americans' familiarity with woodcraft and ground craft proved invaluable to them.

"They were mostly open-air men," remarked a Reuter correspondent on the scene, "with keen eyes and an appreciation of the country, and in the branching jumble of ravines they outpointed the Germans in working their way through without losing touch with their own line or being enveloped by the enemy."

Advancing toward Juvigny in an arc movement, they fought over a battle ground of hopelessly warworn terrain. Toward them showers of machine-gun bullets poured from the débris and remnants of every ruin of the wrecked town, while from the crest of its overlooking hill came flocks of flying shells. The hill ridge became black with smoke from the projectiles as though grimed by the fumes of hundreds of factory chimneys. The blasts of the American guns joined in the roar, so that the noise could almost be said to have become solidified in a continuous, deafening hurricane. The Americans kept moving in the pandemonium, crawling in two contingents, east and west, from shell pit to shattered pill box, avoiding a frontal attack. It was an encircling movement up the slope of the hill, where the town lay, involving tactics which gave hundreds of men the appearance of acting like elusive prairie dogs. They had merely resorted to a combination of open warfare and half trench warfare. As viewed from an observation post, their maneuverings presented this picture to Edwin L. James, the New York "Times" correspondent:

"On the down slope of a hill west of Juvigny could be seen many little holes dug in the ground. Every now and then a lot of American heads would stick up, for all the world like gophers. Then with a rattle the German machine guns would cut loose and the heads would bob back. If the machine guns did not answer, the Americans would leap forward a few feet

and dig a new shelter, maybe in an open spot, maybe in a shell hole."

A pause came in the American advance to enable the French to bring up forces on their flanks, the American guns meantime pounding and harassing the Germans. The French advanced rapidly, and later in the day the Americans resumed their movement. The Germans gave indications of concentrating a force in Juvigny, and on that mass of ruins and positions near by the artillery was ordered to concentrate its fire. For an hour in the afternoon both American and French guns hurled tons of shrapnel and high explosives into the town; but when the Americans approached it seemed to have been vacated. At least four companies of Germans were observed to leave it, and an aviator reported no signs of the enemy.

Germans were there, nevertheless, and in adjacent positions. Clusters of machine guns lurked in the ruins of villages, on the hill to the north and at nearer points: The artillery ceased its fire on the town to avert danger to the Americans, who were ordered to take positions close to it. The enveloping movement proceeded in the face of thousands of German shells, which plowed the terrain over which the Americans crept without retarding their advance. On their left was the hill to the north on which the Germans had thousands of concealed machine guns. It was a useful supporting position for the enemy's forces ambushed in Juvigny itself. The American left wing wormed itself between the hill and the town, while on their right another body of troops had gone forward beyond the objective, so that the two forces could join at a point east of the town. The columns met upon a road behind Juvigny, where both managed to arrive by wide detours unobserved by the distant German artillery, though nearer several hundred machine guns spluttered at them.

The enveloping movement being thus consummated, the town was taken by assault. Prisoners afterward said that about a thousand Germans were in the town when the operations began, many of whom had been killed before the attackers arrived. Those who remained stoutly resisted with machine guns, and

there was some bayonet fighting in the streets. But compared with the resistance the Americans met on the outskirts, the fighting inside the town was not violent. The seeming emptiness of the place was explained by the discovery of a number of natural caves under the streets, where many of the besieged sought refuge. The Americans rained bombs into the moist darkness of these caverns and wrought gruesome havoc. From one cave the Americans took some 180 Germans, who had fled there when the firing became too hot, and emerged to man the guns when it abated. Apart from the prisoners taken, numbering 250, not a German, it was believed, escaped alive from the town.

When it was all over German gunners aided the destruction of their compatriots by dropping a shell among the prisoners sent to the American rear, killing five and injuring many others.

The Germans had been outmaneuvered and outfought by the encircling of the town after three days' intense conflicts. Apparently the wide detour of the American columns, which finally met in the German rear, was not observed by the force in the town. It was caught napping, helplessly trapped. The machine guns and trench mortars were all pointed to the west and northwest, while the Americans sprang in upon them in a converging arc from the other side.

The rest of the American line came up and united with the French on the left and right. In the Americans' path lay German dead and wounded. A stray gun was left in the woods, and a few score of abandoned machine guns and quantities of ammunition were scattered over the terrain. These were all the Germans had left behind them. Anticipating a repulse, the German command had removed the supplies from the endangered zone, and in that respect had left an empty cupboard. Some of the captured machine guns and ammunition were turned on the enemy the next day while the Americans consolidated their new positions east of Juvigny.

They now controlled a zone considerably in advance of that village by the domination of their artillery over the country

for many miles to the east. They immediately established positions on the ridge of the plateau lying east of a line through Juvigny and Chavigny, the latter place having been captured by the French. The two forces continued their pressure against the Germans to thrust them off the plateau. The latter resisted in a series of counterattacks which turned the fighting more or less into a pitched battle in the open.

The Franco-American troops continued their advance on Sunday, September 1, 1918, when it became evident that the enemy's resistance was broken and that he had decided the plateau could not be held. The Americans moved on and took Terny-Sorny in excellent liaison with the French, who had gained a strong hold on the Soissons-St. Quentin highway. Terny-Sorny lay across this road, and was captured after a series of three barrages. After the first barrage the Germans, apparently supposing that there could be no other prelude to an attack than their own method of one barrage before an attack, rushed from their shelters to meet the Americans, only to encounter another barrage. They hastily retreated, and reappeared at the close of that barrage. They were met by a third barrage. These tactics killed so many Germans and so demoralized the remainder that the American infantry, advancing behind the last barrage, speedily overcame them and captured 500 prisoners.

The position on Labor Day was that the Americans and French had secured the object for which they had set out on August 28, 1918, after five days' fighting against four German divisions of crack troops. This was their foothold on the Soissons-St. Quentin highway which gave them a strong position on the plateau running north of the Aisne. The effect of the whole movement on the Germans' precarious situation along the Vesle will presently be seen.

The identity of the American force who thus operated so successfully with General Mangin's Tenth French Army was not disclosed in the dispatches. It was the Thirty-second Division, composed of men from Michigan and Wisconsin. The French called them "Les Terribles." It was these Indians. lumberjacks, and farm boys from the Northwest who broke the

German hold on the Meanière Wood after six vain attacks and carried Cierges after that village had changed hands nine times. Both actions have been described in this history. They capped these exploits by their achievements with the French in breaking the German positions north of Soissons, as just recorded, the effect whereof was to force the withdrawal of the Germans from the Vesle altogether.

# CHAPTER XIX

### BACK TO THE AISNE

"YIELDING to the continued pressure of the Allied forces," General Pershing reported to the War Department on September 4, 1918, "the enemy is in retreat north of the Vesle. Our troops, in close pursuit, have taken Bazoches, Perles, Fismette, and Baslieux, capturing prisoners and machine guns."

The Germans had at least been put to flight from the Vesle heights. As this record had shown, no attempt was made by the Franco-Americans to oust them tactically by frontal assaults. At best strong units had planted themselves on the north bank, nibbling here and there to keep the Germans from holding complete possession of that side of the river and to thwart any massed assault they might otherwise attempt against the main American line on the south bank. A frontal attack would have cost lives anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000. A skillful strategical offensive, made miles away on the west by General Mangin's army in conjunction with the Thirty-second American Division, had struck the blow which made the Vesle heights untenable. The same blow reacted higher up, on the British front, preventing some of the finest divisions of the German army from hastening there to strengthen the resistance to the British assaults on the Hindenburg line. So the latter maze of strongholds, like the Vesle positions, were virtually broken by a battle fought many miles away from it.

On the Vesle Franco-American troops had been held poised in readiness for pursuit as soon as the Germans gave the sign. The unrelenting pressure of the Americans and French from the Soissons Plateau, hammering their way eastward after the dramatic battle of Juvigny, quickly changed the entire situation. On the morning of September 4, 1918, a smoke screen, behind which the Germans began the retreat of their main forces, rose on the northern edge of the plateau north of the Vesle. Fires sprang up in many places, indicating German destruction of shells and equipment they could not take with them. American patrols, observing these signs of withdrawal, went over the river to reconnoiter. They entered Bazoches and Fismette, round both of which places the Germans had fought so bitterly to retain their hold, without encountering any opposition. The trees along the roadway between Bazoches and Fismette had been cut down by German saws and German shells. The stone houses in Fismette had shell holes in their sides, and some were smashed by German air bombers who harassed the oncoming Americans, while in the desolate valley of the Vesle, between Bazoches and Fismette, the Germans had burned the freight cars along the railroad and twisted skeletons stood on the tracks as the Americans passed on from these towns, and crossed the Vesle in force.

German artillery subjected the Americans to a harassing fire, especially when they reached the plateau, where they had to advance in the open for about two miles over high ground plainly visible to the German observers. There was little cover, and both heavy and light artillery swept the zone but failed to check the forward movement. That the Americans succeeded in getting over the plateau without material loss was due to their deploying tactics. They filtered into and through the exposed zone in irregular formation, never presenting an effective target. American and French artillery poured their fire on villages and roads beyond the Aisne, and shelled points where machine guns were located. In the clearing out of these nests the artillery took a larger part in this retirement than in other movements, though, as seen, many had to be disposed of by the infantry. War St. 8-L

Being close on the heels of the Germans, the Americans encountered the usual resistance from rear guards detailed to obstruct the advance while the main body made good its retreat behind the smoke screen. American and French artillery sent a punishing fire over an area extending to the Aisne, along which the Germans hastened while the moving infantry took gun nest after gun nest by assault or forced the gunners to retire. The fighting in this retreat, as in other engagements, showed that the infantryman, as such, had ceased to exist in the German army. A German official report had affirmed this remarkable transformation. The fighting unit in the German army was no longer the rifle but the machine gun. Since retreats had become the rule, protected by machine-gun fire, the Americans' chief barrier was formed, not by bayonets, but by streams of bullets from these portable weapons. The Germans had discarded the system of organizing their forces on the basis of so many rifles to a force. The unit was the machine gun, and the rifle, once their primary fighting weapon, was relegated to a secondary place. The new development transformed German infantry into machine gunners.

There was no last stand by rifle fire or bayonet thrusts. Holding ground by this heroic and open form of warfare called for individual courage, which the Germans lacked. They were strong in group courage, bolstered by treacherous, concealed weapons. It was feline warfare, symptomatic of a disintegrating foe. They were placed by the Germans along a line admirably constructed, so that, no matter how far apart, there was some angle from which an effective crossfire could be made. Some of these organized machine-gun nests were established in ravines, making shooting galleries of the crevices, and commanded the sloping ridges between. The terrain was favorable to this form of defense, but it also favored flanking and enveloping tactics, to which the Americans successfully resorted. They were sharp and brief engagements, in which the Germans who were not killed or badly hurt withdrew into the ravines and into little trenches communicating with larger trenches that led to other ravines through which they escaped. The numerous gun nests, troublesome though they were, failed even to arrest the pace at which the Americans advanced.

A captured order, issued to each of these German machinegun units, instructed them when to fall back and what to do in case of surprise. They were to withdraw only when forced to do so, and, for the rest, to stay at their posts, with a chance of ten to one against their surviving their desperate tasks. They were brave men, but it was the bravery of rats in a hole, and they were abandoned to assignments in which their bravery was futile.

The German retreat was steady and rapid, and to keep pace with it on some areas of the plateau (the lines were moving ahead on a front about eight miles long), the Americans assembled automobile machine-gun detachments, with several days' supplies of food and equipment. There were three men to each car, of which more than thirty swept along, uncertain where their advance might lead them, but equal to any emergencies. These traveling machine-gun detachments were called Ford cavalry, being mounted on the familiar cars of that name, and found their chief employment in bombing the plateau roads to uproot German machine-gun lairs. They had been previously utilized with success north of Château-Thierry in the July operations.

The advancing Americans beheld a different scene from that which had spread before them in their advance from the Marne to the Vesle. From the latter river northward over the plateau the Germans had made a clean sweep of virtually everything, taking with them what they could, and burning what they could not, or what might be serviceable to the Americans and French. It was a predetermined retirement, not like that from the Marne, when, in their haste, the Germans left great stores of ammunition and supplies behind them. Here and there on the plateau roads the Germans had tried to destroy small bridges over ravines; but American engineers quickly repaired the roads. Americans on foot and on horseback, mule teams, automobile trucks, and motorcycles, sped over grain fields overrun with weeds, and passed villages with houses shot to pieces, but no-

where encountered anything of military value. There were flames of ruined German aerodromes on the plateau, standing in aviation fields in a score of places. The plateau was supposed to have been the German aviation center for aerial attacks on Paris and French points between. The canvas coverings of the hangars had even been removed, leaving stripped wooden frames so damaged by shells as to be worthless.

Long before nightfall the Americans had worked their way off the plateau to the lowlands along which the Aisne lay. The next morning (September 5, 1918), the American line extended along the heights which dominated the Aisne, running east and west, and held the crest on a front of four kilometers south of the river, with patrols reaching out over the lowlands. The Aisne wound its way beneath them. The Germans had managed to get most of their forces across the numerous bridges spanning the river, and, with the exception of the machine-gun detachments who had been left to their fate to delay the pursuers, were on the north side of the Aisne that night. The darkness was illuminated by blazing stores and villages set alight by the Germans to celebrate their first voluntary retirement from captured territory in this region.

Both sides began a temporary stabilizing of their lines. The Germans had settled themselves in force along a big canal paralleling the river, and gave every indication of not intending to move farther to their positions on the Chemin-des-Dames without a contest. A display of fire from their long-range naval guns, whose shells fell as far as Fismes and its environs, certainly pointed to massed artillery concentration.

In the foreground, along wooded slopes, the Americans streamed the next morning, fighting more rear guards of German machine gunners who lurked in holes, in trees and under stones. To the left stretched a shelving plateau beyond which the Vesle met the curving Aisne, where the French were moving up. To the American right on the east ran a plateau more level, in which direction there was much fighting at close range.

The situation between the Vesle and the Aisne was by no means straightened out. The German retreat had been prin-

cipally from the Vesle west of Fismes, which centers the river. Eastward the Germans had retained precarious positions, resisting American and French pressure in the direction of Rheims. With the German line bending back west of Fismes, and their retention of their line east of it, which turned southward, a salient was created, its other side formed by the Franco-American line stretching toward Rheims. This salient proved so menacing to the Germans that they began a slow withdrawal; but the American right, moving up, faced a difficult task, the Germans there fighting more in the spirit of their traditions. The American left flank on the salient held firmly. The struggle on their right placed them in a position where they were subjected to a heavy enfilading fire, especially from the German artillery. Despite desperate resistance, they swung their line forward to its junction with the French. Broken country thereabout offered greater scope for a determined defense. In every hillside and ravine were German artillery and machine guns. The Americans faced deadly barrages, as well as clouds of gas, shelled into ravines down which they moved. None the less, they advanced steadily, driving out machine-gun nests one after another. The Franco-American line closed slowly, but with unerring certainty on the German left flank. Clinging to the sector west of Rheims, the Germans displayed their greatest resistance at the point of the angle made by the line swinging upward toward the Aisne. But all the indications were that the German divisions on this stretch of their Vesle front would have to back to the Aisne, as those farther west had done.

Meantime the situation to the west before the Aisne did not greatly change. The Americans, with the French to their left, rectified their lines facing the Germans along the Aisne Canal. Additional forces and supplies arrived, enabling both the Americans and French to advance slightly, the former establishing positions on the canal. The slowing down of the German retreat helped to augment this concentration of forces to the strength needed for a further forward movement. The breathing spell also gave the Germans scope to concentrate their artillery to defend their new lines. There was firing on both sides, the

Germans sending shells into Fismes, Bazoches, and other points, from which the Americans sent reenforcements forward, while the Franco-American guns of both heavy and small calibers tore holes in the enemy lines and played upon crossroads and enemy formations far in the rear.

On the American right, the chief point of contention in the struggle to eject the Germans from the salient was the La Petite Montagne, a commanding position, the highest in that region. There the Germans had not only intrenched themselves but had dug in from the trench floors as additional protection against the heavy guns of the French and Americans. They had also built strong emplacements for heavy machine guns, and kept up a continuous fire upon all points approached by Americans. The latter took up positions in ravines that drained northward, moving cautiously, owing to the direct and indirect fire from La Petite Montagne. American and French guns bombarded the mountain, while German machine gunners blazed away at the attackers. The American detachments made headway at intervals by keeping under cover and refraining from advancing in large formations, proceeding generally in a curved line from Glennes to Viel Arcy.

These were local tactical operations on a front which had lost its immediate strategical importance by the obliteration of the Marne salient. The line from Soissons to Rheims, while not quite straightened, owing to the German bulge east of Fismes toward Rheims, receded, as it were, in the background, lost in the scrimmage taking place on the western front east and west of it. Dramatic developments of American strategy opened elsewhere on a scale which diverted the attention of General Pershing's forces from minor fields.

The further part Americans played in the Vesle-Aisne area found scant allusion in the dispatches and was apparently inconsequential. The final routing of the Germans from the whole region, precipitated by the cracks inflicted on the western front right and left, was undertaken by the French. This seemed to be a light task, to judge by a dispatch from Paris about the beginning of October, 1918, telling of operations between the

Vesle and the Aisne that yielded 2,000 prisoners. There had been no hint of a French attack on a large scale on this narrow front. The conclusion was that the captives had been left as rear guards on an abandoned fighting line and could not get out. Later it appeared that the French had cleared the entire Aisne Canal from Rheims to its junction with the Aisne, taking almost at a single blow all the heights which had so long dominated the city. French aggressions to the west, in the region of Soissons and Laon, developing from the Juvigny operations, likewise contributed to reduce the whole Vesle and Aisne area to a nullity as a contending ground. The Germans were soon far beyond it. "South of Laon," said a Berlin communiqué on October 12, 1918, "we have evacuated the Chemin-des-Dames."

## CHAPTER XX

### ST. MIHIEL

THE field of American activities suddenly switched well to the east of the Aisne and Rheims, beyond Verdun. The Lorraine front, where the original American forces had been long feeling their way as fighting elements in sharp local actions with the Germans, blazed up with a vivid intensity and as quickly quieted. A military enterprise, the most ambitious the Americans had undertaken, was accomplished with sledge-hammer blows on a long triangular front in a couple of days.

The scene of this swift operation was the St. Mihiel salient, which had formed a sharp entering wedge into the French lines since 1914. Its southern flank edged the American sectors, and from its tip its western flank ran northward across the Meuse east of Verdun. Its reduction had been contemplated from the first as the first American offensive on a large scale.

The preliminaries, which were of a far-reaching character, were thus sketched by General Pershing in his report to the Secretary of War:

"The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft tanks, ambulances, the location of hospitals, and the molding together of all the elements of a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our own Service of Supply.

The concentration for this operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most careful attention to every detail.

"The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation on the western front.

"From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the Moselle River the line was roughly forty miles long and situated on commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our First Corps (Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions), under command of Major General Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on Pont-à-Mousson. with its left joining our Third Corps (the Eighty-ninth, Fortysecond, and First Divisions), under Major General Joseph T. Dickman, in line to Xivray, and both were to swing toward Vigneulles on the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to Mouilly the Second Colonial French Corps was in line in the center, and our Fifth Corps, under command of Major General George H. Cameron, with our Twenty-sixth Division and a French division at the western base of the salient, were to attack three difficult hills—Les Eparges. Combres, and Amaranthe. Our First Corps had in reserve the Seventy-eighth Division, our Fourth Corps the Third Division. and our First Army the Thirty-fifth and Ninety-first Divisions, with the Eightieth and Thirty-third available. It should be understood that our corps organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent assignments of divisions to corps."

Though preparations for the assault were made with the usual military secrecy, the rumor leaked by word of mouth over France that American troops were concentrating in the Lorraine sector. Even the German newspapers reported the movements. Perhaps the Germans looked for an advance on Metz, the obvious objective of any forward movement in Lorraine. Certainly they did not expect the Americans to strike where they did, or else were unable to muster sufficient man power to repel the attack.


For some days before the assault an extensive area behind the American lines echoed with the trundling of trains of slow-moving wagons and faster trucks, bearing huge supplies and equipment to the new fighting zone. It was not a case of a single train of twenty or thirty trucks and an occasional battery of artillery, but solid strings of traffic stretching mile after mile over railroad tracks or highroads, over the rough cobble-stones of many villages. Through these hamlets, spread over many miles, the shadowy forms of an endless stream of American troops passed under cover of night. The Germans were thus unaware of the extent of the concentration, as the marching halted at dawn, and the men stayed under cover in the daytime till darkness fell again.

The salient had been a thorn in the side of France for four years. It was a natural fortress, pressed by the lofty Mont Sec, and was seized by the invading Germans in 1914. It had been held ever since. The desperate efforts of the French in 1915 failed to rout them. Its backbone was the ridge of the Côtes de la Meuse, a defensive barrier which, in the French prewar scheme of frontier defense, linked up the fortresses of Verdun and Toul. Next to Ypres it might be said to have been the most famous salient on the western front, bristling with elaborate defensive works, and had struck deep into the French line, an

unsubjugated menace, especially to the rear of the French citadel of Verdun.

In the darkness of the morning of September 12, 1918, beginning at 1 a.m., American guns on both sides of the salient, with a French division, under American command, operating at the tip, began an intense bombardment. A rainy, moonless night was suddenly lit up by a single dash of flame shot across the sky. It was the forerunner of other flashes, which slowly blended to sheets of white light on the horizon. Then from this flame-lit area came the rolling thunder of the guns, and amid their crashing the crack and boom of responding German shells could be heard. The vivid bands of light stretched far eastward and westward over the extended front, lighting up the clouds. Star shells, signal rockets and flares shot across from the enemy positions as beacons to reveal the location of any movement from the American positions for an infantry attack. Within the salient the effect of the first outbursts of American artillery was discernible by reddish glows, which heightened the pyrotechnic color scheme illumining the black night, indicating exploded ammunition dumps and blazing buildings ignited by American fire. The guns not only battered the front German positions, but almost every crossroad, town, and village within range. High explosives broke up highways over which the enemy might bring up reenforcements or retreat. Every battery commander had carefully registered the objectives of his projectiles long before the attack. As the hours advanced the misty rain abated, leaving a horizon of perfect black as a background to the flares which came in a continuously trembling blanket of light. Altogether it was a night of devastating shelling, converting the peaceful valleys between the Meuse and Moselle into fearful thunder pits. Guns surcharged the air with repeated concussion waves whose echoes seemed to shake the ground under them and rock the surrounding hills.

The bombardment lasted for four hours, and as 5 o'clock neared—the time fixed for the forty-mile encircling plunge by infantry and tanks—there was a greater frequency of German star shells, as though the enemy suspected that the fatal hour



THE VICTORY OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AT ST. MIHIEL

was nigh and sought light on the movement. When it came the artillery roar ceased, and in the sudden silence the advance began as the dawn slowly rose.

A crushing barrage opened to protect the troops as they neared the German trenches, and countering it came the clattering of thousands of German machine guns. It was a succession of surprise attacks, developed at a number of points where the German lines were penetrated without much difficulty. Throughout the German resistance was weak in the first stages of the onset. Blockhouses, machine-gun pits, ammunition stores were hastily deserted, to be blown up by the Americans when they came up to them. The defenses of the Germans were ruined at the outset.

The rains that soddened the night continued at intervals, and driving downfalls or thin showers of mist obscured what little daylight there should have been when the troops advanced. The narrow dirt roads that led from the main highway in the main attack from the south were deep in mud, and it was through these roads and over fields that the guns moved, the wagons, mostly drawn by automobile tractors, sinking low in the mire. Later the day improved, bringing fine intervals interspersed with heavy rainstorms; but the rain-sodden ground made the progress of transport and heavy guns exceedingly difficult.

With the troops went many trucks bearing thousands of miles of wire, which was unreeled as the vehicles proceeded, signal-corps men on foot attaching the wires to telephone instruments at assigned points. Miles of wire had already been laid on the St. Mihiel salient and its borders before the attack, and after the Americans had advanced 6,000 telephones were installed and connected with these wires throughout the battle zone. American officers whose troops had flanked the foe's trenches were thus able to signal the location of those trenches to the artillery behind, and bring a deluge of shells in that direction.

In the main attack from the south, whole fleets of tanks, manned by Americans and French, headed the infantry, who followed in open order, plowing through the mud produced by the rainy night, and little troubled by the feeble artillery resistance of the enemy.

The attack extended beyond Mont Sec, the great natural mountain fortress near the salient's tip above Apremont, to the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson. Here open rolling grassland made excellent fighting country. It presented few difficulties to the khaki-clad men, beyond an uncertain foothold in the soaked fields.

They romped over the ground, fighting ferociously where sporadic opposition appeared, as happened near Seicheprey when German machine-gun and automatic fire swept down upon them, and at other times pursuing with ruthless speed the retreating foe. The pace at which whole divisions swept northward was such that their whereabouts were unknown for hours. wireless and telegraphic communication with them had become lost, until couriers or carrier pigeons made known that they had stormed and taken some distant enemy position. They went forward with the steadiness of a flood, trickling into woods on one side and passing out of them on the other, or breaking against a hill or a mountain and gradually surmounting the brow. Rain-soaked, and floundering and slipping at times in the mud—which finally proved too much for many of the tanks -they pressed on, big guns booming behind them, and the enemy melting away in front. American cavalry patrols were in the thick of the pursuit, looking, as one observer described them, like Indian fighters in their rakishly cocked metal helmets. They lacked alike the dashing plume effect of the French cavalry in action and the stateliness of British horse troops; they were content to be a hard-riding, uncompromising force, bent on the business of giving a good account of themselves.

In a military sense, the entire action was normal—if there is such a thing in war. Only the speed of its execution was abnormal. This was largely due to the ruthless sweeping of the enemy's ground by the artillery. The unsurpassed shelling from guns of all calibers left the enemy powerless to bring up reserves or maintain communications. His roads were torn up, his supplies and material destroyed or abandoned, his ammunition

dumps went skyward and his intrenched villages fired. There was nevertheless hard fighting in spots, both brilliant and fierce, though the action as a whole represented a flight screened by weak rear-guard units. One vital point was held for a time by a famous and tried German division; but it was unable to withstand the steady advance of the Americans thrown against it, and, in yielding, lost many prisoners. At other points where the Germans were disposed to make a stand, faulty liaison connections left them in such a quandary that they had no option but to surrender.

This was the situation in which an entire regiment, with its commander and staff, found itself. Left in the lurch with both flanks exposed and, lopped off from the main German force, it was suddenly surrounded by Americans on all sides. The surrender was as simple as corralling a herd of cattle and was not without its humor. "The commander"-as a Reuter correspondent recounted the incident—"requested that his roll should be called so that he might discover how heavy had been his losses. When it was called everyone answered his name but one officer and one private. The commander then suggested that. as his command was so disconcertingly complete, he should march it off in whatever direction his captors desired. So it came to pass that one was met by the astonishing spectacle of an entire German regiment marching off the battle field under its own officers, guarded by a few joyous but ridiculously inadequate troopers, who looked, with their cowboy seat in the saddle and their reckless good humor, like Highland drovers of a bygone century herding raided cattle home."

At another point the Germans decided that there should be no such easy capitulation, and banked up machine guns. Their stand halted the Americans, who resorted to one of their favorite devices in such emergencies. They lay flat on the ground for a period, crawling between aisles of fire for ten yards or so, then suddenly dropping prone again. In this way they approached the guns in an encircling movement. The German fire was too intense, amounting to a hail of bullets that balked any rush attack. The situation was saved by the opportune

arrival of a bevy of tanks, which maneuvered about and plunged into the machine-gun intrenchment.

The point of juncture of the two forces converging toward each other from the west and south sides of the salient was Vigneulles, a little town that centered the northern end of the salient on a hypothetical line run across it on the map. This line became a reality by the Americans' arrival there. A small patrol first reached the town, later followed by a large force which moved down the ridge along the northern edge of a neighboring forest. The enemy made desperate efforts to escape through the forest, and partly succeeded, though not so successfully as to detract from the American achievement. It was true that thousands escaped from the trap before the American line tightened across the edge of the woods, but the fugitives were small units, at most not more than companies, who evaded fighting unless encountered by some patrol, and even then their resistance was slight.

It was early morning on Friday, September 13, 1918, when a member of another American patrol which had reached the town challenged a shadowy outline slowly approaching him along a narrow street, over whose smoldering ruins, set on fire by the retreating Germans, hung a misty veil.

"Go slow with that rifle of yours, Buddy," came the voice of the shadowy figure, whose mushroom helmet, becoming recognizable through the mist, revealed a second American soldier. "We beat you to it by some hours. Got in here shortly after midnight."

The incident marked the closing of the Franco-American ring of steel around the Germans who were left in the St. Mihiel salient and also in a zone east of the Meuse River on the north above Fresnes.

At the base of the salient, taken by the French, the immediate military result was to free two railroads and a canal from the range of German cannon. The American exploit reopened the direct railroad line between Nancy and Paris, and liberated both Nancy and Commercy from the menace of German artillery, which had endangered them from the war's beginning.

The capture of the city of St. Mihiel, after four years' occupation by the Germans, furnished one of the most striking incidents of the war. The French attack was so directed as to force an evacuation without storming the city. The Germans left the town three hours after the attack began on the morning of September 12, 1918. They were so surprised that they were unable to perform their customary ravages before evacuating. But they had carried off everything portable. Sheets and blankets even, were torn from beds among other paraphernalia and loaded into wagons. This loot, however, had to be wheeled up to the top of the salient, and as the fleeing Germans had only some twelve hours in which to get out of it, with the American claws closing in on each side, the wagons never reached the German safety zone beyond.

The city was entered the following afternoon by French and American forces, commanded by Generals Pétain and Pershing, over a war-wrecked bridge, of which only a few rickety planks were left. Ingress in force from the west, except by floats, was cut off; not only had the stone bridge over the Meuse been blown up early in the war, but three makeshift bridges there had been smashed by shell fire. There were three roads to the town from the east. One passed through Apremont, and had to be avoided. lurking German forces still holding it in the morning. The second was blocked by wire and gaping trenches. The third was intersected with trenches, which had to be filled with earth before the road could be made passable. The town itself was only partly ruined. Near the Meuse it was almost destroyed: but elsewhere scores of houses were unscathed. The Germans before leaving had set a few in flames, which the freed civilians promptly extinguished.

The Germans had made life a nightmare for the inhabitants. The latter were kept in blank ignorance of the war's course since the Germans had occupied the city, knowing only what their captors told them. All boys between ten and sixteen had been deported, as well as men of military age. Only aged people and children were left to welcome the Franco-American liberators. They crowded about Generals Pershing and Pétain, who








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At the left is Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, who commanded the American First Army in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive; at the right is Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, who commanded the American Second Army. The uniforms are those of Major Generals



chanced to be accompanied by Newton D. Baker, American secretary of war, then on a visit to the French front. Mr. Baker's presence, by reason of his official rank, deeply stirred the inhabitants. From half-destroyed houses and distant points of the city they flocked to pay grateful homage to the visitors. Women thronged round Mr. Baker, kissing his hand and weeping, and brokenly joining in an ardent chorus of "Vivas!" It was an emotional outburst following four years' subjection under the conqueror's heel. All the Americans entering the town had a similar reception. Women laughed and cried by turns as they seized and kissed the hands of officers and men. For their own compatriots their greetings were deeper, so affecting the French troops and patrols that the deliverers were more moved by the occasion than the delivered. It was a great day for St. Mihiel.

The Germans, in abandoning the salient, left many indications that they had never contemplated evacuation. They had built shelters, beer gardens, and clubhouses, equipped on lines out of keeping with a war environment. Dugouts of officers were luxuriously furnished, some with bathrooms and running water, and electric lights, while outside them were summerhouses where the officers relaxed and drank beer. The country at one point had acquired the character of a prosperous German neighborhood, where townspeople might spend their holidays. North of St. Mihiel was a striking proof that the Germans had settled down to a permanent occupation of the salient. It was an elaborate cemetery, stretching a quarter of a mile, containing 6,000 German graves. It spread from the roadside up a hill, on top of which stood an enormous black iron cross. Massive marble tombstones and monuments, symmetrical, grand and new, stood as straight as German precision could make them. Much wealth and care had been lavished upon it. Flowers bloomed everywhere. Great mausoleums and vaults towered above lesser monuments. On them all were carved loving phrases and gallant tributes to the soldier dead underneath. At least they stayed, if those who raised the monuments did not. There was only room for dead or captive Germans in the St. Mihiel salient after the Americans had entered it.

War St. 8-M

The reduction of the salient involved a military operation of the familiar pincers type used to nip off a projection. One claw of the pincers, some twelve miles thick, rested on the Moselle, at about the Pont-à-Mousson. The other, about eight miles thick, rested on the heights of the Meuse at Haudiomont, a little to the east of the river. The distance to be closed between the claws of the pincers was about thirty miles, and the ground to be nipped off by them was about 200 square miles.

The first day's fighting brought the southern claw of the pincers up to the full limit assigned to it, but the western claw had to face more difficult ground and more strenuous opposition before it reached its assigned position. In the first operations, which aimed to squeeze the narrow tip of the salient before the Germans could escape from the trap, the claws were but four miles apart. The Americans forming the claws were pursuing a large force of the enemy ahead, away from the tip, as well as inclosing another large enemy force in the 200 square miles that their grip embraced. When the claws met. the position looked as though the spreading arms of the claws would have a big force of the enemy on either side of them, and that they would have to fight facing both ways. The risk nevertheless was taken, as the enemy, far from attempting to flank the oncoming Americans, were fleeing through the still open claws at the rate of a thousand an hour before the claws finally closed and trapped thousands of others. The nature of the advance showed a tactical advantage in the possibility of closing in at the top of the salient, and the American troops were ordered to work inward and meet.

Patrols had already gone far ahead. The lines reached the first day were established and consolidated by midnight. The American troops had then broken big holes into the salient, while at its immediate tip the French attacked lightly, merely to hold the Germans' attention while the sides were being bulged in. The first day's operation found the American line well driven into the southern edge of the salient, and running from Fey-en-Haye to Vieville-en-Haye, north of Thiaucourt and south of Beney, Monsard, Montsec, Loupmont, Apremont, and Ailly

Wood, to the old line at Han-sur-Meuse. Then it curved around St. Mihiel. Meantime the Americans advancing with the French on the western side had pushed their line in so that it ran from St. Mihiel to Chauvoncourt, Côte Ste. Marie, west of Spada, west of Dompierre-aux-Bois, along the Grande Tranchée de Calonne, thence by the bend southwest of Hannonville, Terbeauville, and Combres to the old line west of Treseauxyaux.

Before the close of the second day (Friday, September 13, 1918, the whole salient was wiped out, the two invading forces meeting in a line across the salient's top from Pagny on the east through St. Benoit, Hattonville, and Hannonville to Combres on the west below Fresnes. The drive south of the salient, in conjunction with a second drive on the west below Fresnes, with the French moving up from the salient's tip, had folded up the whole German position, and sent thousands of fugitives fleeing to a strip of the Hindenburg line beyond.

General Pershing in his report thus admirably summed up the whole operation:

"After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in the front line advanced at 5 a.m. on September 12, 1918, assisted by a limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by French. These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed wire that protected the enemy's front line and support trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our sudden approach out of the fog.

"Our First Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our Fourth Corps curved back to the southwest through Nonsard. The Second Colonial French Corps made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the Fifth Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counterattack. A rapid march brought reserve regiments of a division of the Fifth Corps into Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our Fourth Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At

the cost of only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with."

The American line rapidly became consolidated in its new positions, reaching out here and there, with a varying strip of no-man's-land dividing it from the new German intrenchments on the Hindenburg line to the north. As usual in such advances, lurking Germans lingered in recesses of forests which had been passed, and they had to be hunted out like foxes from their lairs. The Americans made minor advances to straighten the new front, which extended some thirty-three miles, patrols leading a mile or two beyond the main body. This movement brought the German guns from the Metz forts into play and speeded German preparations to protect the railroad communications in the vicinity of the Metz forts, which were under long-range gunfire of the Americans. The German forces on the Hindenburg line meantime showed feverish activity to resist further American encroachments by wiring areas along their front and constructing new dugouts.

The retreat was stopped. They were at bay. Reenforcements that came up grew in numbers and spread along the Hindenburg line, portending a stubborn resistance when the Americans moved again. The intervening no-man's-land was rather wide. There were patrols of both sides in it, the Americans showing their customary boldness in making forays, to which the German patrols made only a weak resistance. Officially, operations had stopped, such sorties not being counted among military happenings for record. In the air, however, there was ceaseless activity for a period, in sharp contrast to the slackening of ground movements. A great concentration of American flyers, aided by French, British, and Italian contingents, bombed areas back of the German lines, taking part in

scores of spectacular fights with crack German squadrons sent to resist them. The latter made retaliatory raids over the St. Mihiel salient, dropping bombs on towns just evacuated, and only making a stand with Allied airmen when their numbers were superior. The area of battle, in fact, had been diverted from the earth to the clouds. Above the entire area the sky was speckled with swiftly moving dots and the air vibrated with a ceaseless humming. The exploits of one American aerial unit, typical of other American achievements, embraced thirty-five combats in two days, in which seventeen German planes were brought down, and twenty-nine patrols successfully undertaken. Another contingent, in the course of one day, dropped seventeen tons of bombs on a town known to be a German headquarters and packed with German troops, and, not content with that, returned at night and dropped twenty tons more.

On the ground a series of local actions had pushed the American line closer to the Hindenburg positions. These slight advances, which included the capture of the important points of Fresnes and Haumont, brought the line through Ronvaux, Manheulles, Pintheville, St. Hilaire, Doncourt, Woel, Haumont, Jaulny, Vandières, and south to Chambley and Norroy. This line thereafter marked a uniformly stable position, along which the Americans settled five days after the St. Mihiel salient was obliterated. Whatever the Germans feared, intrenched along the second line of their Hindenburg system, the Americans did not contemplate advancing farther for the present. Other developments were impending in another area. The Germans accepted the situation, only employing defensive tactics, and indulging in a half-hearted and perfunctory bombardment of the American lines. Even challenges by American and French contingents were repulsed except when a clash could not be avoided. The Germans appeared at length to be satisfied that the Americans did not intend to attack; certainly they had neither the power nor the heart to counterattack. The situation lapsed into the quiescence which marked other sectors after a big objective had been accomplished. Nevertheless, eventualities could not be ignored by the Germans, who, while evading actions, were as busy as beavers building concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements along their Hindenburg defenses. Behind them lay the Briey and Longwy iron fields, from which the Germans drew heavily for ore for making munitions, and which were vital as sources of supplies. Then there was Metz to be protected.

American shells reached the vicinity of the Metz forts. The Germans charged that the city itself was being bombarded, which was not the case. Strong fortifications extended round three sides of Metz, which was also circled by a belt railroad, with branches to many points of the German lines in front of the Americans. The latter's big guns poured tons of high explosives upon these forts and the railroad junctions, which were also the targets of many American air bombers. The Americans were not killing defenseless women and children in Metz, as the German eagerly complained, but were bent on hampering the German use of the city as a transportation center.

The cause of the American activity on the St. Mihiel front, except for artillery and aerial attacks on the Metz forts, was later explained by General Pershing. The fact was that the First American Army, after obliterating the salient, had gone. While the Germans were nervously concentrating on the Hindenburg line, fearful of another advance, much of the American corps and artillery, with divisions in reserve at other points. were on the move the day after the St. Mihiel operation was finished, trekking toward the area beyond the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the forest of Argonne. where a smashing assault was to be made. The First Army had quietly given place to the Second American Army on the St. Mihiel front, and while the change was being effected little was heard of operations there. The Argonne held attention. and it was not until progress there developed to a crossing on to the east side of the Meuse in November, 1918, that the St. Mihiel front projected into the arena of activities again. The Second Army, under Major General Bullard, then joined hands with the First Army in an advance on a combined front, 115 kilometers long, extending from Sedan east to the Moselle River near Pont-à-Mousson. The St. Mihiel front had not materially

changed from the line at which the First Army left it. The advance began on November 10, 1918, and was directed toward the rich coal and iron fields of Briey, to be followed by an offensive toward Château-Salins east of the Meuse, thus isolating Metz. It was in progress, having already gained some five kilometers, on the morning of November 11, 1918; but the signing of the armistice brought it to a halt.

### CHAPTER XXI

#### THE ARGONNE-MEUSE DRIVE

RESH from its St. Mihiel laurels, the First American Army began its great Argonne-Meuse offensive on September 26, 1918, and pursued it with swinging strides to the moment of the armistice six and a half weeks later. The line attacked was a ontinuation on the west of the St. Mihiel front where the latter swung north from Fresnes, turning west above Verdun, the Meuse intervening. The river skirted the American right flank except a piece of territory which the Americans held on the east of the river, leaving a small portion of the flank exposed; but this segment of the American front, cut by the Meuse, never proved to be in jeopardy. The Germans were too busily engaged west of the Meuse, where the American attack extended from that river through the Argonne Forest to the latter's western edge on the Aisne. Thence westward, from Massiges to Auberive on the Suippe River, a simultaneous offensive was undertaken by the French, the entire Franco-American line of attack approaching fifty miles, of which some twenty miles was American. The situation calling for this combined assault was thus described by General Pershing in his report to the War Department:

"With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In the general attack all along the line, the operation assigned the American army as the hinge of this Allied offensive was directed toward the important railroad communications of the German armies through Mézières and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' accumulation of plants and material would be dangerously imperiled.

"The German army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions, and notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.


"Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense, screened by dense thickets, had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of battle from right to left was the Third Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth Divisions in line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with the Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and Ninety-first Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps reserve, and the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne-le-Château, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions in line, and the Ninety-second in corps reserve. The army reserve consisted of the First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second Divisions."

The line in this sector was thinly held by the French and little had been heard of it since they finally ousted the Germans from holding vital positions commanding Verdun in 1917. Between the Argonne and the Meuse the Americans faced ground

which had already been stained by the blood of countless Germans and Frenchmen. The Germans stormed Verdun in 1914, surrounding it on three sides; but the French successfully resisted their efforts to take it. They repeated their desperate and sustained assaults in 1915 and 1916, writing some of the bloodiest chapters of the war in their terrific conflicts with the French in the Argonne and west and east of the Meuse above Verdun. The Americans were entering a region already damned as a jungle of death.

General Pershing referred to the Argonne line as a "hinge" in the general Allied offensive along the western front. This offensive aimed at folding up the entire German line, which, stretching from the North Sea on the west to the Moselle River on the east, took the form of a salient. The wings of the German salient rested in the west on the fortified position of Lille, and in the east on Metz with its cluster of forts. The British and French struck at the western wing, and to the First American Army and the Fourth French Army was assigned the task of striking the east wing from the Champagne, the Argonne, and the Meuse Valley.

It was no St. Mihiel that the Americans confronted, but an enterprise which had balked other armies for four years. The Americans knew that here a battle loomed which would rank with the first battle of the Marne, with Verdun, with the Somme, and the Chemin-des-Dames, and they knew that on them depended the issue of the great attacks proceeding on the rest of the front. The Argonne sector was admittedly one of the most difficult of the whole front to overcome. It was a maze of broken terrain, confusing topography and meager highways. Germans, in their four years' occupation, had fortified it to the last degree of military skill, and built a system of superb roads, both motor and rail, connecting with their rear positions and bases. The forest provided a strong defensive backbone in a long chain of hills, running north and south, covered with dense masses of trees and undergrowth. The existing foot roads did not extend beyond a few transverse passes running east and west. The least rain converted the soil into a slippery mire.



HOW THE ORMONT AND BELLEAU WOODS WERE TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE

In short, the physical character of the terrain was such that the line of attack for an advancing army was limited to the river valleys flanking the forest, the Aisne on the west and the Aire on the east.


A frontal attack was not practicable across a forest which ran lengthwise north and south, centered by chains of hills whose banks faced east and west. These hills resembled the vertebræ and ribs of a flat fish, with the ribs on one side shortened to half their length. The ribs represented a series of ridges and ravines, perilously steep on the east, but less abrupt and longer farther west. The ravines followed each other in ceaseless succession along the backbone for about twenty-five miles. The problem of breasting such positions, which were formidable enough in their natural state, was increased by a series of stone mansions under the hillsides, approached by stone-lined trenches, which the Germans had built.

But even more insuperable than these dugouts were hundreds upon hundreds of miles of wire woven endlessly among the trees. Around and over the wire grew weeds and grasses exceeding three feet high, making the obstacle more difficult by concealment.

Through the series of hills, ravines, and dense jungles ran the famed Hindenburg line, four kilometers deep, honeycombed with trenches by the hundreds, and fenced with lines of wire sometimes extending to a depth of two and a half miles. Thousands of machine guns were sheltered behind rocks, in trees and holes. The sparse roads had been mined or blown up. Uncounted pill boxes, dugouts, and natural positions, running always to the southern side and on the crests of the hills, primed for resisting a frontal attack, protected the Germans, who also, from the positions, and from gun emplacements farther behind, had the exact range of every cross trail and road which any invading force attempted to use.

East of the Argonne Forest, between the Aire and the Meuse, the Americans confronted a more simple task. The Aire ran along the forest, which bordered its west bank. On the other side of the stream the country was similar in character to the Champagne, gently rolling, with here and there a predominant landmark which overlooked the surrounding country. stretch of passable territory between the Aire and the Meuse was the weakest section in the German line, due to the absence of lines of communications, there being only one railroad running east and west between Sedan and Verdun. In other words, there was but one crossing of the Argonne, and that through the pass at Grand Pré, running from Chatterange to Bazancourt, northeast of Rheims. This Aire-Meuse section led direct to Sedan, some thirty miles away, the most important city on this part of the front, more vital to German communications than was Metz. It was from Sedan, and from Mézières, a little farther on, that the entire southern section of the German line was fed and supplied. As General Pershing pointed out, the American advance aimed at getting astride this Sedan-Mézières railroad, which ran well beyond the northern edge of the Argonne.

On the night of Wednesday, September 25, 1918, the American troops quietly took the place of the small French forces who had been nursing the Argonne line. At 11.30 that night the American artillery opened up an intense bombardment against the enemy's flanks on the Aisne and Aire, and at 2.30 o'clock the next morning the whole front was ablaze with a crushing fire that lasted three hours. It was cross fire and direct fire, from long-range guns in hidden positions, carefully placed there on Wednesday evening. It was a cloudless night. and thousands of guns, all firing furiously, wreathed the hills in ceaseless sparkles, like myriads of fireflies. The rorring of the cannon, like the roll of a giant drum, seemed as deliberate. ominous and methodical as human fate. Lighter artillery injected a sharp, quicker, and more angered note into the symphony of battle when the frontal bombardment opened. air whispered with swishing shells more mysterious, invisible. and trying than ghosts, and from the heavens came a din like that from beaten tinware. The German artillery, which did not appear to be in position to direct a powerful cross fire on



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE-FIRST STACE, SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 1, 1918

the front of attack, was subjected to a gas bombardment the entire time.

Under the roar of guns and the scream of passing shells overhead, the chaplain of one division held mass at a specially erected altar, about which a great throng of soldiers gathered. It was half an hour before the advance, and German shells were falling over the back areas. In the midst of the service a German shell alighted in front of the altar and shattered it. The concussion broke up the assemblage and threw men down in every direction. Yet a roll call showed, according to the narrator of the incident, that neither the chaplain nor a single man was injured. The interrupted mass was concluded without an altar.

The infantry moved at 5.30 o'clock. "We drove," reported General Pershing with a masterly brevity, "through the barbed-wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across no-man's-land, mastering all the first-line defenses." But there was much more in the story of the day's charge that could be contained in any laconic official record.

The advance was organized with the military precision and coordination which marked all the Allied movements under the unity of command, was timed to schedule, and moved like clockwork. Tanks and aerial units were again invaluable aids to the moving infantry. The squadrons of tanks, or "land battleships," trundled with the troops, smashing through wire entanglements and routing the enemy from machine-gun nests. The swampy condition of the terrain, mired by recent rains. obstructed the tanks' progress, and many were stalled in the mud; but these mishaps did not occur before the enemy was in flight before the infantry. Overhead an aerial barrier was maintained, preventing the enemy from observing the movements of troops. There was a fog in the morning, which retarded the airmen's operations over the enemy's lines. number nevertheless swooped low through the murk and swept down on the German troops in the line and over the roads. Wagon trains were attacked, and dead horses and débris blocked the path of enemy forces who soon afterward sought avenues of retreat. As the skies cleared later the aerial observers with their fighting escorts dotted the clouds, guiding and correcting the aim of the artillery, which had never ceased its vigorous harassing fire.

Bird's-eye views from vantage points, or observations of local onlookers of sectional developments, provide an inadequate picture of a swinging advance on such a long front. But these glimpses represented the character of the movements proceeding all along the line, and as such served to furnish a general visualization of the entire attack. For instance, the early morning onset of the infantry, sighted through a cold, uncertain light from a hill near Verdun, was illuminated dimly by the flare from some virulent American battery, which would reveal a column of dark, gnomelike figures pressing forward, or the dust cloud of some speeding lorry; but little else could be seen till dawn came. Then a thin, bluish autumn haze spread and promised clearer views as the morning advanced. Then could be discerned the blackish, brown bursts from American guns smashing on towns and villages in German hands with a steady demolition. Then could also be traced the network of enemy trenches between the Aire and the Meuse, wreathed in shell plumes upon a not distant hill like shapes of suddenly sprouting trees. The telling marksmanship of the American guns shook roofs to ruins and dusted hillsides with the powdered whiteness of walls.

The opening action, as seen at close quarters in a line of moving tanks and infantry, at one point found a vivid narrator in Sergeant Wade Mountfortt, attached to an engineer regiment of the Missouri and Kansas National Guard. Three platoons of his company had been detailed to accompany a tank squadron to dig the machines out of the mire when they became stalled. That was their allotted rôle, but emergency parts fell to them as circumstances dictated.

"Imagine," he wrote home, "eight men walking alongside an armored tank whose business it is to invade enemy strong points to put up battle when it has been found impossible for the infantry to work! Some task!

"It is my firm belief that the enemy had knowledge of the movement of our three platoons, for as we marched eight kilos up a broad French road we were constantly under the fire of long-range enemy guns. I don't believe I'll ever forget the mental strain on this walk to the trenches. I was in charge of a section of three squads, and during that entire hike we were not on our feet for more than ten minutes at a time. It was a case of double time until the hungry whine of a shell sweeping the heavens on its way to us was heard, then down flat on the ground in a foot of mud and water. We passed over a bridge and into a village with shells bursting all about us. While on the bridge a big one lit in the water not ten feet away and covered us with mud and water. A building was blown to atoms not a block away from us as we passed through the little village, which seemed as large as Chicago.

"Word came from the head of our column to be as silent as possible—all orders were to be given in whispers. In fifteen minutes we entered the trenches. What is your idea of the entrance to the front line of a busy sector? I'll tell you what it really is: A hole like a rabbit's under a bush. Sounds tame, doesn't it?

"We crawled through the little gateway into hell, and when I raised up I found we were in a deep support trench knee-deep in water, but treading on duck boards. A winding walk of twenty minutes through the labyrinth, and we were at the dugout, a refuge until we went over the top. I can't make those letters too large or underline them enough so as to convey their real meaning to me that night.

"Not one of my little party slept a wink the remainder of that long wart. I unrolled my pack and threw away everything but the little things I held most dear to me in this life. My blankets, raincoat, shelter half, all went by the wayside. Armed with a trench knife, pistol, rifle, a can of beef, five hard-tack, and a lot of determination, I waited for orders.

"At 2 o'clock that morning the barrage was turned loose. It is impossible for me to describe the din and noise of it all. A million express trains crashing and wrecking in head-on col-

lisions overhead might give some slight idea of the bedlam. This all lasted for four and a half hours. It was then we were called out and taken to the front line to go over. You see, the tanks are in lead of the first wave of infantry, and this little body of men were the first to expose themselves. Give the engineer his due!

"When we got to the jumping-off place the doughboys were lined up in the trench making ready to take the jump. Machinegun men had mounted their guns on the parapet to begin their barrage. Stokes mortars hurled liquid-fire shells which burst like a Fourth of July demonstration across no-man's-land upon the enemy front-line trench.

"Day was just breaking when I climbed up, Captain James helping me. I was nervous at first. My section went to work throwing dirt into our trench to get our two tanks across. That was a small job, for these caterpillars can travel any country a man can walk or crawl. Our artillery and machine guns and the throb of the tank engines were making such a din that it didn't occur to me that the enemy was fighting at all until machine-gun bullets spattered off the armor plate of the tank.

"There was a heavy fog over everything, and it was impossible to see more than the ground immediately ahead. The tanks found it hard to steer a course, so I was told to place my men at twenty-yard intervals ahead to guide the way. I took a squad in advance, dropping a man at each interval. Three of us were left when we came upon a German in a cemented outpost. He saw us first and jumped from his hole in the ground and took out across the shell-torn enemy trenches. My first impulse was to run after him and grab him with my hands; in fact, I had run ten yards before I realized that I had a gun. I shot. He went down and rolled over. I wanted to make sure that he was finished, so I hurried to where he had fallen and found him squirming like a worm in a hot can. One gone anyway!

"We passed over the first, second, and third enemy positions without any great trouble. And not until 11 o'clock did we meet any resistance, and then things began to happen. We were on our way up a road into a little town that had been torn to bits war St. 8—N

by our artillery. In ten minutes the friendly fog had lifted, and I found myself standing alone at the forks of a road in a hell of artillery and machine-gun fire. It was only a matter of seconds until I was in a shell hole filled with water, but safe from the stream of bullets coming from down the road.

"The Dutchman back of that machine gun must have seen my dive to safety, for although he would turn his gun at intervals in another direction, he would always return to my shell hole. The back side of my refuge was higher than the parapet which shielded me from the enemy, so as I looked over my shoulder I could see the bullets as they knocked little lumps of mud from that bank not six inches over my feet. It took me at least five minutes to comprehend the situation. I scooped out a handful of mud eve-high, so that I could see my field of fire. Sure enough, fifty feet straight ahead on the roadside, behind a pile of rock gathered from a demolished hut, was a boche gunner. I could not see the man, but the muzzle of that gun spitting fire as it moved from side to side like the head of a snake was plainly visible. I worked my rifle as fast as I could, taking as perfect aim as I possibly could. When I'd seen the nose of that gun slowly moving in my direction, I'd pull in my head like a turtle, to watch the spat of his fire at my feet. I was in this position for at least a half hour. Sometimes I'd think that my aim had been good, but I suppose that these occasional halts in his work were caused by his threading new ammunition. I raised up once to see if anyone was near me, but had to drop back into my hole the next instant, for he opened up more vigorously, pumping lead at my shell hole for five minutes straight.

"When I next peeked out I saw coming up from the other fork of the road a platoon of infantry. As they swung around the corner, that devil back of the rock pile mowed them down with three sweeps of his gun. Even after the men had fallen he shot into the forms stretched out in the road. A baby tank got into the fracas and piled down on the gun. I followed in the wake of the tank along with a dozen or more infantrymen. When we got to the rock pile which had spelled death for so

many men, there I saw two Germans with their hands over head yelling 'Kamerad.' One was a big-jawed, pot-bellied man of 40 and the other a wild-eyed youth of 18. An infantry sergeant took them in charge and had turned them over to a man to take them to the rear, when a crying doughboy came running up. He was beside himself with rage and the first thing he did was to strike the younger boche in the jaw. He had passed down the road and had seen his brother all crumpled up, dead. He begged to take these men back and the sergeant turned them over to him. There were willow bushes at the road-side and he motioned the two Dutchmen that way.

"That's the way these men fight. They stick to their machine guns, killing as long as their ammunition holds out or they are not overpowered, but when they find they are up against it they yell 'Kamerad.'

"The work of our artillery barrage was perfect. I've read in stories about artillery burying towns, leaving only empty walls as tombstones of what had been villages, but our shells didn't even leave the tombstones. Even cemeteries didn't escape the shelling. I saw the graves of many dead opened by the shells of the marine guns fired at these German nests in villages. Tombstones and grave markers come in handy as posts for wires of communication."

The lines from which the enemy was forced in the first rush were strongly prepared, especially in the valley of the Aire; but the American artillery and infantry forced the Germans to abandon them in less than three hours. The first enemy line was taken in a few minutes; the second offered a greater resistance; and the third delayed the swiftness of the advance. The German reserve positions which the Americans reached were complicated. The latter readily took what was considered the Hindenburg line, but behind that were strong trenches called the "Hagen" positions. Behind those, and linked by much wire and various defensive works were the "Volker" positions, which connected a series of strongholds in the rear. All these intrenchments had to be passed before the line on which the enemy placed his main reliance for resistance could be reached. This

was the so-called "Kriemhilde Stelling," which was part of the general German defensive position, beginning in the north at Douai, continuing south to La Fère, and thence east of the Meuse to the Moselle. But even with this line yet to be reached by the Americans, the enemy had been forced from front positions which nothing would have induced him to relinquish before.

The principal progress was made on the American right over the more penetrable country between the Aire and the Meuse. The American right rested on the Meuse at Regneville, from which the infantry forced their way across a brook and pushed the stubborn opposition they encountered clean through the woods beyond. Then swinging down the crest of a hill they stormed Gricourt. In their stride they swept through Jure Wood, and finally, after some stiff fighting, brought their advance to a close for the day at Dannevoux. In this region their day's advance extended six miles deep across a ten-mile stretch. Enroute strong fighting waged round a number of villages in the line of advance. A little to the left Malancourt and Bethincourt were passed; but beyond them lay the wood of Montfaucon, bristling with machine guns, while Montfaucon itself, a picturesque village, had been turned into a center of resistance. The enemy clung to these places, staying the American advance until Cuisy, on the right, fell to the troops who had taken Bethincourt, and who by a flanking movement, which ended in Septsarges being taken, threatened to cut off the defenders of Montfaucon. The town and hill of Montfaucon were in the center of the American advance and formed a dominating position. Montfaucon, Septsarges, and Cuisy made a triangle and a kind of hinge where the "Volker" position joined the "Hagen" position, enabling the enemy to swing his forces at an advantageous angle to meet any attack from the south and to prevent the Americans emerging through the deep Montfaucon wood in front of the triangle. The Americans did emerge, but did not attack Montfaucon frontally. It stood on a hill, a natural fortress, also used as a storehouse by the Germans, and had to be surrounded.

The troops were so far ahead of the artillery that the gunners could not shoot without danger of hitting them. A halt had to

be called to enable the artillery to struggle up over almost impassable roads in response to an emergency call for heavy and light guns. The engineers eased their path, which ran through a belt of devastated territory five miles in width. They restored bridges and performed other repairs under shell fire, smoothing the way for guns and supplies over roads gaping with big shell holes, which they filled with rock and laid with thousands of sacks of sand. Ruts had to be filled in as fast as heavy trucks had cut them deep into the earth. When the trucks were not hopelessly mired in their own ruts, they were tipped over into the wayside ditches and their contents reloaded on to other trucks, so that the vital supplies and still more vital ammunition could go forward. When trucks were mired so deeply that they could not be removed, the engineers had to cut diverting roads across shell-torn fields in ten minutes' time, and make them passable for the overwhelming traffic of supplies.

Meantime the Germans in the elevated town of Montfaucon, observing the chaos which the American transport had momentarily to overcome—a condition which prevailed generally north of the old American line-did not see the need of evacuating this stronghold, as they did others, and harassed the Americans below, whom they seemed to have at their mercy. The guns finally got into position. But while they were struggling over the roads, American troops had pushed into Septsarges, and on the east toward Epinonville, and also on to the west of Montfaucon. It had been deemed unwise, if not impossible, to storm the latter town without artillery; but the troops did not wait for the guns. They had already suffered a check before machine guns, and knew of the odds against them. Nevertheless Montfaucon was entered, the Germans losing nerve when they beheld the Americans rushing up the slopes on either side, and were easily forced into a retreat.

On the American left within the same sector inclosed by the Aire and Meuse, that is, east of the Argonne Forest, lay Vauquois, at the edge of the line attacked. Here an entire division of the Prussian Guard held the front trenches. The First, Second, and Fourth Regiments were in the line, and the Third in reserve.

They could not stop the Americans, for all their stout fighting, though they held their end of the line longer than their compatriots at the other end, whose weaker resistance had sent the Americans striding up through Malancourt, Bethincourt, Forges, Cuisy, Montfaucon, and Septsarges, to Dannevoux. The Prussian Guards were in the Vauquois-Varennes-Cheppy path of advance, skirting the Argonne, in a line directed toward the important point of Grand Pré. They had an admirable position, and were nearer their actual strength than any other German corps. Vauquois stood on a commanding eminence, and was veined by forty miles of caves which the Germans had extended by tunnels well under the hill to the north of the town. In the caves and tunnels they concealed their men and supplies.

The Americans resorted to the use of gas. First the town was enveloped by dense gas clouds—a device the Americans also employed in certain woods—and then battered by heavy artillery fire. Afterward the approaches to Vauquois round the base of the hill were stormed by tanks, which crawled forward under the shelter of a dense white smoke screen, followed by infantry, who overcame the nests of machine guns they encountered. Even after they lost Vauquois, the Prussian Guards fought stubbornly for Varennes and Cheppy. When these towns fell before the resistless Americans, the advance progressed more in unison with the rate near the Meuse to Dannevoux.

# CHAPTER XXII

## THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE

THE first day's advance on the twenty-mile front produced a penetration of enemy territory to an average depth of seven miles. This progress was principally made between the Aire and the Meuse, in which all the captured towns previously mentioned were situated. The headway into the Argonne Forest was much less, because of the difficult character of the

terrain, already described, and there were no landmarks reached in the forest by which the penetration could be registered. But to the west, in the vicinity of the Aisne, the French had taken Sevron in the first plunge of their Champagne drive. Sevron made a more or less straight line through the forest from Varennes, on the other side, which was in American possession; thence the southern end of the forest, into which the Americans were advancing, was under flanking and frontal fire from three sides.

Progress was retarded the next day. The advance perceptibly slowed down, due to augmented enemy resistance, which increased tenfold in some parts, to heavy rains in the night, which soddened roads already made impassable in places by the destructive devices of the Germans in retreating, and to the superhuman task of moving the artillery up over the damaged roads through the conquered territory to get within the range of the secondary German positions.

"In the chill rain of dark nights," recorded General Pershing, "our engineers had to build new roads across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond no-man's-land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns through the mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but, quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counterattacks in strong force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas."

The roads had been mined, and both German and American shells had left huge craters. One highway, running up the Aire Valley, was blocked by a forty-meter hole where the Germans had blown up a bridge. The latter had to be rebuilt by midnight—those were the orders—to permit the gun crews to rush the artillery up. A thousand engineers set to work, cut trees in the dark of the night, bored the wood, and built the bridge under heavy fire from the Germans. The first gun went over before midnight. In addition there were stone walls, barbed wire, and every sort of impediment in the way of transport. Even where

warfare had not damaged or blocked the roads, four years of disuse, during which they served as shooting galleries for the French and Germans, had left them in a condition that called for a corps of engineers as transport pioneers. Missouri mules and Michigan trucks labored over highways almost newly remade yard by yard by the engineers ahead.

Another all-essential arm of a modern fighting force, the signal corps, were equally heroic with the engineers in performing dangerous tasks in the wake of the infantry. They would run up their telephone wires in villages almost before the Germans had been expelled. One man's wire in this work was shot down twenty-four times. Asked what he did then, he answered that he put up the wire the twenty-fifth time, but that he had first to guide a firing squad to a German machine gun in the near-by woods, whence had come the shots which ruined his wire twenty-four times, before the wire finally stayed strung.

The enemy recovered sufficiently from the first staggering assault to establish his secondary positions during the breathing spell the Americans had to take before resuming. The difficulties of gun movements gave a slight advantage to the Germans, whose fire became heavier, indicating that they were installed with some confidence in the lines to which they had retired. They had been strengthened by large reenforcements, and essayed several determined counterattacks against the new American line from Dannevoux to Varennes, only to meet equally determined resistance from troops in battle for the first time, composed of drafts from Ohio, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana.

By noon on September 27, 1918, the American artillery had at length been swung into new positions from the rear and restarted its devastating fire. To the northwest of Dannevoux the guns poured shells on Brieulles and the roadways to the south and southwest; to the north Vilosnes and the bridge crossing the Meuse were the targets; to the northeast Sivry-sur-Meuse and the river bridge there came under heavy fire, which prevented the Germans from withdrawing their equipment. Similar firing the day previous had stopped the Germans from removing heavy

batteries they had at Dannevoux, including four 210-millimeter guns and eight 150-millimeter pieces, which fell into the hands of the American infantry when they reached that place, together with much ammunition and the personal baggage of three German regiments. The augmented enemy, from his secondary positions, strove to silence the batteries and damage the repaired roads behind the advanced American line; but the shells of large caliber that came over almost without exception fell in woods and fields, and did not impede the American advance, now under way again.

The outcome of the second day's operations was the capture of four more towns-Charpentry, Véry, Epinonville, and Ivoiry. The advance precipitated engagements of great intensity, the Americans meeting the sternest resistance from some of the best troops in the German army, which did not, however, prevent strategic points being secured along the Dannevoux-Montfaucon line, from which strong forces drove forward. Stiff fighting in the region of Charpentry lasted all day. The Germans had left strong detachments of machine gunners flanking the town, and the infantry had to be aided by artillery, which did not come up until midday. Meantime the Germans had the advantage; out on the arrival of the artillery the situation slowly changed, and the Germans able to escape finally withdrew. Along the road between Montblainville and Eclisefontaine, in the same vicinity, strong positions were reduced, whereupon the Germans, availing themselves of excavations across the road, left a small force there, armed with machine guns, as a rear-guard "sacrifice." The opposing lines were not a hundred yards apart. The enemy's futile effort to hold the road cost him dearly.

To the north of Montfaucon, on the same line, the Americans had a still hotter task in capturing a hill dominating the town. It had withstood frontal assaults, and the Germans defending it did not weaken until it was surrounded. But this did not happen before American cavalry had been thrown into the fight to aid the infantry circling the hill, with its myriad of machine guns. The vicinity of Nantillois, farther north, was also the scene of ruthless and sustained fighting.

In the Aire Valley there was a like resolute attempt to hold up the American advance. Here tanks were in the thick of the fray, and several became the temporary target of some German 77's, which had found their range and blocked the tanks' progress in the valley beyond Varennes. The tanks' hardest obstacle in the Aire Valley was the masonry work of the Hindenburg line, which often rose sharply several feet above the level of the ground. The tanks also encountered stone walls, reenforced with bars of steel, across roads and streets forming part of the German line. Athwart one road rose four of these walls in half a kilometer. The Americans climbed over them and then blasted them to the road level. The roads also had concealed traps for the tanks hidden by a few inches of surface bed, under which huge holes had been burrowed. Tanks running over such spots sank out of sight and had to be hauled out by big trucks hitched to them. In spite of such obstructions the tanks played a destructive rôle north of Varennes and Cheppy in storming hundreds of machine-gun nests.

The Argonne Forest remained the chief obstacle to the entire Franco-American movement, which extended from east of the Meuse to the region of Rheims. It lay like a monster liner sunk lengthwise in a channel, with the Americans and French advancing on each side, one between the Aire and the Meuse, the other west of the Aisne in the Champagne country. Lying longitudinally athwart the line of advance, it could only be assailed, by reason of its conformation, by flanking operations. There were no daily loppings off of the forest lengthwise, piece by piece, in step with the advancing lines east and west. It was assaulted on the sides, along the Aisne and Aire Valleys, a tedious procedure involving a slow shaving or thinning of its width till the invaded parts became too narrow for German occupation. Its density and odd configuration, already described, produced dramatic struggles between the resisting Germans and oncoming Americans. The fighting was complicated and confusing, resembling a duel fought to a finish in a dark room. Moving in a depressing gloom, where death lay ambushed behind any one of the countless trunks of trees, and where the rattle of machine guns was multiplied and magnified by the forest reverberations into a deafening snarl of thunder, every American soldier realized the slender chance he had of being succored by friendly hands should he fall. Even should indefatigable stretcher bearers discover him, the task of bringing him out of such malign surroundings daunted the most resourceful. The wounded were rescued, nevertheless, amid almost insuperable difficulties.

The troops faced their forbidding task and advanced into the recesses of the forest as steadily as those plunging through more penetrable territory outside. The enemy had left a heavy force of infantry there, with the usual complement of machine guns. Almost every thicket masked guns, and streams of fire poured from scores of trees. Hundreds of snipers were in the trees, stationed to pick off the advancing Americans, and in one part of the forest their numbers were so overwhelming that the tried infantry signaled for artillery, which quickly ousted the snipers by a barrage. In the main, however, the fighting was without artillery, the combatants being too close to permit the use of big guns. They fought to a standstill, hand-to-hand, crowding in ruthless scrimmages through the dense growth. The Americans even took prisoners. One batch of 230 were marched out of the forest carrying their weapons, which their captors forced them to pile in front of the American division headquarters. In the maze Americans fell in the hands of Germans, some captured twice, and in each case were retaken by their own compatriots with their German guards. Tanks, of the small French type, played their part in subduing the forest, trundling through the jungle with a disconcerting agility into wire entanglements and over trenches and firing point-blank at the machine gunners. Antitank guns were trained on them without impeding their progress; in fact, many of these new German weapons were disabled by their would-be victims, and were added to the rapidly growing salvage heaps of captured enemy equipment. In the fighting the Germans at times were as much at sea as the Americans, despite their lengthy occupation of the forest, the bewildering complication of ravines and ridges confounded them when forced to fight beyond their familiar

dugout lairs. It was blind jungle fighting, confusing alike to assailed and assailants.

On the fringe of the forest the Americans had to cut their way through a deep zone of barbed wire, also through wires nailed to trees, sometimes reaching ten feet in height. The wire ran in every direction, often hidden in the undergrowth. The elaborate trench system within this zone was screened and covered with this network of woven wire, which ran everywhere. They fought all night, with rain falling, inky blackness encircling them, heavy German shells bursting, and gas clouds traveling over the valleys flanking the forest.

The Hindenburg line ran through the forest, as it did to the Meuse-where the Americans encountered other sections of it -and through the Champagne. From front to rear this series of trenches and dugouts in the Argonne, not mud-covered walls and duck boards, but built of masonry and concrete, iron-roofed and camouflaged with foliage, extended more than four kilometers. The positions were caged by wire, except in the line of retreat to the north. The Americans had to tear their way through to reach the Hindenburg line, putting aside rifles for pliers. One wire fence was no sooner penetrated, enabling the troops to dart into the underbrush, than another screen of woven wire interposed in their path. That cut through, they stumbled on to concealed wire entanglements covered with brush. These had to be overcome; then the advancing line drove against broad trenches interlaced with more wire. Meantime the noise of severing wire stirred machine gunners and snipers, who showered streams of fire in the Americans' direction. Withal, despite rain and cold, the pitch darkness, and treacherous foothold, the American troops made a headway that put the Hindenburg line behind them.

The struggle in the daylight was not less blind and strange in the depths of the forest, where it was always gloomy. The troops pursued their wearisome task caked with mud, wet, and chilled to the skin, and at times raw of temper under the physical ordeal and discomforts. It was rough-and-tumble fighting, stubbornly persisted in, and finally took the form of mere bushwhacking tactics in which the Americans, with their individual initiative, were adept. The woods were beaten and scoured for hidden Germans, as hunters search for game. The daily result was scores of prisoners, machine guns, trench mortars, and other equipment, which were sent back as evidence of progress. In the thickest areas of the wooded bastion, the undergrowth was so dense that opposing platoons filtered through without each being aware of the other's proximity. The Germans utilized these blind movements by turning machine guns on the Americans who had passed them; but behind the advancing platoon were American sappers doing their part in sweeping the forest, who served as effective rear guards and routed the enemy gunners.

The entire Argonne-Meuse movement, two days after it began, with the troops advancing in the face of heavy infantry, artillery, and machine-gun fire, reached the outskirts of Brieulles and Exermount. More than twenty towns and enormous quantities of material had fallen to the Americans, and 10,000 prisoners. American aviators kept command of the air, bringing down a dozen enemy balloons and over sixty enemy planes, at a loss of less than a third of that number. The advance up the forest on both sides, the French aiding on the west, put the Germans there in a pocket, from which they scurried to escape over the pass at Grand Pré to the Kriemhilde positions. The American line, by the capture of Brieulles, Romagne, and Exermount, and the drive northward through the forest, came in touch with the Kriemhilde stronghold, which the Germans were busy strengthening. The Germans' resistance indicated fighting for time to establish themselves there. Their opposition took the form of rear-guard actions on a big scale, in which the customary sacrificial tactics were followed to impede the advance, a passive, stubborn holding of ground, on which the fighting swayed to and fro in seesaw fashion. The American progress was measured by the laborious reduction of small points held by groups of machine gunners able to paralyze the handicapped American onset out of all proportion to their fighting value in the open.

The Hindenburg line had been broken, the Hagen and Volker lines crossed, and the Kriemhilde or Brunhilde line, the last

organized German defense works on their side of the fighting front, was in sight. There the Germans intended to make a stand, according to a captured document. On the greater part of the front between the Aire and Meuse Rivers the enemy was either on or immediately in front of this line at the beginning of October, 1918. The section facing the Americans ran from Grand Pré to Brieulles, and thence across the Meuse, where it was protected by prepared positions on Hill 263. It was not as strongly fortified as the Hindenburg line, but was of great natural strength, based on a series of heights, wooded areas, ravines, and valleys, both on and behind the actual line. Key positions were built on concrete, surrounded by barbed wire. At other points hasty steps were taken to erect new fortifications as the Americans approached from the Hindenburg line.

The American advance eased down on the surface because of rains and great difficulties in transporting supplies over mud and bad roads, but there was an evident pause due to strategical considerations. The enemy took advantage of the lull by launching sporadic counterattacks, the momentary successes of which gave the American line a saw-tooth shape, which had to be rectified.

"We had gained our point," reported General Pershing, "of forcing the battle into the open, and were prepared for the enemy's reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves."

# CHAPTER XXIII

### THE KRIEMHILDE DEFENSES

THE First American Army had swept past the entire Hindenburg line between the Meuse and the Aisne, had come within fighting distance of the Kriemhilde-Stellung in parts, but had failed to break the German hold of the Argonne Forest. To the Americans, as already shown, had been allotted the task of swinging the Allies' right hinge on the long German salient at

the Argonne-Meuse sector in conjunction with a similar move by the Belgians and British at the Allies' left hinge on the Dutch border. On the Belgian flank there was a concentration similar to the American concentration northwest of Verdun. Between the two flanks the British and French applied increasing pressure to pin the German strength in the center until the Allies' continuous attacks there forced the Germans to deplete their strength on the flanks to buttress their center. Then the forces on each flank struck. The Germans rapidly gave way on the Belgian flank; but the Americans, at their end, had a much harder task, due to the difficulties of the terrain. Their attack was also expected, which robbed it of the element of surprise, and the Germans had much more to lose, especially vital lines of communication, on their left flank.

The close of the first phase of the Argonne-Meuse offensive was marked by local operations along the front pending the ripening of another vital thrust into the German positions. The whole American line, after a week's forward movement, which ended the first phase, was not without danger, according to military formula. From Pont-à-Mousson to the outskirts of Verdun it faced almost directly northeast toward Etain, the Briey coal fields, and Metz. About Verdun the American line occupied a substantial stretch of the left bank of the Meuse as far as the vicinity of Brieulles, and looked due east across the river at the enemy, who held the opposite bank except a small strip held by the Americans. Westward from the Meuse, along the line of the present fighting, the Americans faced due north, to the point where their line joined the French on their left in the Champagne. They had made a bound forward of some twelve miles westward of the Meuse, and had consolidated their positions despite counterattacks on their own side of the river, and heavy bombardments, including gas shells, from the Germans on the opposite bank. The Meuse provided a wide rampart to the American right; but technically their flank was in danger from the enormous weight of artillery the Germans had across the river. The war, however, had upset many military theories, and experts deemed the American commanders' tactics as well-considered daring. The bold step they took in seizing the exposed left bank of the Meuse revealed an obvious intention to establish themselves firmly there as a basis for a further advance across the river. Plans, in fact, were ripe for a plunge across the territory east of the Meuse above the St. Mihiel lines in conjunction with the Second American Army, which waited the hour to advance in that section. But events made these developments needless.

Of more immediate moment was the completion of the Argonne-Meuse offensive, which was resumed on October 4, 1918. "The Allied efforts elsewhere," reported General Pershing, "cheered the efforts of our men in this crucial contest, as the German command threw in more and more first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this reenforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience. The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which especially favored the defense, by a prodigal use of machine guns manned by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges. In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards, but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of our troops."

The Americans attacked on the forefield of the Kriemhilde positions early in the morning along their entire front. They threatened the enemy's main line of communication, that is, the railroad from Germany that passed through Sedan, and other points. This was the most vital single artery of supply for the German army. The Americans were eighteen miles from it in a direct line, while just west of the Argonne Forest General Gouraud's French Army, with the Second American Corps, had

fought its way northward eight or ten miles to the German line of defense west of Challerange, and captured hills which commanded the enemy's supply lines south of Vouzières.

The attack resulted in an advance of from two to five kilometers. It inaugurated a series of similar small offensives, which continued almost daily throughout October. Measured by the amount of ground gained, the headway made was not marked. The real advantage of the October operations in the second phase of the battle lay in the steady wearing-down process imposed on the enemy, and the capture of local strategic points as jumping-off places for plunging forward on a more extended scale to overcome the Kriemhilde line and get astride the Sedan-Mézières railroad.

The front was massed with ponderous German artillery, grouped in a zone two and a half miles deep, and in the foreground bristled with machine guns, one to every five yards, according to an official estimate. The latter held up the advancing Americans at sheltered points, denting the line, and bitter contests had to be waged before the line could be straightened. The Americans "bucked" the positions steadily, like mammoth football teams, meeting the strongest German forces, which resisted the onsets without regard to the heavy losses they endured. The Aire Valley, where each hill sloped down to the foot of another, each with its little wood, afforded unlimited ambushes for machine-gun nests among the scattered bushes. To the right, from Romagne to the Meuse, repeated battles had swept the land clean; there were no villages, nor trees or other natural shelter for this form of warfare. The open terrain on the right had enabled the American line to be in advance of the left, where the physical character of the Aire Valley and of the Argonne Forest retarded a uniform progress. Hence there was no disposition to move up too far along the Meuse before the line evened on the left. The progress of the French between Rheims and the Argonne also influenced the American tactics.

The operations, which continued for three days, left the right without material change. In the main the troops moving along the Meuse met with little resistance and easily pushed on to the War St. 8—0

outskirts of Brieulles. German artillery on the east side of the river opened an enfilading fire which carried far toward the center, while from enemy guns farther west came a barrage through which one infantry regiment had to storm before the American guns could silence the batteries sending the barrage. The attack proceeded under an intense bombardment from the German guns, which poured shells over the American rear. The American guns, many on railway mounts, shelled the crest of Romagne ridge and the batteries beyond. The German fire from the east bank of the Meuse was thwarted during the first few hours of the attack by a cloud of mustard gas, which stifled and burned the German gunners and prevented shells reaching the American right flank. Over wood-crowned heights, overlooking the country for miles, the infantry advanced, following the dancing white smoke of the American rolling barrage. They attacked the Romagne ridge and the Kriemhilde trenches "in depth." as the British did at St. Quentin. As soon as the first wave of troops stopped a second wave passed through it and renewed the attack. When strong resistance was met the troops split up into small parties and sifted through the German line.

About Cunel Woods, northeast of Romagne, the fighting ebbed and flowed with great intensity, under a heavy bombardment. The Americans first got into the woods with comparative ease. so crushing was their artillery fire, only to be forced out again by superior forces. The woods were finally reoccupied. A bitter struggle waged around Fays Wood, which American infantry had held against repeated and determined counterattacks since the first drive. "You are there!" Major General Bullard had told his troops in a message. "Stay there!" The Germans had poured reenforcements into the northern end of the wood during the night of October 4, 1918, and along the edge placed heavy machine-gun posts which forced a retirement of the American advanced units. The terrain they held was not worth the price that would be exacted by contesting it with augmented German forces, and the withdrawal afforded scope to organize an attack on the machine-gun nests on more equal terms.

### CHAPTER XXIV

### WINNING THE ARGONNE

THE fighting was more defined in the general results achieved I on the American left, which moved along the irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of the Argonne that bordered the river. The operations of the French west of the forest, in conjunction with the American movements on the east. deepened a salient formed in the forest where the Germans still had a considerable force. This force was in jeopardy, and the Germans before the American line stubbornly strove to arrest any further recession northward to prevent their compatriots in the forest from being entirely pocketed. They had maintained this salient in the face of its growing depth, caused by Franco-American movements on either side, which they were unable to impede. Despite the danger of being cut off, the Germans kept strong forces in the thick woods, resisting the flank attacks with dense machine-gun fire from fallen trees. But the salient slowly and surely deepened.

To the north of Exermount, Hill 240, a useful observation point, was captured, and clearances of Germans were made from Chéhéry, Fleville, and three farms, bringing the left more in line with the right, which had kept ahead of the left. The hill did not fall into American hands without vicious and persistent defense by the Germans. They fought tooth and nail to hold it, imperiling as it did the Argonne position if taken. Shaped like an inverted cup, it commanded views of positions for miles round. It was honevcombed with dugouts, the entrance of each protected by earthworks strengthened with wooden and steel props. On its northern slope were German artillery emplacements; on its southern side a steel tower stalked, installed with powerful telescopes. It was a hotbed of machine guns, which were nested on the summit and in the clutter of shell-shattered, stone farmhouses about its slopes. Even when the Americans commanded the east, west, and south slopes of the hill, up which they pressed, despite torrents of bullets from the concealed machine guns, the enemy tried to send reenforcements from the north. Ammunition wagons moving there came under American rifle fire, which compelled the wagons to retreat after many horses and drivers were killed. German machine gunners tried to protect the wagons, but their aid was smothered by the rifle fire. The flanking pressure of the Americans finally prevailed, but not until the summit and sides of the hill had been subjected to an intense bombardment. This was due to a recurrence of machinegun fire after the hill had seemed to be cleared of the nests. Several times the Americans thought they had silenced them, only to be attacked from new ambushes. The last German machine gunner did not surrender or disappear till toward evening, after an all-day fight, when the remaining defenders on the summit fled before the closing cordon of Americans.

The fighting concentrated about the northern tip of the Argonne. There was the narrowing salient to be wiped out; other strategic hills bristling with German defenses lay in the American path; and Grand Pré, north of the forest, whose possession would obliterate the Argonne as a German intrenchment, loomed in the distance. On October 7, 1918, the cluster of hills forming the north end forts of the Argonne was assaulted by the Americans in an advance on the east side. At the same time the troops holding the line inside the forest struck northward, driving at the peak of the German salient, which was also under flank attacks. The outside movement proceeded on a line extending south to the forest's edge opposite Apremont. It moved due west. The Aire River cut through about the center of the sector. The right flank of the American line advanced about 5 o'clock in the morning, with little artillery preparation, crossing the Aire in a thick mist, which completely hid the operation from the enemy on the hills. Here the narrow valley of the Aire widened westward into a bay. An island hill known as 180 centered the bay. At the southern arm of the bay was another hill, 223, connected by a long, high ridge with Hill 244, a German artillery position beyond. Under this ridge lay a long straggling village, Châtel-Chéhéry, which had been entered

several times by American patrols, but had never been out of German hands.

The first objectives of the American right were the capture of the village and the two hills, 180 and 223. The first-named hill invited an attack frontally; but the Americans chose to filter round to the south, and working through the woods there, ascended from that direction. On finding their defenses, which faced eastward, had been turned, the Germans withdrew their artillery and began to dig in on the crest, but were routed. At 6 o'clock the center of the American line moved, fording the river in the lingering thick mist, bound for Châtel-Chéhéry. A shower of grenades apprised them of the enemy trenches as they neared the village. They swept it clear of Germans with the bayonet before 9 o'clock, while the right wing, after taking Hill 180, carried Hill 223.

There remained the key to the whole position at the farther end of the scattered village—Hill 244. It was carried before noon after heavy fighting. Some of the troops worked round through the village and ascended from the east, where the slopes afforded easier foothold, while others filtered through the wood on the south and mounted at that side.

The southern or left wing of the American line got into action early in the afternoon, driving at the edge of the forest. This movement caused the enemy to fall back from the center of the Argonne. Thereupon American troops which had been held in the center by the enemy moved forward and joined hands with the force which had carried Châtel-Chéhéry.

The new positions on the captured hills were organized, and the troops pushed down the western slopes with varying success. Their hold on Hill 223 turned out to be precarious, for the Germans returned the next day with strong forces and drove them from the crest. The Americans obtained reenforcements and swarmed up the hill again in a blinding rainstorm, and after two and a half hours of ruthless fighting recovered possession. The battle was mainly hand to hand, neither side being able to use artillery owing to their closeness to each other. To the northwest further headway was made by securing positions command-

ing the junction of the only roads running through the northern end of the forest. Thus slowly but surely the Americans were down what little hold the Germans still retained of the Argonne.

The operations gave the Americans control of the commanding heights west of the Aire. These aided observation, which was most difficult in the tangle of woods and jungle. Most of the hills were tortured bare of all trees and vegetation, but the ravines and valleys, clothed with thick woods, gave excellent protection to either foe, who was able to filter troops beyond the advance units of the opposing force. This led to the fiercest hand-to-hand fighting, in which the Germans showed no weakening or failing morale. Neither side gave the other any rest, and through a night of rain and the cold of elevated ground both stubbornly fought regardless of hardships. Bitter resistance, despite torrential rains, met the Americans in moving westward along the Châtel-Chéhéry road toward Lancon, which the French, in the cooperating movement against the Argonne on the west, had taken. Important heights, just south of the village of Marcq, were seized, whereby the American line joined hands with the French at Lancon.

The American gains on the east edge of the forest, obtained in conjunction with the attack on Châtel-Chéhéry and Hills 160, 223, and 240, had changed the situation inside the forest. The Americans there had been held up, and now moved forward, breaking a circle the Germans had formed round an American force which, becoming severed from the rest of its division, had found itself trapped by the enemy.

This force had been cut off for five days—October 2 to 7, 1918, —in the heart of the jungle. It was originally composed of 463 officers and men of the 308th Infantry and a company of the 307th Infantry, under the command of Major Charles W. Whittlesey. The latter had received orders to advance on October 2, 1918, to a certain position, and maintained that position under those orders. The Germans were rapidly retreating ahead as the Americans went forward, and in their eagerness to catch up with them, Major Whittlesey's troops gradually deployed and

widened their ranks. This movement allowed a turning body of Germans to infiltrate unseen behind the Americans. latter, who were unused to forest fighting, dashed into a hollow surrounded by heights. A barrage from their own guns had checked them as they mounted one of the hills overlooking the hollow, and they paused for the barrage to pass on ahead of them. Meantime, the Germans on both sides, observing where the Americans would presently find themselves, jointly flanked them on the hills, and closed in at their rear. Hence, on reaching the hollow, the Americans fell into the trap set for them. They bivouacked and threw out outposts. One hill, from which the Germans looked down directly on the Americans, Major Whittlesey determined to attack. A company under Lieutenant Wilhelm stormed it. They were surrounded in trying to cut their way through, losing many men. After several hours an officer and eighteen men returned with the report that Lieutenant Wilhelm's company had broken through and were getting back to headquarters; but runners from outposts presently came in and reported them captured. Then Major Whittlesey realized that his force was surrounded, and that there was nothing to be done but to hold on.

Their trenches were shallow and hastily constructed, affording only meager shelter, and they were subjected daily to a sniping machine-gun fire as well as a trench-mortar bombardment every time they showed themselves. Only with the greatest difficulty and with extreme caution could they make any movement and guard against surprise attacks. Hand grenades were also constantly thrown. The Germans attacked every afternoon, and varied their harrying tactics by tearing through the brush velling, as Major Whittlesey described it, "like 10,000 devils." How many were hit the besieged never knew, as the Germans always dragged their dead and wounded away each night. Day and night the besieged sent out volunteer scouting parties; but whether these got through the German line and reached the Americans in the rear, or whether they were captured or killed, the beleaguered force never knew, as none ever returned. German machine guns surrounded them every fifteen feet or so,

and sent a sweeping rain of bullets at any man who showed himself from the improvised trenches. They had no rockets or other signals to advise their comrades behind of their plight, and they could not attract attention from any source but the Germans.

American aviators daily searched for the "lost battalion," as it was called, flying overhead to discover their location; but every outcry the beleaguered men made to attract attention was drowned by volleys of derisive laughter and shouts from the Germans. The airmen dropped messages where they thought the Americans were, and devised parachutes, laden with food supplies; but the thick forest concealed the exact whereabouts of the besieged.

Such help was sorely needed, as the men had advanced with meager rations, expecting more supplies to reach them later, but these, of course, were not forthcoming. They were reduced to a subsistence on oak leaves and water, and in crawling out of their trenches to obtain their primitive fodder had to risk bullet showers from machine-gun snipers. No relief came and they grew emaciated and weak. But they were buoyed by hope of rescue and a stout determination meanwhile to hold out till the last man. Each scouted the idea of surrender, regardless of wounds, hunger, or fatigue. Their ammunition was so depleted that there was only one belt of cartridges left for the few machine guns they carried, while their rifle ammunition shrank to the point when orders were given not to fire on attackers except at close range to insure that each bullet found its billet and was not wasted.

On the fifth day of the siege (October 7, 1918), a German was seen approaching the little camp bearing a white flag. He brought a neat typewritten message to Major Whittlesey reading:

"We have heard the cries of your wounded. It is impossible for you to escape. Why do you not surrender, in the name of humanity? Send back your reply by messenger."

"Go to hell!" the major shouted in response.

"Righto! Stick it, boys!" roared the men about him.

They did not know that rescue was near at hand. The only outlook they saw was slow death from starvation, for despite

their exhaustion they were united in an unbending resolution not to yield, and had no other answer to the message than that which the German messenger took back.

The rescue came that night as part of the combined movements, already described, which had forced the Germans from positions in the north. The German cordon broke because it was itself in danger of being caught from the north and south. The Americans advanced up the forest with a rush, smashing one German defense after another, passing the no longer besieged camp and driving the besiegers before them in a wild flight. The line being again open, the exhausted troops filtered back to their bases to the south. They had suffered a loss of 50 per cent in killed and wounded. Many of the survivors were wounded, and those who were not had reached a stage of exhaustion that temporarily invalided them from further service.

Thereafter there was little left of German resistance in the Argonne Forest. Three days later (October 10, 1918), it was cleared of the enemy.

It was a notable achievement. The Germans sought no quarter and gave none, and suffered enormous losses. It was the strongest defense on the eastern wing of the great German salient from the North Sea to the Moselle. Its loss was as serious to the German command as its gain was invaluable to the Allies. The Americans took what was regarded as an impregnable position, and one for which thousands of French and Germans had died in former battles of the war. The eastern swing of Marshal Foch's movement against the German front had been held up by the deep dent in the Allied line caused by the German hold of the Argonne. Now the dent had been closed up and the forest was behind the French and American lines. The strongest rampart to the Kriemhilde position had crumbled.

The Germans had so long regarded it as safe from successful attack that, as was their wont, they settled themselves down in luxurious comfort. There was nothing ramshackle or improvised about their quarters. They used the forest as a recreation haunt for jaded divisions wearied by fighting elsewhere.

It was a pastoral retreat as well as a refuge from shell fire. The officers' quarters were as sumptuous as the appointments of a wealthy suburban colony. On the forest hills to the north, the last ground gained by the Americans, were concrete chalets richly designed and painted, with ornate windows and decorated fronts. They were furnished with all the conveniences of a home—good beds, bathrooms, lockers, and the rest. There were clubhouses with billiard tables and bowling alleys; there was even a moving-picture theater seating 600. All the structures were built to resist shell fire.

Its reduction was a slow and tortuous process. Some days a kilometer was gained; some days nothing; but always the battle went on by infiltration through screens of wire and movements in single file through narrow spaces at the risk of discovering the foe ambushed to the right and left and behind. It was a fortnight's task, and for ten days the progress was piecemeal. The capture of the northern heights and the junction with the French brought the beginning of the end.

# CHAPTER XXV

## THE ARMY'S PEACE TERMS

THE American left was now abreast of the right on the main positions between the forest and the Meuse. Added to the swinging up of the line from the backward position it held in the Aire Valley, the strategic value of the Argonne operations of the left wing had carried the troops into more open country. From north of Romagne and east and west of the new positions beyond the Argonne was level ground, with fewer elevated enemy fortifications to be encountered. A spell of quiet came, if the condition of any war front could be so called, in the lull following the accomplishment of concerted movements while preparations for further operations were afoot. The German artillery fire abated even on the right, where the Americans, though not

sensibly advancing the line, had been unremitting in pursuing local operations.

Meantime the aviators took to the field in a brilliant aerial offensive over the enemy lines. They reported dozens of towns. fired by the Germans in their retirement, to be still smoldering, and a significant quiet in extended areas where there had been feverish enemy activity. They were unable to discern any movements on roads where German transports were ordinarily seen in motion, and there was an absence of gun positions. From the greater part of what had just been the enemy's advanced area the guns had evidently been moved back. The aerial operations included a picturesque flight by three hundred and fifty planes, which set out on a bombing expedition from the point farthest east in the Franco-American positions beyond the Meuse to Metz, and returned with the loss of only one man. The flock of airships included swift combat planes as well as bombers. and others with a special mission, like a fleet at sea, with the destrovers patrolling the heavier fighting craft. Antiaircraft German guns sent thousands of shells into the formation without effect, while from the ground groups of German planes rose to contest the invasion. 'The Allied fliers sent twelve of them crashing earthward without changing their formation or departing from the purpose of their flight. A French plane was struck and burst into flames and began settling. Fire streamed from its stern as it eased down in a long wobbly spiral. It fell into no-man's-land and was reported as lost, but it was not. The pilot made a safe descent, so managing the stream of fire by spiraling against the wind, that he kept the flames in his wake.

Following the subjugation of the Argonne Forest, a little fight for a hill east of Grand Pré stood out in the indeterminate movements, where there was no actual pause, proceeding elsewhere along the front. The hill was 182, and formed a commanding position beyond the village of St. Juvin. A company of the Second Battalion of the 306th Regiment, Seventy-seventh Division, led by Captain Julius O. Adler, was ordered to take it. The men struck across the Aire (which takes a western course above the forest) in the early morning of October 12, 1918,

and crossed the valley plain. The Germans sighted them and opened fire from 77's and machine guns, under which the squad of forty-six men pressed on to the village under the hill. Machinegun showers from the houses greeted them on entering; but they moved rapidly through the village, scattering in groups and forcing their way largely by hand grenades. The Germans defended the village weakly, and yielded, leaving sixty prisoners. The American troops then set off for the hill beyond, a few hundred vards to the north. Upon its crest the first to arrive directed a fire from all quarters under cover. The Germans there evidently thought the Americans were present in force, especially as they saw others of the company approaching from the village. Some began to surrender; others fled. Those who did neither could not withstand the American charge. The outcome of the day's fight was that what was left of the forty-six took 192 prisoners on the hill alone. Other American units came up and helped them to establish the new positions. But the Germans returned the next day. In a counterattack in force they wrested the trench on the hill crest from the lesser number of Americans holding it, and the latter had to fall back into the village. The Germans' second sojourn there was just as short-lived.

While the Americans were chopping fresh notches in the German line west of the Meuse, reaching St. Georges and Landres-et-St. Georges, and passing beyond Cunel and Romagne, the news of Germany's acceptance of President Wilson's peace terms filtered through the ranks. It came, oddly enough, at an hour when the artillery had died down and the flashes in the sky became fewer until scarcely a gun spoke again for hours. This quiet seemed a premonitory symptom of an armistice; but the guns awoke again the next day with redoubled vigor. The news did not stir a ripple on the whole front. The troops went about their business which, when it was not fighting, was to keep dry and warm. An armistice had no existence in the trooper's philosophy. His business was to fight and not to trust the enemy any further than he could see him. There was no diplomacy in bayonet thrusts and shooting; diplomacy might end the war. but soldiering conducted it. The Kriemhilde line was before them, yet to be taken, though yielding in spots. The troops understood one word, which was not "armistice" but "objectives." The Germans behind appeared to be shaking in their shoes at the outlook, to judge from an order issued by General von der Marwitz, commander in chief of the Fifth Army, obtained by American intelligence officers:

"It is on the unconquerable resistance of the Verdun front," read the order, "that depends the fate of a great part of the western front, perhaps even of our nation. The Fatherland must rest assured that every commander and every man realizes the greatness of his mission and that he will do his duty to the very end.

"If they do this, the enemy's attack will, as heretofore, break against our firm will to hold.

"The object of this attack is to cut the Longuyon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the West. Moreover, it is the enemy's intention to render it impossible for us to exploit the Briey basin, on which depends in large part our steel productions."

This entreaty to the German troops to hold their ground was needless, for their fighting, in personal bravery and stamina, could not be bettered by any soldiery. The German command was looking to them to achieve the impossible. Hold back the Americans, they urged, and their front was saved. On that success they pinned their faith. The less headway the Americans made, the less would be the German defeat and the better the peace terms. The peace parleys which the German Government desperately pressed upon President Wilson imbued the prisoners captured by Americans with the belief that the Fatherland was gaining the advantage, and that peace diplomacy had been furthered by the resistance offered to the Americans. thought the war was as good as over. But they soon perceived that the First American Army had its peace terms, which did not take the form of appealing notes to which Berlin had resorted in its plight.

The American army's peace terms were flashes from innumerable cannon massed behind the lines. The ruthless projec-

tiles they catapulted among the wearied but resolute Germans on the other side of no-man's-land were foretokens of President Wilson's answer to Germany's first request for an armistice.


"Surrender," the President finally said; but he merely echoed what the American shot and shell were saying while Germany was pleading. In fact, the fighting was renewed with a bitter intensity between the note exchanges.

### CHAPTER XXVI

#### GRAND PRE

On October 14, 1918, attempts to cross the Aire were made east of Grand Pré with the object of storming that vital point north of the Argonne, and portions of the Kriemhilde positions were entered in the face of wire defenses and heavy gas shells. The movement to cross the river began the previous night; but the American engineers, in attempting to throw bridges over the narrow stream, were halted by hand grenades hurled by the Germans in trenches not more than a hundred yards away. With the morning came a deluge from the American artillery on the foe's positions east of Grand Pré, enabling the engineers to run two bridges across. German shells damaged these and other structures, the engineers meantime repairing the crossings as fast as they were disabled.

The crossing was not then successful. Better results of the day's operations were achieved farther east, where another wedge was driven into the Kriemhilde line. St. Juvin was taken and passed on the western side of the wedge and the second-line wire of the St. Georges and Landres-et-St. Georges defenses was penetrated. On the eastern flank of the wedge the Americans climbed the slippery slopes of Hill 288 lying west of Banthe-ville and held it. The hill was taken after an encircling movement which was met by a machine-gun fire estimated as coming from at least two hundred guns concealed in the adjacent woods



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE-SECOND STAGE, OCTOBER 1 TO OCTOBER 31, 1918

of Bantheville. The sections taken of the Kriemhilde line had also to be surrounded. Constructed of masonry and steel, and sheltering a multitude of machine-gun nests, the defenses were not only impregnable to rifle fire, but even .75 shells bounced off without damaging them, and as direct hits from 155's also proved ineffective, the best way of taking them was by a flanking movement.

St. Juvin, like many other places, had been taken before and lost. The enemy's main position there was Hill 182, a sore spot in the American advance north of the village, the earlier struggle for which has been described. Hill 288 was a similar shifting battle ground and was finally taken by the 166th regiment from Iowa with a New York regiment (the 165th), operating on the right. It was the sixth attempt to take the hill. In one struggle, made by regiments of the Forty-second (New York) Division, the troops, attacking frontally, did not take the hill; they did not even reach the hill. In woods stretching all round its sides the Germans had woven line after line of barbed wire, protecting trench after trench and hundreds of machine guns, while in the scrubble on the crest were 77's, whose gunners knew how to shoot point-blank. Several other failures followed.

The Iowa and New York troops tried again on the morning of October 14, 1918, in the rain, before it was light. American 75's dropped shells on the crest with a line range. The New Yorkers, operating on the east, kept the enemy occupied by machine-gun fire and sniping while the Iowans crept through the surrounding woods till they had encircled the foot of the hill. As daylight came both mounted the hill in a cold rain from a leaden sky, the water dripping from their metal helmets. On the crest were 1,800 Germans of a guard division, more than 230 machine guns and two 77's. The advancing troops again struck the tiers of wired trenches. As they penetrated them the Germans resisted with bayonets and snipers. Their machine guns met American machine guns on the slippery slopes, duels taking place between them as close as twenty yards and less. It was a struggle at close quarters; so much so that in the numerous hand-to-hand fights the German 77's, firing from the



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At the left is General Tasker Biss, who was military representative of the United States in the Supreme War Council at Vessables; at the right is General Peyton C. March, the American Chief of Staff



crest at the Americans, hit as many Germans. Five lines of wire had to be penetrated before the troops obtained any footing of the hill. They continued mounting and fighting on the slopes for six hours. At last through the last wire and the last trench, they reached the tortured crest, from which the gunners had fled, and there took over a hundred Germans. The rest of the original 1,800 defenders had been killed or wounded. The American loss was more than half the German, and at that cost the troops had overcome an obstacle in their path—though it seemed only a bald top hill which, for lack of another name, was called 288 because it was that many meters high.

The resumed attack along the front from Grand Pré eastward was over terrain largely made desolate by artillery fire from both sides. The Americans were gaining strips of a wilderness. Not only were villages and farm buildings swept away like chaff before the wind, but hills were denuded of vegetation and trees, the shells leaving them as barren of verdure as broken ground. The American fire first caught the villages ahead, and when the Americans had passed the returning German fire completed the wreck.

The operations the next day (October 16, 1918) were chiefly directed to a resumption of the attack on Grand Pré. It was only a little village with a normal population of under 1,500; but as a military objective it had great strategic value, being the junction of the railways which fed a great part of the German army, and lay at the foot of the valley extending northward, at the entrance of which the Germans fought so stubbornly. Situated on the north bank of the Aire as it wound westward from its south to north direction along the Argonne, it stood as a sort of outlying rampart of the forest on the north, and was doomed to subjection by reason of its situation. The Germans clung to the village, even with the Americans knocking at their doors after conquering the Argonne. This time the Americans did not resort to building bridges to cross the Aire, which cut across the northern end of the wood south of Grand Pré. Under the shelter of the forest the Americans moved in force at six in the morning. They approached the river at four points, and War St. 8-P

instead of rebuilding the bridges which the Germans had destroyed, outwitted the enemy by fording the stream. They waded and struggled through almost impassable mud step by step without attracting the attention of the foe. The muddy water reached to their waists and higher. On the northern bank they encountered broad mud flats in which they sank halfway to their knees. The Germans were amazed at their appearance, expecting artillery fire to herald the attack. During the Americans' steady though slow passage of the mud banks they had time to recover from their surprise, and opened a fierce machine-gun fire. The Americans pushed on beyond the mud banks and plunged into the German positions, closing with the foe in desperate bayonet fighting. Rifles were used as clubs; each man engaged with individual opponents. By 11 o'clock the Americans were in possession, driving the enemy into the Bourgogne Woods to the north.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE FREYA LINE

PARTHER east from Grand Pré, the Americans scored other successes. They were little points, of no great account individually, but represented notches registering the advance into and around the Kriemhilde positions. The objectives gained, despite a desperate contest in each case, were Champigneulle, a mile north of St. Juvin, the Côte-de-Châtillon, Moulin-les-Pas, two hills commanding Loges Wood, and Musarde Farm, a trouble-some point which for two days held up the American advance in the vicinity of the Côte-de-Châtillon. The control of the latter gave the Americans the key to the great stretches that now spread to the north and northeast. The hill represented, in fact, the last of three keys, all of which were bitterly contested. The first was the Mamelle trench, outside of Romagne, which, when won, gave access to the equally vital Dame Marie, and

that position in turn gave access to the Côte-de-Châtillon. From the latter position the great German defensive positions to the northwest could also be controlled and the line exploited further without organized attack, because each enemy position was on a sloping hill that could be swept by an enfilading fire. The Germans were not reconciled to losing the Côte-de-Châtillon, and tried to make a night concentration in the Bantheville Wood for a counterattack. But the enemy did not venture to leave his trenches owing to the opening of heavy American artillery. As the key position to the Kriemhilde line it was then given up as lost, for the Germans began to reveal movements pointing to the hurried construction of another defense line running, on the average, some four kilometers behind the Kriemhilde positions. The symptoms were that they had decided that the latter could not be held, with the Americans situated where they were. They had withdrawn their main forces from the region of Landres-et-St. Georges, the center of the American sector, leaving behind a screen of machine-gun nests. American patrols, advancing into the Bantheville Wood, north of Landres, toward evening on October 17, 1918, did not come into contact with the enemy. The next day disclosed that the enemy had withdrawn from the Bantheville Wood, and also Loges Wood, east of Grand Pré. The first-named retirement meant that the German line had been pushed back four kilometers, and the second two kilometers. The two woods were defense points of the Kriemhilde system. in which there was now a wide American wedge. The Americans took possession of Bantheville Wood. Loges Wood was found drenched with mustard gas to make it untenable, and was not occupied. The American line ran south and the German north of it: but when the gas lifted, the enemy filtered back, finding the Americans had not stayed. There was a fight, which left one-half of the woods held by the Germans and the other by Americans. The return of the Germans was evidently a diversion to occupy the Americans at that point while the new defense line was being prepared.

The new German line came into being as the Freya Stellung, and to that position the Germans withdrew their main forces on

October 19, 1918. The Kriemhilde positions, though wedged in several places, were not wholly abandoned, but formed a sort of front line to the Freya Stellung, and machine-gun nests were maintained wherever the terrain and the Americans permitted. The new line crossed the Meuse south of Dun, climbed Hill 261, ran north of the Andon Valley to Aincreville, north of Bantheville, north of the Grand Carré Farm, north of the Bois Hazois, and thence west to the Bois Bourgogne, north of Grand Pré. Some of these points were held or overlooked by the Americans. The line consisted chiefly of natural defenses, though there were attempts to dig trenches here and there. Wire barriers were only erected in sections. The position was plainly not so strong as the Kriemhilde. The resumption of German artillery fire during the day indicated that the enemy's guns were back into positions supporting the Freya defenses.

There was no uniform progress toward it. The Americans "made headway," or "exerted pressure on the enemy," or "took various positions," or "resisted counterattacks." Further drives in force on an extended scale were under way; but the hour was not ripe. The line was as supple as tape. It swayed back and forth, mainly forth, through the inevitable American rebound which came after German counterattacks. Some counterattacks held. There were tooth-saw formations and dovetailing little salients, each a menace to its reverse neighbor, due to each side making dents in the other's position in a seesaw fashion. The enemy revisited and sometimes lingered in some places which he had abandoned or from which he had been ejected, or clung, as in the case of the Bantheville Wood, to the northern edges of points, the main positions of which he had yielded. Numbers of fiercely fought little actions took place, especially in the vicinity of Grand Pré, where small salients, nosing into the German line, could not be held against counterattacks for the time being. The line was so mobile that at some points American advances touched the fringe of the Freya positions while Germans were still in control of some sections of the Kriemhilde. The enemy held on to his available positions thereabout by maintaining machine-gun strongholds from which to direct a harassing enfilading fire on American troops moving beyond it. A slackening in the frequency of counterattacks, but not in the resistance to American attacks on held positions, was noticed in the German tactics, apparently due to the need of economy in man and machine power. In fact, defensive operations, except when counterattacks could be effected by stealing a march, and without much loss, were more than ever imposed on the Germans. "During the heavy fighting of the last week north of Verdun," reported General Pershing on October 20, 1918, "we have drawn on other parts of the western front a constantly increasing number of German divisions which are bitterly contesting every foot against our strong attacks in order to secure the retreat of the German army, the position of which has been compromised by the attacks from the south and west."

A sharp salient which wedged into the American line and gave much trouble was the scene of a lively encounter on October 21, 1918. It was a thicket called the Bois de Rappes, north of Cunel, infested with machine guns, which artillery fire did not dislodge. On the edge of the wood stood a formidable hill, 299. Both were points of strategic value. Advancing at noon, the Americans drove steadily into the thicket; but it took them three hours to gain possession. The hill, which was outflanked by the wood, held out against the attacks, and there being no reenforcements of infantry available, a regiment of engineers, dropping picks and shovels, rushed into the fray on the order of the commander, and aided in securing the hill. The combined operation yielded 261 prisoners, including six officers, with a number of machine guns.

After the capture of this hill, and also hills 297 and 281, all to the north of Bantheville—a village retaken, after being lost, by virtue of the American positions in the Bois Bantheville—the enemy's position in Brieulles, on the western bank of the Meuse, became untenable. They abandoned the town, first setting it on fire, after having desperately held it ever since the Americans started on their Argonne-Meuse offensive. West of the town, in the Bois de Forêt, a fight had been going on for a week. The

Germans clung to the wood because its loss endangered commanding positions to the north. But the Americans, though pushed back under great pressure, continued their assaults, and finally captured the wood with seventy-five prisoners, most of them machine gunners, who fought to the last. Brieulles itself was not occupied, German shells driving out patrols sent in force to take it. The town went in no-man's-land under American domination.

At the other end of the line, north of Grand Pré, hard fighting was proceeding at the same time. The woods there ran in a great series, and with their backs to them the Germans fought viciously to retain their lodgment, especially in the Bois de Bas and the Bois de Bourgogne. The Americans were resolved on sweeping them out of the woods, in order to safeguard their hold on Grand Pré. Counterattacks thwarted them and forced withdrawals here and there; but the American reaction turned the scale. All-day fighting in this vicinity on October 23, 1918, brought the capture of two farms, the Talma and Bellejoyeuse and the ridge between them. The Germans used light-rolling machine guns, moving them from place to place, particularly at night, with the object of concealing the positions of their heavier guns. Over 200 prisoners fell to the Americans in their encounters about Grand Pré.

A movement in the American center, under a barrage laid down north of Bantheville, took the infantry the next day to the Grand Carré Farm, and astride the new Freya line, which lay over the crest running southeast of the farm and on the ravines beyond, into which the troops filtered. General Pershing called it a "minor operation in the region of Bantheville, our troops advancing their line 500 meters, reaching the ridge north of the village and capturing 170 prisoners." They did not stay long there. German counterattacks three days later drove them back from the farm.

The Freya line was not officially recognized as such. The name stood merely as a new geographical expression for a series of strong natural positions in the hills, ridges, and woods zigzagging just north of the American positions. Unlike the Hin-

denburg and Kriemhilde lines, with their elaborate trench mazes. concrete structures and triple-fold wire meshes, the new German position was unorganized and depended for its strength on nature herself, which had provided strongholds into which the Germans poured their best forces, backed by immense concentrations of artillery of various calibers. The American line, in fact, now probably faced as strong a natural defensive line as any along the entire battle front from Switzerland to the sea. Any advance, for instance, from the Grand Pré Pass, where flerce fighting was continuous, entailed a renewal of the battle for the Argonne. The Americans faced the Bois de Bourgogne and the Bois de Bas, beyond which great woods lay the Forêt-de-Boult. All were really a continuation of the Argonne Forest. broken by the Aire passing westward, and formed a huge ambush for troop concentrations and concealing ammunition and artillery. Farther east were the wooded tracts of the Bois de Barricourt and the Bois de Tailly, to the south of which was a section of the Freya line. The Americans again reached this position on October 30, 1918, by the capture of Aincreville, to the north of which they established a new line on the series of ridges in that region.

The month of October, 1918, closed with intensive artillery outbreaks, especially from the Germans, who resorted to heavy guns to break the slow but sure American pressure on local points. Untold thousands of shells were flung upon the area west of the Meuse. The Americans responded by equally heavy fire on the German rear, long-range guns reaching as far as Longuyon, twenty-three miles northeast of Verdun, and the German lines of communication running through Longuyon, Montmédy, Sedan, and Mézières.

Aerial observers meantime reported that, notwithstanding the natural strength of their new Freya line, the Germans were abating their endeavors to organize trenches and dugouts. They appeared to be content to utilize existing shell holes and fox holes.

The conclusion was drawn, not without ground, that they were not anticipating a long stay in the Freya positions, and

were reckoning upon having to retire to as yet unidentified positions beyond it. They had learned that even strong natural positions, apparently invulnerable, could be taken by Americans. Perhaps they divined what was afoot behind the American lines. In General Pershing's words, "a regrouping of our forces was under way for the final assault."

### CHAPTER XXVIII

### THE THRUST TOWARD SEDAN

THE fruit of a month's pitched battles for position was ripe I for gathering. Not a single engagement recorded, beyond the sweeping plunge of September 26, 1918, assumed other than local dimensions, and many were frequently nullified by German reaction. But in the step-by-step movement of the line, which was never stable for a day and never straight, a series of positions had been attained which opened on to a terrain vastly more favorable to an expeditious grand advance than the territory already conquered. The first and second American offensives had to be mainly pursued over torn areas which had been in no-man's-land for four years, and the army encountered unexampled physical obstacles both for fighting and transport. The terrain that spread beyond the American line on October 31, 1918, that is, from Grand Pré, Champigneulle, Bantheville, Cunel, and Brieulles, had been virtually untouched as fighting ground, and had good roads for army traffic.

For a fortnight the Americans had been consolidating their new positions, which gave them a new starting line for an offensive in force. There was much delay, due to the necessity of improving the deficient and impaired lines of communication. There were only two—on which the Americans depended for moving all their supplies—one by way of Montfaucon and the other by way of Varennes. The roads were such that the army had to trust to a one-way system of transport to move at all.

The Germans found the American difficulties of transport much to their liking.

But move the army did, throwing on to the new line legions of fresh troops, all rested men, in good spirits, spoiling for a fight, and superior in numbers to the nine German divisions that ranged from the Meuse to the Bourgogne Wood at Grand Pré. Northward along the Meuse, at Sedan, was the hinge of the entire German line from Metz to the North Sea, and against that hinge the strength of the American army was directed. The manifold encounters of the past month, after the forward leap of the first day of the Argonne-Meuse offensive, were undramatic and tame contrasted with the concurrent spectacular movements in Belgium and along the Oise and Sambre. But these lunges and swingings back of the edge of the German door farther to the west were largely due to the pressure of General Pershing's shoulder against that door close to its hinge. The Americans were accomplishing an extraordinary feat not revealed by the map. Their operations held one-fifth of the entire German strength, which was concentrated to protect the hinge of the door against the American threat. But the door, despite the protection, began to be wrenched from its hinge.

The final advance began early on November 1, 1918, on a fifteen-mile front in cooperation with the French on the left. The preliminary assemblage of guns was enormous. Never before had the Americans ranged so many in action. Their devastating rain of missiles smothered the foe and enabled the plunge forward to proceed with a gathering momentum over battle areas which for long had been stiff contending ground but which the Germans now abandoned with the precipitation of a routed enemy. Points before or on the American line—Champigneulle, Bois de Loges, (won and lost several times), St. Georges, Landres-et-St. Georges, which the Germans had retained with the Americans close to them, and Brieulles (now in no-man's-land, now in German hands, then in American) were taken and passed. Weak opposition came at the outset from customary machinegun fire. It was brisk for half an hour and then abated, enabling

the troops to move without much fighting. The Germans clung to the Bois de Loges; but the Americans were not now attacking in local sorties but in concentrated force, and the wood fell. By noon all the objectives of this stage of the advance along the whole front had been achieved.

The German fire was not equal to the occasion, and this was explained when the Americans reached the enemy emplacements. The helter-skelter withdrawal before the first rush of the American troops was not the sole reason for the weak response the Germans made to the American guns. Battery after battery was put out of action; in fact, a large proportion of the prisoners were taken from demolished German gun positions, which had been wrecked by the American barrage. The Americans began to reap the fruits of the bitter unsensational battles of the past month, for the Germans at last quit the tortuous line and scampered out of the way. A deep wedge was driven into the heart of the German position, reaching nearly four miles at some points. The progress was less on the flanks, where the German recoil from the impact came later in the day. On the American left the enemy fought bitterly about Champigneulle, on the right about Andevanne. It was a stubborn and costly stand to make a salient of the American wedge in the center. and was without avail. The center, after plunging past Landres-et-Georges, where the German defenses formed the strongest remaining position of the Kriemhilde Stellung, had swept five kilometers over the Agron River to Bayonville, thereby piercing the Freya Stellung to a considerable depth.

The village of Landres-et-Georges and the Hazois Wood in the center, and Champigneulle and the neighboring Loges Wood to the left, were specially fortified by the Germans to resist the American plunge. But the Americans left these ramparts behind, cluttered with débris of a beaten foe. Machine-gun nests, which formed a continuous line before Hazois Wood, two hundred yards from the fringes of the trees, were torn to pieces by American shell fire before the troops reached them. Bodies of Germans, lacerated by direct hits, lay everywhere round the

battered gun positions. In the wood the gunners of heavy pieces had flown before the hurricane, deserting several 77's, placed for direct hits, with large piles of ammunition near by. Farther on machine-gun pits, filled with dead gunners lying by their silent guns, disclosed the deadly effect of gases with which the Americans had drenched the wood. Before Landres-et-St. Georges, similar gun pits ranged behind wire entanglements, guarding a line of fox holes, bore farther witness to the destroying fumes. Here German gunners who had survived the shell fire and the gas likewise abandoned their weapons. Several who were captured said the American shells swept every foot of the ground and shook it so violently that they could not man the guns. The shell holes, in fact, were found to average every yard in portions of the ground.

The line was arched, with a dangerous German position, the Forêt de Boult, flanking it heavily on the left, though this in turn was menaced by French operations on the far side to the west in conjunction with the American left.

The next day's movements took a turn toward bringing up the left and right to a line determined by the farthest point reached at Bayonville.

The center corps swung to help the left, which had been in a snarl with the Germans about the Bois de Loges, only to find the left sweeping ahead. The morning found only weak German rear guards, the main forces having slipped away during the night along the east edge of the forest. The rear guards yielded, the debatable ground about Champigneulle and Loges Wood was swept over by the American troops, and their advance became such child's play, compared with their recent ordeals, that they lost contact with the retreating enemy. The left advance, in conjunction with the center, speedily reached Verpel, Briquenay, and Thenorgues, and developed a pocket of the Forêt de Boult, the French being massed all along the other side.

The Germans outdistanced the Americans, and a caravan of auto trucks were requisitioned so that the troops could recover contact. Fifty trucks, loaded with infantry, started north after the enemy, though the roads, soddened by rain, retarded their pace at times. The American left was moving—on wheels, but not as fast as the Germans, and contact was therefore not readily obtained. The trucks, each with its cargo of troops, with ready rifles, some perched on the hoods and machine guns mounted above the drivers' heads, all in fettle for fighting, trundled in a pursuit which the absence of the enemy made more of a joy ride.

The center made winged progress from its pivotal point, Bayonville. In a heavy, cold rain a hill was readily overcome, the weak resistance surprising the troops: then came a sweep over fields to Buzancy, taken at noon after a forty-minute fight, and the capture of Fosse, four kilometers from Bayonville, in the afternoon. This wholesale yielding of territory was not anticipated by the American command. The German line in the center had given little sign of breaking during the morning. Bitter resistance met the Americans generally, but, notwithstanding, the center continued to push forward considerably farther than either wing, and a slackening appeared necessary if the troops were not to be outflanked. So certain was the American command that the Germans would not retire that the report of the capture of Fosse—over seven miles from where the line stood the day previous—was not credited. But presently came the news of the break on the left and the pursuit in motor trucks, that resistance on the American right, where Doulcon, Villers-devant-Dun, and Barricourt Wood and village were taken, was melting away, and that various other units were moving with marvelous speed, the enemy's stand having unaccountably ceased.

The great advance made in the center was rather due to the American plans than to the strength of the temporary German resistance on the left and right wings. It left the German line in the air. Even the new American line could not be readily drawn. What only was plain was that the remaining Kriemhilde strongholds had been shattered and the Freya positions broken into. The infantry had advanced so rapidly that it had lost communication with headquarters,

The Germans found the strong natural defenses of the Freya Stellung untenable before attempting to hold them. The American advance gathered increasing momentum and bore everything before it. The German retreat became a rout. The Freya line was no more; the next day (November 3, 1918), it had been passed almost its entire length. It had gone the way of the Hindenburg, Volker, Hagen, and Kriemhilde lines. More than that, the German hold on the wooded position in the Forêt de Boult was destroyed. This obstacle to the French and American advance north of Grand Pré was deserted in the night. There was only a thin covering of rear guards to confront the Americans and French, who started up the sides of the forest from points gained the previous day. The opposition could no more stem the advance than the famed broom could sweep back the tide. Boult, north of the forest, was reached by noon, the American line later joined the French north of Belleville, and the Boult salient had gone. Boult brought the American left in line with Fosse, held by the center.

In the center the impetus to push ahead was controlled by the progress of the flanks. Taking its time, the center found its path easy, obtaining little contact with the enemy all day. The left had made a great swing, aided by the French; no less swift was the movement on the right, where Halles and Montigny fell to the Americans. From a strategical standpoint the day was profitable. Boult, Fosse, and Montigny made a regular front, as long as it was to last, in contrast with the jagged, uncertain and dangerous front of the previous day, with the Germans flanking positions on the Meuse and the Boult Forest.

The rapid push on the right to Montigny was not made in accordance with the plans of the German command. One point gained there placed the American guns within range of the German main railroad line between Mézières, Sedan, and Longuyon, which was to be protected at all costs. But the German troops did not consider the wishes of the German general staff nor of their commanders. They did not fight; they got out of the way, ignoring order after order which came into American hands,

commanding them to hold their ground, no matter what happened. Indications of how demoralized and shaken the enemy line had become were shown by captured runners. One had been sent posthaste from army headquarters to find out why the line had broken; others were caught entering the American lines in search of German posts of command! The German field officers lost their grip of the situation, and the movement had become more of a pursuit than a battle.

The Germans fell back, not only along the line west of the Meuse; even east of that river the retiring movement was in progress. Somewhere to the north a stand apparently was to be made on an unnamed line. Toward it crowded troop trains which left railway yards in the rear, where the highways were clogged, not only with slow-moving transport, but motor trucks packed with troops fleeing from the front line. Only the artillery on the far hills behind the German lines seemed to show fight, and hurled shells as though those in command were averse from falling in with the withdrawing infantry.

The fighting under such conditions continued to be half-hearted except where, at brief intervals, strong stands were made by little garrisons left behind. There were scores of such forays, which were always brief and sanguinary, as at Barricourt on the right. There the Americans and Germans met at less than three hundred yards. Ordered to charge, the Americans darted along the streets with fixed bayonets, shooting as they moved. The Germans stood their ground for a brief period and broke; but only a few escaped.

On the left they did not wait to fight. At Boult-aux-Bois, when the Americans reached it at four in the morning, the Germans were heard leaving the northern end of the town by wagon. American patrols were on their heels; but they made good their escape by the time the main American force passed through the town in the gloom.

The general results of the November advance, when only three days in progress, were thus summarized by General Pershing: "Heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy due to the continuous blows during the past month and by the surprise and

force of the renewed attack on November 1, 1918. Statements of prisoners show that their organizations have been thrown into great confusion. Several complete batteries and whole battalions have been captured by our troops. The number of prisoners now exceeds 5,000, and the number of guns more than 100.

"During the last three days we have already penetrated to a depth of twelve miles on an eight-mile front and gained control of dominating heights which enabled us to bring the fire of our heavy artillery on the important railroad lines at Montmédy, Longuyon, and Conflans.

"Since November 1, 1918, seventeen German divisions have been identified on the front of the attack, nine of which were in line on that morning; and additional divisions have reenforced the line since the beginning of the attack in a futile effort to stop our progress.

"In addition to regulars there were in this attack divisions composed of National Army troops from Texas and Oklahoma, from Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, and New Mexico, from New York, from New Jersey, Maryland, and West Virginia, and from the District of Columbia, and Virginia."

On the fourth day the retreating enemy recovered and developed resistance in force to the onward sweep of the Americans, especially along the Meuse south of Stenay. The line advanced none the less. The center, advancing some five kilometers, took the wooded heights south of Beaumont. Farther east the enemy fought bitterly to prevent encroachment on the important town of Stenay by the right, which reached a line between Beaufort and Beauclair and north of Halles and Wiseppe.

The struggle along the Meuse between Wiseppe and Dun was long and vicious. The Germans were between the Americans and the river on a long strip, while beyond the Meuse and the Canal de l'Este, on the other side, the Germans had heavy forces rushed up, aided by a new division. The long stretch on the west bank was finally cleared with a view to a test of the German strength on the east bank. Westward Verrières was

gained as well as Osches by the left wing, which pushed forward slowly but doggedly.

The American right and left still advanced with less speed than the center. The latter, holding the wooded heights south of Beaumont, the last German stronghold west of the Meuse, were only about seven and a half miles from Carignan, on the Mézières-Metz railroad, and about nine miles from Stenay, bringing both places within Allied shell fire. The apex of the center drove into the Beaumont heights, which were vital as dominating positions for the artillery, the division crashing through the most obstinate opposition offered by the Germans since the beginning of the offensive. Patrols went into and beyond the town itself; but its possession was unnecessary as long as the hills were held by the Americans. The Germans could not fight over the terrain north-northeast because of the lack of communications there. They must fall back as soon as the American artillery broke up the remaining railroads, if the main lines from Sedan to Metz were not smashed first. One curious incident at Beaumont was the driving into the American lines at breakneck speed, of three German batteries, which were promptly captured. The artillerymen said they were on their way to reenforce the German front line! The Americans afterward occupied the town. It lay directly west of Pouilly, which was in the bend of the Meuse northwest of imperiled Stenay, and which was also in American hands.

## CHAPTER XXIX

#### CROSSING THE MEUSE

THE situation made the river sector the main scene of fighting. There was resistance elsewhere, but not so determined, the design of the Germans being to yield on the American left and hold up the right on the Meuse, where they had thrown heavy reserves along the east bank to stop the American threat

to advance across the river. The main reliance of the Germans was now on the line of the Meuse, which they appeared determined to defend. But their stout resistance to General Pershing's penetration of their positions east of the Meuse did not modify the salient feature of the situation, which was that their armies west of the Meuse were practically cut off from direct communication with Metz to the east.

The forcing of the Meuse, in the face of heavy German reenforcements, was a hazardous adventure. Beyond Brieulles there was no bridge. The river had to be forded, swum, or crossed by pontoons. Rains had swollen it, and along a lengthy stretch its surface was in commotion from machine-gun bullets which fell and splashed the water like hailstones. The Americans first attempted a crossing north of Sassy under the protection of artillery and rifles, while scores of enemy 75's fired on them. The small bodies of troops who reached the east bank on passageways thrown across by the engineers met such violent enemy resistance in hand-to-hand fighting that they had to retire. This was an initial repulse common to river warfare. The Americans experienced such setbacks on the Marne and they were all in the day's work. The position was that while the Germans held the east bank of the Meuse where they did they imperiled the rapid advance of the Americans on the west bank—though there was more to the venture than safeguarding their Meuse flank-and the repulse had therefore to be rectified.

The bald facts of the crossing, contained in a military description from the official report of Major General Hanson E. Ely, showed that the heroic troops engaged were elements of the Fifth Division:

"Orders had come (November 3, 1918), that the division was to turn due east and force a crossing of the Meuse and of the canal beyond it and seize the heights of the Meuse to the east and thus form a bridgehead for the crossing of the rest of the army.

"The first attempt was made by the Second Battalion of the Sixth Infantry east of Brieulles. Owing to the flooding of the War St. 8—Q

basin of the river northward of Brieulles and its losing southward to within 100 meters of the ground held by the enemy, the front on which a crossing could be made was limited to a line 1,500 meters in extent. To the east of the river lay the canal, about twenty meters wide and approximately ten feet deep. The entire basin of the river and canal was visible from the high ground to the east thereof, which was manned by the enemy with infantry, direct fire artillery, and machine guns, all at close range. On the east bank the Bois de Châtillon extended down to the edge of the canal, concealing all enemy movements.

"Soon after darkness on November 3, 1918, a footbridge was thrown across the Meuse by Company F, Seventh Engineers, without attracting attention. Company E, of the Sixth Infantry, covered by Company G of that regiment and accompanied by Company F, Seventh Engineers, carrying a second footbridge, then cautiously approached the canal. They were met by a hurricane of machine-gun and rifle fire, augmented, a few minutes later, by fire of artillery. The combined detachment rushed forward under this fire and threw themselves in line underneath the high bank of the canal.

"Between midnight and 1 hour November 4, 1918, they were able to place the footbridge and had a second partially finished when work had to be stopped as the enemy swept all approaches by machine-gun fire. Under the protecting fire of all available men and machine guns a small column attempted to rush the bridge at 2 hours November 4, 1918, but were forced back. Repeated efforts to cross resulted similarly, and at dawn no one was over. It was impossible to move in the river basin during the day, and the troops that had reached the canal bank lay there dug in.

"No less difficult than the crossing east of Brieulles was the crossing east of Clery-le-Petit. Here the river was 110 feet wide and ten feet deep. At 16 hours November 4, 1918, two battalions, the Third of the Sixty-first Infantry and the Second of the Sixtieth Infantry, echeloned in great depth, attempted it after artillery and machine-gun preparation. Intense enemy

artillery and machine-gun fire prevented the crossing. Our forces suffered many casualties and the light pontoons which B Company, Seventh Engineers, were constructing were destroyed as quickly as constructed.

"For the crossing east of Brieulles telegraph poles were lashed together and rafts and duck boards prepared. At 18 hours 20, without any artillery or machine-gun preparation, the two footbridges already in place were rushed by detachments from E and G Companies of the Sixth Infantry. The surprise was successful. Firing on both flanks, these companies rapidly mopped up the machine gunners which held the banks and organized a guard for the bridgehead.

"In the meantime, protected by these operations, the Third Battalion of the Sixth Infantry, using the prepared poles, rafts and duck boards and ropes—some by swimming—had silently crossed the river and canal to the west of the Bois de Châtillon. At dawn of November 5, 1918, they attacked the enemy in the woods, which were completely cleaned up by 8 hours.

"More pontoons having been sent up to Clery-le-Petit during the night, a light pontoon bridge was thrown across the Meuse by Company D, Seventh Engineers, at the point where it flows nearest to the cliff southwest of Clery-le-Petit, and two small pontoon bridges were constructed across the canal just east of the pontoon bridge across the river. The canal bridges were rapidly destroyed by enemy machine-gun fire after each attempt to renew them. In the morning of November 5, 1918, Company I of the Sixtieth Infantry swam the river under heavy machine-gun fire and organized a position on the east bank. A half company from the Third Battalion of the Sixty-first Infantry mostly swam or waded from where the bridge was broken.

"At daybreak November 5, 1918, Company M of the Sixty-first Infantry and the Third Battalion of the Sixtieth Infantry had also crossed the river, but only parts of companies I, Sixtieth, and I, Sixty-first Infantry, had crossed the canal. Those that crossed the canal, however, were able to establish a small bridge-

head, thus enabling the troops already across the river to swim the canal, which they did."

Those who could swim were singled out on the theory that being nearly submerged they were less likely to be hit by German fire, while they could also haul ropes and other paraphernalia for assisting nonswimmers. Many reached the east bank by the help of lines drawn taut across the stream despite their being unable to defend themselves. They did not, of course, escape casualties from snipers. Others floated on rafts and collapsible canvas boats. These troops were more exposed to attack than the swimmers, being better marks for the enemy's rifles, and the boats could readily sink by bullet fire even if their occupants were not hit.

The crossing of a wide stretch of mud, after the river itself had been forced, and the sixty-foot Canal de l'Este just beyond, was made under a crushing enemy fire. The Americans stumbled through the mud, undeterred by the withering bullets. Their feet sank into the ooze and slime; their pace slowed to a laborious crawl; their numbers were depleted. But they stumbled on.

The canal, deeper and narrower than the river, with its sheer sides and Germans, almost on the very top of the eastern edge, firing down on the attackers, presented as difficult a problem as the river.

The swimmers, however, having survived the river and its mud, did not stop to think. They plunged into the canal and scrambled to the top under enemy fire. They could only get a footing with the aid of grappling hooks, which had to be caught on the wall edging the canal, and by means of the rope attached to the hooks they pulled themselves up on to the canal bank. Thereupon they divided their attention between driving off the enemy and helping nonswimmers across the canal as they did across the river.

At length over the river and canal in considerable force the Americans fell in with zest to the customary fighting. The Germans, who had apparently doubted the feasibility of crossing the Meuse in numbers, gave way before men who could brave

their fire, swim two rivers and cross a swamp with almost charmed lives, and then attack them without even a pause.

What the Fifth Division did thereafter was set forth by General Ely:

"It went out of its sector in the north and took the town of Mouzay and turned it over to the Ninetieth Division, and it went out of its sector on the south and took the town of Vilcenes and enabled the French division on its right to cross the Meuse. It penetrated twenty-one kilometers into the enemy's lines and wrested from him 190 square kilometers of territory. It captured thirty-six cannon, 677 machine guns and over 1,000 prisoners."


The capture of Dun, Milly-devant-Dun and Mouzay gave the Americans a good strip of the east bank of the Meuse from which to pursue further operations.

On the west of the river the American center meantime broke the new German line of resistance running from Stenay to Ormont in an advance from Beaumont north of the Beaumont-Stonne highway, and swept the Germans out of the Bois de St. Pierremont. The left swung up northward with equal dispatch, carrying the line to Tannay and beyond to the Bois du Mont-Dieu and the lower end of the forest of Mazarin.

## CHAPTER XXX

#### THE LAST PHASE

THE goal came suddenly in sight. On November 3, 1918, the American center was five miles beyond Buzancy, reaching Sommauthe, which was thirteen miles from Sedan. Two days later they were within touch of the city. From the hills in the region of Chemery and Maisoncelle the spires and buildings of Sedan were in plain view six miles away. Reports from the First Corps startled the American headquarters on November 6, 1918, with the tidings that a division had reached a point



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE-SEPTEMBER 26 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918 GENERAL MAP

on the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty-five miles from the line of departure of November 1, 1918. The successive dashes for six days of the determined American infantry, before which the enemy broke, his will to resist overcome and shattered, the gathering momentum of their movement, which became an impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed, the simultaneous surging forward everywhere in the unshaken belief that the day was theirs, the powerful work done by the artillery, which, pressing along the country roads close behind the troops, brought large caliber guns into play upon the enemy's lines at Montmêdy, Longuyon and Conflans, and maintained complete coordination throughout, had gained for the American army the strategical goal which was their highest hope. "We had cut the enemy's main line of communications," General Pershing reported, "and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete disaster." This meant that Germany's chief lateral line between the fortress of Metz and her armies in northern France and Belgium were, by the American advance to Sedan, no longer open to him. The German armies were virtually bottled up, having only one avenue of escape, and that through Liege at the other end of the line.

The advancing troops far to the north set such a fast pace that all communications with the rear were broken, so that the American command, denied aerial information through bad weather, did not know until the next morning that Sedan had been reached at four o'clock in the afternoon of November 6. 1918, and that the American line had been drawn along the Meuse, which cut off a small portion of the city. There the troops consolidated their positions, prepared for a further advance, regardless of the armistice preliminaries proceeding elsewhere. They were the Rainbow Division (composed of National Guard units from two-thirds of the States) and units of the First Division of the First Corps. They held the heights on the south and southeast of the city and the suburbs lying on the west bank of the river. The Germans, in departing from this section, had blown up the bridge leading across the Meuse into the remainder of the city, which was filled with the beaten

enemy. The valley of the river had been flooded and railroad bridges destroyed.

These attempts to stay a further advance showed that the Germans, like the Americans, were not counting on the armistice overtures to bear the desired fruit. Apparently they did not intend to yield the main portion of Sedan unless compelled. On the heights north of the city they assembled big concentrations of troops and guns, as well as at other points where the city could be defended both below and on the river eastward. Concrete intrenchments near the city were strongly held, thousands of men being observed thereabout building stone machine-gun nests, while adjacent woods and bridges not destroyed were mined.

The German scamper south of Sedan to get away from the advancing Americans compelled a resort to primitive methods to shift their guns. Horses had been swept from the kaiser's army; so French cows were hitched to German 77's, and toiled ahead of the pursuers. What equipment was removed could not have been appreciable for American artillery hammered the Germans as they fled, forcing them to abandon war material worth untold millions. Food, lumber, clothing, coal, ammunition, rifles, cannon-everything utilized in war was left behind in their flight, which became precipitate. They did not even have time to complete the task of removing the civilians from Sedan, a precautionary step begun three days previous. But they had no cause for further concern. The Americans paused in their offensive before the city. Whatever stand the Germans planned to make at Sedan as a last hope was never put to the test. Sedan, as a historical signpost along the whole Franco-Belgian front, was a foretoken of the close of the war.

The Americans turned from Sedan and swept east of the river in pursuit of the Germans, stirring up their former St. Mihiel front from the Moselle to the Meuse. Almost till the climax of Sedan, operations east of the Meuse had been of a subsidiary character. The line of attack was not east, but north. Only until the northern objective— Sedan—was reached, in the course of which the American flank on the west bank extended too far from its base for safety, was a diversion in force made across the river. The Americans had held a strip of territory east of the river all along, at the bend of the Meuse just above Verdun, in the vicinity of the battle grounds where the Germans and French had fought so bitterly for the forts and northern approaches of that city. As the advance moved on the west of the river, this American hold on the east side gradually extended by periodic local offensives, reenforced by units from the west bank. The Germans still menaced Verdun, and also held positions north of it that stood in the way of a consolidation of the Franco-American line extending from the St. Mihiel front southeast of Verdun to the Argonne-Meuse front. French divisions. serving under American command, were in active cooperation in this region. They kept a cat's-eye on Verdun and diverted the German attention from the American advance on the other side of the Meuse.

A stimulus came to the eastern operations after the opening of the second phase of the Argonne-Meuse offensive on October 4, 1918, the plan being to creep up the east bank as well as the west.

On October 9, 1918, a little Franco-American drive on an eight-mile front brought a number of hamlets and woods in the American line, and 3,000 prisoners. Charny, an inconvenient German position north of Verdun and too near the American base, was among the captured places. The Germans were pushed northward. A fortnight later another advance took in Bolsetraye Hill, commanding the village of that name, which lay just west of Damvillers, an important point that duly engaged the Americans' attention. Southwest of the latter village was Hill 360, which rose above other hills northeast of Verdun, affording observation over the whole area in which the Americans operated east of the Meuse. Its value was accordingly great to the Germans, who had built deep trenches, leading to dugouts that seemed impregnable, and protected them with 77's and 155's. The hill's wooded flanks formed a great nest of machine guns, and these the Americans had to overcome, while

drenched with German fire from the crest. It was a typical German citadel, and was overcome, but not before the Americans had been thrown back, when halfway up the slope, some five or six times.

The American movement was taking in a wider area east of the Meuse owing to the river turning westward in a loop. Germans were on the curved bank to Dun and beyond to the north, as well as on the east of the American forces. The latter obtained a strong line between the Bois d'Ormont and the Bois d'Etraye, against which the Germans, through violent counterattacks with heavy losses, only gaining a slight recession of the American line in the Bois Belleau. There was several days of fighting for this wood toward the close of October, 1918, before the Germans yielded ground.

With the final movement toward Sedan on the west of the Meuse in November, 1918, came the invasion east of the river beginning with the crossing in force described previously. This was made beyond Brieulles. The fighting on the east side had so far been below a line from that point and the Bois d'Etraye. The Germans foresaw what was coming and had organized strong defense positions in front of the Second American Army. which was operating in the Woevre region in conjunction with the division of the First Army advancing from the river with French divisions. They took special measures against an organized tank assault and had echeloned their artillery at great depth. "The enemy's crossing of the Meuse," said a captured German order, "is to be prevented absolutely. Should he succeed in crossing he is to be thrown back into the Meuse at once. The enemy must not get a foothold on this side of the Meuse under any circumstances."

The Americans, nevertheless, crossed, as was seen, and proceeded to make advances that put Stenay in jeopardy and forced an evacuation of Dun. By evening of November 6, 1918, they had advanced to a depth of four kilometers, neither the difficult nature of the terrain, nor two fresh divisions hurriedly brought up by the enemy delaying the progress to any extent. The Americans here fought over some of the roughest country in

France, to which the Germans desperately clung. The area included the heights of the Meuse, south of the Woevre Forest, on which they tried to maintain a last foothold after holding them since 1916. But the Americans were there, and took the Côte St. Germain, Hill 284, Fountaines, Virosnes, Sivry and Haraumont, incidentally wiping out a German wedge between the American and French lines. A further advance was greatly facilitated by this liaison, which was effected by driving the Germans from their last strongholds at the difficult bend of the Meuse below Dun, clearing them from the river bank. Americans' right flank was being constantly lengthened against the enemy wedge as they advanced on to the heights and their front was far longer than originally intended. Hence the enemy wedge had to be removed. The most easterly heights of the Meuse, dominating miles of open country north of Damvillers were later reached, the Germans being pushed from every foot of ground en route after hard fighting.

The Americans contended with familiar missiles as they proceeded. Bombardments of gas and high explosive shells were daily events and in every thicket about the Meuse hills and the forest of Woevre were murderous gun pits. Withal, the Germans on November 8, 1918, were driven from their last positions on the heights east of the Meuse into the low ground of the Woevre Forest.

These heights were memorable as the locale of the great battle of Verdun in 1916. American and French units had given the finishing touch to what the French alone had already done in keeping the Germans from Verdun. The German positions were taken in the course of an advance to a depth of six kilometers on a front of fourteen kilometers, when Lissey, Ecurey, Bréhéville, Peuvillers, Damvillers, Flabas, and other towns and villages were captured. Meantime the American forces obtained complete control of both sides of the Meuse by the capture of Stenay, east of the river. This was the last of the German strongholds to fall. The district in the vicinity of the town had been flooded by the Germans, who dammed the canals and rivers. Crossing the Meuse from below the town, the Americans

stormed it from the south, sweeping forward against streams of machine-gun bullets and artillery fire from the hills northeast of the town. Beyond the eastern slopes of the Meuse heights a trio of villages were captured, and to the southeast, in the Woevre, troops of the Second Army penetrated the enemy's line and drove him from several well-organized and strongly held positions. All these movements were proceeding while the armistice was pending, and along the whole American line from Sedan, down the Meuse, on the Woevre, and eastward to the Moselle, everything was ready for a continuation of the offensive on a long front. General Pershing's summary of the stage reached in the American operations, and the plans under way for further movements, best described the situation which the signing of the armistice ended:

"On the three days preceding November 10, 1918, the Third, the Second Colonial, and the Seventeenth French Corps fought a difficult struggle through the Meuse Hills south of Stenay and forced the enemy into the plain. Meanwhile, my plans for further use of the American forces contemplated an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle in the direction of Longwy by the First Army, while, at the same time, the Second Army should assure the offensive toward the rich coal fields of Briey. These operations were to be followed by an offensive toward Château-Salins east of the Moselle, thus isolating Metz. Accordingly, attacks on the American front had been ordered, and that of the Second Army was in progress on the morning of November 11, 1918, when instructions were received that hostilities should cease at 11 o'clock a. m.

"At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left, began at Port-sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandières and through the Woevre to Bezonvaux, in the foothills of the Meuse, thence along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre forest to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with the French under Sedan."

The stage was set for the drive on Metz. The First Army had moved from the Sedan-Mouzon front, which was occupied by the French, and four of its crack divisions had been sent to reenforce the Second Army, which was to besiege the famous ring of fortresses. A further drive into German territory was also scheduled to the south toward Mülhausen. But the armistice interposed.

The Americans had started an advance on the morning of November 11, 1918, toward Ornes, north of the Verdun forts, following a violent barrage, which was returned in kind by the enemy. They proceeded to take ground in the customary way, regardless of imminent peace, bearing down on wire entanglements and machine-gun fire, the infantry glancing at their watches, the gunners counting the shells fired. The advance lasted till one minute to eleven, when, like a parting roar of thunder with the passage of a storm, the last salvos came from the guns of both sides, and firing abruptly ceased.

All along the American line, from where it joined the French on the far left to the Moselle and farther east, thousands of heavy guns joined in firing the valedictory shot at the Germans.

"What followed on one sector," wrote an Associated Press correspondent, "was perhaps one of the most singular events of the war. Against the sky line figures were suddenly silhouetted. They appeared cautiously at first, but soon, growing bolder all along the line, they stood upright. These were Germans.

"The Americans were not so cautious. As the barrage died, ending in a final husky rumble in the distance from the big guns, runners went springing along the firing line. Instantly comprehending, the whole line of doughboys leaped from trenches, fox holes and shell craters, splitting the unaccustomed silence with a shrill cheer. The roar of voices was like the outburst at some great college contest in America when a contestant scores a noteworthy play.

"Strange to relate, the defeated enemy joined vociferously in the cheering. The world war was finished.

"At one minute before eleven it would have meant death to show one's self above shelter. Not more than a minute after the hour, the rolling plain was alive with cheering, shouting men, friend and enemy alike. Not many minutes later, Germans and Americans were coming along the narrow stretch of ground so fiercely fought over, some shyly and awkwardly, like embarrassed schoolboys.

"The first advances were followed by offers from the Americans of cigarettes, chocolate, and chewing gum. The Germans in some places reciprocated with offers of hot coffee, bread, and sausage.

"The orders forbidding fraternizing were strict, but the novelty of the situation at times overcame prudence, and doughboys surreptitiously visited near-by enemy dugouts."

Army orders sent to commanders warned them to remind their troops that cessation of fighting had come because of an armistice only, not a peace. Communication with enemy troops was forbidden. Their forces were to be held in readiness tully prepared for any eventuality. Meantime the advancing forces stayed at the line reached at the armistice hour, and were barred from crossing it. Stakes presently indicated it along the whole front. The whole army marked time, waiting for orders from Marshal Foch.

"In all," General Pershing reported, "forty enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26 and November 6, 1918, we took 26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 37th, 42d, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th, and 91st. Many of our divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The 1st, 5th, 26th, 77th, 80th, 89th, and 90th were in line twice. Although some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became equal to the best."

## CHAPTER XXXI

### ON OTHER SECTORS

Trench army fighting in the Champagne north of Rheims and west of the Argonne. The operations of this force, as was shown, conformed more or less to the American drive between the Aire and Meuse Valleys. American divisions—the Second and the Thirty-sixth—played a notable part among the units under General Gouraud, having been sent by General Pershing to assist him in an attack upon the old German positions before Rheims. On the front they occupied were complicated defense works, which they set out to conquer against, in General Pershing's words, "a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare." There was also a strongly held wooded hill, Mont Blanc, to be stormed.


The Second Division, which included the Fifth and Sixth Marines, the Ninth and Twenty-third Infantry, and the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Nineteenth Artillery, undertook the task of overcoming both positions. The attack was on a two-mile front west of Somme-Py, and began on the evening of October 2, 1918 (the day the divisions arrived in the French lines), by a clearance of the German first and second lines of wired trenches in order to get good "jumping-off" positions from which to make the chief assault. This preliminary over, the Americans set out at a fast pace on their objectives the next morning. The advance took two directions, one column aiming for Mont Blanc and the Medeah Farm, the other bound for the bank of the river Arnes in front of St. Etienne. Enfilading fire which raked the American left flank from a German position known as the Essen trench diverted attention momentarily. Though this trench lay before a separate sector, away from the path of advance, the American command sent a detachment to take it, and the flanking fire quickly subsided. Mont Blanc was captured after a second assault. The Americans reached the observatory on its crest before the foe realized that the hill was lost. An observer on duty in the tower was actually captured while writing a report stating that the German "counterattack" was progressing. The message was never sent. Apparently one had been planned, and the observer, seeing Americans approaching the hill and meeting resistance, saw a victorious counterattack proceeding when the Americans were really taking the heights. The advance to St. Etienne met heavy German machine-gun and artillery fire north of the Arnes; but the village was reached. The Americans had gone so far ahead, rapidly advancing over five miles, that there was some danger of their left being cut off and encircled, and a fresh French division had to be put in behind them to cover their exposed flank. Before St. Etienne, in a cemetery, their advance was challenged by strong counterattacks. These repulsed, the village was taken and held.

An enemy machine-gun nest in the neighborhood, attacked by an American company with the aid of volunteers from a French division, yielded without the attackers suffering a single casualty. They captured four officers, 209 men, seventy-five machine guns, a number of trench mortars, and a large new tractor.

In their new positions they had to endure a murderous fire on their front and flanks from the expelled Germans until reenforcements came up to protect their left and right. The outcome of the operations of the Second Division with General Gourand was that the Germans withdrew from before Rheims, abandoning a salient in which they had held positions since September. 1914. The movement materially aided in freeing Rheims from the German menace, and jeopardized the German positions held farther north of the city. The strength of the ground the Americans fought over was attested by mounds and heaps of captured material, including munition boxes heaped to the size of houses. and concrete pill boxes, once whole but now shattered and useless. There were intricate trench systems, which would pass as ground fortifications, and tiny woods transformed into machine-gun ambushes. The wreckage of these German strongholds showed how thoroughly they had been stormed and overcome. Roads had







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been destroyed or torn into gaping holes by mines exploded by the retiring Germans, and the fields for miles on both sides of the main advance were shell-marked with craters that overlapped one another. The French told the Americans that their advance had enabled them to act as the fulcrum of the lever under the German line which tipped it more than eight miles at the western end.

The Second Division was relieved by the Thirty-sixth Division, composed of men from Texas and Oklahoma, who encountered their first experience in the firing line by resisting German counterattacks against the positions won by the Second Division, forcing the Germans farther back under heavy fire, and joining in the pursuit of the enemy in the flight which ensued behind the Aisne. This division was described by the French Corps commander under whom it served as having relieved the Second Division while incompletely organized and under conditions particularly delicate. Nevertheless, these raw troops were ordered to "dislodge the enemy from the crests north of St. Etienne and the Arnes, and throw him back to the Aisne," and "accomplished their mission in its entirety."

On the American sectors east of the Moselle to the Swiss border occasional spurts broke the inactivity of a line which found allusion in the official record as "inactive," where operations were "uneventful" or developing "nothing of importance." What sporadic fighting went on in these sectors was quite overshadowed by the larger movements elsewhere. One local action in the Vosges-on the Lorraine line-brought an admission in a Berlin communiqué that "our advanced posts, which had pushed forward in this region as far as Frapelle, yielded to an enemy local thrust, in accordance with instructions of the command." In other words, the Americans determined to take Frapelle and did so. It was an August engagement, which acquired a little prominence before the St. Mihiel and Argonne offensives occupied the war stage. The village lay east of St. Die and formed a considerable salient in the American line. It was eradicated by the usual raid, preceded by a straight bombardment for a few minutes, then a box barrage that cut the Germans from escape. Thrown out of the village, the Germans made it the target of high explosives and gas shells, but their fire waned when the futility of retaking the place became apparent, the Americans being firmly consolidated in the German trenches.

In this region the Americans discovered Austro-Hungarian troops against them. The gaps on the Lorraine front caused by the withdrawal of German troops farther west were filled up by soldiers the kaiser had borrowed from the Emperor Charles. The American task of guarding this line was not made more difficult by the exchange.

Another incident in the Vosges, late in August, was a German attempt to raid American advanced posts. Enemy artillery and mine throwing caved in an American dugout, burying twelve men, before the attack came. Ten of the buried troopers unearthed themselves when the German fire stopped and met the attackers, driving off forty. One German's dead body could not be taken into the American line for burial till German machine-gun fire, which kept up a steady hail around it, had ceased.

In the Woevre, in the course of an abortive German raid, an American soldier was reported to have sustained sixteen bullet wounds—three in the calf of the leg, ten between the knee and the waist, and three in the arm—yet continued in action. Another trooper was badly wounded in the stomach from fragments of grenades, and also had his nose blown off and his face lacerated. He, too, would not retire until forced to go to a dressing station.

The following description of a little engagement in the Woevre comes from one of General Pershing's reports:

"At 4.30 o'clock morning September 7, 1918, approximately 200 enemy infantry, accompanied by twenty pioneers, raided our lines between Fliery and Limey. A box barrage was laid down 200 meters south of the Metz road. The raiding party entered the sector and then rushed the outpost group, which retired firing toward the enemy. Dividing into three detachments, the enemy tried to encircle this group, but a deploying

platoon succeeded in routing them successfully, causing them to retire.

"Seven of the enemy were captured, two of whom were wounded. Three of the enemy were killed in their trenches. The combat group stated that they saw many enemy wounded being carried off by their own men. Only one of our men was captured and he succeeded in escaping before the enemy could get him back to their lines.

"Interrogation of the prisoners captured established that the raid was made in order to get prisoners for identification of the opposing troops. As no prisoners had been taken for a considerable time, it was decided that a large raiding party should be sent out, made up of units from each regiment of the German division in the sector. Volunteers were asked for, but as none was obtained, men were conscripted for the raid."

The activities of American troops elsewhere on the western front call for record. Of ten divisions billeted with the British army for training purposes as the troops moved over in force across the Atlantic, eight eventually left the British areas, some joining the French, and others their compatriots in the American sectors. The remaining divisions—the Twenty-seventh, composed of New York National Guardsmen, and the Thirtieth, composed of the National Guard of Tennessee and the Carolinas and men from the District of Columbia—stayed with the British from the first and fought with them till hostilities ceased.

After a stay in the British reserve trench system at Doullens, the two divisions were transferred to Flanders in the vicinity of Mount Kemmel. A great German drive was looked for against the southern part of the Lys salient as part of an attempt to break through to the Channel ports. Prince Rupprecht's group of armies were to make this smashing assault, which was all mapped out, even to the date, according to captured German documents. The Lys salient was in the neighborhood of Mount Kemmel, which was held by the Germans. The Americans took over the East Poperinghe line behind Dickebusch Lake. Despite shelters and dugouts and rifle pits they suffered daily losses

from long-range fire, as the flat plains where they were located were under distant observation from Mount Kemmel. Their position was a dangerous one in its relation to the projected German drive. The British doubted whether their troops in front would be able to halt it, and therefore it would crush against the American positions, where the Germans were to be stopped at all costs.

It chanced, however, that the Germans were making their plunge toward Château-Thierry. This enterprise looked so hopeful that the Flanders drive was deferred. The enemy sought to exploit his southern drive toward Paris before venturing on his march to the sea. But the stoppage and the forced retreat of the German legions at the Marne by the American divisions there forced the withdrawal of many units from Prince Rupprecht's armies to stem the Marne overturn, with the result that the attack on the Lys salient was never made.

The changed situation brought about a switch from defensive to offensive tactics in Flanders. The divisions were moved up in front of the Dickebusch Lake sector, relieving two British divisions. The sector was a swamp with water everywhere, the front line being merely a succession of shell holes half full of water in which the troops ate, s'ept, and fought. They were new to front-line conditions, and the Germans tried to terrify them by attempting a daylight raid by a picked band of forty men. At that time (August, 1918), no-man's-land between the lines was the property of the enemy. The raiders breasted it under a sudden protecting bombardment. On reaching the front line a corporal and seven men of the Twenty-seventh Division. marooned in one of the shell holes, met them with a hail of bullets from Lewis guns. It was the last raid attempted. Few of the Germans returned to the lines, and on no-man's-land the Americans thereafter moved about almost at will.

On August 31, 1918, a British attack was undertaken against Mount Kemmel, the Twenty-seventh being on the left, facing Vierstaat ridge and the Thirtieth on the right. Several days' fighting followed, resulting in the capture of the ridge and other points with a number of prisoners, and the establishment of the

British line on more favorable ground. Thereupon Sir Douglas Haig requisitioned the divisions for service farther south.

Later, when the Argonne-Meuse offensive was at its heigh! the Thirty-seventh Division (Ohio National Guard) and the Ninety-first Division (selective-draft men from the Far West and Pacific Coast States), were hastily withdrawn from that front and sent to help the French in Belgium. Detraining in the neighborhood of Ypres, thence advancing by rapid stages to the fighting line, they were assigned to an adjacent French corps, and participated in the resumption of the Flanders offensive on October 31, 1918, attacking and methodically breaking down all enemy resistance. "On November 3, 1918," General Pershing reported, "the Thirty-seventh had completed its mission in dividing the enemy across the Escaut River and firmly established itself along the east bank included in the division zone of action. By a clever flanking movement troops of the Ninety-first Division captured Spitaals Bosschen, a difficult wood extending across the central part of the division sector, reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of Audenarde. These divisions received high commendation from their corps commanders for their dash and energy." About the same time the Thirty-seventh under General Farnsworth played a strong part in the relief of Ghent by an attack on the Eecke salient (sixteen miles southwest of the city), which was stormed with comparatively light losses.

# CHAPTER XXXII


# LE CATELET-ST. QUENTIN

THE Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions reappeared on the British front between Le Catelet and St. Quentin. In the great drive of Field Marshal Haig on September 27, 1918, toward Cambrai, these divisions, advancing on the British extreme left, attacked a series of trenches and fortified farms forming the outer defenses of the main Hindenburg system southwest of Le Catelet. They had not participated in any major operations up to this time, yet they constituted the spearhead in one of the most vital actions of the war. The Hindenburg line in this area, whose approaches they had reached, was as strongly fortified as elsewhere. There were two lines of concrete defenses, with six sets of wire protection before each. Behind was the St. Quentin Canal and masses of artillery.


Previous attempts to take the outer defenses had failed except in a few places. On the front of the American divisions the positions were entirely occupied by the enemy, who had withstood all attacks upon them. It was the mission of the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions to break the line, which had three strong points—the Knoll, Guillemont Farm, and Quennemont Farm. Behind the Americans were the Australians, then a line of British cavalry, next the British whippet or light-running tanks, then the reserves and the artillery.

The entire position bristled with light and heavy machine guns, minenwerfer of various sizes, antitank guns and concealed field pieces. From the rear a deluge of heavy shells supported the defense in the battle which raged furiously all day. On rising ground to the rear was the main Hindenburg system based on an underground tunnel carrying the St. Quentin Canal. All night the struggle continued. The Knoll changed hands several times. The whole region was swept by a tornado of shells.

The character of the fighting in storming the outer defenses may be realized from the vicissitudes of one New York regiment. In the first assault the troops met masses of camouflaged machine guns, which held their fire till the attackers were close to them. Then the hail of bullets came too late to stem the onrush, for the Americans were on top of the guns. A dash, a leap, the flash of a bayonet, a stab of flame from a rifle, and one nest after another was silenced. The line swayed back and forth, with the combatants so close to each other that rifle butts were as effective as anything else. Groups were caught in shell holes, where German rifle fire could not reach them, but they were at the mercy of hand grenades. A party of four, in the first onset,



THE BATTLE LINES IN FLANDERS, AUGUST 8, 1918, TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918



DRIVING THE GERMANS FROM FLANDERS, AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1918, INCLUDING OPERATIONS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTIETH U. S. ARMY DIVISIONS

became separated from their units in mounting a knoll, and dropped into a shell hole fifteen yards from a German machinegun position. The great billows of smoke rolling over the battle field hid them for a while, but the position was too exposed and they finally crept along a ditch and reached a dugout with two entrances. The Germans saw them creeping in, and covered the exits with machine guns. The party remained there all that day and night, and the day following. Their food and water gave out. All they had to eat were stale crusts of black bread. left by the former occupants, and rain water in puddles, and they became dizzy from gas fumes which filtered down into their shelter. All next day (September 28, 1918), German machinegun fire beat against the dugout doors; but evidently unaware of the strength of the party within the Germans refrained from an attack. The party were so cold, hungry, and thirsty that they decided the danger without could not be worse than the ordeal within. So late that night they boldly started forth and wriggled over the ground toward the American line. Groans by an adjacent shell hole brought them to a member of their own regiment who had been wounded in both legs early in the action on the previous morning and who had since lain in the shell hole. His condition decided them to return to the dugout, and they cautiously carried him there, deciding to remain with him no matter what happened. An American barrage now opened, a foretoken of the further attack of September 29, 1918, to which the Germans responded with a counterbarrage. Shells flew over and around the dugout. Presently familiar voices revealed that the new American advance had reached them. One of the party put his head out of the door and narrowly escaped being attacked by the advancing Americans, who were surprised to find comrades in the supposedly German dugout. They were rescued, but were so weak that they had to be carried to the rear on stretchers.

This initial attack of September 27, 1918, had developed on a longer front to the south, a British corps joining the line on the American right. The American divisions therefore centered the advance on the Le Catelet-St. Quentin front, their immediate


objective being the canal, which ran north and south, at a point where it disappeared under a ridge through the tunnel.

The jumping-off place for this difficult operation was not easily reached by at least one New York regiment—the Seventh -which was on the right of an English division charged with maintaining the necessary liaison with it. The British unit which the division relieved on taking over this section of the line had been depended upon to fight its way up to the point determined on as the line from which to make the attack. The line of departure had been reached by the British, but they were unable to hold it. They captured and lost it frequently, being heavily engaged for several days. Their failure to hold their objectives at this point through enemy resistance left them at a distance of from a thousand to twelve hundred yards behind the predetermined line of attack. Hence the American division, when it relieved them, was that much to the rear of the jumpingoff line. This was of serious tactical disadvantage, as one of the regiments of the division encountered the same resistance which had thwarted the British, fighting continuously for two days to gain the line, and on each occasion was driven back by overwhelming counterattacks. They had, moreover, to set out toward it without the protection of a barrage. This was a local condition on a twenty-mile front, it being impracticable to modify the barrage scheme to admit of the barrage falling a thousand yards behind on one strip of the front. The barrage was calculated to conform to the proposed jumping-off position for the whole front of the attack; but on the American line the front occupied by the attacking brigade of the division was not nearer than a thousand yards to where the barrage was to fall. This situation placed the section out of the barrage. The Americans were so far behind it that the German machine-gun nests between the determined line of barrage and the attacking waves were at no time under shell fire and the enemy gun crews could operate their weapons with exceptional freedom and accuracy.

The enemy had divined by the previous struggles to reach the desired line that it was deemed a desirable point to gain; hence he made his greatest concentration there, and, as subsequently shown, made it his main defense on this front. On the American side, the situation, bereft of a barrage protection, had to be accepted and overcome by sheer brute force and the naked bayonet, helped by tanks. That was the condition on one section of the front when the entire British and American line "shoved off" from the Hindenburg outpost defenses to hurl the Germans back between the Scarpe and St. Quentin at dawn of September 29, 1918.

In front of the St. Quentin Canal, whither the Americans were bound, the ground presented a maze of wire entanglements. and was alive with spattering machine guns. There was not an area ten feet square that was not enfiladed by their fire at close range. The natural strength and military development of the position were further linked by many underground galleries connecting with the canal tunnel. The latter ran for over three miles under a mountain ridge, and was honeycombed with intrenched Germans. It formed the entrance to a labyrinth of other tunnels, dugouts, and galleries. The visible enemy was quartered in electrically lighted barges and on the wide towpaths on each side of the canal. The invisible enemy was concealed in the galleries running from the tunnel sides, like rabbits in warren holes. These elaborate underground shelters were safe from shell fire and could house the equivalent of two enemy divisions. At the time of the attack the tunnel was filled to capacity with reserves, from which the German command fed men into their advance positions with safety and ease.

The Hindenburg defenses west of the canal had to be carried, and toward them the leading American elements rushed shouting "Lusitania!" This war cry of the first waves of troops became a ringing slogan. The hard fighting they encountered did not prevent their sweeping over the canal, and they were not even checked by the ambushed Germans in the tunnel, who caught them on their flanks and rear from the north and south portals. Many Germans were also left behind in dugouts, and they, too, proved troublesome. In their zeal to come to grips with the Germans ahead, some of the Americans did not give enough attention to the less absorbing but equally necessary



THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE—AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1918, ASSISTED BY THE TWENTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTIETH U. S. ARMY DIVISIONS

task of "mopping up" the positions they passed. German units in these concealed places poured a fire upon their rear. British, and, in fact, all new troops had erred in this respect again and again, Some American battalions advanced so rapidly that at first they were checked by their own barrage fire. Their impulsive sweep, while showing high courage, was deplored in that it only caused undue casualties; but the event proved that their speed and tenacity in holding the points reached kept the Germans so engaged on that part of their front that they were not only mystified, but could not use their remaining reserves to check the advance elsewhere. The Seventh Regiment lost contact on their left with the British, who had been checked there. Consequently their left was exposed, but they were not deterred, despite being fired upon from their left and rear as well as from the front. They looked to the supporting units following in their rear to dispose of the Germans left behind in hidden places. The latter, however, seemed to ooze out of the ground in such numbers, coming out of holes connected with the underground galleries of the tunnel, that they were able to check all the supporting elements. The result was that the advance units in the first rush found themselves practically surrounded and cut off from their support. This situation entailed a fight lasting forty-eight hours, the Germans encircling them. The British, with American supports, were finally able to fight through and relieve them. Notwithstanding the superior numbers against them, and that their only ammunition and rations were what they carried, the Americans made an unwavering resistance, and left the ground strewn with German dead.

Many of the Germans who formed the surrounding force had issued from the southern end of the tunnel when the Americans swept past. They remained there in hiding until the Americans were a little ahead, and then poured out and plunged into the American rear. The tunnel mouth became choked with dead as a result of the Americans turning to meet this back fire. It was finally blocked with sandbags and exploded shells.

It was part of the schedule for the Australians and the supporting brigade of the Americans to come up and "leapfrog" the forward Americans, and continue the advance. But the character of the fighting, springing, as it did, from all quarters, scattered prearranged precision. It took two days for the Australians and supports to reach the line where the relief was to take place. The German reserves, which emerged out of ground holes from their tunnel stockade and surrounded the advance elements, also held back the Australians and the others. They had to be killed off, captured or dispersed before the "leapfrog" movement could take place. It was feared that the forward elements had all been either killed or captured. The Australians and the rest of the American division found them holding on, tired and besplashed, but in high spirits.

Relieved at last, they opened their ranks, and the newcomers swept through them and became the first wave of the renewed attack.

The fighting everywhere in the American advance was of the hardest character. North of Bellincourt, which they took on their right, the pressure against them was such that they fought to the last man, in not a few cases rather than yield the positions gained. The enemy was resolved to hold the line and hurled masses of men against the Americans, paying a costlier price in resisting than their antagonists did in attacking. Many met their doom in the deep dugouts of the Hindenburg system, killed by American bombs and grenades; but their worst losses came in the untold hand-to-hand encounters. Summing up the operations, General Pershing reported:

"The Thirtieth Division, speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached Jouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and shell craters and under cross fire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately against odds."

Field Marshal Haig's record of the American achievements was as follows:

"North of Bellenglise the Thirtieth American Division, Major General E. M. Lewis, having broken through the deep defenses of the Hindenburg line, stormed Bellincourt and seized Nouroy. On their left the Twenty-seventh American Division, Major General O'Ryan, met with very heavy enfilading machine-gun fire, but pressed on with great gallantry as far as Jouy, where a bitter struggle took place for possession of the village.

"The fighting on the whole front of the Second American Corps was severe, and in Bellincourt, Nouroy, Gillemont Farm and a number of other points, amid the intricate defenses of the Hindenburg line, strong bodies of the enemy held out with great obstinacy for many hours.

"These points of resistance were gradually overcome, either by the support troops of the American divisions or by the Fifth and Third Australian divisions."

# CHAPTER XXXIII

## LE CATEAU

THE next task of the American divisions with the British was to push back a salient south of Le Cateau, a strongly armed position, and holding the line till the flanking division moved up. This operation was part of a three-day advance against the German line from Valenciennes, through Solesmes and Le Cateau to Guise, a line that ran in front of the Sambre Canal. The Thirtieth American Division took over a front of about three miles from two Australian divisions on the night of October 5, 1918, in pursuance of the plan.

The attack opened at dawn on October 8, 1918, the British and French at either side of the Americans, who advanced behind a rolling barrage laid down by British and Australian artillery. It was a whirly ind barrage, the British cannon, wheel to wheel, crashing tons of explosives upon the enemy as a prelude to one of the most furious and vital battles of the war.

The Americans were again at the apex of the advancing lines. Despite an enemy counterbarrage, little resistance was encountered in the onrush. By noon the Thirtieth Division had advanced

three miles, capturing the villages of Brancourt and Premont. This plunge was part of a final thrust into a gap in the last Hindenburg defenses, extending for miles on both sides, the design being to demolish the Hindenburg system completely on a broad front and carry the attack east of it. The movement had so far succeeded that both the Americans and British reached places that were not in the day's program; but having taken the assault beyond the immediate objectives the advance went its own gait. The Germans, in fact, after their terrific resistance on the Le Catelet-St. Quentin front, apparently had little stamina left to defend the Valenciennes-Guise line. The fearful barrage, followed by the infantry and tank charges, put them to flight. Only rear guards and machine gunners remained to repel the attackers, who, as they proceeded, drove deeper and deeper into the German lines, meeting constantly diminishing resistance.

The devastating fire silenced German guns, especially when the Americans reached Brancourt, where German shells began to fall heavily until British cannon, protecting the American advance, stopped the shelling. Other German guns in great numbers were captured. Entire batteries fell into the Americans' hands when they suddenly outflanked both ends of the valley south of Premont and took the village.

From Premont the Americans drove in the general direction of the beautiful town of Bohain, to which the enemy, in quitting it, had applied the torch. Many prisoners came their way, surrendering freely, some offering cigars and inviting handshakes. But the general spirit of the German army hereabout was better shown by one regiment, who, on seeing troops of the Thirtieth Division, ran away like scared rabbits.

As the advance progressed the next day, rear-guard resistance continued to be met, but it was so weak that two villages, Busigny and Becquigny, were entered almost without opposition, and enabled the day's advance to cover four miles. The following day (October 10, 1918), the resumed movement brought a gain of 1,500 yards and the capture of the villages of Escaufort, St. Souplet and Vaux-Andigny. The inhabitants of the last-named

village knew the Americans were in the war, but did not know they were fighting. When the Americans entered they were mistaken for British. They were repeatedly kissed, the more emotional kissing the rifles and bayonets which had delivered them from their oppressors. It was not until they offered tea to the soldiers, when the latter produced sugar for it, that they perceived who their deliverers were.

"Why, you must be Americans!" they cried, and there was another outburst of enthusiasm.

South of St. Souplet the Americans captured more German batteries, bayoneting the gunners. Here again German heavy artillery made them their target, and again British guns interposed and destroyed the enemy gun positions.

The Americans, after their tea drinking with the Vaux-Andigny villagers, quickly left that place behind, reaching the headwaters of the Selle River. A heavy machine-gun fire met them from the east bank. There was hot fighting, which lasted till the enemy strength was thinned out by the American fire. On a crest east of the river the Germans seemed to have prepared positions for a stand. Their line west of the river was strongly held by five divisions and by elements of six others. The Fourth British Army, of which the Second American Corps was a part, was now in front of the Selle, where a pause was necessary to bring up supplies and ammunition and to strengthen the division.

A week later the attack was resumed, the American front being shortened by 4,000 yards. It was launched after daylight in a thick mist which blinded all sense of location. The Germans were massed on the river, badly organized, but prepared to fight, if only to yield after a frenzied spurt of resistance. The movement was difficult, owing to rain, which made the chalky ground afford a precarious and slippery foothold for the troops. Tanks were utilized to lead the assault, manned by Americans trained in England. They trundled across the shallow river, meeting German marine divisions, who fought obstinately. The infantry followed under a rolling barrage, the first wave wading through the muddy water. Meantime engineers, working under

heavy machine-gun fire, ran pontoons across for the second wave of troops. The tanks restricted the enemy fire while the engineers were engaged, and then joined the infantry in mounting the high ground east of the river. Despite an enemy counterbarrage and machine gunners hidden in shell holes, the Americans, under cover of the fog, drove over the crest east of the river and advanced two miles.

They were held up temporarily in continuing the advance the next day by heavily organized machine-gun posts and repeated counterattacks supported by artillery. Obstinate resistance was encountered at the village of Ribeauville, and not until the middle of the afternoon did the enemy lines suddenly weaken and the Americans move on to the Sambre Canal. The last ridge before the canal was occupied by the American and British forces, whereupon this phase in the American operations on the British front ended. The October 17-19, 1918, movement resulted in the capture of six villages, while the whole six days' operations produced a total advance of thirteen miles and 3,400 prisoners.

American troops also figured in an attack launched in August, 1918, between the Ancre and the Somme as part of the British offensive in Picardy. They threw themselves into the fight at the last moment, making a rapid march to reach the front in time for the drive over the top, and ended their march by running into action. The German infantry resisted the first American onset, and then broke, the Americans proceeding without the aid of tanks, the use of which the deep gullies in the ground prevented. There were no trenches, but a thin smoke screen which blew over the ground disclosed the enemy's rear positions. Toward them the Americans ran under German shells which inflicted a few casualties. They reached the enemy line just as the smoke screen lifted, and found themselves at grips with the foe. Elsewhere certain American units had reached positions in front of a wood, from which the Germans opened fire with machine guns. Many of these gunners came up from deep dugouts after the American barrage ceased and placed their guns in prepared pits. The Americans faced a hail of bullets.

With their British comrades they went on, advancing beyond their objectives north of the Somme, and taking the whole of the Chipilly Spur, in a push toward Bray. They belonged to divisions brigaded with the British troops for training.

### CHAPTER XXXIV

#### ON TO GERMANY

THE Third American Army, under the command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman, moved forward on Sunday morning, November 17, 1918, from the lines reached when hostilities were halted, to occupy German territory in accordance with the terms of the armistice. It was composed of ten divisions, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth (Regulars), the Twenty-sixth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second (National Guardsmen of various States), and the Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth (units of the selective draft, or National Army men). Its final destination was the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine, between which and the American lines it was to occupy strips of territory in Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Rhenish Prussia in its line of march.

The situation underwent a rapid transformation during the week intervening between the signing of the armistice and the march of a victorious army into the land of a beaten foe. A prolonged state of war became in process of dissolution. The Germans did not steal silently away. Their exodus was marked by numbers of explosions and fires, indicating the destruction of ammunition and other war material. Other equipment they could not readily obliterate, such as great numbers of motor trucks, guns, and caissons, which were abandoned in the mud; but they damaged them sufficiently to make them worthless. The towns they passed through were stripped of everything portable, the looters disregarding the fact that the day of captures was gone. Returned prisoners reported cavalcades of

stolen property bearing northward, including wagons loaded with household goods and crates of chickens, varied by herds of cattle driven by German troops. The prisoners, of many nationalities, released by the Germans near the front lines, crossed into the American lines in flocks. When the Germans withdrew they left their captives to their own devices, and the latter promptly hastened to their nearest friends. One day brought fifteen thousand released prisoners, mostly French, intermixed with a few Americans. Freed in a cold wave without sufficient clothing, they had seized any apparel their captors had left behind and appeared wearing German overcoats, synthetic uniforms, and even women's clothes. The arrivals also included many French civilians and German deserters.

The Germans were disintegrating their hold upon the country in a German manner. On the surface they were observing the armistice conditions, that is, they were quitting; but they were quitting like brigands who could not forego their calling after surrendering their arms.

The mantle of peace that had fallen upon the land did not convert the armistice into a peace. The American troops were warned that the condition was one of suspended war. The foe being German, the commanders were under no illusions in setting out on their peaceful mission. Any treachery by the retiring foe would be met by an army in being. It was a peace mission on a war footing. The force was well echeloned and advanced in columns. Following the advance guard came the engineers, whose function was not only to repair roads, reconstruct bridges, and clear the way of obstructions, but to inspect keenly every object and position that might be a trap. They particularly looked for mines and tainted water. Every obstacle was tested before it was moved to ascertain if it masked explosives. The Germans had cooperated sufficiently in this direction to inform the Americans where mines were situated, and had themselves destroyed a number of them.

The heavier columns followed the engineers, but at a considerable distance behind, to allow the latter time and space to make the roads safe and passable. The lines were so formed

as to be quickly converted into fighting units. Every brigade was covered by a regiment of 77's, the heavier artillery following close behind. The flanks of the advancing column were equally well protected. No brass bands were heard; no flags waved; no conquering general rode at the head. The troops moved as though prepared to meet the enemy at the next turn of the road. They were accompanied by all the paraphernalia of an army going to war. The Germans themselves were responsible for such precautionary measures by their victorious antagonists. The columns of fighting men marching in measured step, led by patrols, the lumbering cannon groaning along behind them, the ammunition trains and ambulances in the rear, gave the roads an aspect of war that was not war. But it only needed a peremptory order to make it war.

The troops advanced from a line running roughly from Mouzon, Stenay, Damvillers, Fresnes, and Thiaucourt, on a front exceeding fifty miles. They moved off into the habitual morning mists of Lorraine, some of the brigades miles apart on the long line between the extreme left and right. The left wing marched toward the southernmost end of Belgium and Luxemburg. The right wing turned to the German ore fields of Briey. Between the two was a stretch of French territory, which the Germans were evacuating, to be liberated before the whole advancing line could converge to a straight route along the Moselle from Treves to Coblenz. The line narrowed as it proceeded, the right occupying Montmédy, the left Conflans, the center little towns like Etain and Spincourt. North of Conflans was Briey, west of Montmédy lay Longwy. They were names to conjure with in this part of France. From these two centers of the iron industry the Germans had derived most of the ore they used for the war, and had occupied the territory since the fall of 1914. It was the lot of the Americans to enter them as emancipators.

There were surrenders of guns at Spincourt and Bouligny, as well as great stores of lumber, barbed wire, and various engineering equipment. German officers had been left behind to deliver the material to the Americans, from whom they obtained

receipts. At Spincourt forty-two guns of large caliber including two of sixteen inches, used by the Germans to shell the Verdun region, changed hands. They were ranged in order along the village square and were in good condition. The guns surrendered at Bouligny numbered twenty-two.

The country reached showed few traces of war. No trenches, barbed wire, or leveled towns were to be seen. Only neglected fields and streets, looted houses, and shell holes in the roads bore witness to the effects of the war. Over every main road American engineers were scattered like ants, repairing culverts, filling old shell holes, and keeping the highways in condition after the constant grind of army equipment passing over them.

The troops continued to meet elements of another army coming their way, early stragglers of which had appeared the day the armistice was signed. Freed prisoners, American, British, French, Italians, and other nationalities who fought the Germans, daily filtered through the American lines in their thousands. At Spincourt the Americans found 2,000 hungry Russians, whom they sent on to Verdun in trucks which had hauled their supplies. The problem of feeding and housing the swarms of released prisoners taxed both the army and the organizations on the field to befriend soldiers. Outpost feeding stations were started for the wayfarers, who were provided with coffee, bread, and canned meat from the army supplies. One famished group of returned captives raided an American bread truck and emptied it before they could be restrained.

The entry of the Americans as liberators into French towns on their way produced memorable scenes. Each village was in gala dress, the population turned out with affecting welcomes, especially from the old and young, and priests showered benedictions upon them. Freeing impoverished and stricken communities from a long bondage as they marched foot-free through a war-stilled land, without the need of firing a shot, was not a heroic rôle. That rôle the troops had already fulfilled. The part they now played was that of benefactors, which evoked a new satisfaction. The gratitude of those liberated French

civilians was worth all and more of the laurels that go to the hero on the battle field.

The waiting French, while under the German yoke, had known Americans were fighting in their direction long before the armistice came. American prisoners and wounded appeared in their villages, while German movements betrayed that the American legions, far back, were daily approaching nearer. Thereupon they foresaw the day of deliverance and prepared for it. Unknown to their oppressors, they set about making American flags, so that when the Americans came, the latter beheld the Stars and Stripes flying from housetops and churches in every town.

By November 20, 1918, the Third Army was on Belgian, Luxemburg, and German soil. The troops on the right crossed the German frontier of 1914 at points opposite Briey and Audunle-Roman. On the left American marines entered the Belgian town of Arlon, where the day was proclaimed a holiday, and found a fervid welcome awaiting them. Edwin L. James, describing the reception extended to them, wrote:

"For real, downright joy I never saw anything to equal the sights at Arlon. Arlon is a little Belgian city of some 20,000 inhabitants, and is beautiful beyond compare. They had hundreds and hundreds of fête trees, just like our Christmas trees, all along the streets, and they bore tinsel and Japanese lanterns. Overhead were bowers of fir tree branches, and along the streets were pretty girls and handsome women and cheering men and brass bands and the gendarmes. Don't forget the gendarmes. Their uniforms, not worn for four years, had been dug up and burnished so that each 'copper' looked no less than a major general.

"When the Sixth Marines came marching up the main street pandemonium broke loose. There were a thousand homemade American flags, and everywhere banners and big signs reading: 'Hail, generous Americans!' They had not been able to get cloth enough to make all the flags they wanted, and so hundreds had been painted on big sheets of paper. What if the paint did run—the flags were still recognizable."

Swinging northward from Metz, the First Division crossed into Luxemburg and entered the frontier town of Esch. The following day (November 21, 1918), the troops passed through the city of Luxemburg, where, General Pershing reported, "they were welcomed as deliverers by the civilian population, who showered them with flowers and accompanied them in their march through the flag-bedecked streets." From the balcony of her palace, with General Pershing by her side, the youthful grand duchess watched the Americans enter her capital. Only twenty-four hours before she had seen the long columns of gray-clad German soldiers depart for their own soil after occupying her little domain for over four years. The duchy was a blaze of color, the bunting chiefly being its own flag of red, white and blue blent with the Stars and Stripes.

The American army controlled every road, city and village in the principality. The Luxemburg people, including the duchess, joyfully acquiesced in the exchange of "occupying powers." As the Americans were technically on neutral territory, an occupation made necessary to establish and maintain their lines of communication, General Pershing issued a proclamation pointing out that the German evacuation of Luxemburg was demanded as one of the conditions of the armistice and pledging protection, the utmost freedom for the functioning of government and civic institutions and personal liberty while the American troops were on Luxemburg soil. At the same time all transit and communication facilities, as well as all other accommodation needed by an army of occupation, were to be at the service of the American authorities. Luxemburg, in other words, was under American control; its people were to obey any orders the American commander might give for the safety of his troops and for their welfare, and were warned not to commit any hostile acts or to give any information or aid to the enemy. But they were assured that the American army would not be quartered on them longer than was necessary.

It was only an incident in the march to the Rhine, but Luxemburg hailed the American passage over its soil as an event of far-reaching significance. The main army immediately moved on, turning to the northeast edge of the duchy, where it met a perceptibly cooler reception. The German element of the population predominated there; they produced brass bands and crowds, but no enthusiasm.

The Third Army reached the German frontier on November 23, 1918, spreading along a front from Wallendorf on the north to Sierck on the south. Its general line was two rivers, the Sauer and its confluence with the Moselle. The troops established themselves on the western banks of the streams, looking toward Germany in the near distance. Opposite them thousands of German soldiers were still encamped, loath to retire into their own territory just behind them, as required by the armistice. Both Americans and Germans washed their clothes on either side of the Moselle within sight of one another. The troops had paused for the French on their left and right to reach points of junction with them, and for the Germans to make way for them on the opposite shore. The army marked time. According to the armistice, the Germans had fifteen days in which to retire to their own soil. That period of grace deferred the resumption of the American advance for three more days.

The Germans presently withdrew on a general line of retirement along the Perl-Saarburg road, using oxen to haul their supplies and artillery on account of the dearth of horses. The Americans meantime rested on the river banks till the morning of December 1, 1918, when they set out across the Sauer and Moselle, behind German rear guards to occupy the stretch of Rhenish Prussia from the vicinity of Coblenz southward. They moved astride the Moselle, traveling in a northeasterly direction, their lines extending some twenty miles on each side of the stream.

The function of the troops had changed on setting foot upon territory really German. Instead of being an army of liberation, as they were in German-ruled Lorraine, they had become an army of occupation. They spread out on a wide front, in full battle order, bound for Treves, the only important city on the line of route before Coblenz was reached, occupying scores of villages on the way. The attitude of these little Prussian com-

munities was repellent in its sharp contrast to the ardent welcomes which the Lorrainers and Belgians extended to the Americans. It was a calm silence, a schooled gloom. Even the children had been carefully instructed in their deportment. Flags which had been flying to welcome the returning German soldiers were withdrawn, and the crowds retired with them. The Americans had become accustomed to cheering throngs. Their ears still echoed with the farewells of the villagers on the Luxemburg side of the Moselle. On the Prussian side the streets of the villages were almost deserted. At least three-fourths of the villagers remained indoors, with most of their blinds drawn. Occasional groups gathered at street corners, and here and there a German stood at his door as the Americans passed. But the reception was blankly ungenial; there were signs neither of pleasure, disapproval, or overt antagonism. The Prussian populace was gloomily mute. They stayed at home rather than countenance the American occupation by witnessing it.

Studied indifference, when their mien was not pointedly sullen, marked the bearing of the population of Treves on the entry of the Americans into that city. Officially, there was a surface hospitable greeting, but hostility lurked behind the face of Treves. It was Sunday, but no church bells rang. There were no flags, cheers, nor smiles. Outwardly phlegmatic, and bent on preserving a somber and hard bearing to their visitors, the inhabitants of the occupied territory were nevertheless unable to conceal their anxiety as to what treatment would be meted out to them. General Pershing eased their fears by a reassuring proclamation, which was posted in all the places on the line of march. Mindful of the conduct of their troops in Belgium and France, the German populace wondered if the day of retribution had come. But the American proclamation was of a very different tenor to those of the truculent German commanders who imposed their tyranny upon the French and Belgians.

"The American Army," it declared, "is not come to make war on a civilian population. All persons who, with honest submission, act peacefully and obey the rules laid down by the military authorities will be protected in their persons, homes, religion, and property. All others will be brought within the rule with firmness, vigor, and promptness. The American army will govern in strict accordance with international law and the rules and customs of war sanctioned by the civilized world. Inhabitants, on their part, must absolutely abstain in word and deed from every act of hostility or impediment of any kind toward the American forces. It is your duty now to devote yourselves to the orderly and obedient conduct of your private lives and affairs, the reestablishment of normal conditions in schools, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions, and the resumption of your local civil life.

"You will be unobstructed, but, on the contrary, will be encouraged and protected in those pursuits. So far as your attitude and conduct make it possible, local courts, governing bodies, and institutions will be continued in operation under supervision of American authorities. Except where they affect the rights and security of the American army, your present laws and regulations will remain undisturbed and in force. Every violation of the laws of war, every act offering hostility or violence, and every disobedience of the rules laid down by military authority will be punished with the utmost vigor."

The American garrison of 3,500 was left in Treves, and the main body continued their march to the Rhine. The communities the troops passed through, in each of which patrols were left, manifested the same passivity of bearing shown in Treves and elsewhere. The people seemed resolved not to be jarred out of their rôle of nonchalance. Farmers and villagers glanced up casually from their work as the khaki-clad troops tramped by and turned away. Curious stares met them here and there; but no sign of feeling or keen interest was betrayed. Only the children broke from restraint, at times revealing the hidden sentiments of their elders by derogatory remarks or throwing stones at the passing soldiers. There was no vestige of German troops; they were well ahead in their retiring movement.

On December 8, 1918, a request was received by the American headquarters at Treves from the Coblenz authorities asking that a police force be immediately sent there to maintain order. It

was a great occasion. The Germans sought American protection from their own unruly elements. The last German troops had departed to the east bank of the Rhine, and disturbances were feared in a city habituated to military occupation. While the main American army was on the highways, a battalion of infantry was dispatched from Treves to Coblenz by rail—the first occasion a railroad had been used in the advance—and occupied Coblenz four days before the date scheduled, the municipal authorities cooperating.

Coblenz is on the west bank of the Rhine and bridges extend from it over the river. American sentries were immediately posted at their western ends, and the various arsenals, barracks, and army storehouses just evacuated by the German troops, were occupied. A friendlier spirit was shown to the Americans in the Coblenz region. The treatment accorded to the communities through which the Americans passed had become known and produced a more amicable attitude.

The main American army arrived along the Rhine on December 11, 1918, and spread from Rolandseck, south of Bonn, to Trechtingshausen. The line was shortened on the north to Brey in the pause made before the final step—the occupation of the entire Coblenz bridgeheads on both sides of the river from a given radius—was taken. On December 13, 1918, the Rhine was crossed, thousands of Americans pouring over the five bridges of Coblenz into the country east of the river. The people looked on at the first crossing of the Rhine by hostile troops for over a century. The Stars and Stripes waved over the river and American bands played. The troops spread fanwise on the east side and took up positions along the perimeter of a thirty-kilometer semicircle pivoting on Coblenz. This arc contained the bridgehead conceded by Germany in the armistice. The American front along the Rhine extended a few miles beyond either end of the semicircle, overlapping at points the lines of the British on the left and the French on the right. Outside the semicircle was a neutral zone ten kilometers wide, policed by Germany, but not in force. Three French divisions shared in the occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead, taking over the southern part across the river, in order to give an international composition to the force of occupation. For the same reason an American division was sent to take over part of the Mainz bridgehead occupied by the French.

The aged crest of the Ehrenbreitstein fortress, towering on the east bank 400 feet above the river, where several German regiments had been quartered the day previous, looked down impotently over the scene. It was not to be spared. This Gibraltar of the Rhine, as it was called, situated on a rocky promontory, covering over a hundred acres, and accommodating thousands of troops, was occupied by American soldiers.

The same was made of the barracks attached to the royal castle on the Rhine, rising a stone's throw from the business center of Coblenz. The palace itself, one of the ex-kaiser's summer homes, was guarded by American troops to prevent removal of its valuables.

Coblenz was the assembling center for the surrender of enormous blocks of German military equipment, requiring several trains to transport. The war material which German officers gave up to the Americans under the terms of the armistice included 760 guns of large caliber, nearly 3,000 machine guns, hundreds of motor trucks and wagons, and huge quantities of ammunition.

On the river the Stars and Stripes fluttered over a score of patrol boats, commanded by marine lieutenants and detachments of marines, with German operating crews.

The task was complete. An American army was in occupation of German territory for an unspecified time under the armistice. A march of two hundred miles had brought an enemy area of some five thousand square miles under the Stars and Stripes. The American command administered civil affairs in two principal cities, Treves and Coblenz, and in hundreds of small towns and villages, governing about a million people with as little friction as the running of a watch.

# PART VI - WAR ON THE SEA

### CHAPTER XXXV

## NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

THE fact that no engagement occurred between the naval forces of the United States and those of its enemies in the period between August 1, 1918, and the cessation of hostilities, November 11, 1918, is no indication that the United States navy in all its branches was not "carrying on" to the very utmost of its ability and capacity. Indeed, not until the latter part of 1918 did it become known what an immense part the United States navy was taking in the prosecution of the war.

In a general way, of course, it had been known for many months that the United States was not only doing its bit, but even more. It had been an important factor in transporting safely our military forces from this country to Europe from the first day when United States troops were sent abroad. It had established huge naval bases in England, Ireland, and especially in France. Vast numbers of its large and small ships were engaged in European waters in the task of subduing the predatory submarine. Its aerial branch furnished large numbers of officers and men for the purpose of assisting our Allies in guarding their coasts.

One of the most important pieces of work which had been assigned to the United States naval forces, however, did not become known to any great extent until the fall of 1918. This was the laying of an immense mine barrage across the North Sea, extending from near the Norwegian coast to within some thirty miles of the Scottish coast. The establishment of this

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great mine barrier was an enormous task, involving many months of work. It involved the laying of more than 250,000 mines. It was claimed that between June and November, 1918, the United States navy put down more than half as many mines as the British navy had put down during the entire war, and more than three times as many mines as the Germans. All the mines used were of American make, and they were laid at a rate sometimes of several thousand a day, an entirely new record for this kind of work. Altogether American sailors and engineers were responsible for more than 75 per cent of the North Sea mine field, including the deep-sea portion, which was the most difficult to construct.

Many details regarding this huge undertaking, the biggest ordnance mine project ever handled, were given by Secretary of the Navy Daniels late in October, 1918. It appears that for this project a new and improved type of mine was invented, many thousands were manufactured and transported overseas, large bases were established abroad for assembling and issuance to mine planters, a fleet of mine layers was sent and maintained in foreign waters, a score of merchant vessels were fitted out and were kept engaged in transportation of the material from this country, and a mine-loading plant with a capacity of more than a thousand mines a day was erected and was operated for many months.

From the time the United States entered the war, officers of the Bureau of Ordance contended that a most effective way of combating the submarine would be to blockade the enemy's coast by means of mines, or antisubmarine devices, and urged the placing of an antisubmarine barrier around the North Sea to prevent submarines from getting into the Atlantic. They made a thorough study of the various types of barrage, including nets, nets in combination with mines and bombs, and mines alone.

They concluded that mines offered the only practicable solution of the problem; but no mine then existing appeared to be satisfactory for the purpose, so efforts were concentrated on the evolution of a new type with which such a barrier could be established. The immense number required for the project and

the operation of mining in such great depths of water presented new and difficult problems.

The mining section of the bureau, under the direction of Commander Fullinwider, produced a new type of mine, the success of which surpassed all expectations. The first step was to devise a new firing device, and the officers saw possibilities in an electrical antisubmarine device which Ralph Browne, an American inventor, had submitted to the Navy Department in May, 1917, and which, while not of practical value in the form submitted, embodied an element which could be utilized to advantage in a naval mine.

The inventor, in collaboration with officers of the bureau, constructed a model apparatus which on test, July 9, 1917, gave gratifying results, and the bureau immediately proceeded with the design of a mine in which the apparatus could be used. The firing apparatus having been completed, other parts were designed as rapidly as possible, each part being put into manufacture as it was designated and tested. To insure the practicability of planting mines by either British or American planters, outside dimensions of the American mine and planter were made to conform to the standard British gear. Lieutenant Commander H. Isherwood, R. N., worked with the bureau to accomplish this end and assisted in designing the complicated mine anchor.


Tentative plans for a North Sea barrage were submitted to Admiral Benson, chief of naval operations, on June 12, 1917; the development of a mine peculiarly adapted for use against submarines was announced July 18, 1917, and plans for a British-American joint offensive operation were submitted on July 30, 1917. After being approved by Secretary Daniels they were submitted to the British Admiralty by Admiral Henry T. Mayo on his visit to Europe, during August and September, 1917, were accepted in modified form by the British authorities, and the details of the joint operation worked out. Upon Admiral Mayo's return the Bureau of Ordnance was directed by Secretary Daniels to proceed with the procurement of the necessary mines.







At the left is Admiral Sims, who commanded the United States Naval Forces that cooperated with the British in European waters; at the 12th Admiral Wilson, who commanded the United States Naval Forces at the ports of disembarkation in France



At first some officials looked upon the plan as impracticable, mainly on account of the immense amount of material required and the inadequate number of mine layers available. But these difficulties were overcome.

Many thousands of mines had to be produced, and as rapidly as the several parts were designed contracts were placed for their manufacture. Coincident with this work, numerous experiments and tests were made of each part. The routine method would have required the design and test of the mine and all its attachments as a whole before undertaking manufacture, but a year's time would have been lost if this routine had been followed. To obtain the new mine in large quantities, and to preserve due secrecy regarding its characteristics, a radical departure from usual manufacturing methods was adopted. Naval plants did not possess the facilities for manufacturing more than a thousand a month, and these plants were congested with other war work. There were no private plants experienced in the manufacture of mines.

It was impracticable to develop a great plant for the sole purpose of making mines, as there was insufficient time and its purpose would have been only temporary. The expedient was therefore adopted of subdividing the mine into its many elements and having these elements manufactured in different commercial plants, all the parts to be finally brought together and assembled into finished mines at a mine depot. The work was divided among about 140 principal contractors and more than 400 subcontractors. The major portion of the work was done in automobile plants, which possessed the organization and equipment for quantity production.

Having the various parts made at so many points was a somewhat hazardous course to adopt, as the manufacturers would have to tool up and get into quantity production before a single mine could be assembled and tested, and such a policy could be justified only as an urgent war measure where time was a vital consideration. For this reason Rear Admiral Earle, chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, accepted the risk and pushed the work to the utmost.

The results fully justified the means adopted, as a full year's time was saved, and the mines when finally assembled and tested under service conditions functioned as designed. The cost of the new mine was much less than that of similar products before the war, notwithstanding the higher cost of labor and material, and this was due to the quantity production methods followed out and the keen competition between contractors.

While the mine itself was being placed in production, a number of ships were converted into mine planters, a mine-charging plant with a capacity of 1,000 mines a day was erected to load the mines, an important railroad shipping pier was taken over for the handling of mine material, and other necessary arrangements made. Abroad, mine depots were fitted out for the assembly of mines and their issuance to the mine planters.

A fleet of more than twenty merchant ships was taken over by the navy and fitted out for the sole purpose of transporting mine material overseas. Captain Belknap accomplished the work of procuring, fitting out, and organizing the vessels for mine planting. The task of fitting mine bases on shore abroad was intrusted to Captain O. G. Murfin, who proceeded overseas in November, 1917.

The arrangements for the receipt of the various parts, transportation and final assembly were made rapid and automatic and on a scale never before attained in such work. From American ports material started across early in February, 1918. Since that time there has been a constant succession of such shipments, and only one vessel carrying mine material has been sunk by submarines.

Rear Admiral Strauss was selected as commander of the mine force, and sailed in April, 1918, followed by the mine planters under Captain Belknap in May. Vessels of the force reached the bases on May 2, 1918. Since that time many miles of mines have been planted, and the American mine layers, working with the British, have made a vast area impracticable for enemy submarines.

But huge as this one undertaking was, it represented only a part of the navy's work. All the way from the Spanish border

clear around to the English Channel, we established aviation stations so spaced that the entire French coast line was covered by seaplanes and dirigibles. These stations were built almost entirely by our sailors. At each station there was an average of from 200 to 300 men. This aviation force and our patrol vessels did so much splendid work that for the last six months of the war there were practically no sinkings within fifty miles of the French coast.

In northern France in cooperation with the British and Belgians there were established what is known as the northern bombing group, composed of a number of aviation units which did much to prevent the Germans from again using Zeebrugge and Ostend as submarine bases, after they had been rendered useless by the daring enterprise of the British navy, described elsewhere.

An American naval force cooperating with the British at Gibraltar was patrolling the Atlantic in that vicinity and acting as convoy to vessels going to and from Italy, Greece, and Egypt. A flying school, with several naval aviation units was established in Italy, while in the Adriatic a large group of submarine chasers was doing excellent work.

Each naval base had its hospital, and in Scotland an entire watering place was taken over by the Americans for use as a naval hospital.

That the work done by our naval forces was greatly appreciated by the greatest navy in the world, the British, becomes clear when one reads the glowing praise bestowed upon it by a special correspondent of the London "Times" in describing the work performed by United States naval forces stationed at Queenstown, Ireland. "They," he said, "performed a service the effect of which can only be properly appreciated with the end of the war, when the work of all the Allies is reviewed in its due proportion. This, however, may be said: there was a 'gap' in the defenses against submarines, and the coming in of the Americans filled it. These forces were under the orders of the British vice admiral commanding in Irish waters, Sir Lewis Bayly." But, so far as supplies, repairs, discipline, etc., were

concerned, they were controlled by the American senior naval officer.

Most harmonious was the working of the two navies. So close was the cooperation of the two services that when the British vice admiral was on leave some time ago, Admiral Sims, the senior American naval officer, hoisted his flag at Queenstown, and through the island went the rumor that Ireland had been handed over to the United States.

"Destroyers, submarine chasers, and Curtiss flying boats," says our English friend, "comprised at Queenstown the main American forces. The work was most exacting, particularly. as the weather was frequently none too pleasant. And neither a destroyer nor a chaser is the most comfortable of vessels in a heavy sea. But no one complained and there is the same keenness that one finds in the British navy to 'down Fritz.' Submarine hunting and convoy escorting are not without peril or excitement, and while one finds an eagerness to explain the organization side of their work, the Americans are very reticent about relating any incidents of personal valor. One officer I met had recently undergone an experience which falls to few. He was asleep in the forepart of a destroyer doing escort duty, when the helm of the vessel jammed. Had the destroyer continued In her course, she would have rammed the troopship she was escorting. The alternative was to go astern and be jammed herself. She went astern, and the larger vessel cut off the destroyer's bow, which turned over and floated. The crash awakened the officer, who in the darkness searched for the door of his cabin. With the aid of an electric torch he found it, not in the usual position, but above his head. With some difficulty he forced open the door and climbed out.

"There is a large building which smells of Nelson's day, and has floors as thick as pier piles, in process of transformation to a naval barracks. Most of the chasers moor alongside when they are in harbor. Various classes are being started for the men, so that every opportunity will be afforded them for pursuing their studies and obtaining promotion. Probably the most interesting vessel in harbor is the supply and repair ship. It

has been especially built for the purpose, and is an important unit of the fleet. It is replete with every sort of repair shop. Destroyers run alongside for repairs and replenishment of supplies. There are splendidly equipped bakeries and laundries on board—in fact, there is everything that ships and men require. With the gradually increasing forces the hospital accommodation was barely sufficient, and a hospital with 150 beds has been built on shore. The site was selected last March; the buildings were opened last week. Of recreation there is plenty. central feature is a large hall on shore, where the nightly entertainment attracts hundreds of men. Everything is run by the men, and the talent would do credit to a London music hall. The band, supplied by members of different ships' companies. is conducted by an ensign who joined as a veoman. At a show the other night the men were singing some tongue-twisting choruses.

"I think it was a Japanese who, writing to an American in English, apologized for not being able to write in American. My trouble the other night was that I could not sing American."

Even on land the United States navy assisted in winning the war. On October 23, 1918, American 16-inch guns, manned by American bluejackets cooperating with the French, began firing upon German railroad centers back of the Serre-Oise front. The Americans directed their shells against railroad supply stations and junctions in the region of Vervins and also in the vicinity of Rozoy.

These guns were originally intended for new battle cruisers, but a change in the design of the cruisers left the guns available for other use, and as there was in the navy no immediate need for them afloat, Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, chief of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, recommended that they be placed on railway mountings for land service with the armies in France. He felt that if these guns could be placed upon railway mountings that would make them readily mobile, like the British and French naval guns of smaller caliber, they would prove a valuable adjunct to our artillery forces overseas, and he was directed to proceed with the design and construction.

The American naval guns threw a heavier projectile and had a greater muzzle velocity than any previously placed on a mobile shore mounting.

From the first it was seen that in order to make the project successful the railway battery must be made completely mobile, so that it might operate without being based at any one particular spot. For this reason, it was necessary to provide not only the railway cars mounting the guns, but also locomotives and cars sufficient to accommodate all the operatives.

The final plans and specifications which were prepared at the Naval Gun Factory, Washington, under immediate supervision of the bureau, by Captain A. L. Willard, Commander Harvey Delano, and the bureau's designing draftsman, G. A. Chadwick, were completed in less than thirty working days, being ready for submission to the bidders about January 25, 1918. Large mounts were to be built, capable of taking these big caliber guns, each mount with its accessories to be operated as an independent train. The equipment included locomotives, gun cars, ammunition cars, crane cars, construction, sand, timber, berthing and kitchen, fuel, workshop and staff radio cars, cars for officers, battery headquarters, and miscellaneous purpose cars. locomotives built for this purpose were standard consolidation type with four pairs of drivers. The weight of the engine alone was approximately eighty-three tons and the weight of the tender approximately fifty-six tons.

A form of pit foundation was provided to enable the guns to be fired at high angles of elevation. The removal of the gun from over the pit formation and its restoration to complete mobility were but the work of a few minutes. The entire mount was covered with armor plate, 1,600 square feet of plate being required. By shifting the position of the gun mount on the tracks the gun could be brought to bear on any desired target and the proper angle obtained.

When the first gun was completed in April, 1918, gun and mount were put through the severest tests and showed accurate fire at much farther ranges than had ever before been possible with projectiles of such large size.

The car equipment was unusually complete. One car was a complete machine shop, with every facility for repairs, with blacksmith forge and anvil, lathes, shapers, grinders, and drill presses. Ammunition cars were heavily armor plated. The kitchen cars had complete cooking and serving apparatus; the berthing cars had folding bunks for the men, and other cars carried complete sets of spare parts.

As soon as the manufacture of the material was well under way the task of assembling and training personnel for the expedition was begun. Rear Admiral Plunkett was placed in charge of the expedition, and under his direction the force of officers and men necessary was built up. The officers were drawn both from the regular navy and Naval Reserves, and the men for the most part were taken from the Great Lakes Training Station, Chicago.

Early in October, 1918, United States warships and other vessels took part in the destruction and occupation of the Austrian naval base at Durazzo in the Adriatic.

A number of United States battleships also participated in the surrender of the German High Sea Fleet on November 21, 1918.

In spite of the tremendous activity of the United States navy the losses incurred by the actual fighting arm of the service were practically negligible. On September 29, 1918, the battleship *Minnesota* struck a mine off the Delaware Breakwater. There were no casualties, and the *Minnesota*, in spite of having suffered considerable damage, proceeded to port under her own power. The *Minnesota* is of the predreadnought type, built at Newport News, Va., in 1905. She is of 16,000 tons displacement, 450 feet long, and in normal times carried a complement of 985 officers and men. Her armament consists of four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, and a number of smaller rifles.

The only other loss was caused by a collision. On October 9, 1918, the United States destroyer *Shaw* collided in British waters with a British vessel. Though unfortunately fifteen of her men were killed, she, too, succeeded in reaching port under her own steam.

# PART VII -- AMERICA AND PEACE

#### CHAPTER XXXVI

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN PEACE
NOTES—PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLIES—
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE AND CONGRESS

THE sustained success of the Allied armies in France and Belgium in August and September of 1918, the importance of which was fully appreciated by the United States Government, served to strengthen the determination of the Administration not to relax any efforts to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion.

The continued retreat of the armies of Ludendorff and Hindenburg had disturbed and shaken the confidence of the German people in their military leaders, and political counsels were rent with factional strife, but there were no elements in the German Government daring enough to break away from Pan-Germanism and begin negotiations that would be acceptable to the Allies.

In Austro-Hungary, however, where economic conditions were of such a desperate and threatening character that the polyglot empire was faced with revolution and disruption unless a speedy peace could be obtained, an unwilling consent was wrested from the German Government, that a note should be addressed to the belligerent and neutral powers suggesting a meeting for a preliminary and nonbinding discussion of war aims with the view to a possible calling of a peace conference. A note to this effect was received by the Washington Administration on September

16, 1918, a lengthy document from which these extracts only need be quoted here:

"We venture to hope that there will be no objection on the part of any of the belligerents to such an exchange of views. The war activities would experience no interruption. The discussions, too, would only go so far as was considered by the participants to offer a prospect of success. No disadvantage would arise therefrom for the states represented. . . . According to our conviction, all the belligerents owe to humanity to examine whether now, after so many years of a costly and undecided struggle, the entire course of which points to an understanding, it is possible to make an end to the terrible grapple.

"The Royal and Imperial Government would like therefore to propose to the Governments of all the belligerent states to send delegates to a confidential and unbinding discussion, on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace, in a place in a neutral country, and at a near date that would yet have to be agreed upon—delegates who were charged to make known to one another the conception of their Governments regarding those principles and to receive analogous communications, as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined."

The Austro-Hungarian note was coldly received in Washington. Against a peace by negotiations the Administration had firmly set its face. President Wilson had expressed in unmistakable terms his determination to urge the prosecution of the war to a conclusion that would leave the Allies and the United States the sole arbiters of peace terms. The leaders in Congress, regardless of party affiliations, were practically unanimous in the opinion that the time had not yet arrived for beginning peace negotiations with the Central Powers. They were confident that the initiative won by the Allies on the fighting front would be retained, and that the achievements of General Pershing's forces as well as those of the French, British, Belgian, and Italian armies, would ultimately force the Central Powers to make an unconditional surrender.

President Wilson himself had emphasized the idea that this was a war of emancipation and that Germany should be fought "with force without stint" until it was conclusively won.

In the evening of the same day that the Vienna note was received at Washington the reply to Austria-Hungary was made public by Secretary of State Lansing.

"The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly, and with entire candor, stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can, and will, entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain."

This brief, sharp, and decisive reply to the Vienna Government gave great satisfaction to the Senators, Representatives and others in American public life. It was the verdict in Washington that President Wilson had made his purpose plain to conlinue the war until victory was achieved and that the time had not come for peace negotiations.

Despite the subsequent rejection by all the Allies of the Austro-Hungarian plea for an unbinding and secret conference, that Government declared that the offer was still open and at the same time expressed their readiness to participate in the proposed exchange of ideas.

President Wilson made a memorable speech dealing with the war and peace on September 27, 1918, at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, before an audience of 5,000, at the opening of the Fourth Liberty Loan campaign in that city. He spoke of the war as one in which the common will of mankind had been substituted for the particular purposes of individual states. America had entered the conflict when its character was fully defined and when it was plain that no nation could stand by, or be indifferent to its outcome. The issues of the war, the President said, had been accepted as facts and not as any man or group of men had defined them. These issues, putting them in the form of questions, were: Whether any military power should be suffered to determine the fortunes of

peoples over whom they had no right to rule; whether strong nations should be free to wrong weak nations; whether peoples should be ruled by arbitrary and irresponsible force, or by their own free will; whether there should be a common standard of right and privilege for all nations; whether the assertion of right should be haphazard and by casual alliance, or should there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights. On this last point President Wilson developed his idea of how peace might be established at the end of the war. No bargains or compromises should be made with governments, but a League of Nations must be organized to enforce the agreements made when peace was concluded. He made it clear that the peace dictated to a defeated Germany would not rest upon that Government's promise of good conduct in the future, but must be guaranteed.

As the condition of affairs in Austro-Hungary became more chaotic and threatening, and the Allies continued to drive the German armies before them in France and Belgium, the Central Powers on October 6, 1918, addressed new notes to President Wilson asking him to make representations in their interest for a general armistice and negotiations for peace. These negotiations were to be based on the fourteen points in President Wilson's message of January 8, 1918, and the four points of his speech of February 11, 1918, and those equally of September 27, 1918.

Among members of the Senate and Congress and in official circles in Washington the consensus of opinion was that the enemy's latest peace plea should be rejected as summarily as was the last Austro-Hungarian note. Without considering the question of an armistice such as could not be granted, the purpose of this new effort on the part of the Governments of Vienna and Berlin was to secure a negotiated peace from the Allies in order to save their armies from disaster and whatever else could be salved out of the ruin that threatened the two empires. It was noted that neither Austria nor Germany "accepted" President Wilson's program, but only took the program "as a basis for peace negotiations." There was consequently nothing new of

importance in the notes, which were simply invitations to talk peace. The President had recently declared his unalterable opposition to any peace brought about "by any kind of compromise, or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting."

On October 7, 1918, the United States Senate discussed the peace overtures of Germany and Austria in a two hours' session. Every senator who took the floor urged the prosecution of the war until the Central Powers were ready to surrender unconditionally. An armistice at this time, it was argued, was out of the question, as it would enable the enemy to recuperate and reorganize his weakened forces preparatory to striking another blow. It would be time enough to consider peace terms when the real representatives of the German people were the spokesmen and not the Hohenzollern military machine. Not a single voice was raised in the Senate in favor of yielding to the German maneuver, which was unequivocally characterized as a trap for the Allies.

Before framing his reply to the German and Austrian notes, President Wilson consulted the Allied Governments, that the reply would display the views of the Entente and a solid front be presented.

On October 8, 1918, Secretary of State Lansing delivered the President's reply to the Central Powers to the Swiss chargé d'affaires in charge of German interests in the United States:

"Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the imperial chancellor. Does the imperial chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last, and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

"The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

"The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the imperial chancellor is merely speaking for the constituted authorities of the empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view."

Some disappointment was expressed by a few members of the Senate and Congress that the President had not abruptly rejected the German overtures, but the feeling predominated that all loyal Americans must stand unflinchingly back of Mr. Wilson and support him in every move which the demands of the hour seemed in his view to justify. From Senate, Congress, press, and people the general opinion was expressed that before there could be any armistice Germany must withdraw all her troops from conquered territory.

The German Government's reply to President Wilson's question received in Washington on October 12, 1918, was as follows:

"The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Government of the Powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his address.

"The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purposes of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the proposition of the President in regard to the evacuation. The German Government, which has taken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

"(Signed) Solf,

"State Secretary of Foreign Office."

The German reply to President Wilson's questions failed to arouse any enthusiasm in Washington, where it was generally considered that the note lacked frankness; for, while it indicated compliance with the general principles laid down by the President, details were left open in a manner which might prove detrimental to the aims for which America and her Allies were fighting.

After the publication of the German note in the American press the White House was deluged with telegrams from all parts of the country denouncing the German reply as lacking sincerity and urging the President to stand firm and prosecute the war until the Central Powers were forced to make an unconditional surrender. Cablegrams from the British and French Governments received at Washington strongly opposed acceptance of the German proposals as being tricky and insincere. Our great allies were firm in their determination not to grant an evacuation, much less an armistice, on the conditions proposed.

President Wilson replied to the German plea for peace on October 14, 1918, when he reaffirmed his previous declaration that no armistice could be arranged unless the military superiority of the Allies was protected, and he also pointed out the illegal practices which the German military command still maintained.

In Germany there was much indignation over President Wilson's note, especially regarding his references to the destruction and cruelty which the German military command continued even while negotiations for peace were under discussion. At the same time the Federal Council proceeded to curtail, by changing

the constitution, to restrict the kaiser's war- and treaty-making right, which must henceforth require also the consent of the Reichstag. The last obstacle to the reform of Prussia's three-class franchise was also removed, when the Conservative faction in the Prussian Diet voted unanimously to accept equal franchise in Prussia, expressing at the same time their belief that it would not advance the welfare of the people.

President Wilson's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note of October 6, 1918, was not made until October 19, 1918, the delay having been caused by the rapid disintegration of the empire since the first note was written. Mere "autonomy" of the oppressed peoples of the dual monarchy could no longer be regarded by the American Government and its allies as a basis for lasting peace. President Wilson further stated that he could not entertain the present suggestions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, because of important events which had occurred since the delivery of his address on January 3, 1918. Among the fourteen terms of peace formulated at that time were the following:

"The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since this sentence was written and uttered, said President Wilson, the Government of the United States recognized "that a state of belligerency existed between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austrian empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de facto belligerent government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugoslavs for freedom."

The President added that he was no longer at liberty to accept mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a peace basis, but must insist that not he, but they alone, should be judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government would satisfy their aspirations.

This made clear that the American Government and its allies would now be satisfied with nothing less than such a dissolution

of the dual monarchy as would be necessary to give the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugoslavs, and Poles their freedom.

Germany's reply to President Wilson's note of October 14, 1918, was received in Washington on October 21, 1918. It had been the subject of long and heated debate in the Reichstag and the result was regarded by the American Government and her allies as an unsatisfactory and awkward attempt to forward peace negotiations. In substance the note was as follows:

"In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of occupied territory the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the military judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides of the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard." It was suggested to the President that an opportunity should be arranged for fixing the details.

The German Government protested against the President's charges of inhumane and illegal actions on land and sea and proposed that such charges be examined by neutral commissions. The German Government further stated that orders had been dispatched to submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, but could not guarantee that these orders would reach every submarine at sea before its return.

"As a fundamental condition for peace the President prescribes 'the destruction of every arbitrary power, that secretly and of its own single choice disturbs the peace of the world.' To this the German Government replied that hitherto the people of the empire had not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government, nor could they decide questions of peace and war. These conditions had now undergone a fundamental change. A new government had been formed in complete accordance with the wishes of the people based on universal, equal, and direct franchise. It was further stated that the leaders of the great parties were now members of the Government and that no government could henceforth remain

in office unless it possessed the confidence of a majority of that body. The chancellor was now responsible to the people.

"The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

"The question of the President—with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing—is therefore answered in a clear, unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which is free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of an overwhelming majority of the German people.

"(Signed) SOLF."

The greater number of Senators and Representatives regarded the German note as shifty, equivocal, and unsatisfactory, and that it should be answered by President Wilson by a refusal to go into further peace parleys. A few of the Senators and Representatives were of the opinion that the note should be taken seriously, and from the German standpoint was an honest attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The German protest against the accusations of inhumanity in the conduct of the war on land and sea was condemned as audacious and gave a tone of insincerity to other statements in the note.

President Wilson made clear to the party leaders he consulted that it was not his purpose to make any peace with an armed Germany, and that he stood for the absolute surrender of the enemy. Whatever steps Germany had taken in the direction of constitutional reform to free the Government of arbitrary influences, there was no evidence that the kaiser, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff were not still in complete control of the German military organization.

President Wilson's reply to the German Government was delivered by Secretary of State Lansing on October 23, 1918, to the chargé d'affaires of Switzerland representing German interests in the United States. The substance of the President's reply was as follows:

"Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of September, 1918, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be conserved both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

"He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

"The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Govern-

ment has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

"The President would deem himself lacking in candor if he did not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German foreign secretary in his note of the 20th of October, 1918, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people hás yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees exist, or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the empire in the popular will; that the power of the king of Prussia to control the policy of the empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not, and cannot, trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace, and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.

"If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with

them later in regard to the international obligations of the German empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid."

President Wilson's drastic reply to the German Government which left the terms of an armistice to be submitted by Foch, Haig, Pershing, Diaz, and the military advisers of the Allies on a basis of complete surrender, cut off negotiations for peace on any other basis. Until Germany was ready to accept such terms the war would be continued and there would be no further talk of peace with Germany until after her armies had evacuated occupied territory.

President Wilson had, by exchanging views with the Allied Governments, thwarted a cunning attempt on the part of German political and military authorities to create discord among the Governments associated with the United States. For the Germans did not believe that the Allies would support the program laid down in President Wilson's message of January 6, 1918, and which the German Government had accepted as a basis for peace negotiations.

In Germany great political changes were soon under way. General Ludendorff resigned and the Reichstag took over the reins of military control. On October 27, 1918, Germany replied to President Wilson's latest communication.

"The German Government has taken cognizance of the answer of the President of the United States.

"The President is aware of the far-reaching changes which have been carried out, and are being carried out, in the German constitutional structure, and that peace negotiations are being conducted by a People's Government, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it.

"The German Government now awaits proposals for an armistice, which shall be the first step toward a just peace, as the President has described it in his proclamation.

From this note it was inferred that the German Government expected to have a hand in fixing the conditions of an armistice, but the plan of the Allies was that Germany should have no share in arranging the terms, which were to be left entirely to the military commanders and advisers of the Allies. The German Government must accept their decision, or there would be no armistice.

In Austria-Hungary at this time riots and revolutionary movements had created the most disturbing and chaotic conditions. Hungary had set up an independent state, the Czechs were openly defiant, the republican spirit grew apace and the split in the empire widened when German parties formed a provisional government. In her dire hour of need Count Andrassy, the new foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, sent a note to Secretary Lansing on October 28, 1918, requesting his intervention with the President for an immediate armistice on all fronts, and the commencement of peace negotiations. The note was as follows:

"Immediately after having taken direction of the ministry of foreign affairs, and after the dispatch of the official answer to your note of October 18, 1918, by which you were able to see that we accept all the points and principles laid down by President Wilson in his various declarations, and are in complete accord with the efforts of the President to prevent future wars and to create a League of Nations, we have taken preparatory measures, in order that Austrians and Hungarians may be able, according to their own desire and without being in any way hindered, to make a decision as to their future organization, and to rule it.

"Since the accession to power of the Emperor-King Charles his immovable purpose has been to bring an end to the war. More than ever this is the desire of the sovereign of all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, who acknowledge that their future destiny can only be accomplished in a pacific world by being freed from all the disturbances, privations, and sorrows of war.

"This is why I address you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, praying that you will have the goodness to intervene with the President of the United States in order that in the interests of

humanity, as in the interest of all those who live in Austria-Hungary, an armistice may be concluded on all fronts, and for an overture that immediate negotiations for peace will follow."

On the same day that Austria made this appeal to President Wilson a semiofficial note was issued at Vienna which stated:

"Austria was obliged to conform to the methods of President Wilson, who had successively replied to the three members of the Triple Alliance, and act apart from her allies. The monarchy, which has formally adopted President Wilson's line of action, shares his opinion, as was shown by the emperor's manifesto to the peoples, which, in proclaiming the federalization of the monarchy, exceeded President Wilson's program.

"However, the complete reorganization of Austria can only be carried out after an armistice. If Austria-Hungary has declared herself ready to enter into negotiations for an armistice and for peace without awaiting the result of negotiations with other states, that does not necessarily signify an offer of a separate peace. It means that she is ready to act separately in the interests of the reestablishment of peace."

It was the opinion in some quarters in Washington that a different treatment should be accorded the Austro-Hungarian request than had been given to the German pleas for peace, because of the establishment of the independent state of Hungary and the recognition by that state of the independence of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugoslav provinces, and also German Austria, but the American Government had no intention of being diverted from its main object because of the important political changes in the dual monarchy. Even if new states were established before the peace, they must still bear their share of responsibility for the acts of the empire. In American military circles Vienna's fervent plea for an armistice was generally interpreted as an offer to surrender as completely as did Bulgaria, and that Germany would hardly care to continue to make war after her biggest ally had surrendered.

The Washington Government, knowing the desperate political and economic conditions that prevailed in the empire, believed that a way to peace might be more readily found in that quarter than in Germany, for the Emperor Charles knew his throne was threatened; recognized that his power as a ruler was fast slipping from him, and that if he would save anything from the wreck he must speedily accept any terms that the Entente and the United States were prepared to offer. As little or no resentment had been expressed in Berlin because Austria had led in the peace moves, it was evident that Germany was backing her ally and that perfect harmony existed between the two governments at least on the question of an armistice.

## CHAPTER XXXVII

TURKEY CAPITULATES—AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GERMANY SURRENDER—"THE WAR THUS COMES TO AN END" PRESIDENT WIL-SON TO CONGRESS—THE PRESIDENT SAILS FOR FRANCE

THAT Germany was quite as anxious to bring about a speedy A armistice as Austria-Hungary was expressed in a note which the Washington Government received on October 30, 1918, and which the State Department declined to make public because it was evident that the document had been prepared mainly for propaganda purposes. The note described the various steps that had been taken to democratize the German Government with the view to impressing the United States that they had complied with President Wilson's stand not to discuss an armistice with a nation that was still dominated by an autocracy. The note endeavored to prove that the German people were now in complete control of the Government, but it failed to impress the Administration, since it did not show any change in the situation created by other German proposals to suspend hostilities. The evident purpose of the appeal was to influence sentiment in foreign countries and gain sympathy in the United States. It was well understood at Washington and in the capitals of the

Allies that the Central Powers realized that they faced complete disaster and that their only hope of saving anything from the wreck was to bring about a speedy cessation of hostilities.

On October 31, 1918, the representatives of the Entente Powers assembled at Versailles to consider the terms of the armistice after an informal meeting at the home of Colonel E. M. House, President Wilson's personal representative. On this date Turkey capitulated. The United States had no part in arranging the Turkish armistice, which was chiefly the work of the British and French representatives. The principal terms of the armistice granted by the Allies to Turkey were: The opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and access to the Black Sea, and occupation of all forts along these waters by the Allies. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except such as were required to guard frontiers and maintain internal order. The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or waters occupied by Turkey. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Wireless, cable, and telegraph stations to be controlled by the Allies. The surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Yemen, Mesopotamia, etc. All Germans and Austrians—naval, military, or civilians—to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions.

The capitulation of Turkey, though anticipated for some days by the Entente and the United States, was important inasmuch as it was expected to hasten the collapse of the Central Powers. Austria, aflame with anarchy, and with revolutionary mobs parading the capital, had no choice but to submit to the Allies' terms. In Washington the complete collapse and unconditional surrender of Germany was hourly expected.

All interest was now centered in the Supreme War Council in session at Versailles, where the terms to be offered to the Central Powers were under discussion. There were present during the deliberations General Tasker H. Bliss, representing the United States, Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, Field

Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Colonel E. M. House, President Wilson's personal representative, and David Lloyd-George, the British prime minister. It was decided that the terms to be submitted to Germany should be confined strictly to military requirements conditioned generally upon President Wilson's principles. During the discussion of Austrian questions Serbian and Greek representatives were present because of their special interest in Austrian affairs.

At Washington President Wilson kept in touch with the United States representatives at the Versailles Council. Colonel House advised the President of the progress of the deliberations and there were frequent exchanges of communications. It was known in Washington that political and economic conditions in the Central Powers had reached such a pass that Austria could not, and Germany would not, refuse to sign any terms which the Entente was prepared to offer.

The complete destruction of the Austrian armies by the Italians, which resulted in the capture of over 300,000 prisoners and 5,000 guns, left the dual monarchy no alternative but complete surrender. On November 3, 1918, an armistice with Austria was signed by General Diaz, the Italian commander in chief, which went into operation at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the following day. The principal terms in the armistice may be briefly outlined:

Demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and withdrawal of all forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland. Half the divisional corps and army artillery and equipment to be collected at points indicated by the Allies and the United States for delivery to them. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war. The Allies to have the right of free movement over all roads, railroads, and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory. The armies of the Allies to occupy such strategic points as they deemed necessary to conduct military operations, or to maintain order. Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days from Italian and Balkan fronts and all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Evacuated territories to be governed by local authorities under control of the Allied armies of occupation. Immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied prisoners of war and civil populations evacuated from their homes.

The naval conditions included surrender to the Allies and the United States of fifteen submarines and all German submarines in Austrian waters, three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, six Danube monitors, etc. Freedom of navigation for the Allies in the Adriatic and all waterways, with occupation of forts and defenses on the Danube. The existing blockade conditions to remain unchanged, and all naval aircraft to be concentrated and impactionized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America.

The drastic character of the armistice terms were calculated to please even the "Bitter Enders" in America and Europe. President Wilson's diplomacy was now triumphantly vindicated and those members of Congress who had found fault with his note writing were ready to concede that to him belonged a great deal of the credit of bringing about a situation that must lead to the ending of the war on the Allies' own terms.

On November 6, 1918, the German Government sent a wireless message to Marshal Foch asking him to receive German plenipotentiaries who would arrive at the French outposts on the following day (November 7) to arrange for the armistice. The mission was headed by Mathias Erzberger, secretary of state, and included General von Winterfeld, Count Alfred von Oberndorf, General von Grunnel and Naval Captain von Sallow.

As previously noted in the last chapter devoted to military operations, the armistice was signed by the German representatives and all hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918, at 11 a. m. On the same date President Wilson announced the terms of the armistice in his address to Congress. Briefly summarized Germany agreed to the immediate evacuation of all invaded countries, including Alsace-Lorraine, and yielded over to Allied occupation "the countries on the left bank of the Rhine," including control of the crossings of that river at Mayence, Coblenz, and

Cologne; bridgeheads of thirty kilometer radius on the eastern bank and the establishment of a neutral zone from thirty to forty kilometers in breadth and running from the frontier of Holland to the Swiss frontier. Germany surrendered about half her navy, including 160 submarines, which passed at once under control of the Allies to be disarmed and interned in Allied or neutral ports. All other German warships were to be disarmed and concentrated in German naval bases and held under control of the Allies and the United States. All the railways of Belgium, Luxemburg, and of Alsace-Lorraine with their equipment were to be given up.

In the east Germany abandoned the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk. All German troops in Russia, Rumania, or Turkey were to be withdrawn and the agents of German propaganda recalled. The Baltic was opened to the warships of the Allies, and provision was made that through Danzig or the Vistula supplies might be sent to the starving peoples of Poland and Russia.

The Black Sea ports were also to be evacuated by Germany and she must give up the Russian fleet. While the blockade was to be maintained as respected Germany, all German restriction upon the trade of neutrals was removed. Germany must give up all the prisoners she had taken, all the ships she had seized, but this was not reciprocal. German prisoners of war and German ships remained in the custody of the Allies.

While President Wilson was reading to the assembled Congress the drastic terms which Germany had been forced to accept in order to obtain peace there was a tense silence on the part of the great audience. It was only when they realized, as paragraph after paragraph was read, how complete the victory of the Allies was that faint handelapping was heard, then cheers and presently everyone in the gallery and on the floor was on his feet cheering madly. After reading the terms of the armistice President Wilson continued:

"The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

"It is not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end, and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion, and in such force, as to contribute, in a way of which we are deeply proud, to the great result. We know, too, that the object of the war is attained; the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will now seek to revive it?

"The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany, which could once secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world, is discredited and destroyed. And more than that—much more than that—has been accomplished. The great nations which have associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely united in the common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice, embodied in settlements which are based upon something much better and more lasting than the selfish competitive interests of powerful states. There is no longer conjecture as to the objects the victors have in mind. They have a mind in the matter not only, but a heart also. Their avowed and concerted purpose is to satisfy and protect the weak as well as to accord their just rights to the strong."

President Wilson here spoke of the unanimous resolution of the representatives in the Supreme War Council at Versailles to do everything possible to relieve the economic distress of the people of the Central Empires, to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations, and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand. Hunger does not breed reform; it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible "For with the fall of the ancient Governments, which rested like an incubus on the peoples of the Central Empires, has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form, but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves with what governments and of what sort are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace. With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose premises and engagements is it to rest?

"The present and all that it holds belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their Governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest: to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. . . . The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government and who are now at last coming into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with their initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbors and of their former masters and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose, or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they will know and choose the way of self-control, and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last."

Dr. Solf, the German foreign secretary, addressed a message to Secretary of State Lansing on November 11, 1918, urging that negotiations for peace be hastened as Germany was threatened with famine on account of the blockade.

"We had to accept the conditions, but feel it is our duty to draw the President's attention most solemnly and in all earnestness to the fact that the enforcement of the conditions must produce among the German people feelings contrary to those upon which alone the reconstruction of the community of nations can rest, guaranteeing a just and honorable peace. The German people therefore, in this fateful hour, address themselves again to the President, with the request that he use his influence with the Allied Powers in order to mitigate these fearful conditions."

Dr. Solf's appeal for a relaxation of the armistice terms to save Germany from starvation was discussed by President Wilson and the Cabinet. It was the general opinion that Dr. Solf was needlessly alarmed, as the harvest in Germany had been gathered in only a few weeks before the surrender. If famine really threatened the country, however, the Allies and the United States were prepared to take measures to provide the German people with food. Every stipulation of the armistice terms must be kept in force in order to forestall treachery of the beaten enemy, but ships and rolling stock necessary to provide food (and other needs) would be put into use if Germany was indeed in peril of starvation.

The new German Government, now controlled by the Socialists, renewed through Dr. Solf the plea to President Wilson to send plenipotentiaries to The Hague, or some other place, "in order to save the German people from starvation and anarchy."

Secretary of State Lansing replied to this note advising the German Government to communicate its request to all the Allies. He also notified Dr. Solf that the note previously sent to the United States by Germany on the question of food for Germany would be forwarded to the Allied Governments.

It was the attitude of the Washington Administration in agreement with its Allies that these requests called for modifications of the armistice and must be passed upon by the Inter-

allied Supreme War Council at Versailles. The purpose of the United States Government was to furnish relief for Germany as soon as possible if the situation there was as desperate as the dispatches from Berlin indicated. Federal Food Administrator Hoover was immediately dispatched to Europe to consult with Allied representatives on the situation.

On November 18, 1918, it was announced at Washington that President Wilson had decided to go to Europe for the purpose of taking part in the discussion and settlement of the main features of the treaty of peace. It was not his intention to remain throughout the sessions of the formal peace conference, "but his presence is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty, about which he must necessarily be consulted."

During his absence from the United States it was the President's purpose to continue to exercise all the functions of his office, keeping in communication with Washington by wireless while at sea, and by cable, and if necessary by dispatch boats, while he was abroad.

Among Republican members of Congress and to a lesser degree among the Democratic members a considerable opposition developed to President Wilson's plans to go to Europe for the peace conference. It was the view of these members that the President should not be absent from the country at a time when the most important question before the nation, aside from the peace conference, was reconstructive legislation. The majority of the members of Congress, however, were not disposed to embarrass the President by openly opposing his plans, even though they did not altogether approve of his going.

It was not until the 29th of the month that announcement was made from the executive offices of the White House of the men who would represent the United States at the International Peace Conference in France. The commissioners were five in number as follows:

Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States. Robert Lansing, secretary of state. Edward M. House, then representing President Wilson in the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

Henry White, former ambassador to Italy and France.

General Tasker H. Bliss, military adviser of the Supreme War Council.

On December 3, 1918, President Wilson delivered his address to Congress in the chamber of the House of Representatives. He began by announcing his visit to France; paid tribute to the bravery of American soldiers and sailors, and expressed gratitude for the conduct of the American people during the war. He praised especially the work of the women, and again made an appeal for the passage of the woman's suffrage amendment.

America, said President Wilson, would give order and organization to the coming peace not only for ourselves, but for the peoples of the world, as far as they would permit. The problem of the return of peace in domestic affairs was one of economic and industrial development. Public works of every sort should be resumed and plans made for the development of our unused lands and natural resources to aid the returning soldiers. Belgium and northern France should not be left to the vicissitudes of sharp competition for materials and industrial facilities which had already begun. In this connection President Wilson suggested that the War Trade Board have the right to establish priorities of export and supply to these peoples. After dealing with the question of loans to relieve the present burden of taxation on industries, he indorsed the three-year naval program on the ground that it would be unwise to adjust the American program to a future world policy that was as yet undecided.

President Wilson stated that he had no private thought or purpose in going abroad, but believed that it was fulfilling his highest duty 'to play my full part in making good what they (the American soldiers) offered their life's blood to obtain." The President added that he intended to keep in close touch by wireless and cable with the executive departments of the Government, and that Congress would learn of all that he was doing

while abroad. He expressed the hope that he would have the cooperation of the public and of Congress on his mission.

This address was received with less enthusiasm than any delivered by the President in the House of Representatives since America entered the war. There was considerable cheering and applause, but it all came from the Democratic members of Congress. The Republicans and the Democratic senators were silent and remained in their seats. It was expected that at the close of the address senators and representatives would exercise their privilege to question the President about the trip he was about to make, but nothing of the kind occurred. Both houses adjourned almost immediately after President Wilson left the capitol.

In the morning of the following day (December 4, 1918), President Wilson and Mrs. Wilson and the commissioners sailed for Brest, France, on the United States steamship George Washington. This historic event—for Mr. Wilson was the first President of the United States to visit Europe while in office-was witnessed by many thousands of enthusiastic citizens who crowded the water front of Manhattan and Staten Island. There was wild cheering from the multitudes as the George Washington passed down the harbor escorted by five destroyers of the Atlantic torpedo flotilla, and President Wilson was seen on the bridge of the steamship waving his hands and saluting to show his appreciation of New York's tribute. From the windows of every building near the water front men and women were waving flags and handkerchiefs, while steamers, tugs, and other craft blew continuous blasts with their whistles, which, mingling with the shriek of great sirens on the George Washington, made a demonstration such as the harbor never before had heard.

## **EHAPTER XXXVIII**

PRESIDENT WILSON IN PARIS—ENTHUSIASM
OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE—HIS SPEECHES
ON THE ISSUES OF THE WAR

PRESIDENT WILSON and the United States commissioners to the Peace Conference arrived at Brest, France, on December 13, 1918. The Presidential fleet was sighted when fifteen miles offshore. An hour later, when the fleet was signaled at the entrance to the harbor, a mighty shout went up from the waiting crowd. A single destroyer led the way, followed closely by the towering battleships Pennsylvania and Wyoming, flying respectively the flags of Admiral Mayo, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and Vice Admiral Sims, commander of the American naval forces in European waters. Following the battleships a short distance away, came the George Washington, bearing the President, attended by the battleships Arkansas, Florida, Utah, Nevada, Oklahoma, New York, Texas, and Arizona, by French cruisers, and a large flotilla of American and French torpedoboat destroyers.

The entrance to the harbor of Brest is a strait, a mile wide, flanked on either side by steep cliffs surmounted by ten forts, and it was through this passage that the presidential fleet swept along while the cannon roared from the heights and the guns on every American battleship replied.

The quays, hills, and every elevated bit of ground, and the roofs of many buildings were crowded with people and cheers rang out as the fleet moved toward the inner harbor where all the warships and merchantmen dressed ship and manned the yards.

The George Washington anchored a mile from the shore about noon, but it was 3 o'clock before the President and Mrs. Wilson disembarked from a harbor boat and set foot on French soil. At the landing French and American guards of honor presented arms and a military band played "The Star-Spangled Banner,"

while the enthusiastic cheering of the thickly massed people increased in volume.

As Mrs. Wilson, accompanied by General Pershing, stepped ashore she passed a group of American Army nurses who handed her an American flag. When a moment later President Wilson appeared the crowds near the waterside roused the echoes of the old Breton city with their deafening cheers, which the people on terraces and roofs took up, and the very ground seemed to rock with the noise.

President Wilson was joined, as he stepped ashore, by Stephen Pichon, the French foreign minister, and Georges Leygues, minister of marine, who conducted the distinguished guest to a beautifully decorated pavilion. Here the mayor of Brest delivered an address of welcome in the name of the French nation, and the President received a parchment roll, wound round with American colors, containing the city council's greetings. President Wilson acknowledged the greeting and then read a brief address in response to the mayor's speech of welcome.

After the ceremonies the presidential party boarded motor cars and proceeded to the railway station. The city was bright with bunting, and the square named after President Wilson was elaborately decorated with gay-colored streamers and mottoes. All the population of Brest seemed to be in the streets, happy and vociferous. They cheered the presidential party lustily and hailed the President by name in the friendliest fashion. Mr. Wilson, his face wreathed in smiles, bowed his acknowledgments, and waved his hat to the crowds as his car moved through the streets. Four thousand sailors and soldiers lined the route, and they were needed to keep in check the enthusiastic populace.

Arrived at the station, where a huge streamer was displayed inscribed with "Hurrah for Wilson!" the presidential party immediately boarded a saloon carriage for Paris. As the train pulled out of the station President Wilson leaned out of the window and waved his hand to the crowds until lost to view in the distance.

At 10 o'clock in the morning of the following day, the presidential party reached Paris, and the first to greet Mr. Wilson

as he stepped from the train were President Poincaré, Madame Poincaré, and Premier Clemenceau. After a few moments' friendly greeting, the Presidents of the French and American republics, seated together in an open carriage, began their drive, a historic episode long to be remembered, even in this city, which had known great pageants and the splendor attending royal visits.

All Paris was in the streets, for it was impossible to keep the Parisians at work on such an occasion. They cheered madly and threw flowers, and the more than fifty thousand French troops that lined the route taken by the presidential party were needed to hold the enthusiastic crowds in check. The first men President Wilson saw in American uniform in Paris were wounded soldiers from a military hospital, who had been provided with seats on a two-block stretch of sidewalk on the Avenue du Boisde-Boulogne. Every American soldier and civilian, though he took no active part in the reception, was somewhere in the line to cheer the President as he passed. Mr. Wilson was constantly bowing and raising his hat and smiling upon the enthusiastic throngs in acknowledgment of his welcome, while Mrs. Wilson's carriage was heaped with violets and other flowers that were thrown into it along the route. The President's drive ended at the palace of Prince Murat, where he was to be entertained during his stay at the French capital.

At the luncheon given by the President of France at the Elysée Palace later in the day, Mr. Wilson was introduced to the distinguished guests among whom were the presidents of the Senate and Chamber, Premier Clemenceau's ministers, former premiers and foreign ministers and the marshals of France.

President Poincaré în his speech at the luncheon paid tribute to Mr. Wilson's statesmanship, "whose words and deeds were inspired by exalted thought . . . who had found a way to express the highest political and moral truths in formulas which bear the stamp of immortality." He spoke of the passionate desire of the French people to thank, in the person of their President, the great Republic which had given such invaluable assistance to the defenders of right and liberty, through the Red Cross and

countless gifts of its citizens. He paid tribute to the American soldiers who, "fired by their chief, General Pershing, flung themselves into the combat with such a manly contempt for danger, such a smiling disregard for death, that our longer experience in this terrible war often moved us to counsel prudence. They brought with them, in arriving here, the enthusiasm of crusaders leaving for the Holy Land."

Speaking of France's long agony through four terrible years, President Poincaré urged that "Now we must build together such a peace as will forbid the deliberate and hypocritical renewing of an organism aiming at conquest and oppression. Peace must make amends for the misery and sadness of yesterday and it must guarantee against the dangers of to-morrow. . . . We must introduce into the peace we are going to build all the conditions of justice and all the safeguards of civilization that we can embody in it."

In reply President Wilson, after expressing his gratitude for the warmth of the welcome he had received in France, and for the generous things that had been said about himself, asserted that whatever he had said and tried to do was said and done only in an attempt to speak the thought of the people of the United States truly, and to carry that thought into action.

"From the first the thought of the people of the United States turned toward something more than the mere winning of this war. It turned to the establishment of eternal principles of right and justice. It realized that merely to win the war was not enough, that it must be won in such a way, and the question raised by it settled in such a way, as to insure the future peace of the world and lay the foundation for the freedom of its many peoples and nations."

He spoke of the ruin wrought by the armies of the Central Powers, and the necessity of such action in the final settlement as would rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation and make men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon without the certainty of just punishment.

"I know with what order and enthusiasm the soldiers and sailors of the United States have given the best that was in

them to this war of redemption. They have expressed the true spirit of America. They believe their ideals to be acceptable to free peoples everywhere, and are rejoiced to have played the part they have played in giving reality to those ideals in cooperation with the armies of the Allies."

President Wilson expressed his pleasure at being in France to join with President Poincairé in rejoicing over the victory that had been won.

"The ties that bind France and the United States are peculiarly close. I do not know in whatever other comradeship we could have fought with more zest and enthusiasm. It will daily be a matter of pleasure with me to be brought into consultation with the statesmen of France and her allies in concerting the measures by which we may secure permanence for these happy relations of friendship and cooperation, and secure for the world at large such safety and freedom in its life as can be secured only by the constant association and cooperation of friends."

During the afternoon President Wilson received a number of visits. Among those who registered were Premier Venizelos of Greece, and the ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, and China, the Marquis de Lafayette, and members of the French Government.

Responding to a greeting of the Socialist delegation, the President said:

"The war through which we have passed has illustrated in a way which can never be forgotten the extraordinary wrongs which can be perpetrated by arbitrary and irresponsible power.

"It is not possible to secure the happiness and prosperity of the world, to establish an enduring peace unless the repetition of such wrongs is rendered impossible. This has indeed been a people's war.

"It has been waged against absolutism and militarism, and these enemies of liberty must from this time forth be shut out from the possibility of working their cruel will upon mankind.

"It is my judgment that it is not enough to establish this principle. It is necessary that it should be supported by a cooperation of the nations which shall be based on fixed and definite

covenants and which shall be made certain of effective action through the instrumentality of a League of Nations.

"I am confident that this is the thought of those who lead your own great nation, and I am looking forward with peculiar pleasure to cooperating with them in securing guarantees of a lasting peace of justice and right dealing which shall justify the sacrifices of this war and cause men to look back upon these sacrifices as the dramatic and final processes of their emancipation."

In the afternoon members of the General Federation of Labor met in the Place de Clichy and paraded the chief throughfares cheering President Wilson.

On the following day President Wilson conferred with Premier Clemenceau and Colonel House at his residence, the Murat Palace, and in the afternoon visited the tomb of Lafayette in the Picpus Cemetery. No preparation had been made for his reception and he was accompanied only by Brigadier General Harts, a secret service agent, and a French officer who had been assigned to him as his personal aid. President Wilson entered the tomb with bared head, carrying a large floral wreath to which a card was attached bearing the inscription:

"In memory of the great Lafayette, from a fellow servant of liberty."

Having placed the flowers on the tomb the President stood for some moments with bowed head in silent contemplation of the last resting place of America's great and good friend in her struggle for independence.

As on the first day of his arrival in Paris, all the residents seemed to be in the streets eager to get a glimpse of the President. Around the headquarters of the American mission in the Place de la Concorde a dense crowd had gathered, ready to cheer enthusiastically every attaché, however humble his position, who entered or left the building. American army automobiles, wherever they stopped, were immediately surrounded and cheered. It was indeed only necessary to look like an American to be joyously acclaimed by the warm-hearted and grateful people.

#### CHAPTER XXXIX

#### ENGLAND WELCOMES THE PRESIDENT

PRESIDENT WILSON arrived at Dover on December 26, 1918. During the crossing of the Channel the ambulance steamer Brighton, which carried the presidential party, was escorted by a squadron of eight British airplanes, which hovered around the boat during the entire passage from France to England. French destroyers flying the American flag at the mainmast composed the escorting fleet. As the British shores were neared the French destroyers turned about and withdrew, while a flotilla of British destroyers took their places to escort the presidential ship to Dover.

As the *Brighton* steamed into the harbor the enthusiasm that greeted the President's arrival at Brest was duplicated.

President Wilson was received on the pier by the Duke of Connaught, the king's uncle, wearing the khaki uniform of his rank in the British army. The duke welcomed President Wilson in the king's name, and after a few minutes' chat led the way to a special train in waiting to carry the presidential party to London.

In the address of the mayor of Dover, which was read by the recorder of the city, Mr. Wilson was referred to as "President of the republic which, though far away from Europe, determined to associate herself with us and our allies in the battle for freedom and humanity, thus furthering the high ideals which you placed before the world."

President Wilson in his response expressed his grateful appreciation of the cordial welcome, and continued:

"We have gone through many serious times together, and, therefore, we can regard each other in a new light, as comrades and associates, because nothing brings men together like a common understanding and a common purpose. I think that in spite of all the terrible sufferings and the sacrifices of this war we shall some day, in looking back upon them, realize that they

were worth while, not only because of the security they gave the world against unjust aggression, but also because of the understanding they established between great nations to act together with each other in the permanent maintenance of justice and of right."

The presidential train moved out of the Dover station amid the deafening cheers of the people. No stops were made on the way to the capital, but at every town and village large crowds had been waiting for hours to see the President pass and the "special" was hailed everywhere with acclamation and the waving of American flags.

Arrived in London, President Wilson was received with sovereign honors. King George and Queen Mary and leaders of the state welcomed the nation's guest in the most cordial manner, but the President was perhaps more touched by the spontaneous enthusiasm of the plain people who filled the streets. From Charing Cross station to Buckingham Palace continuous cheering, wave on wave, marked the progress of the presidential and royal procession. The British people are often accused of lacking emotion, but on this occasion at least they gave full vent to their feelings and showed in every way that they had taken the President to their hearts.

Before Buckingham Palace a crowd estimated at 20,000 people of all classes and ages had gathered. Girls from the factories and shops elbowed richly clad women from the West End. Farmers and country folk jostled the fashionables of clubland and the rough elements from South London. It was a vast democratic gathering that for the time forgot class distinctions in their desire to honor a great democrat. American soldiers and sailors were to be seen here and there in the front of the throng, eager and curious to witness how their President would be received.

The progress of the presidential and royal procession could be placed by the waves of cheering that increased in volume as the Buckingham Palace was approached and the multitude there took up the sound. When the carriage containing the President and King George came into view the vocal storm was deafening.

#### CHAPTER XL

PRESIDENT WILSON CONQUERS ROME—HE
SPEAKS OF THE BALKAN PEOPLES—THE
VISIT TO THE VATICAN

THE royal train with President Wilson and party reached the Italian frontier in the morning of January 2, 1919, where they were received by the Duke of Lante representing the king of Italy. The scene was the frontier town of Modane where President Wilson had his first taste of an Italian welcome, which indeed lacked neither fire nor enthusiasm. The journey from the border to Rome was like a triumphal procession. The men and women of the mountain districts in their picturesque garb flocked to the stations along the route taken by the presidential train, and mingling with the townspeople in gala attire of bright colors, shouted "Vivas" and waved hats and handkerchiefs, and wildly acclaimed with true Latin fervor the distinguished guest of the nation.

In the morning of the following day President Wilson arrived in Rome. He was received at the station by King Victor Emmanuel, Queen Helena, and leading members of the Government and representatives of the local authorities.

As the President stepped from the train the royal band played the American national anthem. After the king and Mr. Wilson had inspected the Alpine infantry, drawn up as a guard of honor, the party entered the royal waiting room, brilliant with flowers and flags, and where the Mayor's Guard in crimson and gold added more vivid color to the scene.

A few minutes were spent in exchanging greetings and the President was introduced to the members of the royal party and notables of the city; then the procession started, led by the King's Guard on horseback. President Wilson rode in the first carriage with King Victor. Mrs. Wilson was in the second with the queen, and the Duchess of Aosta and Miss Wilson were in the third. Over the procession hovered dirigible balloons and a

squadron of airplanes which scattered on the crowds below leaflets mostly in praise of President Wilson, who was hailed as a true friend of the Italian people.

The city of the Cæsars was in gala attire to receive the guest of the nation. It was a day of brilliant sunshine, which emphasized the bright multicolored flags, the green wreaths and festoons, that decorated the walls and balconies of every house and public building. The throngs of happy, smiling people, many of them picturesquely attired in gay colors, shouting "Viva Wilson" and waving flags, made up a scene of vivid hues and animation.

After the court carriage had driven for some distance, Prince Colonna, mayor of Rome, tendered the President the welcome of the city. The program for the day included a luncheon with the Queen Mother Margherita, a reception by the Parliament, the reception of a deputation from the Quirinal, and a state dinner with the king.

An American contingent, made up of groups who had distinguished themselves in the last offensive, took part with their band in the parade. There was also present a body of the King's Brigade, famous fighters who had been called from the front by the minister of war to honor the guest of the nation. They were accompanied by combat planes also from the front, which, flying at a low level, distributed the President's portrait among the people bearing the inscription: "The soldiers of the air send greetings from the sky of Rome to the much-desired guest of the king and people of Italy; to the proclaimer of the rights and liberties of peoples."

The most important official function of the day was the joint reception tendered the President by the members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. An imposing gathering of distinguished Italians and representatives of the English and American colonies in Rome received the President with acclamation.

One special feature of the President's address in the Chamber of Deputies was his reference to the Balkan peoples, a subject he had not touched on in his previous speeches since coming to the old world. After expressing his thanks for the high honors he had received, President Wilson paid tribute to the bravery of the Italian troops in the war, and of the heartfelt sympathy of the people of the United States for them in their sufferings, sacrifices, and heroic action on the battle field.

President Wilson said that it was easy to speak of right and justice, but it was sometimes difficult to work them out in practice and that now would be required a purity of motives and disinterestedness of object which the world had never before witnessed in the councils of nations.

"The distinguishing fact of this war is that great empires have gone to pieces. And the characteristics of these empires are that they held different peoples reluctantly together under the coercion of force and the guidance of intrigue.

"The great difficulty among such states as the Balkans has been that they were always accessible to secret influence; that they were always being penetrated by some sort of intrigue or another; that north of them lay disturbed populations which were held together not by sympathy and friendship, but by the coercive force of a military power.

"Now the intrigue is checked, and the bonds are broken, and what we are going to provide is a new cement to hold the people together. They have not been accustomed to being independent. They must now be independent.

"I am sure you will recognize the principle as I do—that it is not our privilege to say what sort of a government they should set up. But we are friends of those people, and it is our duty as their friends to see to it that some sort of protection is thrown around them—something supplied which will hold them together."

Excluding force, said President Wilson, there was only one thing that could hold nations together—friendship and good will, o the task at Paris would be to organize the friendship of the world—"To see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital organization to which the peoples of the world will gladly and willingly respond.

"In other words, our task is no less colossal than this: to set up a new international psychology; to have a new real atmosphere. I am happy to say that in my dealings with the distinguished gentlemen who lead your nation, and those who lead France and England, I feel that atmosphere gathering, that desire to do justice, that desire to establish friendliness, that desire to make peace rest upon right, and with this common purpose no obstacle need be formidable.

... "We know that there cannot be another balance of power. That has been tried and found wanting, for the best of all reasons that it does not stay balanced inside itself. ... Therefore there must be something substituted for the balance of power, and I am happy to find everywhere in the air of these great nations the conception that that thing must be a thoroughly united League of Nations.

"What men once considered theoretical and idealistic turns out to be practical and necessary. We stand at the opening of a new age in which a new statesmanship will, I am confident, lift mankind to new levels of endeavor and achievement."

The President's speech was frequently interrupted by thunders of applause, and when he concluded the demonstration of approval continued until he had left the chamber.

In the afternoon President Wilson received at the Quirinal representatives of the Italian Press Association, including thirty editors in chief of the leading newspapers of Italy. The president of the association in his address had emphasized the necessity for a League of Nations and the settlement of all national and racial questions. President Wilson in response said among other things:

"I am not foolish enough to suppose that our decisions will be easy to arrive at; but the principles upon which they are to be arrived at ought to be indisputable and I have the conviction that if we do not rise to the expectations of the world, and satisfy the souls of great peoples like the people of Italy, we shall have the most unenviable distinction in history. Because what is happening now is that the soul of one people is crying to the soul of another, and no people in the world with whose sentiments I am acquainted want a bargaining settlement. They all want settlements based upon right."

President Wilson was the guest of honor at an official dinner at the Quirinal. King Victor Emmanuel in his speech of welcome said that President Wilson might judge from the enthusiastic salutations which accompanied his passage through the streets of Rome that day "the sentiment of admiration and recognition that your own name and labor and the name and labor of the United States stir in the Italian people." said the king, had constantly aimed at the same ideal goaltoward the establishment of the international peace—for which President Wilson had stood with tenacious faith. Already before the vicissitudes of war and the fraternity of armies had established to-day's admirable communion of intentions and purposes between our two countries, legions of our workers had emigrated to your great republic. They had knitted America and Italy together in strong cords of relationship, and these became reenforced by the spiritual affinity between both peoples, who had a common faith in the virtue of free political government. Thus it was, said the king, that when Italy entered the war the American spirit penetrated into the rank and file of the Italian armies through the workers who had returned to the fatherland from America and brought into Italy an echo of their second patria.

"Italy having now gathered to her own bosom those brothers so long sorrowing under foreign oppression, and having reconquered the confines which alone can give her security and true independence, is preparing to cooperate with you in the most cordial manner to reach the most practical means for drawing into a single circle the civilized nations for the purpose of creating in the supreme form a League of Nations, the conditions most fitted to safeguard and protect each one's rights."

In his response to the king's speech, President Wilson, referring to the ties of friendship between Italy and the United States, said:

"It has been a matter of pride with us that so many Italians, so many men of Latin origin, were in our own armies, and asso-

ciated with their brethren in Italy itself in the great enterprise of freedom." The Italians in the United States, said President Wilson, had excited a peculiar degree of admiration, because they were the only people of a given nationality who had organized themselves to see that their copatriots coming to America were guided to places in industries most suitable to their previous habits. No other nationality had done so much as that, and in serving their fellow countrymen they had served the United States, because these people found places where they would be the most useful, and earning their own living almost immediately added thus to the prosperity of the United States—of the country itself.

President Wilson added that "In every way we have been happy in our association at home and abroad with the people of this great state. I was saying playfully to Premier Orlando and Baron Sonnino this afternoon that in trying to put the people of the world under their proper sovereignty we would not be willing to part with the Italians in the United States, because we too much value the contribution that the have made not only to the industry of the United States, but to its thought, and to many of the elements of its life."

President Wilson became a citizen of Rome that night in the historic Capitol in the presence of the king and queen, and members of the Italian cabinet and of the diplomatic corps, including the American Ambassador, Thomas Nelson Page.

After acknowledging the great honor that had been paid him, President Wilson said that as a student of history he recalled the many political changes that centered about Rome, changes that swept away many things, but the thing that had remained permanent was the spirit of Rome and the Italian people:

"This imperial people now gladly represent the freedom of nations. This people which at one time seemed to conceive the purpose of governing the world, now takes part in the liberal enterprise of offering the world its own government. . . . I have rejoiced personally in the partnership of the Italian and American people, because it is a new partnership in an old

enterprise, an enterprise predestined to succeed wherever it is undertaken—the enterprise which has always borne that handsome name which we call 'liberty.' Men have pursued it sometimes like a mirage that seemed to elude them, that seemed to run before them, as they advanced, but never have they flagged in their purpose to achieve it, and I believe I am not deceived in supposing that in this age of ours they are nearer to it than they ever were before. The light that shone upon the summit now seems to shine almost at our feet, and if we lose it, it will only be because we have lost faith."

In the morning of President Wilson's second day in Rome, he was made a member of the Royal Academy of Science. A great public demonstration attended his visit to the Pantheon, where he was received by veterans of the War of Independence, and where wreaths were laid on the tombs of King Victor Emmanuel II and King Humbert. The presidential party then motored up the great hill that overlooks the city, where stands the imposing monument to Garibaldi. Here the President alighted from his car and stood for some moments bareheaded before the statue of the great liberator.

The most important event of the day was the President's call on Pope Benedict in the Vatican. It was also the occasion for another great demonstration by the people of Rome. The Piazza di San Pietro, in the center of which stands the Church of St. Peter, is said to hold over 200,000 people, and it was filled. A great shout went up from this multitude when the President appeared at the head of the square. The vocal storm seemed to startle him for a moment, as if he had not expected such an outburst of enthusiasm, but it was only for a moment, when his face lighted with a smile and he waved his hat and bowed continually as the presidential car moved forward through the dense mass of people.

In the Vatican President Wilson was received by the whole pontifical court, headed by the Major-domo Mgr. Tacci. At the foot of the grand staircase Mgr. Canali, secretary of the Congregation of Ceremonials, attended by a group of Swiss Guards in the picturesque dress designed by Raphael, welcomed

the President, who was then ushered into the Clementine Hall, where Guards with halberds presented arms. In the Throne Room the pope, robed in pure white, received the President. Two gilt chairs had been placed in readiness and Mr. Wilson occupied one, his back to the throne. The sovereign pontiff, after expressing his pleasure in meeting the President of the United States, said that his greatest hope was for a lasting peace. He spoke appreciatively of the part America was playing in the efforts to obtain it, and expressed his confidence that the United States would continue to exercise an increasing influence in the world's affairs.

As President Wilson had rejected the papal peace offer made some months before, the friendly character of the interview between President and pontiff gave great satisfaction in Rome.

The pope, in parting with Mr. Wilson, presented him with a large mosaic reproducing Guido Reni's famous picture of St. Peter, which had been executed in the Vatican grounds; an exquisite work of art whose estimated value was \$40,000. From Cardinal Gasparri the President received two copies of the modified canon law, compiled by the prelate himself, one in white parchment and one in white leather, with autographed dedications to the President.

After the interview with Pope Benedict, Mr. Wilson went to the American Episcopal Church, and in the vestry received representatives of the Evangelical Churches of Italy. Other bodies represented were the Waldensian Church, the English Baptist Mission, the Italian-American Methodist Churches, the Wesleyan Mission, and others. In his conversation with the representatives of the various religious bodies President Wilson was informed that they were all praying for the continued success of his work in the interests of peace. The President replied that he believed the hand of Providence could be seen in "the mobilization of the moral forces of the world." He said that General Pershing had told him that war had awakened a strong religious feeling among the soldiers. He also said that he had been deeply touched at the manner in which the different peoples of the world had responded to the appeal to their idealism.

War St. 8-W.

President Wilson and Mrs. Wilson dined informally with the king and queen at the Quirinal and later went to pay a farewell visit to the royal couple at the Villa Savoia. Here they expressed to their hosts their appreciation and gratitude for the welcome they had received in Rome, which they regarded as a personal tribute paid by the people of Italy to the people of the United States.

President Wilson journeyed from Rome to Milan on January 5, 1919, stopping for three hours at Genoa to visit the tombs of Columbus and Mazzini. Despite the heavy rainfall, which drenched the presidential party, the full program was carried out. Remarkable was the tribute of reverence and regard displayed by the Genoese for their distinguished guest. The common people were especially demonstrative, hailing the President in extravagant terms of praise and admiration. As he passed through the dense throngs many tried to kiss his hands, to touch his clothing. Not even the king and queen, it was said, had received such popular homage.

Speaking at the monument to Mazzini, the President said in part:

"On the other side of the water we have studied the life of Mazzini with almost as much pride as if we shared in the glory of his history, and I am very glad to acknowledge that his spirit has been handed down to us of later generation on both sides of the water.

"It is delightful to me to feel that I am taking some part in accomplishing the realization of the ideals to which his life and thought were devoted."

In accepting the gift of Mazzini's works from the municipality President Wilson said:

"The connections of America with Genoa are so many, and so significant, that in some sense it may be said that we drew our life and beginnings from this city. . . . In a way it seems natural for an American to be a citizen of Genoa. In taking away this beautiful edition of the works of Mazzini I hope I shall derive inspiration as I have already derived guidance from the principles which Mazzini so eloquently expressed.

President Wilson reached Paris in the morning of January 7, 1919, somewhat exhausted from travel and the continuous round of banquets and receptions he had attended. He decided to rest for two days without doing any business, in order to be prepared for the conferences with the Entente premiers later in the week.

The President observed his physician's orders to some extent, but it was impossible for him to remain inactive when so many important questions concerning the Peace Conference must be discussed. During his journeys in England and Italy he had kept in close touch with the members of the American Peace delegation in Paris. On the evening of his return to the French capital he had an informal talk with Colonel House when they discussed the attitude of Premier Clemenceau and Lord Robert Cecil regarding a League of Nations.

President Wilson was invited by Ambassador Jusserand and French officials to visit the devastated regions of France and Belgium, but he had decided to complete first the more important business of preparing the foundations of a permanent peace based on a League of Nations, the main purpose of his coming to France.

He engaged in frequent consultation with the members of the American Peace delegation, and work was begun on the preparation for a formula for the organization of a League of Nations. The American plan took into account the sensibilities of popular opinion in the United States, as well as in the countries of the Allies, which necessitated some modification of the proposals for preventing war which had been advanced. The plan included nothing that could possibly conflict with the constitution of the United States, or which would require a constitutional amendment to carry it out. According to this formula every nation was to maintain its sovereignty, and the league was not pledged to use disciplinary force in the case of a recalcitrant government, even if the majority of the league decided that force must be employed. Briefly stated, the American formula suggested the formation of an association of nations and compulsory arbitration. A year was to be allowed for investigation

and judgment before positive action by the nations having the dispute. According to the proposal there would be no international police force. Each nation was to be left free to develop its naval strength, and would have the right to use its own judgment as to the use of its power if disciplinary measures were voted by a majority of the league.

The American delegation did not indorse the proposal to constitute a government with administrative powers vested in a "President of the World," or in an interallied council exercising supreme authority. It had been said of President Wilson that his purpose in coming to Europe was to gain such a leadership, but the part he had played in the preparation of the American formula disproved the charge.

The President informed Premier Orlando how far he would support Italy's claims. He approved of her claim to territory undeniably Italian, recognizing at the same time the territorial ambitions of the Jugoslavs. Italian control of the Adriatic did not find favor with the President, who approved a project of internationalization that would satisfy the Italians that there would be no military threat to the east of them. Italy, it was well known, was looking to the United States for the support of her claims, but despite President Wilson's warm sympathy he was unable to approve of all of her demands.

## PART VIII—AMERICAN WAR RELIEF

#### CHAPTER XLI

#### THE RED CROSS

WAR, say the philosophers, rouses the evil passions of men; but while this trite remark may be more or less true of wars of the past, the Great War stands sharply contrasted against them for the profound compassion and sympathy for human suffering which it has awakened in the vast majority of the American public. During no previous wars, and in no other belligerent country during the present war, have such vast sums of money been raised, not only for the comfort and relief of the soldiers actually engaged in the battle field, but for the betterment of all who have been made to suffer, directly or indirectly, both abroad and at home. Never before has wealth and personal service been so freely or so abundantly offered for the cause of humanity as during the four years of devastation wrought by Germany and her allies.

First and foremost in the public mind stands the Red Cross among the various agencies through which the American public has given material expression to its desire to assist those who have suffered and sacrificed. With a supporting membership of over 22,000,000 and a budget exceeding that of many a European government, it has indeed accomplished a vast work of relief. Since the San Francisco earthquake, whose sufferers the Red Cross aided so efficiently and so promptly, this organization has come to be regarded by the American people as the national medium through which to render assistance on the occasion of great public calamities, and it was because of the public con-

fidence thus established that American relief for Belgium was so quickly and thoroughly organized. Yet Belgian relief has been only one of the many phases of the work performed by the Red Cross during the war.

In war relief the first thought of the civilian, as well as of the military man, is of the wounded soldiers carried back from the firing line to the field hospital, with whose care the Red Cross is immediately associated. But during this war, as in no other, the immediate care of the wounded has more and more become a function of the army itself, as a matter too vitally important to the efficiency of military organization to be intrusted to private initiative. Thus has the Red Cross been gradually pushed back from the active war zone toward the rear. But the result has been a broadening of the scope of its activities and a widening of its energies in many other directions.

International in its sympathies, the American Red Cross organization had been active in the actual theater of the war long before the United States had decided to participate. On arriving in France, therefore, the first American expedition under General Pershing found its crimson emblem already planted there and its organization firmly established, ready to perform efficiently whatever functions he might assign to it.

The first of these was the supply of hospital necessities and surgical dressings for all the field hospitals, not only for the American forces, but for the French as well. Immediately the Red Cross was performing this task at the rate of 2,826 bales of surgical dressings to 1,116 hospitals a month. At the end of six months it was supplying 4,740 bales to 1,653 hospitals a month. At the same time the American Army Division of the Red Cross was also purchasing and providing portable kitchens for the wounded, portable ice plants for hospitals, portable laundries for field hospitals, and sterilizing plants for the army surgeons.

It was the Red Cross which undertook to establish sanitary conditions in the countryside immediately behind the trenches, where large numbers of men were compelled to live in cramped quarters. Already before the Americans had emerged on the firing line, the medical experts of the American Red Cross were inspecting the villages in these districts and directing the removal of refuse heaps, the cleansing of cesspools, the sterilization of impure water and the quarantine of cases of contagious sickness among the civilian population. The soldiers, naturally, mixed freely among the villagers; sickness among the latter would eventually affect the former. Thus there were two reasons why special attention should be given to maintaining healthy conditions among the civilian population in the zone of hostilities. This the Red Cross was able to provide, not only through the preventive measures already mentioned, but through the medical care given free of charge to the civilan population. In the First American Army zone over forty dispensaries were maintained behind the American lines, centering about Neufchâteau.

One of the problems included in this field of effort was the appearance of a new form of contagious sickness which attacked the soldiers in great numbers, commonly called trench fever. Being unfamiliar with it, the army authorities were unable to cope with it successfully. The Red Cross immediately established a laboratory at its headquarters in Paris and engaged a corps of bacteriologists to make an intensive study of the new disease and to find means to combat it. The results of their labors were then placed at the disposal of the army medical authorities, through the Red Cross Medical and Surgical Information Bureau, and helped them extensively in gaining control of the sickness among the men at the front.

Examples of this type of cooperation with the army authorities in maintaining the efficiency of the men as fighters might be cited indefinitely. It is where it has been given full scope to its own initiative that the Red Cross has more truly revealed its humanitarian character; where it has had the opportunity to show its regard for the soldier as a human being, rather than as a fighting machine.

A cup of hot coffee and a hot beef sandwich are not essentials to the fighting machine, but they are a tremendous comfort to the man, especially when he is wet and weary, however liberal his regular rations from the Government may be. The Red Cross was the first American organization to establish canteens where the soldiers might obtain such comforts free of charge. During the fall of 1917 3,000,000 such lunches were served out to the fighting men of the Allied armies in Paris alone, and at the junctions of the railroads, where traveling soldiers were often obliged to wait in inclement weather to make their train connections, 20,000 rations were frequently served out in one day. Not satisfied with having the soldiers come to them, canteens on wheels were equipped and rolled up close behind the firstline trenches, near enough to the men under fire to enable them to drop back to the rear for a hot lunch when nervously and physically exhausted by a heavy enemy artillery fire. Up to January 1, 1918, the Red Cross canteens on wheels had performed this service to a weary soldier 700,000 times. One French major attributed his successful defense against a German infantry attack to the fact that one of these canteens was doing a rushing business only a few hundred yards in the rear during the intervals between the three or four assaults.

## CHAPTER XLII

## OTHER BRANCHES OF RED CROSS WORK

To many care of the man in uniform may seem the chief and most important phase of war relief, but to the Red Cross the wearing of a uniform is only incidental. If it has shown any discrimination in favor of its many activities, it has been in its succor to children. By far the greater part of the immense sums collected by the Red Cross has been devoted to assuaging suffering among the civilian population of France and Belgium, and, to a lesser degree, among the Italians and other belligerent peoples too. Mighty as were the resources of the organization, they were tried to the uttermost by the demands made on them during the German offensive in the spring of

1918, when the fighting fronts swung back into France and swept the peasant populations of the villages before them. It was during those tense several weeks that the organization's workers in Paris devoted their most intense efforts to caring for the refugees that were pouring into the French capital, the Germans so near that their heavy artillery could be heard pounding the Allies night and day. Five thousand of those refugees were housed by rather peculiar means; houses in course of construction when the war broke out, standing unfinished, were hastily completed and furnished for the accommodation of the homeless creatures trooping in from the scene of devastation. Most of the money thus expended will later be refunded by the owners of the houses completed under these unique conditions.

In December, 1917, the Germans were allowing a certain number of their civilian prisoners in Germany to return to France by way of Switzerland. These, naturally, were the "ineffectives," the physically unfit, unsuitable for any kind of labor, therefore almost entirely children, invalid women and old men. For several months these "repatriés" were arriving at the rate of six hundred or more a day, and the French Government found difficulty in properly caring for them. In the emergency it called on the American Red Cross to assist, to which an immediate response was made through the Red Cross Bureau of Refugees and Relief.

During fifteen weeks this branch of the organization received and temporarily cared for 34,228 children alone. During the month of January, 1918, over 7,000 repatriés were aided and disposed of in comfortable quarters. However, this is merely illustrative. In the beginning of 1918 there were about 1,500,000 French and Belgian refugees in France, of whom 900,000 were completely destitute and needed outside aid. In Havre alone, where a great number of these exiles were collected, the Red Cross built an entire village for the housing of the homeless Belgians. Many of these, mostly women and children, had been directly rescued from the actual scenes of hostilities and from the famine districts by the Red Cross organization itself and brought to places of refuge.

Among the Belgians the American Red Cross will be remembered for some generations with a sense of deep emotion. prived of its sources of revenue and maintained on borrowed money, the Belgian Government was not able to pay its soldiers more than barely enough to keep them alive. The cost of recreation must come from elsewhere, as must also the minor luxuries which rank close to the bare necessities. These came largely from the Red Cross. The Belgian soldiers were granted regular furloughs, but few could make use of these leaves of absence because of the lack of means to subsist away from the barracks. Every month 6.000 of these men on furlough were assisted by the Red Cross with spending money, aside from which quarters were found for them in those cities where they chose to spend their vacations, ranging from renovated tenements to deserted châteaus. This same service was performed for the Belgian nurses, whose pay was also too small to permit of vacation trips. Thirty-two homes for furloughed soldiers and nurses were maintained in Paris and other cities. Every month an average number of 300 Belgian soldiers, discharged on account of disabilities, were clothed by the American Red Cross. But here again the children received first attention: the Red Cross had under its care 15,000 Belgian children in 85 colonies, in Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Holland. It also assisted the Queen of the Belgians in establishing her colony for war orphan children at Vinckem. Finally, it maintained nine civilian hospitals, caring for 2,000 patients, and gave financial assistance to the Belgian military hospitals at La Panne, Wulveringham, Beveren, Hoogstadt, and Cabour, in Belgium, and to the Belgian hospitals in Le Havre, Abbeville, Angerville. Mortain, Rouen, Post Villez, Sainte-Adresse, and Montpellier. in France, all of which cared for 9,000 patients. Yet a whole chapter of a book might be devoted to the educational work carried on by the Red Cross among the Belgians; the classes of young men, soldiers and civilians, numbering 7,650 students in all, covering all subjects from electrical engineering to philosophy and theology, some of these studies being carried on by correspondence with the men in the trenches

A striking departure in war relief was the Home Service Section of the American Red Cross. Readers of the newspapers will remember the keen distress that was suffered by the families of many of the men who joined the military expedition down to the Mexican border when trouble with Carranza on account of Villa's raid threatened. Sometimes this distress was purely economic, on account of the absence of the family wage earner, but quite as often it was mental, caused by worry and fear on account of miscarried letters.

## CHAPTER XLIII

#### SOLDIERS' INSURANCE

THAT the Red Cross did not have to devote any of its funds to the relief of financial distress among the relatives of the soldiers who were killed or disabled was due to another innovation in war relief organization, initiated by the United States Government itself. No summary of the organized war relief carried on during the war can be complete without some mention of the insurance system established by the United States Treasury Department for the benefit of the men in uniform.

The law creating the War Risk Bureau was passed in October, 1917. At first the Government had negotiated with the private insurance companies with the object of insuring the soldiers and sailors in active service against death and disability. The rate they demanded was \$37.50 for each \$1,000 of insurance. Considering this rate exorbitant, the Government decided to undertake this function itself, and fixed the rate at an average of \$8 for each \$1,000 of insurance.

Before the close of the war the War Risk Insurance Bureau was carrying a total of soldiers' insurance greater than the combined risks of the twenty largest insurance companies in the world. By September 1, 1918, the insurance on the lives of soldiers and sailors issued by the Government amounted to

twenty billions of dollars. This was more than one-half the total of all other insurance on lives in the United States.

The limit of insurance for each man was fixed at \$10,000. At the beginning it was estimated that about one-half of the enlisted men would avail themselves of the benefits of this system, and that the average policy would be about \$2,000. Actually 80 per cent of the men in service have availed themselves of the privilege, and the average policy is considerably over \$8,000.

The enlisted man with family was required to allot one-half of his pay, or \$15 a month, to his family. The Government added \$15 a month to this for the wife and an additional \$7.50 for each child, up to \$50 a month. Before the war closed 780,000 checks a month were being issued to such families by the Bureau. The \$10,000 policy entitles the beneficiary to \$57.50 a month, for twenty years; a total of \$13,800.

#### CHAPTER XLIV

## COMMISSION ON TRAINING CAMP ACTIVITIES

As an agency for the relief of actual distress and physical suffering, the Red Cross, of course, stands first, not only on account of its size and mighty resources, but because this is its special domain. But a man with a full stomach and ample shelter may often be suffering from discontent. Clothes, food, and shelter come first, but the need for healthy recreation comes close after these. "An efficient army must be a contented army," said Napoleon; this from the point of view of the purely military man. But from the human point of view it stands to reason that the man who risks his life to fight for the nation has certainly a right to demand that the nation shall give him at least as much daily contentment as he was used to obtain for himself in civil life.

In no previous war has this demand been so widely and thoroughly recognized; in no previous war, in any country, has

so much money and effort been devoted to rendering the soldier's and sailor's life a contented one.

The first to recognize this need on the part of the enlisted man was the War Department when, in 1918, it sent Raymond B. Fosdick down to the Mexican border to study the environment of the small force of soldiers mobilized there. Out of his report grew the plan for the formation of a Commission on Training Camp Activities.

Aside from its suppression of the liquor traffic with enlisted men and the red-light districts in the vicinity of the training camps, these Government commissions have largely limited themselves to coordinating the efforts of the numerous private organizations which have devoted themselves to the social welfare of the enlisted men. Some mention should be made, however, of the Liberty theaters established in all the training camps. at the initiative and expense of the two Government commissions. Each of these local theater buildings will seat from 2,500 to 3,000 men: the one built at the marine training camp at Quantico, Va., is an exact duplicate of Keith's Theater in Washington. D. C., with a seating capacity of 5,000. Regular theatrical companies have been engaged to make the circuit of these Government playhouses. To pay part of the expenses "smileage" books were issued; tickets of admission something on the principle of the opera-season ticket. Later the Government engaged theatrical directors to come to the camps to train the soldiers themselves to organize theatrical companies of their own, the result of which has been the addition of many new members to the theatrical profession now beginning to appear before civilian audiences. Motion pictures, too, are a regular feature of the Liberty theaters when dramatic performances are not being presented; this comes under the auspices of the War Camp Motion Picture Bureau, which rents films through regular trade sources.

Another independent activity of the Government commissions has been the hiring of athletic trainers, some of them men who have been famous in the sporting profession as boxers, wrestlers, runners, etc., and singing leaders. These latter, who teach the

men to sing in chorus, not only the old classics, but the latest vaudeville successes as well, have been engaged on the assumption that singing is one of the chief aids to military efficiency. It might be added that some of these singing leaders have been assigned to the navy, to revive the old-time chanteys of the merchant marine, which have all but died out except in the memories of ancient mariners.

## CHAPTER XLV

#### WORK OF THE Y. M. C. A.

HIEF of the private organizations which have cooperated with the Government in propagating the social welfare of the soldiers and sailors stands, of course, the Young Men's Christian Association, a body already prepared for such work before the beginning of the war. When war against Germany was declared, anticipating the work ahead of it, the Y. M. C. A. created a National War Work Council, composed of 200 leading citizens. This council again created an executive committee of from twenty to thirty members, whose function it was to take direct control of the war work of the organization. The general American public is already sufficiently familiar with the activities of the Y. M. C. A. to need a detailed description of what is really only an extension of its normal functions among young men; a few words need only be devoted to giving some idea of the extent of the work carried on among the enlisted men by this big organization. To it the Government assigned what has been called the "club life" of the soldiers, carried on in the home training camps and in their vicinities in 800 buildings, erected specially at a cost of \$4,710,000; 890 "huts" among the soldiers in France; and 135 "huts" among the American soldiers and sailors in England. In the United States the Y. M. C. A. engaged and kept employed 4,000 secretaries; while abroad, in France, England, Italy, and Russia, its secretaries numbered 6,000 at the close of the war. Like the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A. had undertaken welfare work among the Allied soldiers abroad before the United States had entered the war, having established over 800 clubs among the French soldiers, known as Foyer du Soldat, and among the Italian soldiers as Casa del Soldato. Canteens, or "huts," were also established among the soldiers of the Allies in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and East Africa; and among the German prisoners of war held by the Allied Governments. In the matter of expenditure the Y. M. C. A. stood a good second to the Red Cross; its annual budget was \$50,000,000, and, had the war continued, it anticipated an increase to \$100,000,000 in 1919.

In normal times the work of the Young Women's Christian Association is much the same as that of the Y. M. C. A., except that it is among young women, but in its activities among the soldiers it struck out on a path of its own. Few soldiers, and fewer still of their families, will ever forget the "hostess house" that has been so prominent a feature of every training camp in the United States.

One of the earlier problems of the camp authorities was the reception of the women relatives of the soldiers. They came by the thousands, usually from distant towns or cities, among them many who had never been so far away from home before. Wives would come with small children, loaded down with baskets of food from home, to discover, in despair, that the nearest stopping place might be ten miles from the camp.

The urgency of this situation was brought before the Young Women's Christian Association when it held its meeting in the summer of 1917. Immediately a War Council was created, with a hundred members, whose purpose was to protect all women affected by the war. By this council was conceived the hostess house, suggested by something of the kind which had been a feature of the Panama Exposition in San Francisco, where the organization had maintained a building for the comfort of the women connected with the Exposition.

Out of a fund of \$5,000,000 with which the organization began its war work, \$1,500,000 was appropriated for hostess

houses. About 100 of these were built in or near the various encampments, some of the cantonments, where negro troops were quartered, having two, one for the white and one for the negro women.

In this cheerful spot, created in each hostess house by the Y. W. C. A. workers, the soldiers were able to receive and entertain their women visitors. The buildings are like huge bungalows, varying in size according to the peculiar needs of the camp. In each of them the main feature is a huge open fireplace, in which logs burn when needed. There is a parcel checking room, a restroom for women, out of which opens a fully equipped nursery, and a lunchroom where those who arrive hungry may eat at cost price. Some of the women in charge of the house meet each train, to make sure that no visitor shall wander aimlessly about. In this latter work the Y. W. C. A. has the cooperation of the Travelers' Aid Society, which assigned 600 workers to caring for the women visitors to camps, en route. At the Camp Lewis hostess house the average number of visitors a day amounted to 2,500.

## CHAPTER XLVI

# KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Men's Christian Association, though not on so extensive a scale, is that of the Catholic organization, the Knights of Columbus, whose activities are under the control of a Commission on War Activities, of which William J. Mulligan is chairman. This commission had previously been created by a National Catholic War Council, comprising fourteen of the leading prelates of the Catholic Church in the United States, headed by Cardinals Gibbons, Farley, and O'Connell. Like the Y. M. C. A., the Knights of Columbus organization has established canteens and



E. M. ASHE

## WAR POSTERS

BY

## AMERICAN ARTISTS

A FEW OF THE STRIK-ING BROADSIDES SENT OUT BY THE

DIVISION OF PICTORIAL PUBLICITY



HOWARD GILES



HARRISON FISHER




EDWIN H. BLASHFIELD



A. E. FORINGER



HENRY RALEIGH




F. LUIS MORA



- 1-wheat
- 2-meat use more fish & beans
- -fats use just enough
- 4- Sugar

and serve the cause of freedom

F. G. COOPER



C. B. FALLS



CHARLES LIVINGSTON BULL

.



HOWARD CHANDLER CHRISTY



FRANK BRANGWYN

"huts" where soldiers might drop in for a pleasant, social evening or to write letters home.

In the training camps in the United Sates 150 such rest stations were maintained, and in France 45, the total number of secretaries amounting to 350. In one of these stations in France a daily average of 2,200 envelopes and 3,700 sheets of paper were distributed among visiting soldiers. On Sundays mass was held in the huts, 100 chaplains being assigned to the religious phase of the work, for the special comfort of the Catholic soldiers. But it is noteworthy that on Fridays the Knight of Columbus huts, both at home and abroad, were thrown open to the soldiers of the Jewish faith, that they might enjoy religious service according to their belief. Before the close of the war the Catholics of the United States had pledged a financial support to the work of this organization amounting to \$50,000,000 a year. During the first six months of 1918 \$7,000,000 had been spent.

The Jews of the United States, too, have been active in war relief, since the very beginning, in 1914, initiated by the American Jewish Committee, which had in its treasury then a balance of \$600,000 remaining over from the funds contributed for the relief of sufferers from the Kishinev pogrom. This developed into the Central Committee for the Relief of Jews Suffering Through the War, which has collected and distributed over \$25,000,000. Most of this has been devoted to the relief of refugees, or destitute families, of the Jewish faith, in Palestine, Poland, and Russia.

In connection with war relief some mention must be made of the work of the Council of National Defense, though this was not the primary object of the organization, which had been initiated by an act of Congress. Nevertheless, it was through the Department of Home and Foreign Relief of the Women's Committee of this organization that many women at home were enabled to devote their energies to war work.

It was in connection with the Red Cross that the women of the Council of National Defense were able to enter into their war-relief activities most effectively, largely in the collection of funds and in the recruiting of volunteer workers for the Home Service Section and for the knitting of woolen garments for the soldiers. As an instance, in Tampa, Fla., the local women's committee added 700 new names to the Red Cross membership during one of its drives. Many local units also set about raising money for special objects, such as the adoption of Belgian orphans, the reconstruction of devastated villages, etc.

One of the most striking results of this war has undoubtedly been the prominence which women have assumed in keeping the wheels moving behind the lines, in relief work no less than in the industries. In a sense, women have been unbottled, never again to be bottled; they have tasted of the delight of social effort. Perhaps to this is due the unprecedented scale on which war relief has been carried on during the Great War as in no previous war. At any rate, in all the efforts already mentioned they have taken a prominent, sometimes a controlling part.

### CHAPTER XLVII

# NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR WOMAN'S SERVICE

BUT it was through the National League for Woman's Service that this tendency made itself most manifest, an organization which already had 50,000 members when the United States declared war, under the leadership of Miss Grace Parker and Anne Morgan. Later, before the close of the war, this number was to be augmented to 300,000.

The object of the league was to mobilize the volunteer efforts of American women and direct and coordinate it into the channels of service to the men who are going to fight for the country. "What can I do?" had been the cry of so many women, with time and willingness to serve, but unable to perceive

any special effort to which they might give their support. The league proposed to, and did, give them their answer and their opportunities.

The league divided its membership, covering thirty-one States, into local service clubs. Each local club established a canteen, or clubroom, where enlisted men, either off on leave from the camps, or en route on visits home, might enter and find both gastronomic and social comfort, free of charge, or sometimes at a nominal charge. All the labor needed in connection with these establishments, such as cooking, serving, dishwashing, cleaning, etc., was voluntary, given by women, many of whom had never done a stroke of physical work in their lives before. Indeed, a cooking school was established in some of the local centers in which the volunteer workers might be trained for their work. The women who scrubbed the floors and washed the dishes often arrived in their own automobiles. In New York these volunteer workers numbered 2,000, each of whom was willing to, and often did, give her whole time to the business of the club. In Detroit the local club entered into a contract with the local army authorities to board the men of one detachment, giving them three full meals a day, for three weeks, at the rate of seventy-five cents a day for each man, which was his regulation allowance. The men had complained that this allowance was not enough to maintain them in private restaurants, yet the local club of the league cleared \$1,000 from this transaction. which it devoted to further enterprise for the benefit of the enlisted men.

One notable feature of the league's activities was the Emergency Canteen Service, numbering 500 workers. The workers attached to this service guaranteed to be ready to answer a call to duty at any hour of the night or day. Their duty was to meet incoming trains at the railroad stations and have ready for traveling soldiers or sailors hot lunches, which were often offered them through the car windows. Later this service was taken over by the Red Cross.

The league was never able to utilize all the volunteer labor placed at its disposal, thousands of names being on its waiting

list. This reserve, however, did much of the knitting which was such a conspicuous feature of the home care given to the fighting men of the nation; the slogan of the organization for these members was "A garment a week for France."

#### CHAPTER XLVIII

#### SALVATION ARMY

Last, though no means least, stands the Salvation Army, that a organization whose workers are recruited from the most humble elements of the population. With not such large funds at its disposal as the other organizations, the Salvation Army was still conspicuous in its efforts in behalf of the enlisted men, in France as well as at home. Its "canteens," small and unpretentious, were yet found close up to the firing lines, usually in charge of a married couple enthusiastic for service because of having one or more sons among the very men they were serving. From these "huts," most of them on wheels, so that they might follow the movements of the army, were dispensed "doughnuts and pies like mother makes," prepared by the "lassie" in charge.

Many and diverse, it will be seen, have been the mediums through which the people of America, more than any other people of the belligerent countries, have expressed in material form that profound humanitarian spirit which has so notably distinguished this war from all others. But so wide has been the field in which they have expended their effort that there has been comparatively little overlapping, or duplication of service, except in the matter of collecting funds. And in this latter respect the various organizations had come to an agreement, whereby they were to cooperate in "The United War Workers Campaign" for funds, under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., with the object of raising \$170,000,000, to be apportioned among all of them, when the war came to a sudden close.

## PART IX—OUR ARMY IN FRANCE

#### CHAPTER XLIX

AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENTS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

## By FREDERICK PALMER

(LATE LT. COLONEL U. S. R.)

THE glory of our accomplishment in France lies in the titanic energy and natural resourcefulness of our people which were applied with a unity of purpose which surprised even ourselves. It is possible for us to exaggerate our part in assisting the Allies to final victory, and it is also possible for us to underestimate our part.

If England had not entered the war in 1914, and if Italy and Rumania had not entered later, and if Canada and Australia and the British dominions had not put forth all their strength, and if the United States had not sent an army to France, the Germans would have won. The balance of victory and failure at times hung by a thread. While Americans must always realize that comparatively we suffered slightly beside Britain and France and Italy, and that the Canadians were the veterans of cruel and wicked fighting in holding the western front against the enemy in the height of his confidence, numbers, and efficiency, no one will gainsay that at the end of the conflict we were giving our lives as freely as our neighbors and Allies.

Any consideration of our accomplishment must include the fact that we were as unprepared in April, 1917, for any immense military effort as we had been in August, 1914. While the world witnessed the British making citizen armies out of raw material by slow and costly processes, our governmental policy, to the regret of many of our people, had not been to profit by the application of their experience in view of the emergency which seemed inevitable to many observers, but, as neutrals, to keep ourselves free from any imputation of militaristic aims.

Once we were in the war, the policy of our Government was to put all our preparations in the hands of the regular army and to assist the Allies in every way that was in our power. Our people had learned from observation of the European war that modern warfare required expert direction, and with a unanimity that was startling in a democracy which had always resisted any efforts to form a large army in our country we welcomed the national draft and a centralization of authority in the hands of the President and army chiefs which was out of keeping with all our precedents.

Our training camps were to repeat under the draft the slow and wearisome business of training not only men but officers to command them at the same time that we were building new factories and plants to supply the army with ordnance and with ships to transport men and material to France. As the Allies had waited on England to become prepared, they must now wait on the United States; and in the crisis of their fortunes, when the Germans had had repeated successes, they faced the question of whether or not the resources of the United States in men and material could be transformed into a force that could be exerted by sea against the submarine or on the western front in time to prevent a German victory.

The sending of Major General John J. Pershing to France with a pioneer staff in May, 1917, had for its military purpose the huge and time-consuming task of preparing the way for the troops that were to arrive as soon as we had them trained, and the immediate object of assuring the people of the Allies that we meant to make active warfare on the western front. Although we had relieved the financial stress of the Allies by our loans, and with the removal of our interference with the British blockade we had strengthened the wall around Germany, we were incapable for the first eight months of striking any blow

of account against the enemy except through the flotilla of destroyers which we had sent to cooperate with the British navy in combating the submarine. Considering that the French and British had over three million troops on the western front, the total of our regular army of one hundred thousand men, if all had been immediately dispatched to France, would hardly have been an important military factor. In a war where such enormous numbers were engaged, though we might have ten million able-bodied men in the United States, they were of no combat service against the enemy until they were in France, armed and trained.

The French offensive, in the early spring of 1917, had failed with the result that France was depressed and that all observers agreed that it was not in the power of the exhausted French army to undertake another offensive. The Germans, after their retreat across the old Somme battle fields, had stood firm on the Hindenburg line. Despite their losses they had sufficient force on the western front to assure, unless there was some unexpected break in their morale, their retention of their positions in face of the determined attacks of the British in their summer offensives, culminating in the bloody ridge of Passchendaele, which were made not in the expectation of any decision, but to hold German divisions off from the Italian front, from an effort to crush Rumania, an effort against Saloniki and from exploitation of their successes in Russia.

With Russia out of the war, Rumania crippled, the Servian army reduced to a small body of veterans and the Italian offensive making no decisive progress, it was evident that unless Germany could be starved into submission by the blockade, which seemed out of the question from the information in possession of Allied councils, we must have a fighting force in France which should be as strong as either that of the British or the French while its transport across the Atlantic through the submarine zone was by no means assured. Trusting to no adventitious event to make so large an army unnecessary, General Pershing and his staff, after they had studied the situation and conferred with the Allied command, decided that their duty

as pioneers was to prepare for the operations in France of an army of at least one million men with the communications and plant for their support capable of expansion for the care of two million men.

As the Allies throughout the war had depended very largely for war material upon America and overseas countries, it was essential that we should be capable of largely providing for our army from the resources of our own country. With the French railway system strained to capacity, and France suffering from a shortage of labor behind the lines, owing to all her able-bodied males being in active service, we must furnish transportation as well as labor from home. Despite the strong influences brought to bear to have our soldiers introduced by regiments and battalions into the French and British armies, it was our duty, not only to our national spirit but to our conception of our duty to the Allies, to form an integral American army which should fight as a unit in the same manner that the British and French armies were fighting.

A glance at the map of the whole western front, in reference to the coast line and the harbors of France and its railway systems, will readily indicate to any observer the strategic character of the conception of General Pershing in 1917, which had its climax of success in November, 1918. The British army was on the left of the long battle line from Switzerland to Flanders, with its bases close to the Channel and home bases. The French army was to hold the center of the line, fighting for the heart of France, and on the right the American army, drawing its supplies three thousand miles across the sea and across southern and central France, was to face the Rhine.

For any great final Allied offensive, unless some unforeseen circumstance favored, the Allies must wait upon the formation of an army of American citizens who would be made approximately as capable in all the complicated technique of modern warfare as the French and British armies. That this achievement was possible we knew because of the success of the British new army, and particularly that of the Canadians, who had not even had as much military preparation as the Australians, but had

learned at the cannon's mouth the lessons of experience which no amount of theory or practice can approximate.

As the early introduction of small American forces into the Allied armies must be of relatively small effect in their relation to the immense whole, ample time must be taken for the training and preparation in order to assure the exertion of a maximum of pressure when we should begin to fight in earnest. It was equally important both for the effect upon Allied and German sentiment that when we did begin active campaigning there should be no setbacks for our army. According to the promise which we had made to the French Government we were due to have by July 1, 1918, some five hundred thousand troops in France. Even that number, when you include all the men who were required along the lines of communication, seemed a small force on the continent of Europe, and, at the time that this program was arranged, the suggestion of a million men in France was probably considered seriously only by the officers who were on the ground.

The first American troops to arrive in France was the 1st Division of regulars (then under command of Sibert), including the brigade of Marines. They were very largely raw recruits, in no sense a highly trained regular division; they were to be followed by regular divisions and National Guard divisions, which were to be established in their drill grounds for periods of training before entering the trenches.

Indeed the history of our operations may be divided into three phases:

The first was the period of preparation and training and of trench experience of the earlier divisions and of the organization of our general staff, the instruction of our reserve officers in the various schools and in the actual work at the front, and inaugurating the immense constructive work required for our lines of communication. Through the winter of 1917-18, whether drilling in the muddy fields of Lorraine or holding trenches, our men, in the penetrating, moist, and cold climate, knew as great hardships as any veteran of the Civil War or of the Revolution. Lorraine was aptly called our "Valley Forge" in France. It

was a winter of discouragement including the disaster to the Italian army, the increasing submarine ravages, the want of shipping to keep up the program of troop transport, the failure of supplies to arrive, the final collapse of Russia and Rumania, the depression among the French and Italian people, the severe food restrictions in England, and the gathering of the German armies with their superior numbers for the great offensives for the spring of 1918.

So serious did the Allies consider the situation that they were willing to offer Germany a very favorable peace, but Germany, confident that the Americans could not exert their pressure in time and that Allied spirits were depressed to a point when at any moment Allied disagreement might lead to an Allied collapse, refused to consider the offers. History offers nothing in the record of great wars in affording more contrast than the pessimism in the inner councils of the Allies in the winter of 1917-18, and the spring of 1918, in comparison with the complete victory which was achieved in the fall of 1918.

Our second phase came with the first of the German offensives on March 21, 1918, against the British army. The success of this offensive startled the people of the Allied world to a full realization of the perilous situation of their cause. It was an innovation in tactics in that the Germans had swept through the front lines and support lines of the trench system, capturing the guns whose answering artillery fire had hitherto been the main reliance of the defense in stopping the enemy's charges. and carrying the warfare into the open. We had then only four divisions which had been in the trenches, Bullard's 1st Regulars and Bundy's 2d Regulars and Marines and Edwards's 26th. or New England, and Menoher's 42d, or Rainbow, National Guard Divisions. The plan had been to put them into a permanent American sector in Lorraine, but in face of this new emergency they were to be turned over to the French for such use as Marshal Foch, the new commander in chief of the Allied forces. might decide to make of them.

Up to this time the phrase "Too proud to fight" had haunted the minds of the Allied peoples when they thought of American troops. They considered that we had been very slow in beginning active warfare. Our losses in the quiet trenches that we had occupied had been thus far normally slight compared with those in an active battle sector. There was a disposition to think that probably America was not sufficiently in earnest to make any great sacrifice of lives. We were willing to loan the Allies money, to supply them with materials of war and to make some show of military force; but the contemplation of a nation three thousand miles away from Europe fighting with all the heroic disregard of life of the Allies on their own soil seemed a little out of keeping with the accepted traditions of military history to Europeans.

Never were soldiers watched with more critical interest or deeper appreciation of the influence of the result than our divisions when they were first engaged in violent action at Cantigny and in the Château-Thierry operations in the course of the trying months of the German offensives and the subsequent Allied counteroffensives. Not only had the Europeans wondered if we would fight, but they had grave doubts of our battle skill. The seriousness of the situation deepened their concern. Anyone who really knew America had no doubt that we would fight. At the same time thoughtful Americans, familiar with the increasingly difficult technique which was the accumulation of more than three years' experience, when they thought of how relatively little experience our citizen soldiers had had, saw them go into action beside veteran French and British divisions with misgivings lest their skill might not be in keeping with their valor. Their initiative and furious application led to more rapid learning than the most optimistic of their teachers had imagined.

The American army had been trained for the offensive. We had, at the start, the natural initiative which the Canadians had so abundantly shown, and which in the introduction of the trench raid they applied in the only innovation of tactics with the exception of the tanks which the British army developed. The Canadians, coming from a more sparsely settled country than ours, with a larger percentage of its citizens of English-

speaking origin than we have, if we except the French Canadian population, had the advantage, in the views of many, over American forces which must include a large number of draft men unfamiliar with the English language who had had only a brief residence in the United States.

If the American army was to be the decisive army owing to its youth and its numbers, then there must never enter any thought into our minds other than that once we were prepared for action that action should be continuously one of attack. If the old German trench line were to be broken and the war of movement were again to lead to an Appomattox for the German army that could only be won by tactics which, with unwavering determination, would eventually capitalize German exhaustion after four years of war in the conviction on the part of German soldiers that resistance against the immense forces of American reserves that were coming was hopeless. In brief, America must show the Germans that millions of Americans, who had the spirit of the Canadians, were to follow the Canadians across the Atlantic.

The greatest difficulty that Allied commanders had had was keeping soldiers from falling into the habit of trench defensive, which was the result of the early days of murderous fighting, when all attempts either by the Germans or the Allies to "break through" had failed. Our hope was that our soldiers would have the good fortune to escape the fearful attrition of trench fighting and that our offensive spirit would suffer no setbacks in actual experience.

Where we had been in the trenches we had insistently kept the upper hand over the enemy, meeting his trench raids with better than he gave, answering his artillery fire with heavier artillery fire and pressing him at every point. No feature of war is more underestimated than psychology. The psychology of conviction that you are going to win, confirmed by actual victory in the first shock of arms, is one of the best guaranties of continued victory.

Happily, our divisions, which were transferred to the active battle front in western France, were able to apply their offensive

spirit with immediate offensive results. At Cantigny, on the eve of the third German offensive, in our first attack we took all of our objectives skillfully, and when the 2d Division was thrown across the Paris road to resist the advance of the Germans which was then slowing down, our men, who were in the pink of youthful vigor, immediately attacked. They were on a comparatively short front, but their conduct thrilled all the Allied soldiers and people with the rallying conviction that the Americans had brought to France a telling new energy into an old war. British who had stood out stubbornly against the mighty German thrusts felt more than ever confidence due to the presence of American divisions with their army. More important than generals or staff, the American individual soldier stood in no awe of his enemy, but, on the contrary, was confident of his personal superiority. It needed no urging from his officers for him to attack. When in doubt his idea was to charge. Again, the 3d Division in the defense of the Marne bridgeheads at Château-Thierry, though it had had no trench experience and had never been under fire before, simply confirmed the quality which the old divisions had exemplified as something that was a common trait.

Against the great fifth German offensive the 42d, or Rainbow Division, which was represented with the National Guard of our twenty-six States and was conscious of holding the honor of the National Guard and of the honor of America in its keeping, showed that if stubborn resistance was requisite as well as attack they could be depended upon. Dickman's 3d Division, against that same offensive, broke the German crossing of the Marne and then, when the front line battalions had lost one-third to one-half of its men, counterattacked with a dexterity and a viciousness that thrilled the most veteran and phlegmatic of military critics.

For the Allied counteroffensive, which was the turning of the tide against the German offensives, the French High Command chose that the 1st (now under command of Summerall) and 2d (now under command of Harbord) Divisions, should cooperate with the best of French divisions in the drive toward

Soissons which was to force the gradual evacuation of the Germans of the Marne salient.

This operation and the operations that preceded it in resisting the German offensives were all known to the general public as Château-Thierry, which is the name of the town lying in the lap of the hills on the bank of the Marne. No American soldiers ever fought in Château-Thierry with the exception of the maz chine-gun battalion of the 3d Division, which was in the town very briefly in a rear-guard action before retiring with its French associates to the other side of the Marne to prevent the Germans from crossing. In the counteroffensive it was the French who retook the town without any fighting as it was no longer defensible once the surrounding hills had been taken, and in their taking we assisted. But for all the splendid work of our divisions in the second battle of the Marne, as it is sometimes called, Château-Thierry has become the accepted name. Any one of the eight divisions engaged in the operations which began with the defense of Paris and ended with driving the Germans back to their old line was at Château-Thierry in the accepted sense of the term.

General Pershing had been convinced that the Marne salient, which extended into the Allied line in an immense pocket, not only from its configuration invited attack, but that the Germans had so far extended themselves in their giant efforts that the tables could be easily turned. If he had been slow to enter his divisions into active sectors until they had been trained, he was now, in face of this opportunity, not only prepared to send in his trained divisions, but to send in divisions which had only recently arrived. By this time we were beginning to feel the accumulated results of the work of our training camps at home in forming our untrained citizens into battalions and regiments and divisions, and we were having the actual results in France of the full awakening of the American people and the Allies to the danger of defeat which the German offensives had brought. and the shipping which had been provided for at the Abbéville Conference of the Allied statesmen and commanders was rushing the men from our training camps to Europe with a speed

that surpassed the transport program by two to one by mid-summer.

Instead of five hundred thousand in July, 1918, we had a million; and the two million would soon follow.

The indefatigable industry of our workers, in preparation for the reception of vast hosts which at the inception of the great plan seemed visionary, now appeared as the most practical kind of prevision, a prevision which was to play an important part in winning the war. By results we had answered the fears of all skeptics. All the way from the North Sea, over four hundred miles to Switzerland, the traveler saw American soldiers behind the line; and they were scattered through all the villages of France. We had ten divisions who had been assigned to the British, we had soldiers in training in the Ypres salient on the old Somme battle field, in Champagne, in the Woevre, in Lorraine, and in the forests of the Vosges Mountains in sight of the Alps. The transports were disembarking men by the thousands every day and railroad trains were dispatching our divisions here and there with a frequency that left it out of the question that any man or woman in France should not now realize by their own observation that America was in the war in earnest and she was bringing her man power to bear on the battle front.

Our project for an army of our own had been abandoned for the time being in order to meet the emergency due to the German offensives. The American effort in France had been that of many scattered divisions called to fill breaches and then sent into the attack in order to make the most of the turn of the tide. We could not have an American army in our own sector until these detached divisions had assisted in making sure that Paris was forever out of danger, and that there was not enough spirit or force left in the German armies to undertake an offensive of any kind.

The situation of our forces meanwhile was unique and amazingly difficult. The British had their line from thirty to seventy-five miles from the coast which was only an hour's ride away from England itself, and the French were in their own country wherever they went. But the nearest homes of our

soldiers were three thousand miles away and the homes of some of them were five and six thousand miles. When they received "leaves" they could not go to visit their families as the British and French might. While the British were in their permanent sector with all the system of supplies regularly established, our soldiers might be one day serving with the British army and the next day with the French; they knew the weariness of long rides on railway trains, billets in barns and haylofts, and no home associations except that of their own companionship and that supplied by the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A., the Knights of Columbus, and the Salvation Army. They were under the strictest kind of censorship, their mail took weeks to reach France and then followed them about from place to place in trying to overtake them.

The rapidity with which they were being brought across the seas in unexpected numbers into a land which had suffered the strain of war for four years led to confusion and discomfort under the fearful pressure of the forthcoming tremendous effort which was to use all the will power, energy, and brains of every man that America had in France.

For we were now to know no rest until the armistice was signed. After the 1st and 2d Divisions had fought themselves to utter exhaustion in the drive to Soissons with a loss of nearly 50 per cent of their infantry, the work of reducing the salient fell upon the "Yankee" 26th Division, which had been hurried from a long tour in the mud and misery of the Toul sector, upon Muir's "Iron" 28th Division of Pennsylvania National Guard, coming fresh from the drill grounds back of the British front to the drive toward the Ourcq, upon the redoubtable 3d Division, which, despite its losses in resisting the German crossing of the Marne, took up the counteroffensive with a fiery zeal.

Then the 42d Division swung around to take the place of the "Yankee" 26th, after it had fought heroically to exhaustion in attacking through more forests and against more machine-gun nests, and Haans 32d Division of National Guard from Michigan and Wisconsin, "the Arrows," who always broke the line which

came down the apron of the hills toward Cierges under artillery fire with the jauntiness of parade, conquered the wicked woods and heights of the ravines on the other side of the Ourcq in its first great action. Hersey's 4th Regular Division with but little experience lived up to the record of the other divisions by promptly becoming veteran and Duncan's 77th "Liberty" Division, of New York City, the first of the National Army divisions to arrive in France and the first to know active battle, pressed on to the Vesle. All these gave all the strength they had, all fought until in weariness they must accept relief, in that wonderful revelation of citizen America turned soldier.

There was not one of these divisions that did not regret that instead of being associated with French divisions they were not associated with American divisions. All were ambitious to be a part of our own army. They had finished their Château-Thierry job; they had done all that was expected of them; they had met the emergency. Château-Thierry had been an introduction, a preparation, a proof of quality for other and greater tasks which commanders had now learned that we could perform.

Now began the Hegira of our divisions toward our own American sector in Lorraine, where all but two, who were with the British, were to join them. With the assurance that by the first of December we should have more than two million Americans in France while the number of German reserve divisions were dwindling and the Germans could hope for no further reenforcements, the offensive of Château-Thierry was to be followed by the succeeding offensives with which, as opportunity offered, Marshal Foch was to conduct his final campaign. Germany had no hope now of winning the war. The question was how soon it might be won by the Allies.

With the attack on the Saint Mihiel salient our army entered upon its third and greatest phase, which was the cumulation of all the plans made in June, 1917. At that time it was considered that we should be ready for our first offensive operation as an integral force by the autumn of 1918, and the salient was considered as its objective; but, as I have said, we had not calcuwarst.

lated upon a million men by midsummer of 1918, which our lines of communication would have to supply, let alone two million by November 1, 1918. The requirements laid upon transport and supply were more than doubled, while the emergency of scattering our divisions to resist the German offensives had introduced an unexpected feature, and the strain upon France and England, as the result of these offensives, had interfered with our receiving as much assistance from them as we might have originally expected.

As officers in France had foreseen, the promises of our ambitious program in the manufacture of aeroplanes, ordnance, and material of war at home, could not be fulfilled even by the most diligent application of energy and enterprise as soon as the War Department had hoped. We were still equipping all our divisions with British gas masks and helmets. Only in the last days of the Château-Thierry operations had a plane driven by a Liberty motor flown over our lines. All our artillery and machine guns were still French. The Browning machine guns were only just beginning to arrive; and we waited upon the American tanks and gas outfits and other weapons.

These handicaps made the successes which were to follow all the more remarkable. The increasing forces must all have their daily rations, and in the pressure of battle the artillery must not lack ammunition, and there must be at all times sufficient transport, whether railroad, motor, or horse, in order that the supplies should be delivered at the front. Therefore the development of the Service of Supply as a part of the whole project must keep pace in capacity and efficiency with the demands of the fighting forces.

Our army's activities were divided into three zones: the base, the intermediate, and advance, with that of the base and the intermediate in charge of the commanding general of the Service of Supply at Tours. Every harbor of western France not occupied by the British was teeming with American effort, while Marseilles, in the Mediterranean, was caring for our increasing business which the Atlantic ports could not accommodate. The

recruits for the army of the Service of Supply must keep pace with those for the army at the front. Battalions of negroes had been brought from the Southern States to act as laborers and stevedores. We were using German prisoners for labor as fast as they were captured.

At Bordeaux and Saint Nazaire, particularly, among the ports, we had built long expanses of wharves and the spur tracks which connected them with systems of warehouses. The plan had been always to have reserve supplies for forty-five days at the base ports; with thirty days' at the great intermediate depot of Gièvres, where another vast system of spur tracks and warehouses had been built in open fields, and fifteen days' supplies at the regulating stations with their systems of spur tracks and warehouses where the trains were made up to meet the immediate requisitions from the front. Without any prevision as to when the war would end, with nothing certain except that we must go on preparing as if it were to last for years in order the sooner to force the end, new construction, while requirements of the present were met, must keep pace with growth. We had car and locomotive assembling shops; motor repair shops; salvage depots, remount depots, and immense areas of hospitals, with as many as eighteen thousand beds in a single area, which had been building in grim expectation of the flow of wounded from the front when we began operations on a large scale. Nurses and doctors must be in sufficient numbers for the emergency.

Never had America had such a test of its organizing capacity as in its formation of the Service of Supply. Its problems, both in number and complexity as well as in the size of the task, the amount of material and personnel required, were far greater than those of the Panama Canal. The leisure which any undertaking permits in carrying out plans and the dependence which may be placed upon the receipt of tools and material in time of peace were both wanting under the pressure of war. Personnel for this enterprise was summoned from our engineers, our business men and experts, and from the ranks of skilled labor in every civil branch who were for the first time brought together

in a national organization in foreign surroundings where they faced many difficulties with which they were unfamiliar, under the direction of the regular army, which had to reconcile all policies with the requirements of the front line, and which had to expand its imagination and its powers of organization from a quartermaster's business of a little regular army to the mastery of unparalleled forces in the direction of reserve officers who had been used to handling great business enterprises.

Next to the position of General Pershing that of the commanding general of the Service of Supply was the most important in France. It was proposed at one time from Washington that he should have authority coordinate with General Pershing's direct from Washington; but this was strongly opposed on the ground that the commander in chief of the fighting army must be supreme over every branch if he were to be responsible for the success of a campaign. Major General James G. Harbord, who had been the first chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Force and later commanded the marine brigade of the 2d Division and afterward the division itself in the Château-Thierry operations, was summoned from the front late in July, 1918, at a time when the rapid arrival of troops from America and the prospects of the terrific demands of the campaigns which would ensue made it vital that there should de administrative reform in the Service of Supply by some man not only of high organizing ability but with the personal quality that inspires coordination among his adjutants, if the Service of Supply were to be equal to the enormous demands which would be placed upon it in the next few months.

Whether it was the officers drawn from civil life without military training, or the laborers or the privates, every man in the Service of Supply wished that he were at the front. Hundreds of officers with combat training and thousands of soldiers who had been in the training camps found themselves, because of their particular efficiency in business organization, immured in some particular Service of Supply branch, doing long hours of prosaic work in the different camps and shops

of the base ports and central France without hope, so far as they could see, of ever hearing a shot fired. It seemed to them frequently that the staff organization of the Service of Supply lacked the characteristics of energetic direction and team play with which they had been familiar in civil life. They had everything to make them discouraged. General Harbord, with the reputation he had won as a fighter, his magnetism, his understanding of human nature and his capability of promptly grasping the essentials of any problem, soon showed that he had the talent for transforming the spirit of the personnel by applying the indefatigable industry and the patriotic spirit of this vast force in a homogeneous corps, without which the victory of the American forces in France would not have been possible.

While General Harbord was reorganizing the Service of Supply, General Pershing was preparing in haste and under great handicaps for the direction of hundreds of thousands of men in battle. The division was the fighting unit of our army. It went into the trenches and into battle as a division; was transferred from one part of the line to the other as a unit which was complete in all its branches, with a personnel of twenty-seven thousand men, or about double the size of a British or French division. The command of many divisions in battle brought us to the question of higher tactics. We had to train officers for this high responsibility as well as for leading the battalions in the front line.

According to the original plan we were to have six divisions to a corps. Major General Hunter Liggett, as soon as we had four divisions in training, had been set the task of organizing our first corps. He had a high reputation in the regular army as a student and tactician, and he was a man of great poise and a most thorough student. The withdrawal of our divisions from our Lorraine sector, in order to assist in the defense of Paris and later in the counteroffensive of July, had allowed General Liggett little practical experience. With the rapid arrival of our troops other corps staffs were rapidly formed. Major General Robert L. Bullard, who had commanded the

1st Division in the Toul sector and in the attack on Cantigny, was given the command of the 3d Corps. For a brief period both General Liggett and General Bullard and their staff had some experience acting as corps commanders in the Château-Thierry operations. Not until the Saint Mihiel operations, however, had we ever had more than two divisions operating together under American command. Meanwhile we had organized our First Army, which was under the personal command of General Pershing.

With our new corps and army organization, we were now to undertake an attack against the fortifications of one of the most formidable positions on the western front with a shorter period of preparation than had been generally accepted as necessary by the veteran French and British armies whose staffs had had four years' training under actual battle conditions. The experts, whether in the gaining of intelligence, in the handling of traffic, or in the highly complex technique of the arrangements for the liaison of artillery and infantry and aviation and all the other branches of uniformity of operations between the divisions, were to apply in practice what they had learned in theory and by observation of the Allied armies. Their theory had been learned at the staff school of Langres, solving problems of combat organization and listening to lectures by staff officers of other armies; but theory is not practice.

Since 1915 there had been no important action from Verdun to the Swiss border. The wedge of the Saint Mihiel salient, which the Germans had won in 1914 with its commanding hills and ridges, had remained an eyesore on the map of the western front. Aside from its strong natural positions it was defended by the most elaborate of modern fortifications. By the criterion of precedents of previous offensives against front-line positions we should succeed in our undertaking only at an immense cost of life, should the Germans decide to make a determined defense. Until a few days before the attack we had every expectation that they would. The original plan was that we should go through to Mars-la-Tour and Etain until we

were before the great German fortress of Metz. Marshal Foch changed this plan, as we shall see.

By the time we had finished the Saint Mihiel operations the chilling fall rains would have begun in earnest. These would not only expose the men, but would impede transport. We should use the winter months for applying the lessons learned in our first offensive in the forming of our organization for the greater offensive which was to begin in the spring of 1919 and continue until we had won a decision. For in 1919 it was the American army with its inexhaustible reserves and the vigor of its youth which was due to do the leading and to endure accordingly heavy losses. The artillery, the machine guns, the tanks, and all the other material which we had been manufacturing at home as it arrived through the winter of 1918 we should incorporate into our organization.

Marshal Foch, who desired the complete success of the Saint Mihiel offensive as a part of his plan, had assigned to the American army, under General Pershing's command, ample forces in addition to our own artillery and aviation. While French divisions were to mark time at the apex of the salient before following up our attack, the American divisions from right to left, the 90th, 5th, 2d, 89th, 42d, and 1st were to swing in on the eastern side of the salient, with the 82d as a pivot and the 26th Division, cooperating with French troops, was to swing in on the western side. For the first time our army corps and divisional artillery were to cooperate in a preliminary bombardment in cutting the barbed wire, encountering the enemy's artillery fire, and to prepare the way for the charge of a long line of American infantry in the first attack of an American army as an army on the continent of Europe. For the first time the responsibility for command all the way from the front line through all the headquarters up to that other commander in chief was ours. The French staff officers were at hand with their advice and information, but ours was the decision and the battle was ours.

By the morning of September 12, 1918, the Germans, in view of the strength of our forces and of the pressure on other parts of their line, had decided not to make strong resistance in the

Saint Mihiel salient. Indeed, they contemplated a rear-guard action in withdrawal, but not expecting that we would attack on the 12th, owing to rainy weather, we practically caught them before their withdrawal had begun, with the result that the impetuosity of the attack of our men, who forced their way through stretches of barbed wire which the artillery fire had not cut, cleared both the first and second lines of defense on schedule time and gathered in prisoners and guns out of all keeping to their losses. On the morning of the 13th, troops of the 26th Division and the 1st Division, swinging in from the east and west, had come together and the Saint Mihiel salient was no more. Our success had been complete and inexpensive. It thrilled the Allied armies with fresh confidence in our arms when they saw that the angle on the old line of the map had been straightened and the German people, to whom the Saint Mihiel salient had become equally a symbol, were accordingly depressed.

Already, instead of looking forward to months of preparation for the next offensive, our army had begun preparations for another offensive which was to begin only thirteen days after that of Saint Mihiel. Marshal Foch had decided before the Saint Mihiel attack to change his plan, and instead of going through to Mars-la-Tour and Etain, only to cut the salient, withdrawing surplus troops for action elsewhere. In conjunction with the Fourth French Army, which was to attack from the left, we were to attack from the Argonne Forest to the Meuse River in the greatest battle in which Americans had ever been engaged. Following the success of the Château-Thierry offensive in which our troops had played a part, the British Canadians and the French had had continuing success in their offensives beginning on August 8, 1918. Our 32d Division had increased the reputation which it had won in the fighting on the Ourcq by assisting the French in breaking the old front-line positions northeast of Soissons.

The Allies had now regained practically all the ground that the Germans had won in their spring and summer offensives. In places they had penetrated the Hindenburg line. The Belgian as well as the British and French armies were about to take the offensive. The German losses in prisoners and material in the last month indicated a decline in German morale. Information confirmed the idea that Hindenburg, with his rapidly weakening reserves, was contemplating a withdrawal to the line of the Meuse. Every consideration called upon the Allied armies to stretch their resources in men and material to the utmost in order to take advantage of the situation. For the first time since the war had begun on the western front they completely had the initiative.

The next step was to broaden the front of the Allied attacks, further confusing Ludendorff in his dispositions, and breaking through the Hindenburg line and all the old front-line positions which the Germans had held for four years, to force the offensive in the open, where rapid maneuvers could harass the effort of the Germans in withdrawing their forces and the material which they had accumulated through four years, and by repeated blows continue to weaken their morale until a positive decision was won.

If Ludendorff were given leisure for a deliberate retreat to a shorter line which he could fortify during the winter while his army recovered its spirit, this shorter line would give him all the advantage which serves the defense in deeper concentrations of troops to the mile with less room for the offensive to maneuver for surprises.

All the Allied offensives—Champagne, Loos, the Somme, Arras, and Passchendaele—had been made to the west of the Argonne Forest, because of the advantage of ground. To the east, facing the Rhine, the Germans had their great fortress of Metz, and the positions in Lorraine and the Vosges Mountains and the wedge of Saint Mihiel, which had seemed unconquerable. The Meuse River winds past Saint Mihiel through the town of Verdun, then northward where it turns westward toward Sedan. All the way from Saint Mihiel, including the hills of the forts of Verdun, which look out on the plain of the Woevre with the fortress of Metz in the distance, runs a rampart of heights clear to the great bastion of the Forest of

Argonne, where the country becomes more rolling, and therefore better ground for military operations.

The line of our second offensive was to be from the Meuse River just west of Verdun to the western edge of the Argonne Forest. Anyone who looks at the map of the old line of the western front and of the enemy's railroad communications would say at once that this was the obvious line for an offensive. The Metz-Lille railway line, two-track all the way, and in places four-track, runs through Sedan and Mézières, following the Meuse Valley where it turns westward. This was the most important southern transversal line that the Germans had for supplying their armies in eastern France and connecting them with the coal fields of northern France. Northeast of the Meuse-Argonne positions were the famous Briev iron fields on which the Germans were dependent for their supplies of ore for the Krupp works. A blow toward Mézières and toward Briev was a blow at the heart of German military, power.

The Germans fully realized the danger in this direction and knew, as our generals knew, how thoroughly it was protected. They had all the advantage of rail connections in hastening their reserves to this point if the Allies had made an advance in this direction. In 1916 or 1917 the Germans would have welcomed the Meuse-Argonne offensive, in the confidence that the Allied attacks would have suffered as bloody repulses as the Germans suffered at Verdun against the same kind of positions. The front German line was in the southern part of the Forest of Argonne with its ravines and hills covered with dense undergrowth. And back of this was still another great forest, that of Bourgogne. Offensives against even small patches of woods had proved the hopelessness of any frontal attack against forests.

East of the Argonne Forest is the little river Aire, its valley forming a trough between the hills, and between that and the Meuse for a distance of about ten miles the German line, which had been placed in the retreat from the Marne, had at its rear a whaleback of rising heights which reached their summit in the neighborhood of Buzancy. From this summit it was downhill all the way to the Meuse River. It was this summit which the American army must gain in advancing over ground in which nature seemed to have had in mind the possibilities of modern warfare in defense. The heights would give observation for the enemy guns which were hidden on the reverse slopes. Numerous patches of woods and tricky ravines made ideal positions for machine-gun nests. One position gained, the victor still looked ahead to higher ground. The enemy could always bring his reserves up under cover while those of the attacking force would be in full view.

The soldiers of our new army had shown that they had the spirit of attack. Marshal Foch was to give them the opportunity to display it to the utmost, and in the conference which he and General Pershing held before the battle of Saint Mihiel one of the great decisions of the war was made. We were to send partly trained divisions into a conflict in winter rains and under incalculable hardships in the faith that our courage, exerted to its utmost in the fall of 1918, might break the weakening German army before it could recover its spirit, while the losses which this effort entailed would save us from far greater losses in the spring and the prolongation of the war. Though we should never reach the summit of those heights, the threat which we should make against the German line of communications must withdraw more and more German troops from other parts of the line, and keep on increasing the confusion of Ludendorff's dispositions.

The only American comparison for the Meuse-Argonne Battle was the Appomattox campaign which lasted much longer and consisted of a series of separate actions with nothing like the concentration and continuous fighting which the Americans of another generation were to endure. Grant had no lack of supplies, he had more guns than he could use and was fighting on his own soil with ample resources in reserve within easy reach. Pershing's army was not relatively as ready for the task that it was to undertake as McClellan had been for his Peninsula campaign.

From the time of the attack of Saint Mihiel on September 12. 1918, until September 25, 1918, we had thirteen days to prepare for an offensive which, as it was made by a new army, could be likened to the great Somme offensive of the British in 1916. Then the British had taken five months in which to build roads, dig assembly trenches, prepare ammunition dumps, and bring up necessary engineering material. But it must be borne in mind that at this time the enemy was in the prime of his numbers and confidence. Moreover, such elaborate arrangements were then considered necessary in order to take powerfully intrenched lines. They had the fault of warning the enemy in ample time of any concentration which enabled him to mass men and material for defense. Later, the French had developed a system of limited objectives of brief artillery preparations, followed by the rolling barrage which preceded the advance of the infantry, while the enemy's strong points and gun positions were smothered with shells. The Germans, however, in their great offensive against the British in March, 1918, had taken ample time for preparation while they made the innovation of driving through for sufficiently great depth to become masters of all the trench defenses and of the opposing artillery.

In the counteroffensive toward Soissons on July 18, 1918, and again in the Anglo-French-Canadian offensive of August 8, 1918, and the succeeding offensives, the Allies had depended on either a very brief artillery preparation or upon not opening fire until the moment of the infantry's advance while they followed through in the German fashion. In our Meuse-Argonne offensive, we had all these precedents and the experience of the officers in directing them for our guidance. But very veteran and skilled armies had carried out the later style of offensive, and they had the advantage which comes from long experience that the units, used to keeping their uniformity in battle action, did not become dispersed after they had made a certain advance as was supposed to be the case in any extensive offensive where new divisions were engaged.

The most disastrous example in throwing an untrained division into a violent attack was that of the British 21st Division

in the fall of 1915 at Loos, which in trying to apply its drill-ground training under fire, became disorganized and failed to take its objectives. Later, after it had had more experience, this same division, though no more courageous than in its first battle, proved itself masterful in the complicated technique of modern attack which it had learned in diligent application in smaller actions after Loos, and by applying the lessons learned at Loos by thorough drilling.

Practically all our pioneer divisions which had had long experience in France were either engaged at Saint Mihiel or else they were occupied elsewhere. For the new offensive we must therefore depend upon new divisions which had been a shorter time in France than the 1st or 2d or 26th or 42d Divisions.

Following the attack by the American army on the Meuse-Argonne line and the 4th French Army on its left with their threat toward the lines of communications, the British and French were to strike the Hindenburg line in the St. Quentin-Cambrai region on September 29, 1918, and on October 2, 1918, the French were to attack to the east of Rheims. Thus a succession of offensives were to broaden the whole front of operations in an effort to break through the old trench line, all the way from the Meuse to the North Sea, and bring the Allied armies into the open where they would be forever free of trench shackles. This was a most audacious enterprise which was warranted by the information which the Allies had of the state of the German army. The Bulgarian army was beginning to disintegrate and the Italians had turned the Austrian offensive on the Piave into a disaster from which the Austro-Hungarian armies could not recover. Throughout the months of August and September, 1918, the Germans had been yielding large numbers of prisoners and an immense quantity of material, while the Allied losses had been comparatively light.

The German cards were now on the table; the number of German divisions in reserve were known; and in the arrival of American divisions the Allies had a vast store of man power. We had become the dependable quantity of a mighty growing reserve force.

Marshal Foch chose to put us in the very hinge of the whole movement and he set for our objective in a swift series of advances nothing less than the heights of Buzancy—the heights of the whaleback itself. Had we gained that within three or four days, we would have threatened the retreat of the whole German army, indeed, the capture of a hundred thousand or more Germans would have been fairly certain. No one considered such a success except in the category of a military miracle until German reserves were more depleted than they were at the end of September.

Ludendorff, on his side, knew that he must hold the hinge of the door. He might yield toward the west, if necessary, but must not yield in front of Mézières and Sedan. The neck of the bottle must not be closed. The measure of our initial success, whatever the intrepidity of our attack, must depend largely upon how far we were able to take the Germans by surprise, and the depth of our advance must depend upon our ability to bring up our artillery and ammunition and food for our men. To the rear of the line from the Meuse to the Argonne Forest there are literally only two roads of approach. If we attempted to build more, they would immediately be visible to the aeroplane observers of the enemy. We could not build more when our engineers and our laborers were occupied at Saint Mihiel.

If we arranged elaborate dumps of ammunition, these would inevitably be seen by the enemy or their presence would be communicated in some way as past experience had proved. To move long columns of troops and transport by day was equally an advertisement of our plan for an enormous attack which was the thing that we wished to conceal when the success of the attack was to depend upon secret mobilization and a swift blow. If we were to repair the old roads across the broad area of the shell-crushed no-man's-land and through the trench systems after our attack, this also required the assembling of a great deal of material in view of the enemy.

No part of a modern army's arrangements is more difficult than the handling of the necessarily dense vehicular traffic behind the immediate front, even if ample supplies are brought to the railheads. The numbers of motor trucks and ambulances required were incredible. Our Service of Supply, which had been concentrating all its energies and material toward Saint Mihiel, now had to prepare for another equally great offensive. New railheads, new railways, new hospitals, new headquarters, and new routes of transport had to be established. With the certainty that the Saint Mihiel sector, if it became violent, would consume large quantities of ammunition we had to provide for the immense consumption of ammunition which would undoubtedly be required in the Meuse-Argonne.

The continued fighting throughout the summer, with additional and unexpected requirements for the new offensive campaign, had made increasingly heavy drafts upon transport and animals. It was no use to say that more horses were coming from Spain and from America; they were needed now. All the tanks and aeroplanes and the light and heavy artillery which were in the making at home or on the docks at New York would be of no service unless they were in the battle. The lack of sufficient railway lines and shortage of rolling stock required accordingly more travel on the limited roads approaching the area of concentration east and west of Verdun.

When artillery, in course of being withdrawn from the Saint Mihiel front to go to the Argonne front, had their horses killed, the weary survivors who were now to draw the guns could not be forced through according to the usual schedule. They had to cross the streams of traffic running to the Saint Mihiel front. At night all the roads were solid columns of men and vehicles that had to keep at the uniform pace of the slowest of its units lest motor transport, which could go fifteen miles an hour, in trying to pass tractor-drawn heavy artillery that could go three or four, should become imbedded in the mud and thus stall the whole column for hours.

Thus the unprecedented strain of the Meuse-Argonne Battle, which was to endure for six weeks, began with the difficulties of mobilization. During the Château-Thierry operations we had had summer weather, when men could sleep in the open with comfort, when it was easy to repair broken roads and

when motor trucks which got off the road did not sink into the mud. Now we had already entered the period of chill fall rains which made the ground porous and wet marching soldiers to the skin. Instead of time for reflection and reorganization, in applying the lessons of the Saint Mihiel salient, every officer and man was straining his utmost to make sure by improvisation, when organization failed and by sheer sleepless industry, of meeting with forced smiles each new contingency as it developed.

Our three corps in line were, the first under General Liggett on the left, the fifth under General Cameron in the center, and the third under General Bullard on the right. The corps head-quarters were established only four days before the attack. Unfamiliar except in theory, and from what they had learned at Saint Mihiel, with the problems of directing an army in a prolonged battle, they had not a quarter of the time for preparations which they ordinarily should have received even if they had had long experience. They did not know the division commanders or the divisions which were to serve under them, and the divisions did not arrive until the last moment.

Artillery brigades, fresh from the training grounds where they had only received their guns, marched up to be assigned to divisions with which they had never cooperated in action. Batteries that had no horses depended upon batteries that had horses to be drawn into position. The coordination of infantry units for the attack was dependent upon coordination by paper directions rather than previous association.

We had an enormous concentration of artillery and of aviation, thanks to assistance from the French, but our aviation and much of that of the French sent us was new. Our aviators lacked experience as observers in keeping their liaison in directing artillery fire and in informing the infantry of the movements of their units and of the enemy's. Infantry and artillery commanders who had had little previous battle experience, were not always fortunate in their efforts to keep liaison with one another and with the aviation in view of the aviation's inexperience. To say that the American army was ready for

such an offensive as that of the Meuse-Argonne would be unfair to the men who began the battle and detracting from the glory of their achievement. Her courage, eagerness, adaptability, and industry were merits which were to overcome the handicaps in a way that made results even more glorious in the greatest battle of our history.

Aside from the fact that two of the divisions in line were going under fire for the first time there was not one of the divisions which was not handicapped in some way for their effort, either for want of artillery or because they had had no time to rest after hard marches or previous battles. In the space of this brief review it is impossible to tell of their actions in detail which reflected credit on each one of the Regular, National Guard, or National Army divisions, and which, taken together, reflected credit upon the army as a whole.

On the right was Bell's 33d Division of Illinois National Guard. At its back was the famous Mort Homme, or Dead Man's Hill, where Frenchmen and Germans had struggled in the battle of Verdun, with its shell craters now fringed with weeds. The 33d had to cross the Forges Brook and swing in toward the Meuse River protecting the right flank of the whole movement which rested on the river. On the left of the 33d was the 80th. Cronkhite's Blue Ridge Division, trained at the British front and come from Saint Mihiel. Next in line was the 4th Regular Division, which, coming fresh from the British front, had fought magnificently in the Château-Thierry operations. On its left was Kuhn's 79th, the National Army Division from Camp Meade, which had never heard a shot fired until it marched up amidst the roar of guns and artillery preparation. Then we had Farnsworth's 37th, National Guard of Ohio, which with unconquerable persistence was to take the wicked Malancourt Woods; and then the 91st Division of the National Army from the Pacific slope which was to give such a remarkable exhibition of continued and determined advance. Next we had Traub's 35th Division, National Guard from Kansas and Missouri, which was set the dreadful task of taking the heights on the west of the Aire river and of crossing the Exermont ravine. Next was War St. 8-Z

Muir's 28th, or "Iron" Division, National Guard of Pennsylvania, which was in the valley of the Aire and faced the wooded heights of the Argonne which were thrust out Gibraltarlike into the valley. Finally, on the extreme left was the 77th, National Army from New York (now under command of Alexander), facing the heart of the formidable Argonne Forest.

Some of these divisions had more difficult obstacles than others to overcome. Their relative position in line was due less to a strategic arrangement, with any view to their experience or to their exhaustion in relation to their objectives, than to the relation of their positions to the roads by which they had had to travel in reaching the front. Up to this time the 4th, the 77th, and the 28th had probably seen the most fighting. They had just come from the Château-Thierry operations and in common with all the other divisions, were short of transport and had to make forced marches.

All the men of all the divisions had either been sleeping in box ears on railroad trains or they had been in the miserable crowded billets of small villages, getting what rest, after marching at night, they could during the day, in the midst of the rumble of traffic. No corps, divisional, regimental, or battalion commander, no chief of one of the staff sections who had anything to do with the direction of traffic, could say quite how this was accomplished, except by sleepless vigil and grim, sweating effort, but the fact was that the miracle had happened; for on the night of September 24, 1918, every division was in position, with a thin fringe of the French remaining in the front line in order to prevent the Germans, if they took any prisoners, from identifying the number of American divisions which were present.

Marshal Foch had now postponed the attack until the 26th; this gave the men a day in which to rest as much as they could, and a little more time for the artillery and staff to make its preparation.

General Pershing, who was to direct the battle in person, had taken up his headquarters in the city hall of the village of Souilly on the "sacred road" from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun where the French commanders had planned the defense against the great German offensive of 1916.

On the morning of the 26th, after six hours of artillery preparation, the waves of infantry of these nine divisions which had now assembled in the front-line trenches, relieving the French, went over the top in beginning the greatest battle in American history. The fortifications which they attacked represented the result of all the experience which the Germans, in their antlike industry, had applied in preparing their defenses. No-man's-land had been pummeled by four years of shell fire until the rims of shell craters joined. The weeds which had grown up hid the rims, slippery in the morning mist, and made footing more uncertain on the soft turf. The barbed-wire entanglements were deep, in keeping with the formidability of the German trench system. When they built these works, the Germans rightly considered them impregnable. The story of every battalion that attacked that morning, as well as every battalion that participated in the Argonne Battle, is worthy of a lengthier description than I am giving to the whole operations of the American Expeditionary Force.

It is usual in such attacks that, at many points of the line where the enemy's barbed wire has not been cut by the artillery fire, or where machine-gun nests are strategically placed, portions of the advancing wave of infantry are held up with the result that succeeding portions push on until they are caught in salients in enfilade fire. This leads to confusion and frequently to arresting the whole attack, or at least to interfering with the plan, thus giving the enemy time to bring up his reserves and profit by his opportunity. This had happened in the Somme offensive, at Loos, at Passchendaele and in the fifth and last German offensive and, indeed, in every big offensive on the western front. There was every reason why it should happen this time to the eve of any experienced observer who had not the youthful enthusiasm of our soldiers, who in their ingrained American offensive spirit, attacked in a manner as confident as if they were used to breaking first-line trench systems as a part of their routine of drill.

It was this spirit, on that memorable morning, that carried the fortifications at every point. By every rule, by every precedent, after they had gone through the barbed-wire and in and out of the maze of trenches and then over the shell craters of Noman's-land they ought, even if they had not been under fire, to have lost their uniformity of line and formed into irregular groups. But instead of this they kept on going, overcoming the enemy's machine-gun nests and gathering in prisoners, when sheer fatigue ought to have stopped them. By night some of them had reached objectives five and six miles beyond the front line.

The daring stroke of throwing our army against the Meuse-Argonne line straight at the enemy's communications had already had its reward; although the Germans had been warned of the attack, they had no idea that it would be in such force. They recognized at once that the threat against the Lille-Metz railroad was serious. They must bring up good divisions and enough of them, and sufficient artillery, to make sure that it was arrested.

Our task, now, was the thankless one of continuing to draw more and more divisions against us in the consciousness that every German whom we held or whom we killed or wounded was one more removed from the British or French fronts. We were to have the stiffest fighting of any part of the line, and the value in what we did was not to be reckoned in ground gained, but in damage done the enemy. During the following days we continued to advance while the Germans settled down in strength in front of us and established themselves in the strong trench line of the Kriemhilde Stellung across a series of commanding heights. Our divisions, exhausted after a week or more of fighting, had to be relieved by rested divisions which were called to the front including the 3d and the 5th and 1st Divisions of Regulars. We had to weaken our line a little owing to the necessities of transport.

The embargo on building roads before the attack, and our inability to bring up engineering material, and our lack of labor and sufficient experience in handling traffic, which can only be

learned in battle, led to inevitable congestion. The area of shell craters, extending for half a mile or more as well as across no-man's-land, which consisted simply of earth pulverized by four years of shell fire, seemed to have no bottom to the engineers who worked night and day in order to make the passage of the artillery and the heavy motor trucks possible. In the dripping rain and penetrating cold, taking what sleep they might steal in wet clothes, all hands kept ceaselessly at their task while the men in the front line were digging "fox holes" in the seeping slopes of hills among the roots of trees of gassed woods and in ravines. The issue was joined in stubborn and bitter fighting in which it was the American plan always to keep the initiative and the upper hand over the enemy and to force him to put in more and more of his decreasing reserves.

We still had our Second Corps with the British under the command of Major General George W. Read, consisting of O'Ryan's 27th National Guard Division from New York and Lewis's 30th National Guard Division from the Southern mountain States. They had assisted in driving the Germans out of the positions they had won in the Ypres salient in April, 1918. After that they were swung around across the old Somme battle field, and in keeping with the policy of the Allied command, which recognized the confident valor of our men in the attack, they were to be sent against one of the strongest portions of the old Hindenburg line, that of the region over the St. Quentin Canal tunnel. Allied commanders said that the sheer presence of our troops in the offensive inspirited their own. The homesickness of our men who knew that they could not return until they had won the war was an impelling influence to force the issue now that their quick intelligence assured them that victory depended upon pressing the enemy hard.

Though the 27th and 30th Divisions were never to be associated with their own army, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of September, 1918, they were to know in the company of the British the same kind of fighting that we had in breaking the line in the Argonne, as they charged through the enemy's

barrages and against his machine-gun nests for the conquest of the famous positions which had taken the name of Hindenburg, who had given them his especial attention and who had declared that they never could be taken. The 30th made a clean sweep, but it was not in human power for the 27th Division to reach all of its objectives. The gallant men of the 27th had, however, in two days' fighting, immortalized their division before the Australians, coming fresh into the line, took their place according to schedule and completed the task.

Throughout the offensives of August and September, 1918, the German positions in front of Rheims had remained where they were established in September of 1914. On October 2, 1918, in an offensive in this sector, Le Jeune's 2d Division with its brigades of Regulars and Marines, which led all our divisions in the number of its casualties in this war, was joined with the French in an attack to disengage Rheims; and when, after fighting its way through the deep trenches cut in the chalky soil of Champagne, the 2d stormed Blanc Mont, the German guns had fired their last shot at the cathedral and were in retreat. Smith's 36th Division of National Guard, from Texas, which was without its artillery and which had never been under fire, took the place of the 2d, and, after enduring with an amazing equanimity a terrific bombardment from the German guns before they withdrew, pursued the enemy to the Aisne at a rate of travel worthy of Texans and most discomforting to German veterans.

We now return to the Meuse-Argonne Battle, where as I have said, the issue was joined in "hammering it out on this line" tactics, and divisions which had fought with lion-hearted determination until they were staggering with exhaustion and their ranks depleted by casualties, were withdrawn in order that fresh divisions might take their place. Some divisions either for one reason or another were able to remain in longer than others. The harder a division's experience the more it suffered from what is known as "dispersion"; its units, either in their continued advances or in resisting attacks and counterattacks in the midst of continued shell fire, lost their cohesion. How they

kept cohesion even for a day was a marvel past understanding. A division which had only a portion of its troops at a time in the front line could last longer than a division that had put all its reserves into action and had worn out the personnel of the whole division.

Much depended upon the division commander and his staff. If he were capable and his division well-trained, he could accomplish results through prompt tactical adaptability to the situation on his front without unnecessary sacrifice of his men. In holding ground against machine-gun fire the fewer men on the front the better. The object was always to gain, of course, the maximum of advantage at the minimum of cost. When our lines settled down in a position it was not to intrench according to the old system, but simply to bide their time for another attack.

There was no thought but the offensive. The days of trench warfare were entirely over. The contact with the enemy was through outpost lines in fox holes and machine-gun positions chosen carefully with a view to interlocking fire that covered every possible path or avenue of approach. With the Germans bringing up fresh artillery and countless machine guns in full realization of the situation it became evident that further advance by piecemeal was impracticable and that another general attack should be made along the old battle front.

Across the Meuse River on our right flank were a series of heights ideal for artillery positions, overlooking not only the valley, but all the ravines, the roads, and open places. Thus our 3d Corps, swinging toward the whaleback, was literally in a trough of fire from the heights of the whaleback in front and in flank and from the heights across the Meuse in flank. On our left flank our 1st Corps was in the same hateful position as our 3d on our right. The 28th Division was fighting against the wooded escarpments which extended from the bastion of the Argonne Forest into the river valley. In the forest itself, the 77th was meeting with stubborn resistance in the thick underbrush, and the French army on its left was as unable as the 28th Division on its right to relieve its situation.

Summerall's 1st Division of Regulars, the oldest of our divisions in France, with its rank full and its spirit high, which had been brought from Saint Mihiel and attached to the 5th Corps, was swung over to the 1st Corps for its part in the general attack set for October 4, 1918. It was evident that no further progress could be made until we had mastered the commanding heights on the eastern wall of the Aire, and for this task the 1st Division was chosen. Fighting with all the experienced skill and courage which was its characteristic, it succeeded in its undertaking in a series of continuing attacks and with a loss of over nine thousand men, which included about half its infantry. In order to spread the wedge which it started, Duncan's 82d, or All-American Division of the National Army, swung in on its left between it and Muir's 28th across the river bottoms against the heights on the other side. With this aid the 28th was able to continue its advance and complete its task before it was relieved, and the 77th Division, the French army now coming up on its left, was able to make a thrilling advance to the northern edge of the forest.

On the right of the 1st, Haan's 32d Division of Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard, with a heroism in keeping with its brilliant record on the Ourcq and at Juvigny, extended the wedge in that direction by repeated assaults upon the stubbornly defended positions which were a part of the Germans' powerful Romagne system. Later Menoher's Rainbow Division, the 42d, relieved the 1st Division, and with a tenacity of purpose in keeping with its veteran reputation continued attacking until its magnificent persistence had its reward. To the east the 3d Division (now commanded by Buck and later by Preston Brown), which had been the stone wall on the banks of the Marne against the fifth German offensive, was fighting against terrific odds. It was to pay for the ground which it gained in the ensuing days with over eight thousand casualties.

Meanwhile, with every advance that its divisions made, the position of Bullard's 3d Corps became more wickedly exposed to the fire from across the Meuse where the German artillery from its heights looked down upon our men as upon the arena

of an amphitheater. But here, as elsewhere, there was no cessation of the offensive. Hershey's 4th Regular Division, schooled in the Château-Thierry fighting, showed an endurance in keeping with its skill by remaining in line for over three weeks; the 5th Regulars, first commanded by MacMahon and then by Ely, which had learned their first lesson in attack by its taking of Frappelle in the Vosges Mountains, and which had again at Saint Mihiel shown a mettle which promised to make it dependable for any kind of an emergency, had now come in to take the place of Cronkhite's 80th in that trough of hell where it was to begin its long and thrilling career of accomplishment in the great battle. On its right, Allen's 90th National Army from Texas had come in on the left and immediately, though it had not been long in France, proved that it was worthy of the best traditions of its home State by its stoicism under gas and shells and the attacking fervor which were to give it a place of honor until the armistice was signed—after its crossing of the Meuse.

The Germans were now bringing in their best veteran shock divisions and countless machine guns manned by chosen "no quarter" gunners. It is significant that on September 29, 1918, three days after we had begun our Argonne attacks, Hindenburg had informed the German Government that it ought to sue for peace, and on October 3, 1918, after the British assault, which included our 2d Corps, had broken the Hindenburg line and the ferocious attacks against the positions in the Rheims sector had developed, that he informed the German Government that the situation of the German army was hopeless. Therefore the Germans on the Meuse-Argonne front were fighting with the desperation of men with their backs against the wall to save the line of communications for their retreat. Our lack of sufficient fresh divisions in reserve and of sufficient artillery in the second week of October, 1918, for extensive operations may have given them hope of success; but we were gathering our forces for another general attack.

Meanwhile it became increasingly evident that something must be done to stop the flanking fire into our 3d Corps from

across the Meuse where the 17th French Corps was calling for American divisions to assist in mastering the heights where the plentiful German artillery was in position. Bell's redoubtable 33d Division of Illinois National Guard had crossed the river from the left bank, after a most remarkable feat of bridge building under heavy fire, and had swung north as a part of a general attack against these heights. Here the fighting was to be equally as fierce and quite as thankless as on the main battle front; for here the Germans were in the area of their old Verdun offensive, and they were perfectly familiar with the ground and had at their backs all the roads and barracks which they had used in 1916. The main line of hills and ridges, and the covering positions of the lesser heights and slopes which they held, were already prepared with dugouts and cement pill boxes, while in place of Württembergers they brought in their best Prussian troops, with ample machine guns, to assist an artillery defense which had the sweep of a half-mile circle east and west of the Meuse, thus enabling them not only to concentrate at any point on our 3d Corps on the west bank of the Meuse, but upon the 17th French Corps on the east bank.

Our approach to these defenses was through the ruined villages of the Verdun battle fields and along the roads which led us into the bottom of a cup, with its rim occupied by the enemy, through a ravine which was truly called "Death Valley." Morton's 29th, National Guard of New Jersey, which was to have its first important battle experience in conquering positions which would have baffled the skill of the most veteran of divisions, advanced on the right of the 33d. Later Edwards's 26th "Yankee" Division, which had known all the kinds of fighting which the American army had to offer, arrived from its drive in closing the Saint Mihiel salient for a period of a remorseless. grinding fighting which was in keeping with its experience. Against pill boxes, woods, and twisting ravines, across open spaces swept by machine-gun fire, repulsed by counterattacks and attacking again, the 33d (until it was relieved), the 29th for a long period, and the 26th had a battle of their own under the 17th French Corps.

The Germans had even stronger reasons for not yielding the heights on the east of the Meuse than they had on the west of the Meuse. Once we had Belleu Wood and Pylon Observatory we looked down on a broad valley and were approaching the last of the hills which separated us from the plain of the Woevre and German soil. Indeed, this portion of the east bank of the Meuse was the very key to the positions where the Germans would have made their stand on a shorter line if they succeeded in withdrawing their army.

October 11, 1918, was memorable in the history of the organization of the American Expeditionary Force, as, on that day, General Pershing appointed Major General Hunter Liggett our pioneer corps commander, to command the 1st American Army, and appointed Major General Robert L. Bullard to the command of the 2d Army which was operating on the Saint Mihiel salient. Both were veterans who had won the additional star of a lieutenant general which they now received for long service in France. General Bullard had commanded the 1st Division: and two other men who had been trained in that veteran school also received promotions. Major General John L. Hines, who had come to France as a major, succeeded General Bullard in command of the 3d Corps and Major General Charles F. Summerall was given command of the 5th Corps in place of General Cameron. Major General Dickman, who had commanded the 3d Division in the Château-Thierry operations, succeeded General Liggett in command of the First Corps.

On October 14, 1918, another general attack for the length of the main battle front took place. The Germans could not afford to lose any great depth of ground or their main positions defending the crest of the whaleback would be in danger. All their skill was applied in their maze of machine-gun positions, to utilize every detail of advantage of that monstrously favorable ground of slopes, woods, and ravines. The American divisions, steeled now to this ruthless fighting against a hidden enemy, took machine guns only to find that there were machine guns behind them; they took woods, ravines, and crests only to find that there were more woods, ravines, and crests yet to be

conquered. They made vital gains and fought off fierce counterattacks to hold them. And the Germans brought in still more divisions and still more artillery and machine guns in their desperate determination which they set against that unremitting offensive spirit and unyielding will of the Americans. Under cold rain and mist in the soaked earth the grinding continued.

After the 77th Division had come out victorious from its long fight in the Argonne Forest, McCrea's 78th "Lightning" Naional Army Division had relieved it in that inconceivably hard and thankless task of cleaning up the town of Grand Pré and the positions north of the gap of Grand Pré. Day after day it kept on attacking even when there was a lull in other parts of the line. When Wright's 89th Division came into the line we had in these men of the Middle West, well drilled and in fine fettle, another new force in the battle which was to bring honor to the National Army and the nation. The 89th and the 90th and 5th Divisions and other divisions improved their opportunities in the final week of October, 1918, by taking positions which were valuable for the general attack, now in preparation, which was to take place on November 1, 1918.

With ample artillery and fresh reserves at our command we were determined to gain the summit of the whaleback in a final drive. This was the third phase of the battle, the second having been the long merciless hammering throughout the month of October, 1918, in which the endurance, the nerves and the aggressive spirit of American soldiers were tested as they never were before. Every day we were becoming more skillful in combat and our traffic arrangements were improving in their organization. The line from left to right on the morning of November 1, 1918, was: the 78th, 77th, 80th, 2d, 89th, 90th, and 5th Divisions. Our infantry, protected by the best artillery service which it had ever had, with the exception of some delay at certain points, irresistible in its sweep everywhere, gained its objectives, mastering the heights for which it had fought for six weeks. On November 2, 1918, the German communiqué made its confession to the German people that the American army had broken the German line.

The battle now became one of skillful maneuvers and rapid pursuit down the apron of lesser heights and slopes toward the Meuse. Behind the 1st Corps in reserve was the 42d Division; behind the 5th Corps in the center the 1st; and behind the 3d Corps on the right the 32d. These three veteran divisions, after their rest from the fearful fighting of the second phase of the battle, now had the opportunity finally, as the movement spread, to join in the glorious final phase which saw that army of regulars, guardsmen, and draftmen, the strongest force America had ever had under arms, as citizens victorious in the cause of democracy.

On November 11, 1918, when the armistice was signed, the 5th and 90th Divisions of the 3d Corps had swung well across the Meuse, taking the heights on the other side. The 89th and 2d Divisions were also across, while the 42d Division had reached the suburbs of Sedan, and the 77th Division was on the left bank. Kuhn's 79th Division from Camp Meade, which had relieved the worn and gallant 29th Division, which had done such lion's work across the Meuse, moving in unison with the operations beginning November 1, 1918, had conquered the heights which had poured their fire down into the trough where the Third Corps had fought. The 26th Division, which had stubbornly kept in line despite its losses and the misery of its position, was able to appreciate, as only such veterans could, the privilege of operating on the 79th's right, in mastering the positions on its front which had so long defied it. These two divisions were both attacking on the morning of the 11th. Before nightfall they had gained the last of the hills separating them from the plain of the Woevre. Thus the rapid daily advances of the American forces toward and across the Meuse, in their capture of the positions upon which the Germans depended for their winter defense line, had been not the least of the arguments which Marshal Foch was offering the Germans for signing the armistice.

We had only two divisions in reserve when hostilities finished. If we had come late into the war, once our legions were prepared, we had not been hesitant in giving them for service. All the resources of our army from the base ports to the front line had

been stretched to their limit. Our hospitals were full and our surgeons exhausted. We had broken up freshly arriving divisions when the Service of Supply demanded more labor in order that the demands of the front should be filled at this juncture when the hope had risen in every heart that by a supreme effort we might bring the orgy of the great war to a close. We had fought for six weeks in chill winter rains and in face of fire and of hardships: and in the test of nerves, courage, and devotion we had come out triumphant. And through it all there had been no finer heroism than that of the trained army nurses who kept cheerful when staggering with fatigue in caring for the wounded in our hospitals. Be it aviator or motor truck driver, soldier in the fox hole or stevedore on the docks, all had given their strength and zeal in keeping with the spirit of their errand in France. There remained the task of the organization of the 3d Army, under General Dickman from the veteran divisions, which had the fortune to be in the front line on November 11, 1918, to march through Luxemburg and across the German frontier to the Rhine, where they did their duty as policemen during the peace negotiations; and the further task of reversing the great machinery of the army, in sending the soldiers home in good health after their wonderful experience and splendid service.

## PART X—THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT PARIS

## CHAPTER L

FIRST SESSION OF PEACE CONGRESS—CLEMEN-CEAU, PERMANENT CHAIRMAN—PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT COMPLETED

THE Peace Congress held its first session at 3 o'clock in the afternoon on January 18, 1919, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. The scene of this historic event upon which the interest of the world centered was the former Salle d'Horloge, renamed for the occasion Salle de la Paix, one of the most magnificent reception rooms in all Europe.

The French Government had made careful preparation of the chamber for every need of the assembly, and in a manner worthy of such a gathering.

For the opening session seventy-two seats were provided, the Japanese, the British and Colonial delegates, and the fifth British delegate were on the outer side of the great horseshoe. To the right of the table of honor a seat was reserved for the fifth American delegate.

The delegates representing Italy, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, Peru, Portugal, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay were seated in the order named.

At the left wing of the table sat the delegates of Siam, Rumania, Poland, Liberia, Hedjaz, Ecuador, China, and Bolivia.


A striking object among the decorations of the splendid chamber was a heroic marble statue of Peace holding aloft the

torch of Civilization which stood behind the chair of Premier Clemenceau.


A council table of horseshoe form, covered with green baize, stood directly before the statue. Nine seats of honor had been prepared at the upper end of the table for the presiding officer, the vice presidents and the premiers. On each side of the wings of the great horseshoe there were fifteen seats, making sixty in all, in addition to the nine seats of honor at the head of the table.

The seats, upholstered in leather of a vivid crimson, served to emphasize and throw into relief the figures of the representatives in somewhat somber attire. The walls of the chamber were decorated in white and gold and from the ceiling, whose borders were frescoed with dancing Cupids in pastel shades, hung four great crystal chandeliers. An abundance of light from five large windows overlooking the Seine made it possible for the delegates to read and write in any part of the hall. From the council room there opened another sumptuous apartment overlooking the gardens where the delegates could retire for consultations. Adjoining was a superbly furnished dining room, where meals could be served when protracted meetings were held.

Long before the Peace Congress began its session the Quai d'Orsay was thronged with people, their eyes fixed on the windows of the Salle de la Paix. The Palais Bourbon and the Foreign Office were protected by a line of troops, and a special guard of honor was drawn up near the entrance to the Foreign Office, the delegates passing through a double file of soldiers. Each arrival was the signal for a fanfare of trumpets and full military honors from the troops on guard. President Wilson's appearance a few minutes before the time fixed for the opening of the session was the occasion for a remarkable demonstration of good will on the part of the crowd. The President joined M. Pichon, the French foreign minister, in the anteroom and was conducted to the council chamber. At the table of honor Mr. Wilson was joined by Secretary Lansing, Mr. White, and General Bliss, and exchanged greeting with other delegates.



The American Peace Mission, photographed at Hotel Crillon, Paris. From left to right, they are, Colonel E. M. House, Robert Lansing, President Wilson, Henry While, and General Tasker Bliss



President Poincaré entered the chamber at 3 o'clock, and the entire assembly stood up as he delivered his address, which was in French. After he had concluded, an interpreter read the speech in English.

In the course of his remarks, which were delivered with calm earnestness, M. Poincaré, after greeting the delegates in the name of the French Republic, reviewed the course of the war, placing on Germany the guilt of premeditation in plunging the world into frightful disaster for the purpose of spoils and conquest. He praised the Allies for the mighty efforts they had made to crush the German menace, and dwelt on America's unselfishness in entering the world war in defense of free ideals.

In conclusion he spoke warmly in favor of the League of Nations, which would be a supreme guaranty against any fresh assault upon the rights of peoples. M. Poincaré then declared the congress open and retired.

Georges Clemenceau, the French premier, was elected permanent chairman of the conference. Speeches by President Wilson, Premier Lloyd-George, and Baron Sonnino expressed the desire of the representatives of the different nations to reach a friendly understanding with respect to the problems that were to be decided at the conference.

President Wilson, in proposing Premier Clemenceau for the permanent chairmanship, said:

"It gives me great pleasure to propose as permanent chairman of the conference Mr. Clemenceau, the president of the council.

"I would do this as a matter of custom. I would do this as a tribute to the French Republic. But I wish to do it as something more than that. I wish to do it as the tribute to the man.

"France deserves the precedence, not only because we are meeting at her capital, and because she has undergone some of the most tragical suffering of the war, but also because her capital, her ancient and beautiful capital, has so often been the center of conferences of this sort, on which the fortunes of large parts of the world turned.

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"It is a very delightful thought that the history of the world, which has so often been centered here, will now be crowned by the achievements of this conference—because there is a sense in which this is the supreme conference of the history of mankind.

"More nations are represented here than were ever represented in such a conference before. The fortunes of all peoples are involved. A great war is ended which seemed about to bring a universal cataclysm. The danger is past. A victory has been won for mankind, and it is delightful that we should be able to record these results in this place.

"But it is more delightful to honor France, because we can honor her in the person of so distinguished a servant. We have all felt in our participation in the struggles of this war the fine steadfastness which characterized the leadership of the French in the hands of Mr. Clemenceau. We have learned to admire him, and those of us who have been associated with him have acquired a genuine affection for him.

"Moreover, those of us who have been in these recent days in constant consultation with him know how warmly his purpose is set toward the goal of achievement to which all our faces are turned. He feels as we feel, as I have no doubt everyone in this room feels, that we are trusted to do a great thing, to do it in the highest spirit of friendship and accommodation, and to do it as promptly as possible in order that the hearts of men may have fear lifted from them, and that they may return to those purposes of life which will bring them happiness and contentment and prosperity.

"Knowing his brotherhood of heart in these great matters, it affords me a personal pleasure to propose that Mr. Clemenceau shall be the permanent chairman of this conference."

In accepting the presidency of the congress M. Clemenceau expressed his gratification for the honor paid him and outlined the principal questions which the conference must decide. The three principal subjects of these were, he said, responsibility of the authors of the war, responsibility for the crimes committed during the war, and international labor legislation. The League of Nations would lead the program at the next full session.

Mr. Lloyd-George, who seconded Mr. Wilson's motion, and Baron Sonnino, the Italian foreign minister, paid tribute to M. Clemenceau's courage, energy, and inspiration which had helped the Allies to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion.

At this session the regulations governing the conference proceedings were adopted. The following were the regulations regarding the composition of the congress:

The belligerent Powers with general interests—the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan—shall take part in all meetings and commissions.

The belligerent Powers with particular interests—Belgium, Brazil, the British Dominions, and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugual, Rumania, Serbia, Siam and the Czecho-Slovak Republic—shall take part in these sittings at which questions concerning them are discussed.

The Powers in a state of diplomatic rupture with the enemy powers—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay—shall take part in the sittings at which questions concerning them are discussed.

The neutral Powers, and states in process of formation, may be heard either orally or in writing, when summoned by the Powers with general interests at sittings devoted especially to the examination of questions directly concerning them, but only so far as these questions are concerned.

The representation of the different Powers was fixed as follows:

Five for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; three for Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia; two for China, Greece, the king of the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic; one for Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama; one for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.

The British Dominions and India were to be represented as follows:

Two delegates each for Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India, including the native states; one delegate for New Zealand.

Although the number of delegates must not exceed the above figures, each delegate had the right to avail himself of the panel system, by which the representatives of the Dominions, New Zealand, and India might be included in the representation of the British Empire.

Montenegro would be represented by one delegate as soon as the political situation of the country was cleared up. The conference would fix the representation of Russia at the moment when the matters concerning Russia were examined.

It was further decided that the secretariat should be appointed from outside the plenipotentiaries, composed of one representative of the United States of America, one of the British Empire, one of France, one of Italy, and one of Japan.

It was decided that the publicity of the proceedings should be assured by official communiqués prepared by the secretariat and made public. In case of a disagreement as to the drafting of these communiqués the matter should be referred to the principal plenipotentiaries or their representatives.

A provision was made that all questions to be decided upon should be subject to two readings. The program regarding resolutions which was agreed upon was, in brief, that a committee should be formed for drafting the resolutions adopted, composed of five members not forming part of the plenipotentiary delegates, and composed of one representative of the United States of America, one of the British Empire, one of France, one of Italy, and one of Japan. This committee should concern itself only with questions that have been decided. Its sole duty should be to draw up the text of the decision adopted and to present it for the approval of the conference.

The supreme council, consisting of two ranking delegates from each of the five chief Powers, held its first session on January 20, 1919, when the Russian situation was considered and was further discussed on the following day. At the session of the council of January 22, 1919, the decision was announced by which all Russian factions were invited to a conference at Princes' Island, Sea of Marmora. (The proposed conference was subsequently abandoned, as certain Russian factions re-

fused to negotiate with representatives of the Soviet Government of Lenine and Trotzky.)

At the meeting of the supreme council on January 23, 1919, an order of business was announced for a plenary meeting of the conference on January 25, 1919, when the following questions were considered for this purpose.

First.—International legislation on labor.

Second.—Responsibility and punishments in connection with the war.

Third.—Reparation for war damage.

Four.—International régime of ports, waterways, and rail-ways.

On January 24, 1919, the supreme council met for the first time as the supreme war council. Besides President Wilson and the premiers and foreign ministers of the Allied Powers, there were present also Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig, General Pershing, General Diaz, and the generals of the Versailles war council, including Generals Wilson, Bliss, Bolling, and Robilant.

The council conferred with Marshal Foch and other military authorities as to the strength of the forces to be allowed to the various Allied Powers on the western front during the period of the armistice.

The President of the United States and the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the Allied and Associated Governments addressed a communication to the world in which reference was made regarding the use of armed force in many parts of Europe and the East to gain possession of territory "the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine." Those employing armed force for such purposes were warned that they were prejudicing their claims by so doing, and that "if they expect justice, they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the Conference of Peace."

On the same day the mission of the Allies and Associated Great Powers to Poland was discussed. It was agreed that M. Pichon, the French foreign minister, should prepare the instructions to the mission, and that one press representative for each

of the five great Powers should be allowed to accompany the mission. The question of territorial adjustment concerning the German colonies was then discussed by Sir Robert Borden, prime minister of Canada; Mr. Hughes, prime minister of Australia; General Smuts, representing General Botha, the prime minister of South Africa, and Mr. Massey, prime minister of New Zealand.

At the second plenary session of the Peace Conference on January 25, 1919, with M. Clemenceau in the chair, the plan for a League of Nations was unanimously adopted. The resolution on the creation of a committee on the League of Nations was as follows:

It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement which the associated nations are now met to establish that a League of Nations be created to promote international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

This league should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

The members of the league should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretaries to carry on the business of the league in the intervals between the conference.

The conference therefore appoints a committee, representative of the Associated Governments, to work out the constitution and the functions of the league, and the draft of resolutions in regard to breaches of the laws of war for presentation to the Peace Congress.

That a commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire upon the following:

First.—The responsibility of the authors of the war.

Second.—The facts as to the breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

Third.—The degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemy's forces, including

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members of the General Staffs and other individuals however highly placed.

Fourth.—The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offenses.

After the reading of the resolutions by M. Clemenceau President Wilson addressed the assembly. He said that they had met together for two purposes: to make the present settlements rendered necessary by the war and to secure the lasting peace of the world not only by the present settlements, but by the arrangements which they should make for its maintenance.

The League of Nations Mr. Wilson believed to be necessary for both of these purposes. Some complicated questions could not be worked out to an ultimate issue at the time, but would need subsequent consideration, they were not susceptible of confident judgments at present. It would be necessary to set up some machinery to render the work of the conference complete.

"We have assembled here for the purpose of doing very much more than making the present settlements that are necessary.
... We are not the representative of governments, but representatives of the peoples. It will not suffice to satisfy governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind.

"The burdens of the war have fallen in an unusual degree upon the whole population of the countries involved." Here, Mr. Wilson spoke of the burden thrown upon the older men, women, and children, upon the homes of the civilized world.

These people looked to this assembly to make a peace which would make them secure. "It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make permanent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and peace maintained. . . . Central settlements may be temporary, but the actions of the nations in the interest of peace and justice must be permanent. We can set up permanent processes. We may not be able to set up a permanent decision."

In a sense, said President Wilson, the United States was less interested in this subject than the other nations here assembled. Her great territory and extensive sea borders made her less likely to suffer from enemy attacks than other nations. The deep ardor of the United States for the society of nations did not spring from apprehension, but out of the ideals begotten of the war.

"In coming into this war the United States never for a moment thought that she was intervening in the politics of Europe, or the politics of Asia, or the politics of any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause of justice and liberty for men of every kind and place.

"Therefore the United States would feel that its part in this war should be played in vain if there ensued upon it abortive European settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guaranty involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the associated nations of the world."

To make the League of Nations a vital thing, said Mr. Wilson, it must continue to function, there must be no intermission of its watchfulness and of its labor; it should be the eye of the nations to keep watch upon the common interest.

The select classes of mankind, said President Wilson, were no longer governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind were now in the hands of the plain people of the whole world. "Satisfy them and you have justified their confidence not only, but have established peace. Fail to satisfy them and no arrangement that you can make will either set up or steady the peace of the world." In the United States the great project of a League of Nations was regarded as the keynote of the whole. "If we returned to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow citizens. . . . We have no choice but to observe their mandate. But it is with the greatest pleasure and enthusiasm that we accept that mandate. And because this is the keynote of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instructions; we would not dare to compromise upon any matter as the champions of this thing—the peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle that we are the masters of no peoples, but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own destinies, not as we wish, but as they wish.

"We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the private choice of a small coterie of civil rulers, of military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great Powers upon the small. Those foundations were the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in the game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace. . ."

Mr. Lloyd-George, the British premier, and Signor Orlando, premier of Italy, followed President Wilson, and made eloquent speeches in support of the resolution. After Leon Bourgeois, a French delegate, and representatives of China, Poland, and Belgium had expressed their adherence to the plan for a League of Nations the resolution was unanimously adopted.

It was decided at the conference to appoint a commission in regard to reparation for war damage to consist of representatives from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia who would report on the amount of reparation which the enemy countries ought to pay, on what they are capable of paying, and on the method, form, and time within which payment should be made.

A resolution in regard to international legislation on industrial and labor questions was also passed. This provided for the appointment of two representatives apiece from the five great Powers and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers represented at the Peace Conference to inquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect and to recommend the form of a permanent agency, to continue such inquiry in cooperation with and under the direction of the League of Nations. The conference also adopted a resolution to

appoint a commission to inquire and report upon the international régime of ports, waterways, and railways.

The supreme council at its session on January 27, 1919, prepared a program of work and the constitution of new committees for economic and financial questions and those relating to private and maritime laws. The question of the former German colonies was discussed on the following day. At the two sessions of the supreme council on January 29, 1919, reports were heard from delegates on the Polish situation and Polish claims, and the Czecho-Slovak delegates gave their views.

The question of Kiauchau and the Pacific Islands created sharp differences between the delegates of China and Japan. China finally agreed that Kiauchau should be left to the disposal of Japan, to be restored to China on condition that it was opened as a commercial port.

At the meeting of the supreme council on January 30, 1919, the question of the German colonies in the Pacific and in Africa and the occupied territory in Turkey was discussed. Provisional arrangements were made to incorporate in the constitution of the League of Nation a plan for administering the German colonies by which the league should assign them to various powers for administration. This was opposed by the representative of Australia, who insisted on the annexation of New Guinea to Australia.

President Wilson was firmly opposed to a division of Germany's colonial possessions among the Powers which then held them. He believed that to divide the colonies among the Entente nations would be in direct contravention of the "Fourteen Points" which had been accepted as a basis of peace, and would violate the principles of the League of Nations.

The famous "Fourteen Points," it will be remembered, were formulated by President Wilson, and in January, 1918, were offered to the belligerent nations as the foundation for peace negotiations:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any

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kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as seas may be closed in whole, or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal as far as possible of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associated for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and also impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon the strict observance of principles that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the desired determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under the institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of the comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they themselves have set and determined for the

government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrongs done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace and Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development.

XI. Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nations which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity for autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenants.

XIV. A genuine association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small states alike.

At the session of the supreme council on February 1, 1919, a decision was reached concerning the German colonies and the conditions were later confirmed by the covenant of the League of Nations.

President Wilson presided at the opening meeting of the League of Nations Commission on February 3, 1919, held at the residence of Colonel Edward House in Paris. The United States was represented by Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and Mr. Miller, technical expert. Lord Robert Cecil and General Christian Smuts represented Great Britain; for France, Leon Bourgeois and Ferdinand Larnaude; for Italy Premier Orlando, and for Japan Baron Chinda; also delegates from Belgium, Serbia, Brazil, Portugal, and China.

The discussion in which Mr. Wilson took a leading part was not general but specific, as the printed text of the agreed plan for the formation of the League of Nations was before the meeting.

On the same date important committees on reparation, ports, waterways and railways held their first formal meetings. The French and British presented a program recognizing the right of nations to control international waterways and international railways, which was accepted by the commission.

The commission of the Allied Nations held daily sessions beginning February 4, 1919, and made continued progress. The delegates were unanimous in believing that a League of Nations was desirable, but some doubted its immediate efficiency and favored maintaining the old order of balance of power until the new plan had demonstrated its capacity and workability, to meet the needs of nations loving peace. Much time was spent in winning over these dissenters, and it was only accomplished after long and patient endeavors.

The final session of the League of Nations Commission was held on February 13, 1919, when a French delegate offered a clause for an interallied military force to compel peace, and the Japanese presented an amendment providing that racial discrimination should not be tolerated. Both proposals were defeated.

At this meeting the constitution of the League of Nations as finally drafted was unanimously adopted by the committee and President Wilson was designated to present the completed plan to the plenary council at their next session.

## CHAPTER LI

THE COVENANT AND DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—PRESIDENT
WILSON'S SPEECH IN SUPPORT; HE RETURNS
TO AMERICA—THE UNITED STATES SENATE
CRITICISES LEAGUE DOCUMENT

ON February 14, 1919, President Wilson read the draft of the constitution of the League of Nations before the plenary council of the Peace Conference and afterward delivered an earnest and spirited address in support of the plan. Lord Robert Cecil, head of the British delegation, expressed his approval of the League and constitution in an eloquent speech, and the Italian Premier Signor Orlando, described his satisfaction at having collaborated in one of the greatest documents in all history.

Leon Bourgeois, for France, said that the French delegation reserved the right to present their views on certain details of the plan which made no distinction between great and small States. France and Belgium, said M. Bourgeois, were especially exposed to danger, and required additional guarantees. He urged a system of permanent inspection of existing armaments and forces as a means to avoid the renewal of wars.

The text of the document read by President Wilson at the plenary session, opening with a preamble, is here given in full.

"In order to promote international cooperation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations."

Of the twenty-six articles which comprise the constitution of the League of Nations some were afterward amended, and such changes will be noted later in their place.

The first seven articles of the constitution which are the least important to the general reader may be thus summarized:

The action of the high contracting parties under the terms of the covenant shall be effected through the meeting of a body of delegates representing them, and the meetings of an executive council, and of a permanent international secretariat to be established at the seat of the League. Each of the high contracting parties shall have one vote, but not more than three representatives.

The executive council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and representatives of four other states members of the League. Meetings shall be held as occasion requires and at least once a year. Any Power shall be invited to attend a meeting of the council when matters concerning its interests are to be discussed. The first meeting of the body of delegates shall be summoned by the President of the United States.

Admission to the League of states not signatories to the covenant requires the assent of not less than two-thirds of the states represented in the body of delegates. Only full self-governing countries or dominions shall be admitted.

Article VIII. Provides that the executive council shall determine for the consideration of the several governments what military equipment and armament is fair in proportion to the scale of forces, laid down in the program of disarmament. The high contracting parties agree to examine the manufacture by private enterprise of war material and direct the executive

council to advise how to prevent the evil effects attendant on such manufacture, respecting the need of those countries that cannot manufacture munitions and war implements necessary for their safety.

Article IX. Permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provisions of articles I and VIII and on military and naval questions generally.

Article X. This and the two following, as among the most important articles in the constitution, and which became the subject of heated controversy, must be given in full:

"The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the states members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat of danger of such aggression, the executive council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled."

Article XI. States that any war, or threat of war, is a matter of concern to the League, and the high contracting parties reserve the right to take such action as will conserve the peace of nations.

Article XII. States in effect that if disputes arise that cannot be adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy no resort to war will be made until the questions involved are submitted for arbitration of the executive council. Until three months after the award by the arbitrators war will not even then be resorted to against a member of the League which complies with the award of the arbitrators, or the recommendation of the executive council.

Article XIII. The high contracting parties agree that disputes or difficulties arising between them which cannot be settled by diplomacy they will submit the whole matter to arbitration. They agree to carry out in good faith any award that may be rendered.

Article XIV. Provides for the establishment of an international court of justice to hear and determine any matters suitable for submission to it for arbitration.

Article XV. Disputes between members of the League not submitted to arbitration shall be referred to the executive council. If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the council shall be published and recommendation made by the council for the settlement of the difficulty. If the report is unanimously agreed to by the council other than the parties to the dispute, the high contracting parties agree that they will not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendations.

Article XVI. "Should any of the high contracting parties break or disregard its covenants under Article XII, it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, which hereby immediately undertakes to subject it to the severance of all intercourse between their nationals, trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the convenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.

"It shall be the duty of the executive committee council in such a case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenant of the League." This article further states that the high contracting parties agree to mutully support each other financially and economically, and in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the convenant-breaking state.

Article XVII. Considers disputes between one state member of the League and another state which is not a member of the League, or between states not members of the League. In such event the high contracting parties invite the state, or states, not members of the League to become members and accept the obligations of the League membership for the dispute in such conditions as the executive council shall deem just. The executive council will immediately inquire into the merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may be deemed just and war St. 8—BB

equitable. Any Power refusing to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of the League would constitute a breach of Article XII. The provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable too against a state taking such action.

Article XVIII. In this article the League is empowered with general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with countries where control of the traffic is necessary.

Article XIX. Deals with the question of colonies and territories which through the war have ceased to be under the old sovereignty. "Inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves . . . there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League." The tutelage of such peoples, it was advised, should be intrusted to the advanced nations, and should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League. Communities that have reached a stage of development as in Turkey could be provisionally recognized as independent nations, subject to administrative advice and assistance by mandatory power until they were strong enough to stand alone.

Article XX. In this the League promises to endeavor to secure and maintain fair conditions of labor for men, women, and children in all countries where their commercial and industrial relations extend, and agree to establish a permanent bureau of labor.

Article XXI. Provision through the instrumentality of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all states members of the League. Special arrangements with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated during the war.

Article XXII. The high contracting parties agree to place under control of the League all international bureaus already established if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus in the future shall be placed under the League.

Article XXIII. Every treaty or international engagement entered into by any member of the League shall be registered with the secretary general and published by him. No treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

Article XXIV. The body of delegates shall have the right to advise the reconsideration by states members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and of international conditions of which the continuance may endanger world peace.

Article XXV. The high contracting parties agree to abrogate all obligations inconsistent with the terms of the covenant, and will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with those terms. Powers signatory hereto, or subsequently admitted to the League, who have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this convenant shall take steps to secure release from such obligations.

Article XXVI is concerned with amendments to the covenant. These are to take effect when ratified by the states whose representatives compose the executive council, and by three-fourths of the states whose representatives compose the body of delegates.

At the conclusion of his reading of the draft of the constitution of the League, President Wilson said in part:

"It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it, and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called upon to make definite. It is a definite guaranty of peace. It is a definite guaranty by word against aggression. It is a definite guaranty against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin.

"Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared and its powers are unmistakable. It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for cooperation in any international matter. That is the significance of the provision introduced concerning labor. There are many

ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion. I anticipate that there will be a very great usefulness in the bureau of labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the League. Men, women, and children who work have been in the background through long ages, and sometimes seemed to be forgotten. . . . Now these people will be drawn into the field of international consultation and help and will be the wards of the combined governments of the world.

"As you will notice there is an imperative article concerning the publicity of all international agreements. Henceforth no member of the League can claim any agreement valid which it has not registered with the secretary general... And the duty is laid upon the secretary general to publish every document of that sort, at the earliest possible time. . . .

"Then there is a feature about this covenant which to my mind is one of the greatest and most satisfactory advances that have been made. We are done with annexations of helpless peoples, meant in some instances by some Powers to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of the world . . . put an obligation upon us to look after their interests primarily before we use them for our interests and that in all cases of this sort hereafter it shall be the duty of the League to see that the nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and directors of these peoples shall look to their interests and their development before they look to the interests and desires of the mandatory nation itself. . . .

"It has been one of the many distressing revelations of recent years that the great Power which has just been happily defeated put intolerable burdens and injustice upon the helpless peoples of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself, that its interest was rather their extermination than their development, that the desire was to possess their land for European purposes and not to enjoy their confidence in order that mankind might be lifted in these places to the next higher level.

"Now the world, expressing its conscience in law, says there is an end of that, that our consciences shall be settled to this

thing. States will be picked out which have shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world will come into a new light and into a new hope.

"So I think that I can say of this document that it is at one and the same time a practical document, a human document. There is a pulse of sympathy in it. There is a compulsion of conscience throughout it. It is practical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate.

"It was in one sense, said Mr. Wilson, a belated document, for he believed the conscience of the world had long been prepared to express itself in some such way.

"We are not just now discovering our sympathy for these peoples and our interest in them. We are simply expressing it, for it has long been felt and in the administration of the affairs of more than one of the great states represented here—so far as I know all of the great states that are represented here—that humane impulse has already expressed itself in their dealings with their colonies whose peoples were yet at a low stage of civilization.

... "Many terrible things have come out of this war, gentlemen, but some very beautiful things have come out of it. Wrong has been defeated, but the rest of the world has been more conscious than it ever was before of the majority of right. People that were suspicious of each other can now live as friends and comrades in a single family, and desire to do so. The miasma of distrust, of intrigue is cleared away. Men are looking eye to eye and saying: 'We are brothers, and have a common purpose. We did not realize it before, but now we do realize it, and this is our covenant of friendship.'"

After notifying by cable the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs at Washington, that he would return to America and confer with them at the White House, President Wilson sailed from Brest for home on February 15, 1919. Greeted at Boston by a great multitude of enthusiastic citizens, he delivered an address in the afternoon to 7,000 people assembled in Mechanic Hall on the subject of the League of Nations. Traver-

sing much of the ground he had covered in his speech on the draft of the League in Paris, Mr. Wilson said he had been impressed with the wonderful fact during his work at the Peace Conference that there was no nation in Europe that suspected the motives of the United States. . . .

"Before this war, Europe did not believe in us as she does now. She did not believe in us during the first three years of the war. She seems to have believed that we were holding off because we thought we could make more by staying out than by going in. And, all of a sudden, in a short eighteen months, the whole verdict is reversed. . . . They saw what we did—that, without making a single claim, we put all our men and all our means at the disposal of those who were fighting for their homes, in the first instance, but for a cause, the cause of human rights and justice, and that we went in, not to support their national claims, but to support the great cause which they held in common. And when they saw that not only America held ideas, but acted ideals, they were converted to America and became firm partisans of those ideals. . .

"And now do you realize that this confidence which we have established throughout the world imposes a burden upon us, if you choose to call it a burden? It is one of those burdens which any nation should be proud to carry."

President Wilson said that all the peoples of Europe were buoyed up with a new hope, that they believed a new age was dawning, when nations would understand each other and support each other in every just cause and unite every moral and physical strength to see that right should prevail. "If America were at this juncture to fail the world, what would become of it?" He dwelt on the despair and bitterness that would follow if America failed to justify the world's hope; on the return to the old bad conditions that had prevailed before the war when all European nations were hostile camps.

Yet the most satisfactory treaty of peace, said Mr. Wilson, would have little value unless it were backed by the united nations to defend it, with great forces combined to make it good, and the assurance given to oppressed peoples of the world

that they should be safe. America would not disappoint the hopes of the world, and would make men free. "If we did not do that, the fame of America would be gone and all her power would be dissipated. She then would have to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no sweep beyond the nearest horizon." He spoke of the claims of Poland, and the wrongs of Armenia, and of the aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs, and how certain powers would pounce upon them if there were not the guarantees of the world behind their liberty.

President Wilson said he had returned to report progress which would not stop short of the goal. The people were in the saddle and they would see to it that if their own present governments did not do their will some other governments shall. "And the secret is out and the present governments know it."

Before President Wilson returned to America the League of Nations covenant had already been discussed in the United States Senate. The Republican members in particular were vehement and even bitter in denouncing the project as set forth in the original draft. Senator Poindexter declared in the course of a three-hour speech that the charter of the League meant surrender of American sovereignty to European nations. Article X bound the United States as one of the contracting parties, he said, to preserve against aggressions the territory and political independence in all states members of the League. This, argued the Senator, would compel the United States to tax its people and sacrifice its soldiers to make war on behalf of a foreign country. In mixing in the affairs of small European nations, these small nations would intrude into the affairs of the United States. To place into the hands of the council of the League of Nations-all but one foreigners with different ideals and interests-such control over the sovereign action of the American people for which so many heroes had labored "would be as though it were a pitiful murder of the very souls of our fathers in their own house, builded by their hands. . . ."

Senator Borah, Republican, attacked the League as a radical departure from the policy laid down in Washington's Farewell

Address and the Monroe Doctrine. Article X, which provided for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the nations of the League, the Senator said, would first obligate America to protect the territorial integrity of Great Britain. If the British Empire was threatened in any part, not the United States Congress, or the people, or the Government would determine what should be done, but the executive council, of which the American people had one member, would determine what should be done. The British Empire, united in interest with Italy and Japan, would outvote America in the League. The whole project, he believed, would sterilize the principle of nationalism and abrogate the American Constitution.

The League found a sturdy and eloquent champion in Senator Hitchcock, Democrat, of Nebraska, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. In the course of a speech delivered on February 27, 1919, Senator Hitchcock expressed his belief that the League was a positive guaranty against future world wars. The attitude Japan might take regarding her nationals was not a cause for worry. Japan had already recognized the exclusion laws of the United States. There was no question about Mexico, which could not give guaranties of international obligations and therefore would not be admitted to the League.

Senator Hitchcock declared that those who opposed the League were thinking in the terms of the past. The fear expressed that the League would open the way to European despotism was without foundation, for the spirit of despotism had vanished. Democracy was the mastering spirit in all the nine nations represented in the executive council, yes, even in Japan. Such a league, he argued, with its provision of arbitration and delay for calm consideration, would make war improbable. The restrictions on armaments would save the great nations billions and eliminate oppressive tax burdens.

One of the principal arguments against the League was that in joining it America would have to renounce the Monroe Doctrine and relinquish the right to attack any nation that attempted to establish itself in the Western Hemisphere. Senator Hitchcock argued that the League of Nations included the very purposes of the Monroe Doctrine in that it prevented the aggression of nations upon each other. An unfriendly act, or attack, upon any American republic, or upon the United States, would at once be the subject of inquiry and action by the League of Nations. America also would no longer be compelled to defend alone the Western Hemisphere, but would be backed by the sympathy and help of the League of Nations.

"We have been told that this is one of those entangling alliances against which Washington warned us. I deny it. In Washington's day the world was full of alliances, the nations of the world were seeking to maintain, through the theories of the balance of power, their rival interest. Alliances were for the very purpose of waging war, whereas the League of Nations is a great covenant among the democracies of the world for the purposes of preserving peace."

Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Republican leader in the Senate, expressed the definite opposition of his party to the League as proposed in a speech before the Senate on February 28, 1919.

Senator Knox, Republican, of Pennsylvania, ex-Secretary of State and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, speaking on March 1, 1919, before the Senate, expressed himself in favor of a modified League that would preserve our sovereignty. The chief points in his argument may be summarized.

The Central Powers must not be left out of the League, or it would force them for mutual protection to form a second League of Nations, which the neutral states would almost certainly join. The result would be two great camps, each preparing for a new and greater life-and-death struggle.

Even the term League of Nations was a misnomer, for according to the proposed plan the nations of the world were divided into three classes.

First.—Signatories to the covenant confined perhaps to the five great Entente Powers—British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and United States.

Second.—States not signatory, but named in the protocol, in-

cluding possibly such Entente Powers, if any, as were not signatories, as well as other states neutral in the war.

Third.—Those states which are neither signatories nor protocol states which must furnish guaranties as to their intention to be bound by their internationl obligations, to be admitted to the League.

Thus the League of Nations, said Senator Knox, in the sense of all the nations was not created by the document, nor were the states members of the League treated as equals. He pointed out the difficulties in withdrawing from the League. "Once in this union we remain there no matter how onerous its gigantic burdens may become."

The climax to the senatorial discussion came when Senator Lodge circulated a proposal to reject the League of Nations constitution as then drafted. Thirty-nine members of the next Senate, said Senator Lodge, approved of the proposal, and read out their names. The thirty-nine members of the next Senate, if they stood fast for rejecting the League's constitution, would represent more than one-third of the body which must ratify any treaty by a two-thirds vote before it became effective.

Immediately after Congress adjourned on March 4, 1919, President Wilson left Washington for New York, where he delivered an address on the League in the evening of that date at the Metropolitan Opera House.

President Wilson in his address covered much the same ground he had traversed in his Boston speech, and paid his respects to the critics of the covenant in somewhat scathing terms. He was amazed that there should be in some quarters such ignorance of the state of the world. "These gentlemen do not know what the mind of men is just now. Everybody else does. I do not know where they have been closeted. I do not know by what influences they have been blinded; but I do know that they have been separated from the general currents of the thought of mankind. . . . I have heard no counsel of generosity in their criticism. I have heard no constructive suggestions. I have heard nothing except 'will it not be dangerous to us to help the world?' It will be fatal to us not to help it."

After concluding his address President Wilson and party boarded the George Washington and sailed again for France.

The attacks on the League of Nations in the United States affected the attitude of the French press and of the delegates in Paris, who had been critical of the project. But as soon as it became apparent that the Wilson program was in danger of defeat at home the press rallied to its support and the delegates, fearing failure of the whole project, became advocates of the covenant as it stood. Only Germany denounced it as unjust to the German people. Italy gave unqualified support, and England's attitude, as expressed through Mr. Balfour, was that an immense responsibility rested on the American people. "They have come into the war. Their action has had profound importance. Their service to mankind in this crisis will make a great page in their history. But that service is only half accomplished if they do not take a share in the even more responsible labors of peace."

The effect of the assaults upon the League was to speed up the preliminary work on the Peace Treaty.

# CHAPTER LIL

REVISED COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—THE TREATY OF PEACE.

On April 28, 1919, the revised covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the plenary session of the Peace Conference without divisions and without amendment. Sir Eric Drummond of Great Britain was nominated the first secretary general of the League.

The covenant as drafted may be briefly summed up.

"The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this covenant, and also such of those other states named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant." (In the annex to the covenant the original members of the League of Nations signatory to the treaty of peace are given as follows: the United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New South Wales, India, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, Siam, and Uruguay. States invited to accede to the covenant: Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela.) It is interesting to note that Mexico was not included among the states invited to join the League.

Article I, as revised, provides that "Any self-governing state, dominion, or colony, not named in the annex may become a member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the assembly, provided it shall give effective guaranties of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments.

"Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal."

Article IV, as revised, reads: "The council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, together with four other members of the League. These four members of the League shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the League first selected by the assembly, representatives of (blank) shall be members of the council."

Two new paragraphs in this article provide specifically for one vote for each member of the League in the council, which was understood before, and providing also for one representative of each member of the League. A new paragraph in Article V expressly incorporates the provision as to the unanimity of voting, which was at first taken for granted. The second paragraph of Article VI has added to it that a majority of the assembly must approve the appointment of the secretary general.

In Article VII Geneva is named as the seat of the League, as before, but the council are given power to establish it elsewhere if subsequently desired.

A new paragraph in Article VII establishes equality of employment of men and women by the League.

An added paragraph in Article XIII gives instances of disputes which are generally suitable to arbitration, such disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact, which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach.

A new paragraph added to Article XV is an amendment regarding domestic jurisdiction, that where the council finds that a question arising out of an international dispute affects matters which are clearly under the domestic jurisdiction of one or other of the parties, it is to report to that effect and make no recommendation.

A new paragraph in Article XVI provides for expulsion from the League when a member violates any covenant "by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon."

Article XXI was not in the first draft of the League covenant and reads: "Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration, or regional understandings, such as the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

This amendment recognizing the validity of the Monroe Doctrine meets the "inequality of voting power" criticism, and its inclusion in the covenant was regarded as a personal triumph for President Wilson.

Article XXII provides that all agreements shall be unanimous and that a nation must decide whether it is to be a mandatory for any other nation.

Article XXIII contains a new clause providing for just treatment of the aborigines, a clause looking toward prevention of the white slave traffic and opium traffic, and a clause looking toward progress in international prevention of disease.

Article XXV specifically mentions the Red Cross as one of the international organizations which are to connect their work with the work of the League.

Article XXVI permits the amendment of the covenant by a majority of the states composing the assembly, instead of three-fourths of the states, though it does not change the requirement in that matter with regard to the vote of the council. A new paragraph was added to this Article at the request of the Brazilian delegates in order to avoid constitutional difficulties. It permits any member of the League to dissent from an amendment, the effect of such dissent being withdrawal from the League.

On May 7, 1919 (the anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*), the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Germany on the other was delivered to the German plenipotentiaries at Versailles. Fifteen days were allowed for reply.

The treaty represents the work of more than a thousand experts who were continuously engaged on the task for three and a half months. It is the longest treaty ever drawn, totaling about 80,000 words. The treaty does not deal with questions affecting Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey except to the extent of binding Germany to accept any agreement reached with her old allies.

The covenant of the League of Nations is contained in the first section of the treaty and in addition to its general duties others are specified.

The League may question Germany at any time for a violation of the neutralized zone east of the Rhine as a threat against the world's peace. A high commissioner of Danzig will be appointed to guarantee the independence of the free city, and arrange treaties between Danzig, Germany, and Poland. It will appoint three out of five members of the Sarre commission, oversee its régime and carry out the plebiscite. The mandatory system will be applied to the former German colonies and the League will act as a final court in the matter of the plebiscites of the Belgian-German frontier and Kiel Canal disputes.

## SECTION II.

## BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY.

Germany cedes to France Alsace-Lorraine, 5,600 square miles to the southwest, and to Belgium two small districts between Luxemburg and Holland, totaling 382 square miles. To Poland she cedes the southeastern point of Silesia beyond and including Oppeln, most of Posen and West Prussia, 27,686 miles. East Prussia is thus isolated from the main body by a portion of Poland. Germany loses dominion over the northeastern tip of East Prussia, forty square miles north of the River Memel and the internationalized areas around Danzig, 729 square miles. and the basin of the Sarre, 738 square miles, between the western border of the Rhenish Palatinate of Bayaria and the southeast corner of Luxemburg. The Danzig area consists of a V between the Nogat and Vistula Rivers, made a W by the addition of a similar V on the west including the city of Danzig. The southeastern third of East Prussia and the area between East Prussia and the Vistula north of latitude 53 degrees 3 minutes is to have its nationality determined by popular vote, 5.785 square miles, and the same with Schleswig, 2,787 square miles.

## SECTION III.

#### BELGIUM.

Germany is to consent to the abrogation of the treaties of 1839 which established Belgium as a neutral state, and she agrees to any convention the Allied and Associated Powers may determine to replace them.

She is to recognize Belgium's sovereignty over the contested territory of Moresnet and part of Prussian Moresnet, and renounce in Belgium's favor all rights over the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, whose inhabitants may within six months protest the change, in whole or part, the League of Nations to decide.

Germany renounces her various treaties and conventions with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, all rights of exploitation of railroads, and adheres to the abrogation of its neutrality, accepting in advance any international agreement arrived at by the Powers.

Germany will not maintain fortifications, or armed forces, within fifty kilometers east of the Rhine, hold maneuvers, or maintain works to facilitate mobilization. In case of violation "she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers who sign the present treaty and as intending to disturb the peace of the world."

#### ALSACE-LORRAINE.

Alsace-Lorraine are restored to France with their frontiers as before 1871. Citizenship is regulated by detailed provisions distinguishing those who are immediately restored to French citizenship, those who have to make applications therefor, and those for whom naturalization is open after three years. All public and private property of former German sovereigns passes to France without payment or credit. Ownership over railways and rights over tramway concessions and the Rhine bridges pass to France.

For five years manufactured products of Alsace-Lorraine will be admitted free of duty to Germany to a total amount not exceeding in any year the average of the three years preceding the war. Textile materials may be imported from Germany into Alsace-Lorraine and reexported free of duty. For seven years, perhaps ten, the ports of Kehl and Strassburg shall be administered by a French administrator appointed by the Central Rhine Commission. Property rights will be safeguarded in both ports and equality of treatment in traffic assured nationals, vessels, and goods of all countries.

Contracts between Alsace-Lorraine and Germany are maintained, but France has the right to annul them on grounds of public interest. Judgments of courts hold in certain classes of cases, others require first a judicial exequatur. War-time political condemnations are null and void and the obligation to repay war fines is established, as in other parts of Allied territory.

THE SARRE.

To compensate France for the destruction of her coal mines in the north, Germany cedes to France full ownership of the toal mines in the Sarre basin, their value to be estimated by the Reparation Commission and credited against that account. France replaces the present owners, whom Germany undertakes to indemnify. France will continue to supply coal for present needs and contribute in just proportion to local taxes. The basin extends from the frontier of Lorraine as reannexed to France as far as St. Wendel, including on the west the Sarre valley as far as Saarholzbach and on the east the town of Homburg.

To secure the rights and welfare of the population and guarantee to France entire freedom in working the mines the League of Nations will appoint a commission of five to govern the territory, one French, one a native of Sarre, and three representing different countries other than France and Germany. Existing German legislation will remain the basis of the law, but the commission may make modifications after consulting a local representative assembly which it will organize. It will have taxing power for local purposes only. The assembly must approve new taxes. The wishes of local labor organizations will be considered in labor legislation and the labor program of the League. French and other labor may be utilized freely; the former are at liberty to belong to French unions. Pensions and social insurance will be maintained by Germany and the Sarre Commission.

There will be no military service; a local gendarmerie will preserve order. The people will preserve their local assemblies, religious assemblies, schools, etc., but may only vote for local assemblies. They will keep their present nationality except as

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they wish to change it, and their property will be respected if they wish to leave the territory. As a part of the French customs system there will be no export tax on coal and metal products going to Germany, nor on German products entering the basin and for five years no import duties on products going and coming. For local consumption French money may circulate without any restrictions.

After fifteen years a plebiscite will be held to discover if the people wish a continuance of the régime under the League of Nations, union with France, or union with Germany. The right to vote will belong to all inhabitants over twenty, resident therein at the signature. The League will take into account the cpinions expressed and decide the ultimate sovereignty. In any portion restored to Germany the German Government must buy out French mines at their appraised value, which if not paid for in six months pass finally to France. In case that Germany should buy the mines, the League will decide how much coal shall be annually sold to France.

## SECTION IV.

"Germany recognizes the total independence of German-Austria in the boundaries traced." She recognizes the independence of the Czecho-Slovak state, including the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, accepting the frontiers as will be determined, which in the case of the German frontier follows the frontier of Bohemia in 1914.

## POLAND.

Germany cedes to Poland the greater part of upper Silesia, Posen, and the province of West Prussia on the left bank of the Vistula. A Field Boundary Commission of seven, five representing Allied and Associated Powers and one each representing Poland and Germany, shall be constituted to delimit this boundary. Special provisions to protect racial, linguistic or religious minorities and secure equitable treatment of commerce for other nations will be laid down in a subsequent treaty.

The southern and eastern frontiers of East Prussia as touching Poland shall be fixed by plebiscites, the first in the regency of Allenstein between the southern frontier of East Prussia and the northern frontier, or Regierungsbezirk Allenstein, from where it meets the boundary between East and West Prussia, to its junction with the boundary between the circles of Oletsko and Angerburg, thence the northern boundary of Oletsko to its junction with the present frontier. The second plebiscite will be held in the area comprising the circles of Stuhm and Rosenberg and the parts of the circles of Marienburg and Marienwerder east of the Vistula.

In each case German troops and authorities will move out within fifteen days of the peace and an international commission of five members appointed by the Allied and Associated Powers will arrange for a free, fair, and secret vote.

Regulations will be drawn up by the Allied and Associated Powers assuring East Prussia full and equitable use and access of the Vistula. A subsequent convention will fix terms between Poland, Germany, and Danzig, to assure railway communication across German territory on the right bank of the Vistula between Poland and Danzig, while Poland shall grant free passage from East Prussia to Germany. The northeastern corner of East Prussia about Memel is to be ceded by Germany to the Associated Powers, the former agreeing to accept the settlements made, in particular as regards nationality.

### DANZIG.

Danzig and the territory near it is constituted a free city under guaranty of the League of Nations. A high commission appointed by the League and the president of Danzig shall draw up a constitution in agreement with the representatives of the city, dealing with all differences between the city and Poland. The boundaries of the city shall be delimited by a commission appointed within six months of the peace of representatives chosen by the Allied and Associated Powers and one each for Germany and Poland. A convention, the terms to be fixed by the Powers, will include Danzig in the Polish customs frontiers

through a free area in the port; insure Poland free use of the city's waterways, docks, the control of the Vistula and the whole railway system within the city, and telegraphic and telephonic communication between Poland and Danzig; provides against discrimination against Poles in the city, and places its foreign relations and the diplomatic protection of its citizens abroad in charge of Poland.

DENMARK.

The frontier between Germany and Denmark, will be fixed by the self-determination of the population. Ten days from the peace German troops and authorities shall evacuate the region north of the line running from the mouth of the Schlei, south of Kappel, Schleswig, and Friedrichstadt along the Eider to the North Sea south of Tönning; the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils shall be dissolved and the territory administered by an international commission of five, of whom Norway and Sweden shall be invited to name two.

This commission shall insure a free and secret vote, and draw a new frontier on the basis of the plebiscite, Germany renouncing all sovereignty over territories north of this line in favor of the Associated Governments, who will hand them over to Denmark. All military works on islands of Helgoland and Dune will be destroyed by German labor under supervision of the Allies.

#### RUSSIA.

Germany agrees to respect the independence of all territories which were part of the Russian Empire. Accepts abrogation of Brest-Litovsk and other treaties, and recognizes all treaties of the powers with states part of former Empire. The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right of Russia to obtain restitution and reparation on the principles of present treaty.

## SECTION V.

Outside Europe, Germany renounces all rights as to her own and her allies' territories to all the Allied and Associated Powers and will accept whatever measures are taken by the five powers.

#### GERMAN COLONIES.

Germany renounces in favor of the Allied and Associated Power her overseas possessions. All property of the German Empire, or state, passes to the government exercising authority in the territory. Provision will be made for the repatriation of German nationals and of German subjects holding property. Germany undertakes to pay damages to French nationals in the Cameroons who suffered from acts of German civil and military authorities between January, 1900, to August 1, 1914.

### CHINA AND SIAM.

Germany renounces in favor of China all privileges and indemnities resulting from the Boxer rebellion of 1901, and all public property except diplomatic and consular establishments in the German concessions of Tientsin and Hankow, and in other Chinese territory except Kiauchau, and agrees to return to China all astronomical instruments seized in 1900 and 1901. Germany accepts the abrogation of concessions at Hankow and Tientsin, China agreeing to open them to international use. Germany renounces all claims against China, or any allied or associated government, for the internment or repatriation of her citizens in China, and for seizure or liquidation of German interests. She renounces in favor of Great Britain her state property in the British concession at Canton, and of France and China.

Germany recognizes that all agreements with Siam ceased July 22, 1917. All German property but consular and diplomatic premises pass to Siam. Germany waives all claims against Siam for seizure of German property during the war.

### LIBERIA.

Germany renounces all rights under international arrangements of 1911 and 1912, regarding Liberia. All commercial treaties and agreements between herself and Liberia are abrogated and she recognizes Liberia's right to determine the status and condition of the reestablishment of Germans in Liberia.

#### MOROCCO.

Germany renounces all her rights, titles, etc., under the act of Algeciras and French-German conventions of 1909 and 1911, and all arrangements with the Sherifian Empire. She undertakes not to interfere in any negotiations as to Morocco between France and other powers, accepts the French protectorate and renounces the capitulations. The Sherifian Government shall have complete liberty of action over German nationals. All German property may be sold and the proceeds deducted from the reparation account.

EGYPT.

Germany recognizes the British Protectorate over Egypt and renounces the capitulations and all treaties, etc., concluded by her with Egypt. She undertakes not to intervene in any negotiations between Great Britain and other powers. She consents to the transfer to Great Britain of the powers given to the late Sultan of Turkey for securing the free navigation of the Suez Canal. German nationals will be dealt with as in Morocco. Anglo-Egyptian goods entering Germany shall enjoy the same treatment as British goods.

Germany accepts all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers make with Turkey and Bulgaria.

#### SHANTUNG.

Germany cedes to Japan all rights, etc., notably as to Kiauchau and the railroads, mines, and cables acquired by her treaty with China of 1907 and agreements as to Shantung. All German rights to the railroad from Tsingtau to Tsinan-fu, including mining rights, pass equally to Japan, and the cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and Che-foo free of all charges.

## SECTION VI.

THE GERMAN ARMY, ARMAMENTS, ETC.

The German army must be demobilized within two months of the peace. Its strength may not exceed 100,000 including 4,000 officers, to be devoted exclusively to maintaining internal order and control of frontiers. The great German General Staff is abolished. The army administrative service is reduced to one-tenth of the total in 1913 budget.

Customs officers, coast guards, etc., may not exceed the number in 1913. Local police may be increased with growth in population only, and none of these may be assembled for military training.

Within three months of the peace all establishments manufacturing arms and munitions of war except those specifically excepted must be closed and their personnel dismissed. The amount of armament and munitions allowed Germany is laid down in detail tables, all in excess to be surrendered or rendered useless. The manufacture or importations of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases is forbidden, as well as importations of arms, munitions, and war material. Germany may not manufacture such material for foreign governments.

Conscription is abolished. The enlisted personnel is to be maintained by voluntary enlistments for a term of twelve consecutive years. Officers remaining in the service must agree to serve to the age of forty-five. Newly appointed officers agree to serve for twenty-five years.

No military schools but those indispensable shall exist in Ger, many two months after the peace. No associations, such as societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs, etc., may occupy themselves with military matters. All measures of mobilization are forbidden.

All fortified works in German territory within a zone of fifty kilometers east of the Rhine shall be dismantled within three months. Construction of new fortifications is forbidden. Fortified works on southern and eastern front may remain. Interallied commissions will see to the execution of the provisions for which a time limit is set, the maximum named being three months. Germany must afford them every facility to go to any part of Germany, pay their expenses, and cost of labor and material necessary in destruction or surrender of army equipment.

#### THE GERMAN NAVY.

The German navy must be demobilized within two months of the peace. She will be allowed six small battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo boats and no submarines, either military or commercial, with a personnel of 15,000 men, including officers, and no reserve force of any character. Conscription is abolished, only voluntary service being permitted, with a minimum period of twenty-five years' service for officers and twelve for men. No member of the German mercantile marine will be permitted any naval training.

All German vessels of war in foreign ports and the German high-sea fleet interned at Scapa Flow will be surrendered, the final disposition to be decided upon by the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany must surrender forty-two modern destroyers, fifty modern torpedo boats, and all submarines with their salvage vessels. War vessels under construction must be broken up, other war vessels may be placed in reserve, or used in commerce. Ships cannot be replaced except those lost, until at the end of twenty years for battleships, and fifteen years for destroyers. The largest armored ship permitted Germany will be 10,000 tons. All German fortifications in the Baltic defending the passages through the belts must be demolished. For three months after the peace German wireless stations at Nauen, Hanover, and Berlin will be permitted to send commercial messages only under supervision of the Associated and Allied Powers. and no more may be built.

## CABLES-AIR FORCES.

Germany renounces all title to specified cables, the value of such as were privately owned being credited to her against reparation indebtedness. The armed forces of Germany must not include air forces for more than 100 unarmed seaplanes. No dirigibles shall be kept. All the air personnel must be demobilized within two months except for 1,000 men retained until October 1, 1919. No aviation grounds or dirigible sheds are allowed within 150 kilometers of the Rhine, or the eastern

or southern frontiers. Existing installations will be destroyed. Manufacture of aircraft is forbidden for six months. All military and naval aeronautical material must be surrendered within three months, except the 100 planes specified.

## PRISONERS.

Repatriation of German prisoners and interned civilians will be carried out without delay at Germany's expense by a mixed commission of Allies and Germans. The Allies have the right to hold German officers until Germany has surrendered persons guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war. Repatriation is conditional on the immediate release of any Allied subjects still in Germany. Germany is to restore all property belonging to Allied prisoners.

## GRAVES.

Both parties will respect and maintain the graves of soldiers and sailors buried on their territory and assist commissions charged with identifying, registering, etc., erecting monuments over the graves, and to afford each other facilities for repatriating the remains of their soldiers.

## SECTION VII

#### RESPONSIBILITIES.

"The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, not for the offenses against any criminal law, but for the supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."

Holland will be requested to surrender the ex-emperor, and a tribunal will be set up composed of one judge from each of the five great powers, with full guarantees of the right of the defense. It will fix the penalty which should be imposed.

Persons accused of acts violating the laws and customs of war will be tried and punished by military tribunals. If the charges affect the nationals of only one state, they will be tried before a

tribunal of that state; if they affect the nationals of several states, they will be tried by joint tribunals of the several states concerned. Germany shall surrender all persons so accused and all documents and information necessary to insure full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of the offenders, etc.

## SECTION VIII.

### REPARATION AND RESTITUTION.

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of herself and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. The total obligation of Germany to pay is to be determined and notified to her not later than May 1, 1921, by an Interallied reparations commission. At the same time a schedule of payments to discharge the obligation within thirty years shall be presented. . . . She further agrees to restore to the Allies cash and certain articles which can be identified.

Germany shall pay within two years one thousand million pounds sterling in either gold, goods, ships, etc.; this sum being included in the first thousand million bond issue referred to later. Expenses such as those of the army of occupation and payments for foodstuffs, raw materials, etc., may be deducted at the Allies' discretion.

Germany further binds herself to pay all sums borrowed by Belgium from her allies as a result of Germany's violation of the treaty of 1839, up to November 11, 1918, and will at once issue and hand over to the Reparations Commission 5 per cent gold bonds falling due in 1926.

Germany is required to make compensation for all damages caused to civilians, such as injury caused by acts of war, exposure at sea, maltreatment of prisoners; damages to the Allied peoples represented by pensions and separation allowances, to property; damages to civilians forced to labor; damages in the form of fines or levies imposed by the enemy.

The sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan.

In case of voluntary default by Germany the Allied and Associated Powers shall take measures which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, and may include economic and financial prohibition and reprisals.

The Reparations Commission shall consist of one representative of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, a representative of Serbia or Japan taking the place of the Belgian representative when the interests of either country are particularly affected, with all other Allied Powers entitled, when their claims are under consideration, to the right of representation without voting power. The commission shall permit Commany to give evidence regarding her capacity to pay and assure her opportunity to be heard. Permanent headquarters will be established at Paris, which will become the exclusive agency of the Allies for reparations. Majority vote will prevail, except that unanimity is required on questions involving the sovereignty of the Allies, the cancellation of all, or part of Germany's indebtedness, the time and manner of selling, negotiating, etc., bonds issued by Germany.

The commission may require Germany to give issues of bonds from time to time to cover claims not otherwise satisfied. Bond issues are required presently of Germany in acknowledgment of its debt as follows: 20,000,000,000 marks gold payable not later than May 1, 1921, without interest; 40,000,000,000 marks gold bonds bearing interest at 5 per cent under terms fixed by the commission. Interest on Germany's debt will be 5 per cent, unless otherwise determined by the commission. Payments not made in gold may be accepted in the form of properties, commodities, businesses, rights, concessions, etc.

The German Government recognizes the right of the Allies to the replacement ton for ton and class for class of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war, and cedes to the Allies all German merchant ships of 1,600 tons gross, and upward; one-half of her ships between 1,600 and 1,000 tons gross, and one-quarter of her steam trawlers and other fishing boats, to be delivered within two months to the Reparations Commission. Germany further agrees to build as reparation merchant ships to the amount not exceeding 200,000 tons gross annually during the next five years. All ships used for inland navigation taken by Germany from the Allies are to be restored within two months; the amount of loss not covered by such restitution to be made up from Germany's river fleet up to 20 per cent thereof.

To effect payment by deliveries in kind, Germany is required for a period of years varying in each case to deliver coal, coaltar products in specific amounts to the Reparations Commission. The conditions of delivery will be modified so as not to interfere with Germany's industrial requirements.

#### DEVASTATED AREAS.

Germany undertakes to devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas, replacing destroyed articles by the delivery of animals, machinery, etc., existing in Germany and to manufacture materials needed for reconstruction.

Germany is to deliver to France annually for ten years coal equivalent to the prewar output of Nord and Pas de Calais mines, and the annual production during above ten-year period. Germany further gives options over ten years for delivery of 7,000,000 tons of coal per year to France, in addition to the above, of 8,000,000 tons to Belgium, and of an amount rising from 4,500,000 in 1919 to 1920 to 8,500,000 in 1923 to 1924 to Italy, at prices fixed as prescribed in the treaty. Provision is also made for delivery to France of benzol, coal tar and ammonia.

Germany is to restore within six months the Koran of the Caliph Othman to the King of the Hedjaz, the skull of the Sultan Okwawa to Great Britain, and to the French Government papers and flags taken in 1870. For destroying the Louvain library Germany is to hand over manuscripts, rare books, etc., to the equivalent of those destroyed.

Germany is also to hand over to Belgium the wings of the altar piece of "The Adoration of the Lamb" by the Van Eyck's, now in Berlin, and the wings of the altar piece "The Last Supper," now in Berlin and Munich.

### FINANCE.

Powers to which German territory is ceded will assume a portion of the German prewar debt, the amount to be fixed by the Reparations Commission, except Alsace-Lorraine and Poland. If the value of the German public property in ceded territory exceeds the amount of debt assumed, the states to which the property is ceded will give credit on reparation for the extess, excepting Alsace-Lorraine. Mandatory powers will not assume any German debts, or give any credit for German Government property. Germany renounces all right of representation on, or control of, state banks, commissions, or like organizations.

Germany is required to pay the total cost of the armies of occupation as long as they are maintained in German territory, this cost to be a first charge on her resources. The cost of reparations is the next charge, after making such provisions for payment for imports as the Allies may deem necessary.

Germany is to deliver to the Allied and Associated Powers all sums deposited in Germany by Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, in connection with the financial support extended to them during the war, and to transfer to the Allies all claims against Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey in connection with agreements made during the war. Germany confirms the renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk.

Germany will expropriate any rights or interests of her nationals in public utilities in ceded territories, or those administered by mandatories, and in Turkey, China, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and transfer them to the Reparations Commission which will credit her with their value.

## SECTION IX.

#### OPIUM.

The contracting powers agree, whether or not they have signed and ratified the opium convention of January 23, 1912, or signed the special protocol opened at the Hague in accordance with the resolutions by the third Opium conference in 1914, to bring the said convention into force by enacting within twelve months of the peace the necessary legislation.

### RELIGIOUS MISSIONS.

The Allied and Associated Powers agree that the properties of religious missions in territories belonging to or ceded to them shall continue in their work under the control of the powers, Germany renouncing all claims in their behalf.

## SECTION X.

## ECONOMIC QUESTIONS.

For six months Germany shall impose no tariff duties higher than the lowest in force in 1914. For wines, oils, vegetable oils, artificial silk, and washed and scoured wool, the restriction obtains for two and a half years more. For five years, unless extended by the League, Germany must give favored-nation clauses treatment to Allied and Associated Powers. She shall impose no customs tariff for five years on goods originating in Alsace-Lorraine and for three years on goods originating in former German territory ceded to Poland, with the right of observation of a similar exception for Luxemburg.

#### SHIPPING.

Ships of the Allied and Associated Powers shall for five years and thereafter under condition of reciprocity, unless the League otherwise decides, enjoy the same rights in German ports as German vessels, and have most-favored-nation treatment in fishing, coast trade, and towage, even in territorial waters. Ships of a country having no seacoast may be registered at some place within its territory.

#### UNFAIR COMPETITION.

Germany undertakes to give the trade of the Allied and Associated Powers safeguards against unfair competition, suppressing the use of false wrappings and markings and on condition of reciprocity to respect the laws and judicial decisions of Allied and Associated States in respect of regional appellations of wines and spirits.

## TREATMENT OF NATIONALS.

Germany shall impose no exceptional taxes or restrictions upon the nationals of Allied and Associated States for a period of five years, and unless the League acts, for an additional five years German nationality shall not continue to attach to a person who has become a national of an Allied or Associated State.

### MULTILATERAL COVENTIONS.

Some forty multilateral conventions are renewed between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers, but special conditions are attached to Germany's readmission to several. As to postal and telegraphic conventions Germany must not refuse to make reciprocal agreements with new states.

She must agree, as respects the radiotelegraphic convention, to provisional rules to be communicated to her. In the North Sea fisheries, and North Sea liquor traffic, convention rights of police and inspection over associated fishing boats shall be exercised for at least five years only by vessels of these powers. As to the international railway union, Germany shall adhere to the new convention when formulated. China, as to the Chinese customs tariff arrangement of 1905 regarding Whangpoo and the Boxer indemnity of 1901; France, Portugal, and Rumania as to the Hague Convention of 1903, relating to civil procedure; and Great Britain and the United States as to Article III of the

Samoa Treaty of 1899, are relieved of all obligations toward Germany.

## BILATERAL TREATIES.

Each Allied and Associated State may renew any treaty with Germany, in so far as is consistent with the Peace Treaty, by giving notice within six months. Treaties entered into by Germany since August 1, 1914, with other enemy states, and before or since that date with Rumania, Russia, and parts of Russia, are abrogated, and concessions granted under pressure by Russia to German subjects are annulled. The Allied and Associated States are to enjoy most-favored-nation treatment under treaties entered into by Germany before August 1, 1914, and during the war.


## PREWAR DEBTS.

Clearing houses will be established, one in Germany, and one in each Allied and Associated State for the payment of prewar debts and those from contracts suspended during the war. For adjustment of proceeds of liquidation of enemy property and settlement of other obligations each state participating assumes responsibility for debts owing its nationals, to nationals of enemy states, except in case of prewar insolvency of the debtor. Proceeds of sale of enemy properties in each participating state may be used to pay the debts owed the nationals of that state. Disputes to be settled by the courts of the debtor country.


#### ENEMY PROPERTY.

Germany shall restore or pay for all enemy property seized or damaged by her, the amount to be fixed by a mixed tribunal. German property within Allied or Associated States may be liquidated as compensation for property of their nationals not paid for by Germany, who will compensate her nationals for such losses.


Prewar contracts between Allied and Associated States—excepting the United States, Japan, and Brazil,—and German nationals are canceled except for debts for accounts already performed.



The signers of the treaty for the United States: President Woodrow Wilson, Robert Lansing, Henry White, Edward M. House, Tasker H. Bliss; for the British Empire: David Lloyd-George, Andrew Bonar Law, Viscount Milner, Arthur James Balfour, George N. Barnes



Signatures of Ch. J. Doherty and A. L. Sifton, Canada: W. N. Hughes and Joseph Cook, Australia; Louis Botha and J. C. Smuts, South Africa; W. F. Massey New Zealand; Ed. S. Montagu and Sir Ganga Singh, India; for France: Georges (Temenceau, S. Pichon, L. L. Klotz, A. Tardieu, Jules (Tambon



Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama  THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSONNELLE



Signatures and seals of the German delegates, Dr. Hermann Muller and Dr. Bell.

Names of delegates, not previously given, who signed on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, are: ITALY, Baron Sonnino, Marquis Imperiali, S. Crespi; BELGIUM, Paul Hymans, Van den Heuvel, E. Vandervelde; BOLIVIA, Ismael Montes: BRAZIL, P. Calogeras, Rodrigo Octavio; CUBA, Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente; ECUADOR, Enrique Dorn y de Alsua; GREECE, E. Venizelos, N. Politis; GUATEMALA, Joaquin Mendez; HAITI, Tertulien Guilbaud; HEDJAZ, Rustem Haidar, Abdul Hadi Aouni; HONDURAS, Policarpo Borlia; LIBERIA, C. D. B. King; NICARAGUA, Salvador, Chamorro; PANAMA, Antonio Burgos; PERU, Candamo; POLAND, Paderewski, Dmowski; PORTUGAL, Costa, Soares; RUMANIA, Bratiano, Coanda; JUGOSLAVIA, Pachitch, Trumbitch, Vesnitch; SIAM, Prince Charoon, Prince Traidos Probandhu; CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, Kramarcz, Benes; URUGUAY, Buero.

For the transfer of property, leases of land, mortgages, etc., arbitral tribunals of three members, one from Germany, and one each chosen by Associated States, shall have jurisdiction over all disputes.

#### INSURANCE.

Fire insurance contracts are not dissolved by the war even if premiums have not been paid, but lapse at the date of the first premium falling due three months after the peace. Life insurance contracts may be restored by payment of accumulated premiums and interest. Marine insurance contracts are dissolved by the outbreak of war except where the risk insured against had already been incurred. Reinsurance contracts are abrogated unless invasion has made it impossible for the reinsured to find another reinsurer. Any Associated or Allied Power may cancel all contracts running between its nationals and a German life insurance company, the latter being obligated to hand over the proportion of the assets attributable to such policies.

#### INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY.

Rights to industrial, literary, and artistic property are reestablished. Special war measures of the powers are ratified, and the right reserved to impose conditions on the use of German patents and copyrights in the public interest. Except as between the United States and Germany prewar licenses and rights to sue for infringements committed during the war are canceled.

## SECTION XI.

## AERIAL NAVIGATION.

Aircraft of Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage, etc., and equal treatment with German planes in German territory and with most-favored-nation planes as to commercial traffic. Germany agrees to accept Allied certificates of airworthiness, competency, etc., and to apply the convention relative to aerial navigation concluded between the powers to her own aircraft over her own territory.

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## SECTION XII.

## TRANSIT, PORTS, WATERWAYS.

Germany shall grant freedom of transit through her territories by mail or water to persons, goods, from or to any of the Allied and Associated Powers without customs or restrictions. The powers shall have equal rights with her own nationals in her ports and waterways.

Free zones existing in German ports on August 1, 1914, must be maintained with due facilities as to warehouses, etc., without charge except for use and administration.

The Elbe from the junction of the Ultava, the Ultava from Prague, the Oder from Oppa, the Niemen from Grodno, and the Danube from Ulm are declared international together with their connections, and will be placed under international commissions.

The Rhine is placed under a central commission to meet at Strassburg, within six months of the peace. Germany must give France all rights to take water to feed canals between the two extreme points of her frontiers. She must also hand over all drafts and designs for this part of the river.

Belgium is permitted to build a Rhine-Meuse canal, Germany to construct the part within her territory. The Central Rhine Commission may extend its jurisdiction over the lower Moselle, upper Rhine and lateral canals. Germany must cede to the Allied and Associated Governments certain vessels and facilities on all these rivers as specified by an arbiter named by the United States.

In addition to most-favored-nation treatment on her railways, Germany agrees to cooperate in through-ticket services between Allied, Associated, and other states, to allow the construction of improvements and to conform her rolling stock to enable its incorporation in trains of the Allied and Associated Powers.

### CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

To assure Czecho-Slovakia access to the sea toward the Adriatic she may run her own through trains to Fiume and

Trieste. Germany will lease her spaces in Hamburg and Stettin, the detail to be worked out by a commission.

#### THE KIEL CANAL.

The Kiel Canal shall be free and open to all ships of all nations at peace with Germany; subjects, goods, ships to be treated on terms of absolute equality, and no taxes may be imposed but those necessary for upkeep and improvement.

## SECTION XIII.

## INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION.

Members of the League of Nations agree to establish a permanent organization to promote international adjustment of labor conditions to consist of an annual conference and a labor office, the former composed of four representatives of each state, two from the government and one each from employers and employed.

The international labor office will be established at Geneva as a part of the League. It is to collect and distribute information on labor throughout the world, publish a periodical, and prepare agenda for the conference. The first conference will take place in October, 1919, at Washington to discuss the eight-hour day, prevention of unemployment, child labor, and similar questions.

Nine principles of labor conditions are recognized in the treaty. They include the principle that labor should not be regarded as a mere commodity; the right of association of employers and employees; a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; the eight-hour day, or forty-eight hour week; a weekly rest of twenty-four hours, including Sunday; abolition of child labor, education, and proper physical development of children, equal pay for equal work for men and women; equitable treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein, including foreigners; a system of inspection in which women shall take part.

## SECTION XIV.

#### GUARANTIES.

As a guaranty for the execution of the treaty, German territory to the west of the Rhine with the bridgeheads will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for fifteen years. If Germany faithfully carries out conditions, certain districts, including the Cologne bridgehead, will be evacuated in five years, certain other districts and territories nearest the Belgian frontier after ten years, and remainder after fifteen years.

If Germany fails to observe her obligations during occupation, or after fifteen years, the whole or part of the areas will be immediately reoccupied. If before the expiration of the fifteen years Germany complies with all her treaty undertakings, the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately.

All German troops at present in territories east of the new frontier shall return as soon as the Allies deem wise.

# SECTION XV.

# MISCELLANEOUS.

Germany agrees to recognize the full validity of the treaties of peace and additional conventions to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the powers allied with Germany, to agree to the decisions to be taken as to the territories of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and to recognize the new states in the frontiers to be fixed for them. Germany agrees not to put forward any pecuniary claims against Allied or Associated Powers signing the present treaty based on events previous to the coming into force of the treaty.

# CHRONOLOGY OF THE WORLD WAR

1914

June 28. Archduke Francis Ferdinand assassinated at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

July 23. Austria presented an ultimatum to Serbia.

July 26. Germany warned other powers not to interfere with Austria in her dealings with Serbia. English, French, and Russian diplomats began efforts to prevent war.

July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.

July 30. Austrian forces bombarded Belgrade, and Russia began a partial mobilization.

July 30. Germany made demand for the cessation of Russian mobilization. August 1. Germany declared war upon Russia, and France declared mobilization. Italy notified Germany that she would remain neutral.

August 2. German troops entered the duchy of Luxemburg, and German forces appeared before Liège, Belgium. Belgium refused the

passage of German troops through its territory.

August 3. The German Ambassador to Paris demanded his passports and the French Ambassador to Berlin was recalled. War was declared between France and Germany. German troops invaded Belgium, which appealed to Great Britain for aid.

August 4. Great Britain declared war on Germany, and the House of Commons voted a war credit of \$525,000,000. Germany notified Belgium of the existence of a state of war between the two countries. The

United States proclaimed its neutrality.

August 5. The Germans attacked Liège. Earl Kitchener was appointed

British Secretary of State for War.

August 6. Austria-Hungary declared war upon Russia, and the English Parliament voted an additional \$500,000,000. The United States cruiser Tennessee left New York with \$5,500,000 in gold for the use of Americans stranded in Europe.

August 8. British troops landed in Belgium. Portugal declared herself an ally of Great Britain. French troops entered Alsace-Lorraine. French and German troops met in their first clash in the Vosges.

August 10. France declared war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12. Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary. The Germans were temporarily repulsed at Haelen.

August 13. Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany.

August 16. German cavalry appeared before Brussels.

August 18. The Belgian Government left Brussels for Antwerp.

August 20. The Germans, unopposed, entered Brussels.

August 22. Namur was besieged by the Germans.

August 23. The Emperor of China declared war upon Germany.

August 23. The Great Retreat of the English and French armies from Mons began.

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August 27. Namur was captured by the Germans. The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, formerly North German Lloyd Liner, was sunk off the west African coast by the British cruiser Highflyer.

August 30. The Allied forces continued to retire in the direction of Paris.

September 3. The French Government moved from Paris to Bordeaux. September 6. The Germans reached the high tide of invasion in France.

September 12. The Germans continued their retreat from the Marne.

September 14. Germans reached the Aisne and the Allied armies attempted to cross, in the face of bitter resistance.

September 14. The Allies crossed the Aisne near Soissons.

September 16. The Russian northern army was forced behind the river Niemen.

September 22. The German forces retired to Noyon. British cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue were sunk in the North Sea by German submarines.

September 24. The Russian forces passed the fortress of Przemsyl.

September 28. Japanese and British forces attacked the fortress of Tsingtau. September 29. German forces invested Antwerp.

October 8. Germans entered Antwerp. The garrison escaped.

October 15. The British crusier Hawke was sunk by a German submarine in the North Sea.

October 17. Russian armies resumed offensive operations in the east.

October 20. Begins the bloody battle of the Yser, following the attempt of German forces to reach the Channel ports.

October 22. The German forces bombarded Lille, France, and destroyed many important buildings.

October 25. Germans, in spite of resistance, crossed the Yser River near the coast.

October 26. Gavrilo Prinzep and twenty-three accomplices were found guilty of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife.

October 28. The German cruiser *Emden* sank the Russian cruiser *Zhemt-ehug* in the harbor of Penang. Germans were forced to evacuate the southern branch of the Yser.

November 1. Five German cruisers defeated the British fleet under Admiral Cradock off the Chilean coast.

November 2. Great Britain declared the North Sea closed to commerce.

November 5. Great Britain and France declared war on Turkey.

November 7. The Japanese forces captured Tsingtau.

November 9. The German cruiser *Emden* was destroyed by the Australian cruiser *Sydney*.

November 10. The struggle along the Yser River continued. Serbians defeated the Austrian army, capturing 2,000 prisoners. Russian forces resumed the offensive around Warsaw.

November 15. The Serbians, after fierce battle, were defeated by the Austrian army.

November 16. Belgians flooded the coast lands in order to prevent the advance of the German forces.

November 19. German forces advanced into Poland were driven back in disorder.

November 29. The Russians continued their success against German forces in Poland.

December 1. General De Wet, leader of the rebellion in South Africa, was captured, practically ending the rebellion.

December 2. Belgrade was captured by the Austrians.

December 5. The Germans were forced to evacuate Vermelles, a French town on the Belgian frontier.

December 6. Battle of Lodz in Russian Poland, which began on November 19, was ended with an inconclusive German victory.

December 8. The British fleet near the Falkland Islands met and destroyed the German squadron which sank two British warships on November 1, off the coast of Chile.

December 10. A German submarine raided the harbor of Dover, England. December 13. British submarine B-11 entered the Dardanelles by passing under the mine fields and torpedoes and sunk the Turkish battleship

Messudiah.

December 14. Russians defeated the German forces at Mlawa. Belgrade was recaptured by the Serbians.

December 16. A squadron of German ships bombarded English ships, killing and injuring many persons.

December 18. The German army approached Warsaw.

December 19. The Germans were forced to evacuate Dixmude, which they had held since November 10.

December 23. The Turkish army began an advance on the Suez Canal.

December 24. The Germans defeated the Russian army at Mlawa in northern Poland. The entire Russian army began a retreat.

December 29. Russian forces were forced to retire on the pressure of the Austrian advance along the eastern front in Galicia.

1915

January 1. British battleship Formidable was sunk by a German submarine in the English Channel.

January 3. The Russian army defeated the Turkish forces in the Caucasus.

January 6. The German army continued to advance in Poland.

January 16. The Russian army of invasion captured one of the passes over the Carpathian Mountains.

January 18. The French forces approached within range of the outer forts

of Metz.

January 21. Austrian forces in northeastern Hungary were shattered by attacks. General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, resigned the office of minister of war, and was succeeded by General von Hohenborn.

January 24. A naval engagement was fought between British and German fleets. German armored cruiser Blücher was sunk and the other

German vessels fled.

January 29. The Germans assumed the offensive in the forest of the Argonne. January 31. German submarines made a second raid in the British Channel and destroyed several British merchant ships.

February 2. Wiener von Horn, a German-American, unsuccessfully attempted to dynamite the bridge across the St. Croix River.

February 3. The Turkish forces attempted to force a passage over the Suez Canal and were repulsed by the British troops.

February 4. Germany declared a war zone of the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, to go into effect on February 18.

February 8. Russian forces were obliged to evacuate a large part of the territory held in the province of Bukowina.

February 10. Russian army suffered a disastrous defeat in East Prussia.

February 12. A large squadron of British airplanes dropped bombs on the

Belgian coast towns, inflicting heavy damage.

February 16. Germany proposed to the United States Government that she would abandon her attacks on British merchant ships if Great Britain could be persuaded to allow the free passage of foodstuffs to German civilian population.

February 18. German decree creating a war zone in the waters around

Great Britain and Ireland went into effect.

February 24. Germans captured Przasnysz, an important strategic point in Russian Poland.

February 27. The William P. Fry, an American sailing vessel, was sunk by a German cruiser.

March 1. Great Britain and France announced their intention to prevent

commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.

March 2. Germany offered to modify her submarine warfare if Great
Britain would also make concessions.

March 6. Premier Venizelos resigned his office on account of the decision of King Constantine to the entrance of Greece on the side of the Allies.

March 14. The German cruiser *Dresden* was sunk off the Chilean coast. March 19. The French battleship *Bouvet* and two British battleships were

sunk by floating mines in the Dardanelles.

March 21. Major General Sir William Robert Robertson was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the British Army.

March 22. Austrian fortress of Przemsyl surrendered to the Russian army.

March 25. French achieved success in upper Alsace.

April 3. Bulgarian soldiers crossed the frontier and attacked Serbians guarding the border.

April 4. German forces in Russia prepared for a great offensive.

April 22. The second battle of Ypres began. April 25. The battle of Ypres continued.

April 26. The German cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm was interned at Newport News.

April 27. The battle of Ypres continued with heavy losses on both sides.

May. 1. Fierce fighting went on in the Gallipoli peninsula. The American tank ship Gulflight was sunk by a German submarine.

May 6. The Russian forces on the eastern front were routed by Germans

under General Mackensen. May 7. The transatlantic liner *Lusitania* was sunk by a German sub-

marine, with a loss of 1,150 persons, including over 100 Americans.

May 13. The Bryce Commission on Belgian atrocities made public its report. The American Government protested to Germany over the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

May 14. Fierce fighting continued in the Ypres sector. The Russian armies retreated before the Germans, barely escaping a rout.

May 23. Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary.

May 28. Germany replied to the American note on the Lusitania.

June 1. Przemsyl was recaptured by the Austro-German forces.

June 9. Italian troops won successes against the Austrians on the Isonzo River.

June 20. Mackensen wins a great victory over the Russians at Rawa-Russka.

July 8. The United States authorities took possession of the German wireless plant at Sayville, Long Island.

July 9. The German forces in German Southwest Africa surrendered to General Botha.

July 12. The German cruiser Königsberg was destroyed by British war vessels off East Africa.

July 21. The United States Government sent a third note to Germany on the rights of neutral passengers on ships of belligerents.

August 5. Warsaw was captured by Austro-German forces.

August 10. The training of reserve officers was begun at Plattsburg.

August 17. London was raided by a Zeppelin, killing ten persons.

August 19. The liner Arabic was sunk by a German submarine.

August 21. Italy declared war against Turkey.

September 1. The German Ambassador declared that no more passenger ships would be sunk without warning.

September 2. President Wilson received a message from the Pope in relation to peace.

September 9. The Austrian Government was asked to recall Ambassador

September 25. The French and British began a great offensive in Champagne.

September 29. British forces defeated the Turks in Mesopotamia.

October 4. British and French troops landed at Saloniki aid Serbia.

October 5. Premier Venizelos of Greece resigned after King Constantine refused to support the Allies.

October 6. The French launched a successful attack on the Champagne region.

October 9. Belgrade was captured by the Austro-German forces.

October 13. Edith Cavell was shot by the Germans as a spy.

October 14. Bulgaria declared war on Serbia.

October 19. Major General Monro succeeded Sir Ian Hamilton in command of operations in the Dardanelles.

October 22. The Germans inflicted a severe defeat on the Russian armies.

October 25. The French made gains in Champagne.

November 9. The Italian liner Ancona was sunk by an Austrian submarine causing the death of 272 persons, including 27 Americans.

November 18. The British resumed advance at Gallipoli. November 25. The British retired to Kut-el-Amara.

December 3. The American Government demanded the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, German diplomats.

December 15. Sir Douglas Haig was appointed commander in chief of the British forces in France.

December 19. The British carried out a successful evacuation of Anzac and Suvla Bay, Gallipoli.

December 29. Austria meets American demands in regard to the Ancona.

1916

January 1. Fighting was renewed at the Dardanelles.

January 7. German Ambassador notified the American Government that submarine operations in the Mediterranean would be conducted according to international law.

January 8. Germany notified the United States that vessels would be sunk only when carrying contraband of war and that the safety of crews would provided for.

January 9. British forces successfully evacuate Gallipoli.

January 25. The French carried on successful operations around Nieuport.

January 29. Paris was attacked by Zeppelins.

February 6. Field Marshal Von Mackensen assumed command of the Austro-German army opposing the Allies at Saloniki.

February 9. The Russians began a new offensive in Galicia. February 16. The city of Erzerum was captured by the Russians. The British declared that they had completed the conquest of Kamerun, a German colony in Africa.

February 24. The great German drive at Verdun was repulsed with great

loss.

February 26. The Germans captured several important points about Verdun.

February 28. Turkish forces evacuated Trebizond and other Black Sea ports.

March 7. The House of Representatives voted to lay on the table the McLemore resolution, warning American travelers to avoid sailing on armed merchant ships of belligerents.

March 8. 'The German Government presented a memorandum stating its

attitude on the submarine boat controversy. March 16. Terrific fighting went on around Verdun.

March 18. Germans occupied part of the town of Vaux.

March 24. The English steamship Sussex was sunk by a German submarine; many passengers killed.

April 10. Germany denied that the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine.

April 18. Secretary Lansing declared to Germany that relations would be severed if submarine attacks on steamships continued.

April 19. President Wilson addressed Congress on the submarine issue.

April 22. Sir Roger Casement was captured on the Irish coast.

April 24. A revolt broke out in Dublin.

April 25. A squadron of German cruisers raided the English coast.

April 27. Martial law was declared throughout Ireland.

April 29. The surrender of General Townshend at Kut-el-Amara was announced.

May 3. Several leaders of the Irish rebellion were executed for treason.

May 5. Activity was renewed along the entire Eastern front.

May 10. Germany admitted that the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine.

May 12. James Connolly, Commander in Chief of the Irish revolutionists, was executed.

May 31. The British and German fleets met at Jutland; after a fierce engagement the German fleet fled.

June 3. President Wilson signed the army reorganization bill.

June 5. Earl Kitchener and many others were lost when the British cruiser Hampshire was destroyed by a mine or torpedo off the Orkney

June 17. The Russian army entered Czernowitz.

Sir Roger Casement was convicted of treason.

July 6. David Lloyd George was appointed Secretary of War for Great Britain.

July 7. The British resumed the offensive on the Somme.

July 11. The Germans advanced east of the Meuse at Verdun. July 22. Russian forces achieved successes in the Riga district. July 27. Captain Charles Fryatt was executed by the Germans for attempting to ram a submarine.

August 3. Sir Roger Casement was hanged in London.

August 4. The French gained successes at Verdun.

August 9. Italian forces occupied the Austrian city of Göritz.

August 27. Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary.

August 30. Field Marshal von Hindenburg succeeded General von Falkenhayn as chief of staff of the German armies.

September 3. Allies renewed their offensive north of the Somme River. Bulgarian and German troops invaded Rumania in the Dobrudja district.

September 14. The Fourth Greek Army Corps, with headquarters at the port of Kavala, was placed in the hands of the Germans by its com-

October 7. British and French troops in the Somme district advanced on a front of ten miles.

October 23. Constanza, Rumania, captured by the Bulgar-Turco-German army.

October 24. At Verdun, French penetrated German lines to a depth of two miles, winning back the fort and village of Douaumont, the Thiaumont field work, Haudromont Quarries and Caillette Wood.

November 1. The German submarine merchantman Deutschland arrived at New London, its second trip to the United States, bringing a \$10,000,000 cargo of chemicals, gems and securities.

November 2. The Germans at Verdun evacuated Fort Vaux.

November 6. British steamer Arabia torpedoed and sunk in the Mediterranean; passengers rescued.

November 13. British launched a new offensive against German line in France on both sides of the Ancre Brook, at the northern end of the Somme battle line.

November 21. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow, resigned. Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, died at Schönbrunn Castle, near Vienna, at the age of eightysix. His nephew, Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, succeeded him on the throne.

November 29. Admiral Sir David Beatty was appointed to command the British grand fleet, succeeding Sir Jellicoe.

December 5. Herbert H. Asquith resigned as Prime Minister of England. December 7. David Lloyd George accepted the British post of Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.

December 12. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg announced to the Reichstag that Germany and her allies proposed to enter forthwith into peace negotiations.

1917

January 10. The Allied Governments state their terms of peace; a separate note from Belgium included.

January 22. President Wilson addresses the Senate giving his ideas of steps necessary for world peace.

January 31. Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare in specified zones.

February 3. United States severs diplomatic relations with Germany; Bernstorff dismissed.

February 24. Kut-el-Amara taken by British, under General Maude (Campaign begun December 13).

February 28. "Zimmermann note" revealed.

March 4. Announced that the British had taken over from the French the entire Somme front.

March, 11. Bagdad captured by British under General Maude.

March 11-15. Revolution in Russia, leading to abdication of Czar Nicholas II.

March 15. Provisional Government formed by Constitutional Democrats under Prince Lvoff and M. Milyukoff.

March 12. United States announced that an armed guard would be placed on all American merchant vessels sailing through the war zone.

March 17-19. Retirement of Germans to "Hindenburg line;" evacuation of 1,300 square miles of French territory on front of 100 miles from Arras to Soissons.

March 22. United States formally recognized the new Government of Russia set up as a result of the revolution.

March 27. Minister Brand Whitlock and American Relief Commission withdrawn from Belgium.

April 2. President Wilson asks Congress to declare the existence of a state of war with Germany.

April 6. United States declares war on Germany.

April 8. Austria-Hungary severs diplomatic relations with the United States.

April 9-May 14. British successes in Battle of Arras (Vimy Ridge taken April 9).

April 16-May 6. French successes in Battle of the Aisne between Soissons and Rheims.

April 20. Turkey severs relations with United States.

May 15-September 15. Great Italian offensive on Isonzo front (Carso Plateau); capture of Gorizia, August 9; Monte Santo taken August 24; Monte Gabriele, September 14.

May 15. General Pétain succeeds General Nivelle as commander in chief

of the French armies.

May 17. Russian Provisional Government reconstructed. Kerensky (former Minister of Justice) becomes Minister of War. Milyukoff resigns.

May 18. President Wilson signs Selective Service Act.

June 3. American Mission to Russia lands at Vladivostok (Root Mission).

Returns to America August 3.

June 7. British blow up Messines Ridge, south of Ypres, and capture 7,500 German prisoners.

June 12. King Constantine of Greece forced to abdicate.

June 15. Subscriptions close for First Liberty Loan (\$2,000,000,000 offered; \$3,035,226,850 subscribed).

June 26. First American troops reach France.

June 29. Greece enters war against Germany and her allies.

July 4. Resignation of Bethmann-Hollweg as German Chancellor. Dr. George Michaelis, Chancellor (July 14).

July 20. Drawing at Washington of names for first army under selective service.

July 20. Kerensky becomes Premier on resignation of Prince Lvoff.

July 31-November. Battle of Flanders (Passchendaele Ridge); British successes.

August 10. Food and Fuel Control Bill passed.

August 15. Peace proposals of Pope Benedict revealed (dated August 1); United States replies, August 27; Germany and Austria, September 21; supplementary German reply, September 26.

August 20-24. French attacks at Verdun recapture high ground lost in 1916.

September 8. Luxburg dispatches ("spurlos versenkt") revealed by United States.

September 15. Russia proclaimed a republic.

October 24-December. Great German-Austrian counterdrive into Italy; Italian line shifted to Piave River, Asiago Plateau, and Brenta River.

October 26. Brazil declares war on Germany.

October 27. Second Liberty Loan closed (\$3,000,000,000 offered; \$4,617,-532,300 subscribed).

November 7. Overthrow of Kerensky and Provisional Government of Russia by the Bolsheviki.

November 13. Clemenceau succeeds Ribot as French Premier.

November 18. British forces in Palestine take Jaffa.

November 22-December 13. Battle of Cambrai; successful surprise attack near Cambrai by British under General Byng on November 22 (employs "tanks" to break down wire entanglements in place of the usual artillery preparations); Bourlon Wood, dominating Cambrai, taken November 26; surprise counterattack by Germans December 2, compels British to give up fourth of ground gained. German attacks on December 13 partly successful.

November 29. First plenary session of the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris; sixteen nations represented; Colonel E. M. House, Chairman of American

delegation.

December 5. President Wilson, in message to Congress, advises war with Austria.

December 6. United States destroyer Jacob Jones sunk by submarine with loss of over sixty American men.

December 6-9. Armed revolt overthrows pro-Ally Administration in Portugal.

December 7. United States declares war on Austria-Hungary.

December 9. Jerusalem is captured by British force advancing from

Egypt.

December 13. Berlin announces armistice negotiations with Russia; begin December 16. German aerial bombs kill several United States railway engineers, and two engineers died from gunshot wounds. Chinese troops arrive at Harbin, Manchuria, oust Russians and prevent Bolsheviki gaining control of city.

December 15. Inter-Allied Economic Council, Great Britain, France, and Italy represented, organizes in London, elects assistant secretary of

United States Treasury, Oscar T. Crosby, president. Armistice agreement between Bolshevik Government and Central Powers signed at Brest-Litovsk.

December 18. Sixteen to twenty large German Gothas raid London, kill ten, injure seventy; two of the raiders are brought down.

December 23. General Guillaumat succeeds Sarrail as commander in chief of Allied forces at Saloniki.

December 27. Turkish army defeated by British in attempt to retake Jerusalem.

1918

January 5. Between Lens and St. Quentin German raids on British lines

repulsed with heavy enemy losses.

January 7. In mutiny at Kiel, German naval base, submarine crews kill thirty-eight of their officers. Earl Reading, Lord Chief Justice of England, appointed British High Commissioner to United States.

January 13. Premier Clemenceau orders arrest in Paris of former Premier

Caillaux on charge of treason.

January 14. Attempt is made to shoot Russian Premier Lenine,

January 28. In Italian offensive east of Asiago Plateau Italian forces capture Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele, and 1,500 prisoners. Rumanians capture Kishineff, capital of Bessarabia. Allied aviators attack Zeebrugge. German airplanes raid London, kill 47, injure 169. Germans make air raid on Paris, kill 36, injure 190.

January 31. It is for the first time announced that the United States troops are occupying first-line trenches. Germans raid American line, kill two,

wound four, one missing.

February 1. Major General Peyton C. March made chief of general staff. Italians advance to head of Melago Valley. Rumanians occupy Kishineff. Bolsheviki seize Rumanian ships in Black Sea; capture Odessa and Orenburg.

February 5. United States transport Tuscania torpedoed off Irish coast;

loss, 101.

February 13. On western front United States batteries aid in raid in Champagne district.

February 18. Viscount Ishii, recently head of a special Japanese mission to the United States, is appointed Ambassador.

February 21. British troops occupy Jericho, fourteen miles from Jerusalem. February 22. United States troops are in the Chemin-des-Dames sector, the Aisne, France. At General Pershing's request the entire army canteen work in France has been taken over by the Y. M. C. A.

February 27. Japan proposes joint military operation with Allies in Siberia

to save military and other supplies.

March 1. Generals Kaledine and Korniloff defeated by Bolsheviki near Rostof-on-Don.

March 2. Kieff, held by Bolsheviki since February 8, occupied by German

and Ukrainian troops.

March 3. By treaty of peace with four Central Powers signed at Brest-Litovsk, Bolsheviki agree to evacuate Ukrania, Esthonia, and Livonia, Finland, the Aland Islands, and Transcaucasian districts of Erivan, Kars, and Batum.

March 4. Germany and Finland sign treaty.

March 5. In Lorraine sector United States troops of "Rainbow Division" (New York City) repel German raid and take prisoners.

March 6. United States troops hold four and one-half miles of battle front "somewhere in France."

March 8. In the Ypres-Dixmude sector Germans attack on mile front; English counterattack. Leon Trotzky resigns as Russian Foreign Minister.

March 9. On Lorraine front United States forces bombard and obliterate over a mile of German trenches. Russian capital moves from Petrograd to Moscow.

March 10. British occupy Hit in Mesopotamia.

- March 11. United States troops go over the top at Toul and return without loss.
- March 12. In Toul sector United States artillery discover and blow to pieces German gas projectors, upsetting plans for gas attack.
- March 13. German troops enter Odessa and control Black Sea; take fifteen Russian warships.
- March 14. General Pershing's men make first permanent advance, occupy evacuated trenches northeast of Badonvillers.
- March 18. Great Britain and United States take over Dutch shipping in United States and British ports.
- March 21. Beginning of "Big Drive" on 50-mile front, from Arras to La Fère. On Lunéville sector United States artillery fire destroys first-and second-line positions. Canadians make gas attack between Lens and Hill 70. British monitors bombard Ostend. German long-range gun bombards Paris.
- March 26. Battle continues on whole front south of Somme.
- March 27. General Pershing offers all United States forces for service wherever needed.
- March 28. Heavy fighting along 55-mile front from the southeast of Somme to northeast of Arras. Entire Turkish force in area of Hit, in Mesopotamia, is captured or destroyed; 3,000 prisoners taken (including German officers), 10 guns, 2,000 rifles, many machine guns, 600 animals. British forces cross the River Jordan.
- March 29. The French General, Ferdinand Foch, chosen commander in chief of all Allied forces in France (British, French, American, Italian, Belgian, and Portuguese). The German long-range gun kills seventy-five worshipers at Good Friday services in a Paris church, and wounds ninety.
- April 1. Long-distance bombardment of Paris continued; four killed; nine injured.
- April 3. War Council at Washington, D. C., announces that all available shipping will be used to rush troops to France.
- April 5. United States army at end of the first year of the war totals more than 1,500,000 men.
- April 7. United States troops in Toul sector repel two German raids.

  Turks take Ardahan from Armenians; Constantinople reports Turkish
  troops advancing over wide area in the Caucasus.
- April 10. British and Portuguese, on line from La Bassée Canal to Armentières, are forced back six miles; at Messines Ridge, south of Ypres, British retire two miles. In a counterattack on Givenchy British take 750 prisoners.
- April 11. United States Government takes over 63 coastwise vessels, making, with railroad-owned vessels, 111 coastwise ships, nearly 400,000 tons under Government control.
- April 12. Charles M. Schwab made director general of Emergency Fleet Corporation, to have entire charge of Government shipbuilding program. Field Marshal Haig issues a special order of the day, "All positions must be held to the last man."
- April 13. Germans capture Rossignol, advance to border of Nieppe Wood; take 400 prisoners. French hold Hangard against repeated counterattacks and repulse German raids between the Ailette and the Aisne. The British and French Governments agree to confer on General Foch title of Commander in Chief of Allied armies in France.

April 15. Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Minister, resigns.

April 22. Baron von Richthofen, the leader of the German flyers, with eighty victories, is brought down behind the British lines and buried with military honors.

April 24. Germans attack the whole front south of the Somme, but are repulsed; in later attacks gain Villers-Bretonneux, east of Robec. British

retain their line.

April 25. Germans assault from Wytschaete to Bailleul; in Lys salient,

French and British lose ground. Germans capture Hangard.

April 28. The loss of Kemmel Heights forces British to retire. Locre changes hands five times; Germans get footing there, but are driven from Voormezeele.

May 6. Treaty of peace is signed at Bucharest by representatives of

Rumania and the four Central Powers.

May 19. Australians capture Ville-sur-Ancre, a mile from Morlancourt; 360 prisoners, 20 machine guns; German raids in Picardy and Lorraine are repelled by United States troops.

May 21. President names Peyton C. March, chief of staff, with rank of

general.

May 25-June 14. German submarines sink nineteen ships off coasts of

New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.

May 27. Big drive bgeins on western front; Germans drive Allies across the Aisne-Marne Canal; Germans attack British at Berry-au-Bac and the French by the Chemin-des-Dames Ridge; near Dickebusch Lake Germans penetrate French positions, advance in Aisne Valley, reach Pont-Arcy.

May 30. Germans advance to within two miles of Rheims.

May 31. German forces north of the Aisne advance to Nouvron and

Fontenoy, but fail to cross the Marne.

June 1. Germans attack on whole front between the Oise and the Marne, advance as far as Nouvron and Fontenoy; attack on Fort de la Pompelle drives out French, who counterattack, regain positions and take 400 prisoners and four tanks.

June 5. Germans advance on south bank of Aisne, take Dommiers; United States troops penetrate enemy positions in Picardy and Lorraine;

French counterattack regains ground near Vingre.

- June 6. West of Château-Thierry United States troops drive Germans a mile on two-mile front, take 270 prisoners; United States and French troops advance in region of Neuilly-la-Poterie and Bouresches; German attacks at Champlat, heights of Bligny, southwest of Ste. Euphraise and between the Marne and Rheims, are repulsed; French take Le Port, west of Fontenoy and north of the Aisne, village of Vinly, and regain Hill 204.
- June 7. United States and French troops take villages of Neuilly-la-Poterie and Bouresches and Bligny, between the Marne and Rheims, and 200 prisoners.
- June 8. By attacks on the Marne, Franco-American troops put Germans on defensive; United States forces, under General Pershing, capture and hold Bouresches.
- June 11. Allies in counteroffensive advance on seven-mile front between Montdidier and Noyon retake much ground; take 1,000 prisoners.
- June 16. On Italian front Allies regain all ground lost in first Austrian rush, except a few places on Piave River.

June 19. 40,000 Germans attack Rheims from three sides and are repelled with heavy loss.

June 23. Italian forces drove the Austrians across the Piave River, with a loss of 180,000 men.

June 25. American marines and regulars cleared Belleau Wood, killing 300 Germans.

June 27. The first contingent of American troops arrived in Italy. Secretary Baker made the first drawing in the new selective draft.

June 29. Italian forces continue successes.

June 30. France recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as a separate nation.

July 1. American forces landed at Kola, Finland.

July 2. It was announced that over 1,000,000 American troops were in France.

July 9. The French armies advanced on a wide front.

July 12. The Austrian armies were badly beaten by the Italians at Berat. French troops continue advance on western front.

July 13. The former Czar Nicholas of Russia was assassinated by Bolsheviki.

July 15. Germans begin the fifth drive on a fifty-mile front.

July 18. French and American troops begin great offensive against Germans.

July 19. Germans begin retreat from the Marne.

July 20. American troops force back Germans, taking many prisoners. July 21. Château-Thierry was occupied by French and American forces.

July 22. Americans capture many villages in France.

July 25. Allies continue to close the pocket of the Aisne-Marne salient.

July 31. General von Eichhorn, German dictator at Kiev, was assassinated.

August 3. The Allies advance on a wide front.

August 4. The German retreat in the Aisne region continued.

August 7. American and French troops crossed the Vesle River in pursuit of the Germans.

August 8. The French and British launched a new offensive in the Somme region.

August 17. American troops took back several villages.

August 23. The British continued to advance in the Somme region.

August 25. The British advanced ten miles on a thirty-mile front, taking nearly 20,000 prisoners.

August 29. The British captured Bapaume.

August 31. The British, aided by the 27th and 30th American Divisions, captured Mount Kemmel.

September 5. The Allies advanced on a ninety-mile front.

September 7. The Germans began a general retreat on a front of hundred miles.

September 11. British, French, and American forces close in on the Hindenburg line.

September 13. American forces cleared the St. Mihiel salient and take 12,000 prisoners.

September 22. General Allenby defeated Turks in Palestine, taking 12,000 prisoners.

September 27. The British advanced on the Cambrai front, taking many villages and prisoners.

September 29. British and American forces pierced the Hindenburg line. September 30. The Belgians captured Roulers.

War St. 8-EE

October 1. French reenter St. Quentin.

October 2. American troops forced back Germans in Argonne Forest.

October 5. Germans abandon Lille.

October 6. Fourth Liberty Loan begins. Prince Max, the German Chancellor, proposed a suspension of hostilities.

Uctober 7. The German retreat continued.

October 8. President Wilson asks Germany's intentions in regard to peace.

October 9. The British take Cambrai. October 14. Allied successes continue.

October 18. Many towns in Belgium are recaptured by Allies.

October 23. President Wilson promises Germany to take up question of armistice with Allies.

October 24. Allies continue to advance on all fronts.
October 28. Hungary accepts terms offered by Allies.

October 30. Italians advance north of the Piave.

November 1. American troops advance to Grandpré, capturing many villages and prisoners.

November 4. Austria accepts terms of truce.

November 5. The American first army advances on both sides of the Meuse.

November 7. Americans capture Sedan.

November 8. General Foch receives German armistice delegates. Republic proclaimed in Bavaria.

November 9. Socialists take over government in Berlin.

November 10. Kaiser Wilhelm flees to Holland.

November 11. German envoys sign armistice terms.

November 20. French enter Buda-Pesth. German submarines surrender to British. American troops cross the Lorraine frontier.

November 21. The entire German fleet surrendered to the British Grand Fleet and the American fleet.

November 22. Homeward movement of American forces begins. King Albert makes triumphal entry into Brussels.

November 28. Thanksgiving Day was celebrated in London.

December 1. American troops crossed the frontier of Prussia.

December 3. President Wilson started for the peace conference.

December 5. Carter Glass was nominated Secretary of the Treasury.

December 13. The President arrived in Brest.

1919

January 3. President Wilson appointed Herbert Hoover director general of an international organization for the relief of the starving populations of the liberated countries. The President and Mrs. Wilson were welcomed by the King and Queen of Italy in Rome. The President addressed the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies, declaring that the old days of "the balance of power" are over.

January 4. The President cabled an appeal to Congress for an appropriation of \$100,000,000 to feed the starving peoples of Austria, Turkey, Poland, and western Europe. The President paid a visit to the Pope.

January 7. President Wilson returned to Paris and, together with the other American peace delegates, held a conference with M. Clemenceau. The Spartacides in Berlin started a revolutionary outbreak.

January 9. The Government troops in Berlin defeated the Spartacides.

January 12. The Supreme War Council met in Paris.

January 13. The House of Representatives passed the measure appropriating \$100,000,000 for the aid of the starving peoples of Europe.

January 15. The Berlin Government announced the completion of a newly drafted constitution covering the union of fifteen States.

January 16. Karl Liebknecht was killed by soldiers while endeavoring to escape from custody.

January 17. Jan Ignace Paderewski was agreed upon by the Polish factions as the first premier of Poland.

January 18. The Peace Conference held its first session in Paris. Clemenceau was chosen president.

January 19. General election was held in Germany.

January 25. The Peace Conference adopted a resolution creating a League of Nations.

January 29. The new Polish Government was recognized by President Wilson.

February 6. The German National Assembly convened at Weimar. Friedrich Ebert was elected president.

February 7. American recognition was extended to Jugo-Slavia.

February 14. President Wilson read before the Peace Conference the summary of the covenant of the League of Nations.

February 15. President sailed for American.

February 19. M. Clemenceau was shot by a French anarchist. The wound was not serious.

February 21. Kurt Eisner, Socialist premier of Bavaria, was assassinated in Munich.

February 24. President Wilson arrived at Boston.

February 26. The President discussed the covenant of the League of Nations with members of Congress.

March 5. President Wilson started on his return trip to Paris.

March 13. The President arrived in France. The German Government executed over 200 Spartacides in Berlin.

March 25. A new Socialist cabinet was installed in Prussia.

April 1. A delegation of Filipinos presented to Secretary Baker a memorial asking for independence.

April 15. Communists again captured Munich.

April 23. The Italian delegation to the Peace Conference announced their withdrawal as a result of President Wilson's declaration that Italy should not have Fiume.

April 25. The German couriers in advance of the peace delegates arrived in Paris.

April 28. The covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the Peace Conference.

May 6. The terms of the Peace Treaty were presented to all the Powers represented at the Conference.

May 8. The German Government ordered a suspension of all amusements as mourning over the terms of the treaty.

May 10. The Treasury Department announced an oversubscription of the Victory Loan.

May 19. The Austrian peace delegates arrived at St. Germain.

May 21. An extension of one week was granted to the Germans for consideration of the Peace Treaty

May 26. The council of four declared in favor of recognizing the Kolchak Government in Russia.

May 29. The German delegates presented counterproposals to the Peace Treaty.

June 14. The council of five finished the revisions made to meet the protests of the Germans.

June 16. The German delegates were handed the revised treaty.

June 19. The Italian cabinet resigned following a note by the Chamber of Deputies expressing a lack of confidence.

June 20. The German cabinet resigned.

June 22. German men and officers sunk the vessels interned at Scapa Flow. June 25. General von Hindenburg resigned as commander in chief of the general armies.

June 28. The Treaty of Peace was signed by the German, Allied, and

and who a

associated delegates, thus ending the World War.

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
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# APPENDIX



# FINAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

September 1, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith my final report as Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe.

#### PART I .- PERIOD OF ORGANIZATION

1. I assumed the duties of this office on May 26, 1917, and, accompanied by a small staff, departed for Europe on board the S. S. Baltic May 28. We arrived at London on June 9 and, after spending some days in consultation with the British authorities, reached Paris on June 13.

2. Following the rather earnest appeals of the Allies for American troops, it was decided to send to France, at once, 1 complete division and 9 newly organized regiments of Engineers. The division was formed of regular regiments, necessary transfers of officers and men were made, and recruits were assigned to increase these units to the required strength.

The offer by the Navy Department of one regiment of Marines to be reorganized as Infantry was accepted by the Secretary of War, and it became

temporarily a part of the First Division.

Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units, even approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to take the field. To meet the new conditions of warfare an entirely new organization was adopted in which our Infantry divisions were to consist of 4 regiments of Infantry of about treble their original size, 3 regiments of Artillery, 14 machine-gun companies, 1 Engineer regiment, 1 Signal battalion, 1 troop of Cavalry, and other auxiliary units, making a total strength of about 28,000 men.

#### MILITARY SITUATION

3. In order that the reasons for many important decisions reached in the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may be more clearly understood and the true value of the American effort more fully appreciated, it is desirable to have in mind the main events leading up to the time of our entry into the war.

1914

4. Although the German drive of 1914 had failed in its immediate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gains. German forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupied rich industrial regions of northern France, embracing one-fourteenth of her population and about three-fourths

Note—The charts referred to in this report are on file at the War Department, Washington, D. C.

of her coal and iron. The German armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles in length, stretching from the Swiss border to Nieuport on the English Channel; her troops were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative remained in German hands.

In the east the rapidity of the Russian mobilization forced Germany, even before the Battle of the Marne, to send troops to that frontier, but the close of 1914 found the Russian armies ejected from East Prussia and driven back

on Warsaw.

The entry of Turkey into the war, because of the moral effect upon the Moslem world and the immediate constant threat created against Allied communications with the Far East, led to an effort by the Allies in the direction of the Dardanelles.

#### 1915

5. Italy joined the Allies in May and gave their cause new strength, but the effect was more or less offset when Bulgaria entered on the side of the Central Powers.

The threatening situation on the Russian front and in the Balkans was still such that Germany was compelled to exert an immediate offensive effort in those directions and to maintain only a defensive attitude on the western front. German arms achieved a striking series of successes in the vicinity of the Mazurian Lakes and in Galicia, capturing Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilna. The Central Powers overran Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile, the Italian armies forced Austria to use approximately one-half of her strength against them.

In the west, the French and British launched offensives which cost the German armies considerable loss; but the objectives were limited and the effect was local.

The Dardanelles expedition, having failed in its mission, was withdrawn in January, 1916. In Mesopotamia the Allied operations had not been successful. Although the British fleet had established its superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had developed into a serious menace to Allied shipping.

#### 1916

6. Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern front at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west, and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in the spring of 1916. But Russia was not yet beaten and early in June, aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in the west, she began the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrous to Austria.

Roumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertook a promising offensive against Austria. The British and French armies attacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned to the defensive in the west, and in September initiated a campaign in the east which, before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate for Russia as well as Roumania.

## Spring of 1917

7. Retaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient for the final conquest of Russia, Germany prepared to aid Austria in an offensive against Italy. Meanwhile, the Russian revolution was well under way and, by the midsummer of 1917, the final collapse of that government was almost certain.

The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western front led the Allies with much confidence to attempt a decision on this front; but the losses were very heavy and the effort signally failed. The failure caused a serious reaction especially on French morale, both in the army and throughout the country, and attempts to carry out extensive or combined

operations were indefinitely suspended.

In the five months ending June 30, German submarines had accomplished the destruction of more than three and one-quarter million tons of Allied shipping. During three years Germany had seen practically all her offensives except Verdun crowned with success. Her battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had withstood every Allied attack since the Marne. The German general staff could now foresee the complete elimination of Russia, the possibility of defeating Italy before the end of the year and, finally, the campaign of 1918 against the French and British on the western front which might terminate the war.

It cannot be said that German hopes of final victory were extravagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of history. Financial problems of the Allies were difficult, supplies were becoming exhausted and their armies had suffered tremendous losses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil population but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that, although their superiority on the western front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be undertaken and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the German defense. Allied resources in man power at home were low and there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength, even in the face of the probability of having practically the whole military strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring of 1918.

8. This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet this was temporary, and a review of conditions made it apparent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible. After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the following to Washington on July 6,

1917:

Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May.

#### ORGANIZATION PROJECTS

9. A general organization project, covering as far as possible the personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was forwarded to Washington on July 11. This was prepared by the Operations Section of my staff and adopted in joint conference with the War Department Committee then in France. It embodied my conclusions on the military organization and effort required of America after a careful study of French and British experience. In forwarding this project I stated:

It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive in 1918, and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force—i. e., at least 3,000,000 men.

The original project for organized combat units and its state of completion on November 11, 1918, are shown in the charts appended to this report. With a few minor changes this project remained our guide until the end.

10. While this general organization project provided certain Services of Supply troops, which were an integral part of the larger combat units, it did not include the great body of troops and services required to maintain an army overseas. To disembark 2,000,000 men, move them to their training areas, shelter them, handle and store the quantities of supplies and equipment they required called for an extraordinary and immediate effort in construction. To provide the organization for this purpose, a project for engineer services of the rear, including railways, was cabled to Washington August 5, 1917, followed on September 18, 1917, by a complete service of the rear project, which listed item by item the troops considered necessary, for the Services of Supply. Particular attention is invited to the charts herewith, which show the extent to which this project had developed by November 11, 1918, and the varied units required, many of which did not exist in our Army prior to this war.

11. In order that the War Department might have a clear-cut program to follow in the shipment of personnel and material to insure the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and symmetrical, a comprehensive statement was prepared covering the order in which the troops and services enumerated in these two projects should arrive. This schedule of priority of shipments, forwarded to the War Department on October 7, divided the initial force called for by the two projects into six phases corre-

sponding to combatant corps of six divisions each.

The importance of the three documents, the general organization project, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority of shipments should be emphasized, because they formed the basic plan for providing an army in France together with its material for combat, construction, and supply.

AMERICAN FRONT AND LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

12. Before developing plans for a line of communications it was necessary to decide upon the probable sector of the front for the eventual employment of a distinctive American force. Our mission was offensive and it was essential to make plans for striking the enemy where a definite military decision could be gained. While the Allied Armies had endeavored to maintain the offensive, the British, in order to guard the Channel ports, were committed to operations in Flanders and the French to the portion of the front protecting Paris. Both lacked troops to operate elsewhere on a large scale.

To the east the great fortified district east of Verdun and around Metz menaced central France, protected the most exposed portion of the German line of communications, that between Metz and Sedan, and covered the Briey iron region, from which the enemy obtained the greater part of the iron required for munitions and material. The coal fields east of Metz were also covered by these same defenses. A deep advance east of Metz, or the capture of the Briey region, by threatening the invasion of rich German territory in the Moselle Valley and the Saar Basin, thus curtailing her supply of coal or iron, would have a decisive effect in forcing a withdrawal of German troops from northern France. The military and economic situation of the enemy, therefore, indicated Lorraine as the field promising the most fruitful results for the employment of our armies.

13. The complexity of trench life had enormously increased the tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a question of providing food, but enormous quantities of munitions and material were needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden of meeting the heavy demands of the

three and one-half million Allied combatants then engaged.

The British were crowding the Channel ports and the French were exploiting the manufacturing center of Paris, so that the railroads of northern France were already much overtaxed. Even though the Channel ports might be used to a limited extent for shipments through England, the railroads leading eastward would have to cross British and French zones of operation, thus making the introduction of a line of communications based on ports and railways in that region quite impracticable. If the American Army was to have an independent and flexible system, it could not use the lines behind the British-Belgium front nor those in rear of the French front covering Paris.

The problem confronting the American Expeditionary Forces was then to superimpose its rail communications on those of France where there would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries of supply of the two great Allied armies already in the field. This would require the utmost use of those lines of the existing French railroad system that could bear an added burden. Double-track railroad lines from the ports of the Loire and the Gironde Rivers unite at Bourges, running thence via Nevers, Dijon, and Neufchateau, with lines radiating therefrom toward the right wing of the Allied front. It was estimated that these with the collateral lines available, after considerable improvement, could handle an additional 50,000 tons per day, required for an army of 2,000,000 men. The lines selected, therefore, were those leading from the comparatively unused South Atlantic ports of France to the northeast where it was believed the American Armies could be employed to the best advantage.

14. In the location of our main depots of supply, while it was important that they should be easily accessible, yet they must also be at a safe distance, as we were to meet an aggressive enemy capable of taking the offensive in any one of several directions. The area embracing Tours, Orleans, Montargis, Nevers, and Chateauroux was chosen, as it was centrally

located with regard to all points on the arc of the western front.

The ports of St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bassens were designated for permanent use, while Nantes, Bordeaux, and Pauillac were for emergency use. Several smaller ports, such as St. Malo, Sables-d'Olonne, and Bayonne, were available chiefly for the importation of coal from England. From time to time, certain trans-Atlantic ships were sent to Le Havre and Cherbourg. In anticipation of a large increase in the amount of tonnage that might be required later, arrangements were made during the German offensive of 1918 to utilize the ports of Marseilles and Toulon as well as other smaller ports on the Mediterranean.

For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces were based on the American Continent. Three thousand miles of ocean to cross with the growing submarine menace confronting us, the quantity of ship tonnage that would be available then unknown, and a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French ports to our probable front, presented difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable as compared with those of our Allies.

15. For purposes of local administration our line of communications in France was subdivided into districts or sections. The territory corresponding to and immediately surrounding the principal ports were, respectively,

called base sections, with an intermediate section embracing the region of the great storage depots and an advance section extending to the zone of operations, within which the billeting and training areas for our earlier divisions were located.

16. In providing for the storage and distribution of reserve supplies an allowance of 45 days in the base sections was planned, with 30 days in the intermediate section and 15 days in the advance section. After the safety of our sea transport was practically assured, this was reduced to a total of 45 days, distributed proportionately. When the Armistice was signed all projects for construction had been completed and supplies were on hand to meet the needs of 2,000,000 men, while further plans for necessary construction and for the supply of an additional 2,000,000 were well under way.

#### GENERAL STAFF

17. The organization of the General Staff and supply services was one of the first matters to engage my attention. Our situation in this regard was wholly unlike that of our Allies. The French Army was at home and in close touch with its civil government and war department agencies. While the British were organized on an overseas basis, they were within easy reach of their base of supplies in England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simple as compared with ours. Their training could be carried out at home with the experience of the front at hand, while our troops must be sent as ships were provided and their training resumed in France where discontinued in the States. Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet all the initial demands, so that priority of material for combat and construction, as well as for supplies that could not be purchased in Europe, must be established by those whose perspective included all the services and who were familiar with general plans. For the proper direction and coordination of the details of administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and training, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army.

The functions of the General Staff at my headquarters were finally allotted to the five sections, each under an Assistant Chief of Staff, as follows: To the First, or Administrative Section—ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men and animals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusements; to the Second, or Intelligence Section information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counterespionage, maps, and censorship; to the Third, or Operations Section-strategic studies and plans and employment of combat troops; to the Fourth Section -coordination of supply services, including Construction, Transportation, and Medical Departments, and control of regulating stations for supply: to the Fifth, or Training Section-tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and athletics. This same system was applied in the lower echelons of the command down to include divisions, except that in corps and divisions the Fourth Section was merged with the First and the Fifth Section with the Third.

18. As the American Expeditionary Forces grew, it was considered advisable that, in matters of procurement, transportation, and supply, the chiefs of the several supply services, who had hitherto been under the General Staff at my headquarters, should be placed directly under the supervision of the commanding general, Services of Supply. At General Headquarters, a Deputy Chief of Staff to assist the Chief of Staff was provided, and the heads of the five General Staff sections became Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

The General Staff at my headquarters thereafter concerned itself with the broader phase of control. Under my general supervision and pursuant to clearly determined policies, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Services of Supply, keeping always in close touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillment. Thus a system of direct responsibility was put into operation which contemplated secrecy in preparation, prompt decision in emergency, and coordinate action in execution.

19. With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officers rapidly increased, but the available number of officers trained for staff duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a General Staff college was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, for the instruction of such officers as could be spared. An intensive course of study of three months was prescribed embracing the details of our staff organization and administration, and our system of supply, and teaching the combined employment of all arms and services in combat. Officers were carefully chosen for their suitability and, considering the short time available, graduates from this school returned well equipped for staff duties and with a loyal spirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College carried to completion four courses of three months each, graduating 537 staff officers.

#### TRAINING

20. Soon after our arrival in Europe careful study was made of the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both the French and British maintained continuously a great system of schools and training centers, which provided for both theoretical and practical instruction of inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers. These centers were required not only to train new troops, but to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by giving them a short course in the duties of their new grades. These school systems made it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge of the latest methods developed by experience and at the same time counteract false notions.

21. A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1917, for our Armies in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces a sound fighting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop training in all units up to include divisions. Corps centers of instruction for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders of all arms were established. These centers also provided special training for the instructors needed at corps schools. Base training centers for replacement troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks and mechanics, were designated. The army and corps schools were retained under the direct supervision of the Training Section, General Staff. The schools mentioned graduated 21,330 noncommissioned officers and 13.916 officers.

Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most promising soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command of platoons and companies. There were graduated from these candidate schools in France 10,976 soldiers.

It was planned to have 22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January 1, 1919, graduating 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were to be graduated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen, making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to November 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as officers.

It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the imperative and

immediate necessity for trained replacement officers.

22. Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Department that French and British officers be asked for to assist in the instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization and development of our own schools, a large number of our officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following paragraph on divisional training:

Trench warfare naturally gives prominence to the defensive as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and in practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for future offensive.

For training our Artillery units, special localities such as Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and the instruction was usually carried on in conjunction with French artillery followed up later, as far as

possible, with field practice in cooperation with our own Infantry.

23. The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result in our Army and to encourage the offensive spirit that the following was published in October, 1917:

1. \* \* \* (a) The above methods to be employed must remain or become distinctly our own.

(b) All instruction must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive. This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a

settled habit of thought.

(c) The general principles governing combat remain unchanged in their essence. This war has developed special features which involve special phases of training, but the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations, and other service manuals remain the guide for both officers and soldiers and constitute the standard by which their efficiency is to be measured, except as modified in detail by instructions from these head-quarters.

(d) The rifle and the bayonet are the principal weapons of the infantry soldier. He will be trained to a high degree of skill as a marksman, both on the target range and in field firing. An aggressive spirit must be developed until the soldier feels

himself, as a bayonet fighter, invincible in battle.

(e) All officers and soldiers should realize that at no time in our history has discipline been so important; therefore, discipline of the highest order must be exacted at all times. The standards for the American Army will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instructions required of the cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France. \* \*

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and recommending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare so far as necessary be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions, whether serving temporarily with the British or French, were trained as thus indicated. The assistance of the French units was limited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instruc-

tors taught the use of French arms and assisted in the preparation of

elementary trench warfare problems.

Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training completed in the United States, one month was allotted for the instruction of small units from battalions down, a second month of experience in quiet sectors by battalions, and a third month for field practice in open warfare tactics by division, including artillery. Unfortunately many divisions did not receive the requisite amount of systematic training before leaving the States and complete preparation of such units for battle was thus often seriously delayed.

24. The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efficiency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement. Instruction which had hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and conceptions of inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent instructors, was brought under a system based on correct principles. Approved and systematic methods were maintained and enforced largely by the continual presence of members of the Training Section with the troops both during the training period and in campaign.

#### INTELLIGENCE

25. Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary loss only in the light of complete and reliable information of the enemy. Warfare with battle lines separated by short distances only, made possible the early acquirement of information, such as that obtained through airplane photography, observation from balloons and planes, sensitive instruments for detecting gun positions and raids to secure prisoners and documents. All such information, together with that from Allied sources, including military, political, and economical, was collected, classified, and rapidly distributed where needed.

26. From careful studies of the systems and actual participation by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an Intelligence Service was evolved in our forces which operated successfully from its first

organization in August, 1917.

With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air and ground and the exploitation of prisoners and documents, have proved more effective than the less direct means. Every unit from the battalion up had an intelligence detachment, but only in divisions and larger organizations did the intelligence agencies embrace all available means and sources, including radio interception stations and sound and flash-ranging detachments.

27. The subjects studied by the Intelligence Section embraced the location of the enemy's front line, his order of battle, the history and fighting value of his divisions, his manpower, his combat activities, circulation and movement, his defensive organizations, supply, construction and material, air service, radio service, strategy and tactics, and what he probably knew of our intentions. The political and economic conditions within the enemies'

countries were also of extreme importance.

28. To disseminate conclusions, daily publications were necessary, such as a Secret Summary of Intelligence containing information of the broadest scope, which concerned only General Headquarters; and a Summary of Information, distributed down to include the divisions, giving information affecting the western front. A Press Review and a Summary of Air Intelligence were also published.

Maps showing graphically the disposition and movement of enemy troops in our front were the best means for distributing information to our troops. At the base printing plant and at General Headquarters base maps were prepared while mobile printing plants, mounted on trucks, accompanied corps and army headquarters. Combat troops were thus supplied with excellent maps distributed, just before and during an attack, down to include company and platoon commanders. Between July 1 and November 11, 1918, over 5,000,000 maps were used.

29. The secret service, espionage and counterespionage, was organized in close cooperation with the French and British. To prevent indiscretions in the letters of officers and soldiers, as well as in articles written for the press, the Censorship Division was created. The Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer so desired, censored all mail written in foreign languages, of which there were over 50 used, and frequently checked

up letters of entire organizations.

30. The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplish three broad results:

To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information of our forces. To give to the people of the United States the maximum information con-

sistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they were known at the time.

There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents, while visiting correspondents reached a total of 411.

#### SUMMER OF 1917 TO SPRING OF 1918

31. In order to hinder the enemy's conquest of Russia and, if possible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, the Allies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far as their diminished strength and morale would permit. On June 7, 1917, the British took Messines, while a succession of operations known as the Third Battle of Ypres began on July 31 and terminated with the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge November 6-10. The British attack at Cambrai is of special interest, since it was here that American troops (Eleventh Engineers) first participated in active fighting.

The French successfully attacked on a limited front near Verdun, capturing Mort Homme on August 20 and advancing their lines to La Forge Brook. In another offensive, begun on October 23, they gained considerable ground on Chemin des Dames Ridge. These French attacks were characterized by most careful preparation to insure success in order to improve the

morale of their troops.

32. Notwithstanding these Allied attacks on the western front, the immense gains by the German armies in the east, culminating at Riga on September 3, precipitated the collapse of Russia. The following month, the Austrians with German assistance surprised the Italians and broke through the lines at Caporetto, driving the Italian armies back to the Piave River, inflicting a loss of 300,000 men, 600,000 rifles, 3,000 guns, and enormous stores. This serious crisis compelled the withdrawal of 10 French and British divisions from the western front to Italy. The German situation on all other theaters was so favorable that as early as November they began the movement of divisions toward the western front. If needed, her divisions could be withdrawn from the Italian front before the French and British dared recall their divisions.

33. At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American Army. Marshal Joffre during his visit to America had made special request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also asked for Engineer regiments and other special service units.

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the time being French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension was deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conference held on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders in Chief and the British and French Chiefs of Staff:

General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty ou western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy.

The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With the approach of winter, depression among the Allies over the Russian collapse and the Italian crisis was intensified by the conviction that the Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring.

A review of the situation showed that with Russia out of the war the Central Powers would be able to release a large number of divisions for service elsewhere, and that during the spring and summer of 1918, without interfering with the status quo at Saloniki, they could concentrate on the western front a force much stronger than that of the Allies. In view of this, it was represented to the War Department in December as of the utmost importance that the Allied preparations be expedited.

34. On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in France and but one division had appeared on the front. Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to develop. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of our troops into the line and urged the amalgamation of our troops with their own, even insisting upon the curtailment of training to conform to the strict minimum of trench requirements they considered necessary.

My conclusion was that, although the morale of the German people and of the armies was better than it had been for two years, only an untoward combination of circumstances could give the enemy a decisive victory before American support as recommended could be made effective, provided the Allies secured unity of action. However, a situation might arise which would necessitate the temporary use of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defensive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of our firm purpose to form our own Army under our own flag.

While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and concentrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, the training of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare. As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover it was obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed divisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under stress of defeat, with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again, there

was no doubt that the realization by the German people that independent American divisions, corps, or armies were in the field with determined pur-

pose would be a severe blow to German morale and prestige.

It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger American units on the front would be most beneficial to the morale of the Allies themselves. Accordingly, the First Division, on January 19, 1918, took over a sector north of Toul; the Twenty-sixth Division went to the Soissons front early in February; the Forty-second Division entered the line near Luneville, February 21, and the Second Division near Verdun, March 18. Meanwhile, the First Army Corps Headquarters, Major General Hunter Liggett commanding, was organized at Neufchateau on January 20, and the plan to create an independent American sector on the Lorraine front was taking shape. This was the situation when the great German offensive was launched on March 21, 1918.

#### PART II.—OPERATIONS

#### EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS

1. The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with October, 6 divisions were to be sent during that quarter, 7 during the first quarter of 1918, and 8 the second quarter. While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food.

2. On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the

War Department with the following recommendation:

Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is 4 army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon General Bliss and other American members of the conference. Generals Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

Paragraph 4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak, and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of these requirements will be sent later.

and again on December 20, 1917:

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire First Corps with

its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December, January, and February contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a program be carried out as per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of army troops and auxiliaries, in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions\* and many corps troops. It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by General Bliss.

3. During January, 1918, discussion were held with the British authorities that resulted in an agreement, which became known as the six-division plan and which provided for the transportation of six entire divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our own shipping program. High commanders, staff, Infantry, and auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions, beginning with battalions, the Artillery to be trained under American direction, using French matériel. It was agreed that when sufficiently trained these battalions were to be re-formed into regiments and that when the Artillery was fully trained all of the units comprising each division were to be united for service under their own officers. It was planned that the period of training with the British should cover about 10 weeks. To supervise the administration and training of these divisions the Second Corps staft was organized February 20, 1918.

In the latter part of January joint note No. 12, presented by the Military Representatives with the Supreme War Council, was approved by the Council. This note concluded that France would be safe during 1918 only

under certain conditions, namely:

(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength and that they receive the expected reenforcements of not less than two American divisions per month.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVES OF 1918 AND RELATED ALLIED AGREEMENTS

4. The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some 56 kilometers. For a few days the loss of the railroad center of Amiens appeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the Military Representatives with the Supreme War Council prepared their joint note No. 18. This not repeated the previously quoted statement from joint note No. 12, and continued:

\* The First, Forty-second, Second, and Twenty-sixth Divisions had arrived; but not the Replacement and the Depot Divisions.

The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, and which can extend to the other theaters of operations, may very quickly place the Allied Armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condition (see (a) par. 2) can no longer be maintained, and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied Armies as soon as possible by permitting in principle the temporary service of American units in Allied Army corps and divisions. Such reenforcements must, however, be obtained from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American Army.

The Military Representatives are of the opinion that from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine-gun units, organized as that Government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly.

The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time, General Bliss, the American Military Representative with the Supreme War Council, and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result that the Secretary recommended to the President that joint note No. 18 be approved in the following sense:

The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be under the direction of the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permits, into an independent American Army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view.

While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of shipments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that were to be trained in the British area, as that Government was to provide the additional shipping according to the six-division plan agreed upon even before the be-

ginning of the March 21 offensive.

On April 2 the War Department cabled that preferential transportation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units during the existing emergency. Preliminary arrangements were made for training and carly employment with the French of such infantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation. As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified to give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the Allies were now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for the shipment of infantry and its complete incorporation in their units, which fact was cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the specific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantry be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity for future priority be determined later.

5. The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British had erroneously assumed

that the preferential shipment of infantry was to be continuous. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000 infantry and machine-gun troops, with certain auxiliary units to be brought over by British tonnage during April, should go to the British area as part of the six-division plan, but that there should be a further agreement as to subsequent troops to be brought over by the British. Consequently, a readjustment of the priority schedule was undertaken on the basis of postponing "shipment of all noncombatant troops to the utmost possible to meet present situation, and at the same time not make it impossible to build up our own Army."

6. The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack against the British lines on a front of some 40 kilometers in the vicinity of Armentieres and along the Lys River. As a result of its being included in a salient formed by the German advance, Passchendaele Ridge, the capture of which had cost

so dearly in 1917, was evacuated by the British on April 17.

The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace them entirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21, I went to London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in the April 7 conference. The result of this London agreement was cabled to Washington April 24, as follows:

(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and signal troops of American divisions and the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping during May for training and service with the British army in France up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess of that required for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to make these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will be carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up American divisions.

(b) That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions and such corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organizations follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnel be trained with French matériel and join its proper divisions as soon as thoroughly trained.

(c) If, when the program outlined in paragraphs (a) and (b) is completed, the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry, etc., of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping available for transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangement as will insure immediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at the earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary units to complete the organization of American divisions and corps. Provided that the combatant troops mentioned in (a) and (b) be followed by such Service of the Rear and other troops as may be considered necessary by the American Commander in Chief.

(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when trained and organized shall be utilized under the American Commander in Chief in an American

group.

(e) That the American Commander in Chief shall allot American troops to the French or British for training or train them with American units at his discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British shipping or included in the six divisions mentioned in paragraph (a) are to be trained with the British Army, details as to rations, equipment, and transport to be determined by special agreement.

7. At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville May 1 and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements or units to

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serve with their armies. After prolonged discussion regarding this question and that of priority generally the following agreement was reached, committing the Council to an independent American Army and providing for the immediate shipment of certain troops:

It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American Army, preference will be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British Armies; with the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the direction of the American Commander in Chief after consultation with the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France.

Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such

other troops as may be determined by the American Commander in Chief.

Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this program shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British Government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander in Chief may determine.

Subparagraph C. It is also further agreed that if the British Government shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine further action.

The gravity of the situation had brought the Allies to a full realization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the transportation of American troops. Although their views were accepted to the extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry and machine gunners, the priority agreed upon as to this class of troops was not as extensive as some of them deemed necessary, and the Abbeville conference was adjourned with the understanding that the question of further priority would be discussed at a conference to be held about the end of May.

8. The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Oise and Berry-au-Bac against the French instead of against the British, as was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The initial Aisne attack, covering a front of 35 kilometers, met with remarkable success, as the German armies advanced no less than 50 kilometers in four days. On reaching the Marne that river was used as a defensive flank and the German advance was directed toward Paris. During the first days of June something akin to a panic seized the city and it was estimated that 1,000,000 people left during the spring of 1918.

The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2. The opinion of our Allies as to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon further priority for infantry and machine gunners are shown by the following message prepared by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and agreed to by Gen. Foch:

The Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting at Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the United States:

"We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up) there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He, therefore, urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

"We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies re-

gards as essential to ultimate victory."

A separate telegram contains the arrangements which General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner have agreed to recommend to the United States Government with regard to the dispatch of American troops for the months of June and July.

(Signed)

CLEMENCEAU,
D. LLOYD GEORGE,
OBLANDO.

Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport of American infantry and machine gunners that the troops of those categories which had received even partial training in the United States were practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our Services of Supply made it essential that early relief be afforded by increasing its personnel. At the same time, the corresponding services of our Allies had in certain departments been equally overtaxed and their responsible heads were urgent in their representations that their needs must be relieved by bringing over American specialists. The final agreement was cabled to the War Department on June 5, as follows:

The following agreement has been concluded between General Foch, Lord Milner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American troops in the months of June and July:

"The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the employment of combined British and American tonnage. We recommend:

"(a) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz. six divisions without artillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacements

for combat troops); (2) 25,400 men for the service of the railways, of which 13,400 have been asked for by the French Minister of Transportation; (3) the balance to be troops of categories to be determined by the Commander in Chief,

American Expeditionary Forces.

"(b) For the month of July: (1) Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (four divisions minus artillery 'et cetera' amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacement); (2) the balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

'(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage will

be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be dispatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain.

(Signed)

"FOCH. "MILNER.

"PERSHING."

9. The various proposals during these conferences regarding priority of shipment, often very insistent, raised questions that were not only most difficult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was a critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while, on the other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily postponed the formation of a distinctive American fighting force and the means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to win the war. A few of the Allied representatives became convinced that the American Services of Supply should not be neglected but should be developed in the common interest. The success of our divisions during May and June demonstrated fully that it was not necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in order to utilize American manhood most effectively.

#### ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF

10. When, on March 21, 1918, the German Army on the western front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armies and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies were being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was to end the war before America's effort could be brought to bear. Germany's best troops, her most successful generals, and all the experience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort.

The first blow fell on the right of the British Armies, including the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt cooperation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly illustrated the necessity for having some one with sufficient authority over all the Allied Armies to meet such an emergency. The lack of complete cooperation among the Allies on the western front had been appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention by the Supreme War Council. A plan had been adopted by which each of the Allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction of the military representatives of the Supreme War Council of which General Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found available and the plan failed.

This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate consideration of the question of having an Allied Commander in Chief. After much discussion during which my view favoring such action was clearly stated, an agreement was reached and Gen. Foch was selected. His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United States by the President on April 16. The terms of the agreement under which General Foch exercised his authority were as follows:

BEAUVAIS, April 3, 1918.

General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments with the coordination of the action of the Allied Armies on the western front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French, and American Governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

The Commander in Chief of the British, French, and American Armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each Commander in Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government, if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch.

(Signed)

G. CLEMENCEAU.
PETAIN.
F. FOCH.
LLOYD GEORGE.
D. HAIG, F. M.
HENRY WILSON, General, 3. 4. 18.
TASKER H. BLISS, General and Chief of Staff.
JOHN J. PERSHING, General, U. S. A.

EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS FROM MARCH TO SEPTEMBER, 1918

11. The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to General Foch's headquarters, at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the Allies demanded this divergence from our

plans.

On March 21, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available—the First and Second then in line, and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve; the Forty-second relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with the French in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions (Third, Thirty-second, and Fifth) were arriving.

12. On April 25 the First Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in

order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 toward Château-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our new position and counterattack succeeded counterattack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of

proportion to the numbers involved.

13. Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the Thirty-second, intended for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the Fifth Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The Third Division was assembling in its training area and the Third Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh had arrived in the British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Thirtjeth, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the Aisne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The Second Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Château-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Château-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river

crossing.

The enemy having been halted, the Second Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured. In these operations the Second Division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.

14. To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about 60 kilometers, and during the German drive along the Lys had also sent reenforcements to assist the British. The French lines had been further lengthened about 45 kilometers as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French reserves to an extremely low point.

Our Second Corps, under Major General George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the ten divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, five American divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. The Seventy-seventh and Eighty-second Divisions were moved south to release the Forty-second and Twenty-sixth for employment on a more active portion of the front; the Thirty-fifth Division entered the line in the Vosges, and the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Château-Thierry as reserves.

On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficial to the Allied morale, particularly as

it was believed that the German losses were unusually heavy.

15. On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First, Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth Divisions were on the Château-Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, some small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with our troops or with the French; the Forty-second Division was in support of the French east of Rheims; and four colored regiments were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the British Army, three having elements in the line. In our training areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the process of arrival.

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counteroffensive that was obvious. If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under Allied command, the suggestion was accepted in principle and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The Forty-second Division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. Southwest of Rheims, and along the Marne to the east of Château-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 kilometers beyond the river being effected against the French immediately to the right of our Third Division. The following quotation from the report of the commanding general Third Division gives the result

of the fighting on his front:

Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front-line positions, causing the infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the Third Division sector except the dead.

On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at

certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

16. The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching of the counterattack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of reserves. Every American division with any sort of training was made available for use in

a counteroffensive.

General Pétain's initial plan for the counterattack involved the entire western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18, without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

The First Division, throughout 4 days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the 7 German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British division. The Second Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first 26 hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division. The result of this counteroffensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second Divisions the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the

Allies.

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counteroffensive. A little to the south of the Second Division, the Fourth was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The First American Corps, Major General Hunter Liggett commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Château-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st. At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of Charteves and Jaulgonne.

In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the French division. From this time until August 2 it fought its way through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourq, advancing toward the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on August 3. Early in this period elements of the Twenty-eighth Division participated in the advance.

Farther to the east the Third Division forced the enemy back to Roncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty-second Division from the Vosges front. The Thirty-second, after relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on the line of the Ourcq River, advanced

abreast of the Forty-second toward the Vesle. On August 3 it passed under control of our Third Corps, Major General Robert L. Bullard commanding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division took up the task of the Forty-second Division and advanced with the Thirty-second to the Vesle River, where, on August 6, the operation for the reduction of the Marne salient terminated.

In the hard fighting from July 18 to August 6 the Germans were not only halted in their advance but were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

17. The First and Third Corps now held a continuous front of 11 kilometers along the Vesle. On August 12 the Seventy-seventh Division relieved the Fourth Division on the First Corps front, and the following day the Twenty-eighth relieved the Thirty-second Division in the Third Corps, while from August 6 to August 10 the Sixth Infantry Brigade of the Third Division held a sector on the river line. The transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was ordered at this time, and the control of its front was turned over to the Third Corps.

On August 18 General Petain began an offensive between Rheims and the Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossing the Vesle on September 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateau south of the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh on September 6. The Twenty-eighth was withdrawn from the line on September 7. Two days later the Third Corps was transferred to the region of Verdun, the Seventy-seventh Division remaining in line on the Aisne River until September 17.

The Thirty-second Division, upon its relief from the battle on the Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from August 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desperate fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road.

18. On the British front two regiments of the Thirty-third Division participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on August 9 as an incident of the allied offensive against the Amiens salient. One of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly Ridge, capturing 700 prisoners and considerable material.

### ASSEMBLING THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

19. In conference with General Petain at Chantilly on May 19 it had been agreed that the American Army would soon take complete charge of the sector of the Woevre. The Twenty-sixth Division was already in line in the Woevre north of Toul and was to be followed by other American divisions as they became available, with the understanding that the sector was to pass to our control when four divisions were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on farther west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement had no immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our divisions northeast of Paris, the organization of an American corps sector in the Château-Thierry region was taken up with General Petain, and on July 4 the First Corps assumed tactical control of a sector in that region. This was an important step, but it was by no means satisfactory, as only one American division at the moment was operating under the control of the First Corps, while we had at this time eight American divisions in the front line serving in French corps.

20. The counteroffensives against the Marne salient in July, and against the Amiens salient in August had gained such an advantage that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dispersion of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitious for assembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along the Allied front, their supply had become very difficult. From every point of view the immediate organization of an independent American force was indicated. The formation of the Army in the Château-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of the Woevre, which was to extend from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to north of St. Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Foch and myself on August 9, and the details were arranged with General Pétain later on the same day.

21. At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Commanders in Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations. Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command and these formed the basis of future cooperation of the Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude should be to maintain the offensive. As the first operation of the American Army, the reduction of the salient of St. Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially important that the movement be undertaken and finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about the middle of September.

Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American divisions and the organization of the First American Army under my personal command was announced on August 10, with La Ferte-sous-Jouarre as head-quarters. This Army nominally assumed control of a portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were given for its secret concentration in the St. Mihiel sector.

22. The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps headquarters to participate in the St. Mihiel attack were the First, Fourth, and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul, and the Fifth not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation, within the short period available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in Artillery, Aviation, and special troops, caused by the shipment of an undue proportion of Infantry and Machine Guns during the summer, were largely met by the French.

23. The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan Railroad system which was vital to the German armies west of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armament and munitions.

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the general line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)—heights south of Gorze-Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use on the western face of 3 or 4 American divisions, supported by the attack of 6 divisions of the Second

French Army on their left, while 7 American divisions would attack on the southern face, and 3 French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be taken by the Second French Army would be closely related to the attack of the First American Army, General Petain placed all the French troops involved under my personal command.

By August 30, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, and army troops, of the quantities of supplies and munitions required, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads, were well under way.

24. In accordance with the previous general consideration of operations at Bombon on July 24, an allied offensive extending practically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After the reduction of the St. Mihiel sector the Americans were to cooperate in the concerted effort of the Allied armies. It was the sense of the conference of July 24, that the extent to which the different operations already planned might carry us could not be then foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved before the season was far advanced. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919.

On August 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at my headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable results toward the Chemin des Dames on the French front, it was now believed that the limited allied offensive, which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the year. At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal Foch that the general operations as far as the American

Army was concerned should be carried out in detail by:

(a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second French

Army, reinforced by from 4 to 6 American divisions.

(b) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west to the Souain Road, to be executed on the right by an American Army astride the

Aisne and on the left by the Fourth French Army.

To carry out these attacks the 10 to 11 American divisions suggested for the St. Mihiel operation and the 4 to 6 for the Second French Army, would leave 8 to 10 divisions for an American Army on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation should be initiated on September 10 and

the other two on September 15 and 20, respectively.

25. The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the immediate separation of the recently formed First American Army into several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was directly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American Army, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking to the use and supply of our armies on a particular front. The inherent disinclination of our troops to serve under allied commanders would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

A further conference at Marshal Foch's headquarters was held on September 2, at which General Petain was present. After discussion the question of employing the American Army as a unit was conceded. The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at provided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be exploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the Allied armies were to be employed in a converging action. The British armies, supported by the left of the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai; the center of the French armies, west of Rheims, would continue the actions, already begun, to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American Army, supported by the right of the French armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mezieres.

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of

operations.

26. The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to me. In my opinion, no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions then in that zone. The First American Army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation, after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later than September 25.

As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St Mihiel operation was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville. The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. 18 to 19 divisions were to be in the front line. There were 4 French and 15 American divisions available, 6 of which would be in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not to advance. Furthermore, 2 Army Corps head-quarters, with their corps troops, practically all the Army Artillery and Aviation, and the First, Second, and Fourth Divisions, the first two destined to take a leading part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.

27. The salient had been held by the Germans since September, 1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the western front; namely, the Mezieres-Sedan-Metz Railroad and the Briey Iron Basin; it threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for 8 kilometers to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within the German lines the detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had reinforced the positions by every artificial means during a period of four years.

28. On the night of September 11, the troops of the First Army were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was the First Corps, Major General Liggett, commanding, with the Eighty-second, Nine-

tieth, Fifth and Second Divisions in line, extending from the Moselle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Major General Joseph T. Dickman, commanding, with the Eighty-ninth, Forty-second, and First Divisions, the left of this corps being opposite Montsec. These two Army Corps were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the First Corps. The First Division on the left of the Fourth Corps was charged with the double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some 20 kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient, where it was to make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corps. On the western face of the salient lay the Fifth Corps, Major General George H. Cameron, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division, Fifteenth French Colonial Division, and the Fourth Division in line, from Mouilly west to Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divisions, the Twentysixth alone was to make a deep advance directed southeast toward Vigneulles. The French Division was to make a short progression to the edge of the heights in order to cover the left of the Twenty-sixth. The Fourth Division was not to advance. In the center, between our Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, was the Second French Colonial Corps, Major General E. J. Blondlat, commanding, covering a front of 40 kilometers with 3 small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the enemy from the tip of the salient.

The French independent air force was at my disposal which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German

rail movements.

At dawn on September 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the Infantry of the First and Fourth Corps advanced. The Infantry of the Fifth Corps commenced its advance at 8 a. m. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight on September 13, elements of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions made a junction near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, 18 kilometers northeast of St. Mihiel. The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy, and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of September 13. The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable to earry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000 casualties during the actual period of the advance.

During the next two days the right of our line west of the Moselle River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be

held by the smallest practicable force.

29. The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American Army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently

insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theater of operations. 'The strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

#### MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION

30. The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal Foch and General Petain on September 2. It was planned to use all available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St. Mihiel front. The Army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line, on the front Brieulles-Romagne sous Montfaucon-Grandpre, and thereafter, by developing pressure toward Mezieres, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some 12 to 15 kilometers was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defenses were virtually continuous throughout that depth.

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counteroffensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious

obstacle to offensive operations.

31. The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems—one in the north, passing through Liege, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through that region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to the Carignan-Mezieres Railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formed the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German defensive positions. The effect of this convergence can be best understood by reference to plate No. 3. It will be seen, for example, that the distance between "no man's land" and the third German withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometers; the distance between the corresponding points near the tip of the great salient of the western front was about 65 kilometers, and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers. The effect of a penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army would be equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west; furthermore, such an advance

on our front was far more dangerous to the enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometers or more in depth.

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only protected his left but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne Forest covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and the forest the heights of Montfaucon offered perfect observation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate defense which the importance of the position would require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting.

32. When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of 14 days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies involved in the Meuse-Argonne battle, over the few roads available, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included 15 divisions, of which 7 were involved in the pending St. Mihiel drive, 3 were in sector in the Vosges, 3 in the neighborhood of Soissons, 1 in a training area, and 1 near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the Artillery, Aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the St. Mihiel attack and therefore could no be moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St. Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on September 13, the second day of St. Mihiel, reserve divisions and Army Artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne front.

That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of my command until September 22, on which date my headquarters were established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in addition to the Second French Colonial Corps, composed of 3 divisions, there was also the Seventeenth French Corps of 3 divisions holding the front north and east of Verdun.

33. At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle, the enemy had 10 divisions in line and 10 in reserve on the front between Fresnes-en-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

34. The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases, the first from September 26 to October 3, the second from October 4 to 31, and the third from November 1 to 11.

# Meuse-Argonne, First Phase

35. On the night of September 25, the 9 divisions to lead in the attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third Corps, Major General Bullard commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth Divisions in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Major General Cameron commanding, with the Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh, and Ninety-first Divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Major General Liggett commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions. Each corps had 1 division in reserve and the Army held 3 divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to support the attack of the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation, and the enemy had no tanks.

The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Romagne-Buzancy, the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in the center, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the Argonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest without our having to deliver a heavy attack

in that difficult region.

36. Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, the Infantry advanced at 5.30 a.m. on September 26, accompanied by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of defenses. Montfaucon was held tenaciously by the enemy and was

not captured until noon of the second day.

By the evening of the 28th a maximum advance of 11 kilometers had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Septsarges, and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of Brieulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw into first line before September 29. He developed a powerful machine gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counterattacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth Divisions. These divisions had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was within 2 kilometers of Aprement. We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

37. By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont—Nantillois—Apremont—southwest across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily. The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they attacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions. On the night of the 29th the Thirty-seventh and Seventy-ninth Divisions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third Divisions, respectively, and on the following night the First

Division relieved the Thirty-fifth Division.

38. The critical problem during the first few days of the battle was the restoration of communications over "no man's land." There were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed them. The spongy soil

and the lack of material increased the difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting the infantry action.

# Meuse-Argonne, Second Phase

39. At 5.30 a. m. on October 4 the general attack was renewed. The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne had increased from 10 in first line to 16, and included some of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small advances were realized, except by the First Division on the right of the First Corps. By evening of October 5 the line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fleville-Chehery, southwest through the Argonne.

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his commanding positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further stabilization of the new St. Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse

River.

40. On the 7th the First Corps, with the Eighty-second Division added. launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day the Seventeenth French Corps. Major General Claudel commanding, initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of 6 kilometers to a line well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make more rapid retirements farther west and withdraw his forces from northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications through Sedan.

41. We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replacements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October combat units required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than 45,000 would be available before November 1 to fill the existing and prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and Allied, especially as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of the Allied Armies farther west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to continue its aggressive tactics our divisions then with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking newly arrived divisions.

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Marshal Foch and General Petain on October 10, the former expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the Allied attack should continue. General Petain agreed that the American divisions with the

French were essential to us if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks and, before those divisions with the French had been released, it became necessary for us to send the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions from the First Army to assist the Sixth French Army in Flanders.

42. At this time the First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. Therefore, on October 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second Army with Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard in command, under whom it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. On October 16 the command of the First Army was transferred to Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, and my advance headquarters was established at Ligny-en-Barrois, from which the command of the group of American Armies was exercised.

43. Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order particularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. The First and Fifth Divisions were relieved by the Forty-second and Eightieth Divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole front was made on October 14. The resistance encountered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometers north of Sommerance. A maximum advance of 17 kilometers had been made since September 26 and the enemy had been

forced to throw into the fight a total of 15 reserve divisions.

During the remainder of the month important local operations were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First Corps, Major General Dickman commanding, advanced through Grandpre; the Fifth Corps, Major General Charles P. Summerall commanding, captured the Bois de Bantheville; the Third Corps, Major General John L. Hines commanding, completed the occupation of Cunel Heights; and the Seventeenth French Corps drove the enemy from the main ridge south of La Grande Montagne. Particularly heavy fighting occurred east of the Meuse on October 18, and in the further penetration of the Kriemhilde-Stellung on October 23 the Twenty-sixth Division entering the battle at this time relieved the Eighteenth French Division.

44. Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing number of Germany's best divisions, rising from 20 in line and reserve on September 26, to 31 on October 31; the enemy's elaborately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg Line, in our front had been broken; the almost impassable Argonne Forest was in our hands; an advance of 21 kilometers had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and the great railway artery through Carignan to Sedan was now seriously threatened.

The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casualties and the guns were towed out of line by motor trucks. The American soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in this continuous fighting during most inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position. Through experience, the Army had developed into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the task successfully.

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was forced to meet the constantly recurring crises by breaking up tactical organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated portions of the field.

Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replacements, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919.

# Meuse-Argonne, Third Phase

45. The detailed plans for the operations of the Allied Armies on the western front changed from time to time during the course of this great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the great Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Railroad remained unchanged. Marshal Foch coordinated the operations along the entire front, continuing persistently and unceasingly the attacks by all Allied Armies; the Belgian Army, with a French Army and two American divisions, advancing eastward; the British Armies and two American divisions, with the First French Army on their right, toward the region north of Givet; the First American Army and Fourth French Army, toward Sedan and Mezieres.

46. On the 21st my instructions were issued to the First Army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack on October 28, that would be decisive if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and that of the Fourth French Army on its left should be simultaneous, our attack was delayed until November 1. The immediate purpose of the First Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, to turn the forest north of Grandpre, and to establish contact with the Fourth French Army near Boult-aux-Bois. The Army was directed to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall of the first day and then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boult-aux-Bois in preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the initial advance of the Infantry.

On this occasion and for the first time the Army prepared for its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our divisions were either on the line or close in rear: the French artillery, aviation, and technical troops which had pre-

viously made up our deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations; and our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experience second to none.

47. On the morning of November 1, three Army corps were in line between the Meuse River and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the right the Third Corps had the Fifth and Ninetieth Divisions; the Fifth Corps occupied the center of the line, with the Eighty-ninth and Second Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the first day; and on the left the First Corps deployed the Eightieth, Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-eighth Divisions.

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the Infantry advanced, closely followed by "accompanying guns." The Artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the Infantry. By nightfall the Fifth Corps, in the center, had realized an advance of almost 9 kilometers, to the Bois de la Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of Barricourt, while the Third Corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grandpre. On the 2d and 3d we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the fronts of the right and center corps; to the left the troops of the First Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the Artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-Sedan Railroad and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans. By the evening of the 4th, our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and had swept through the great Foret de Dieulet, reaching the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were 8 kilometers north of Boult-aux-Bois.

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with increasing swiftness. The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse in a brilliant operation by the Fifth Division, driving the enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the strong posi-

tions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.

By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its river crossing to a distance of 10 kilometers east of the Meuse, completely ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into the swampy plain of the Woevre; the Fifth and First Corps had reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategical goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, 41 kilometers from our point of departure on November 1. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for an immediate armistice on November 6.

48. Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while the Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on

November 5.

Between the 7th and 10th of November the Third Corps continued its advance eastward to Remoiville, while the Seventeenth French Corps, on its right, with the Seventy-ninth, Twenty-sixth, and Eighty-first American

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Divisions, and 2 French divisions, drove the enemy from his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 p. m. on November 9 appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the Commander of each of the Allied armies.

"The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreats along the entire front.

"It is important to coordinate and expedite our movements.

"I appeal to the energy and initiative of the Commanders in Chief and of their armies to make decisive the results obtained."

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th-11th and the morning of the 11th the Fifth Corps, in the First Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the commanding heights within the reentrant of the river, thus completing our control of the Meuse River line. At 6 a. m. on the 11th notification was received from Marshal Foch's headquarters that the Armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a. m. Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an Armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the 11th had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficult that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after 11 a. m.

49. Between September 26 and November 11, 22 American and 4 French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German divisions, representing 25 per cent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the western front. Of these enemy divisions 20 had been drawn from the French front and 1 from the British front. Of the 22 American divisions 12 had, at different times during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine guns, and large quantities of material.

The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribed to this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began until the Armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his divisions to our front was continuous. The rate at which German divisions were used up is illustrated by plate 7, which shows an increase of 27 divisions on the American front during the battle.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY

50. Under the instructions issued by me on November 5, for operations by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of the stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited number of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains realized reflected great credit on the divisions concerned. On November 6 Marshal Foch requested that 6 American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction of Château-Salins. The plan was agreed to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under the direction of the commanding general Second Army.

# XXXVIII THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

This combined attack was to be launched on November 14, and was to consist of 20 French divisions under General Mangin and the 6 American divisions under General Bullard. Of the divisions designated for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-sixth were in Army reserve and were starting their march eastward on the morning of November 11, while the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth were being withdrawn from line on the Second Army front.

### AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS

51. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, American divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions of the front. The Second Army Corps, Major General Read, commanding, with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions on the British front, was assigned the task in cooperation with the Australian Corps, of breaking the Hindenburg Line at Le Cateau, where the St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. In this attack, carried out on September 29 and October 1, the Thirtieth Division speedily broke through the main line of defense and captured all of its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed until some of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions from October 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced about 24 kilometers.

52. On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions assisted the Fourth French Army in its advance between Rheims and the Argonne. The Second Division completed its advance on this front by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key point of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash and skill. The division here repulsed violent counterattacks, and then carried our lines into the village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the Germans to fall back before Rheims and yield positions which they had held since September, 1914. On October 10 the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second, exploiting the latter's success, and in two days advanced, with the French, a distance of 21 kilometers, the

enemy retiring behind the Aisne River.

53. In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that 2 American divisions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium, where slow progress was being made. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions, the latter being accompanied by the Artillery of the Twenty-eighth Division, were hurriedly dispatched to the Belgian front. On October 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, these divisions entered the line and attacked. By November 3 the Thirty-seventh Division had completed its mission by rapidly driving the enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself on the east bank, while the Ninety-first Division, in a spirited advance, captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered Audenarde.

### AMERICAN TROOPS IN ITALY

54. The Italian Government early made request for American troops, but the critical situation on the western front made it necessary to concentrate our efforts there. When the Secretary of War was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American troops to Italy to show America's interest in the Italian situation and to strengthen Italian morale. Similarly a request was made by the Italian Prime Minister at the Abbeville conference. It was finally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary

hospital and auxiliary services, and the Three hundred and thirty-second Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July, 1918. These troops participated in action against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave River and in the final pursuit of the Austrian Army.

#### AMERICAN TROOPS IN RUSSIA

55. It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Allied troops should be sent to cooperate with the Russians, either at Murmansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the British Government, through its ambassador at Washington, urged American participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War Department directed the dispatch of three battalions of Infantry and three companies of Engineers to join the Allied expedition. In compliance with these instructions the Three hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, the First Battalion, Three hundred and tenth Engineers, Three hundred and thirty-seventh Field Hospital Company, and Three hundred and thirty-seventh Ambulance Company were sent through England, whence they sailed on August 26.

The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening conditions. The Allied force operated under British command, through whose orders the small American contingent was spread over a front of about 450 miles. From September, 1918, to May, 1919, a series of minor engagements with the Bolshevist forces occurred, in which 82 Americans were killed and 7 died

of wounds.

In April, 1919, two companies of American railroad troops were added to our contingent. The withdrawal of the American force commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on August 25 there was left only a small detachment of Graves Registration troops.

### THE ADVANCE INTO GERMANY

56. In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, the Allies were to occupy all German territory west of the Rhine, with bridgeheads of 30 kilometer radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The zone assigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz and the district of Treves. This territory was to be occupied by an American Army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse Rivers and the Luxemburg frontier.

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on November 16, contemplated that 2 French infantry divisions and 1 French cavalry division would be added to the American forces that occupied the Coblenz bridgehead, and that 1 American division would be added to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As this arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference of views regarding the government of occupied territory, it was represented to the Marshal that each nation should be given a well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops of the commander responsible for the particular zone. On December 9 Marshal Foch accepted the principle of preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to the French command at Mayence.

57. Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First or Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans, had been made before the Armistice to organize a Third Army and, on November 14, this army, with

Major General Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was designated as the Army of Occupation. The Third and Fourth Army Corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second Divisions, and the Sixty-sixth Field Artillery Brigade were assigned to the Third Army. This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Major General William M. Wright commanding, with the

Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth Divisions.

The advance toward German territory began on November 17 at 5 a.m., six days after signing the Armistice. All of the Allied forces from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the retreating German armies. Upon arrival at the frontier, a halt was made until December 1, when the leading elements of all Allied armies crossed the line into Germany. The Third Army Headquarters were established at Coblenz and an Advance General Headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately taken to organize the bridgehead for defense, and dispositions were made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities.

The advance to the Rhine required long arduous marches, through cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after their participation in the final battle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline

both during the advance and throughout the period of occupation.

58. The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line of communications of the Third Army after reaching the Rhine lay through Luxemburg. After the passage of the Third Army, the occupation of Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of communications, was intrusted to the Fifth and Thirty-third Divisions of the Second Army. The city of Luxemburg, garrisoned by French troops and designated as the headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief, was excluded from our control.

Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced. Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburg was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned the "administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," my instructions were that our troops would not be subject to his control. Later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Foch placed the entire Duchy in the American Zone.

#### RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES

59. On the day the Armistice was signed, the problem of the return of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War Department and, on November 15, a policy recommended of sending home certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available shipping without delay. On December 21 the War Department announced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the return of our forces and continue as rapidly as transportation would permit. To carry this out, a schedule for the constant flow of troops to the ports was established, having in mind our international obligations pending the signing of the treaty of peace.

60. While more intimately related to the functions of the Services of Supply than to Operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief recital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to America. Prior to the Armistice but 15,000 men had been returned home. Although the existing organization was built for the efficient and rapid handling of the

incoming forces, the embarkation of this small number presented no difficulties. But the Armistice suddenly and completely reversed the problem of the Services of Supply at the ports and the handling of troops. It became necessary immediately to reorganize the machinery of the ports, to construct large embarkation camps, and to create an extensive service for embarking the homeward-bound troops.

Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarkation ports, Marseilles and Le Havre being added later to utilize Italian and French liners. The construction of the embarkation camps during unseasonable winter weather was the most trying problem. These, with the billeting facilities available, gave accommodation for 55,000 at Brest, 44,000 at St. Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bordeaux. Unfortunately, the largest ships

had to be handled at Brest, where the least shelter was available.

To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St. Nazaire, an Embarkation Center was organized around Le Mans, which eventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their records were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobilization. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation service was charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hundreds of thousands who passed through, which required the maintenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.

61. On November 16 all combat troops, except 30 divisions and a minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be made of the American divisions, and that the retention of 30 divisions was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to maintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divisions, and he proposed that we maintain 30 divisions in France until February 1, 25 of which should be held in the Zone of the Armies, and that on March 1 we should have 20 divisions in the Zone of the Armies and 5 ready to embark. The plan for March 1 was satisfactory, but the restrictions as to the divisions that should be in France on February 1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously interfere with the flow of troops homeward.

In a communication dated December 24 the Marshal set forth the minimum forces to be furnished by the several Allies, requesting the American Army to furnish 22 to 25 divisions of Infantry. In the same note he estimated the force to be maintained after the signing of the preliminaries of peace at about 32 divisions, of which the American Army was to furnish 6.

In reply it was pointed out that our problem of repatriation of troops and their demobilization was quite different from that of France or Great Britain. On account of our long line of communications in France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and travel in the United States, even with the maximum employment of our then available transportation, at least a year must elapse before we could complete our demobilization. Therefore, it was proposed by me that the number of American combat divisions to be maintained in the Zone of the Armies should be reduced on April 1 to 15 divisions and on May 1 to 10 divisions, and that in the unexpected event that the preliminaries of peace should not be signed by May 1, we would continue to maintain 10 divisions in the Zone of the Armies until the date of signature.

The Allied Commander in Chief later revised his estimate, and, on January 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German demobilization would

permit the reduction of the Allied forces to 100 divisions, of which the Americans were requested to furnish 15. In reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary inasmuch as it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could reduce our forces below the number asked. We were, therefore, able to keep our available ships filled, and by May 19 all combat divisions, except 5 still in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to proceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to utilize all troop transports to include July 15.

62. The President had informed me that it would be necessary for us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1 summarizes the

agreement reached:

"By direction of President, I have discussed with Marshal Foch question of forces to be left on the Rhine. Following agreed upon: The Fourth and Fifth Divisions will be sent to base ports immediately, the Second Division will commence moving to base ports on July 15, and the Third Division on August 15. Date of relief of First Division will be decided later. Agreement contemplates that after compliance by Germany with military conditions to be completed within first three months after German ratification of treaty, American force will be reduced to one regiment of infantry and certain auxiliaries. Request President be informed of agreement."

As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third Division was released on August 3 and the First Division on August 15.

# PART III.—SUPPLY, COORDINATION, MUNITIONS, AND ADMINISTRATION

### THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

1. In February, 1918, the Line of Communications was reorganized under the name of the Services of Supply. At that time all staff services and departments, except the Adjutant General's, the Inspector General's, and the Judge Advocate General's Departments, were grouped for supply purposes under one coordinating head, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with a General Staff paralleling, so far as necessary, the General Staff at General Headquarters.

The principal functions of the Services of Supply were the procurement, storage, and transportation of supplies. These activities were controlled in a general way by the commanding general Services of Supply, the maximum degree of independence being permitted to the several services. This great organization was charged with immense projects in connection with roads, docks, railroads, and buildings; the transportation of men, animals, and supplies by sea, rail, and inland waterways; the operation of telegraph and telephone systems; the control and transportation of replacements; the hospitalization necessary for an army of 2,000,000 men; the reclassification of numerous officers and men; the establishment of leave areas and of welfare and entertainment projects; the liquidation of our affairs in France; and the final embarkation of our troops for home.

The growth of the permanent port personnel, the location near the base ports of certain units for training, and other considerations led to the appointment of a territorial commander for the section around each port

who, while acting as the representative of the commanding general Services of Supply, was given the local authority of a district commander. For similar reasons, an Intermediate Section Commander and an Advance Section Commander were appointed. Eventually there were nine base sections, including one in England, one in Italy, and one comprising Rotterdam and Antwerp, also one intermediate and one advance section.

The increasing participation of the American Expeditionary Forces in active operations necessitated the enlargement of the responsibilities and authority of the commanding general Services of Supply. In August, 1918, he was charged with complete responsibility for all supply matters in the Services of Supply, and was authorized to correspond by cable directly with the War Department on all matters of supply not involving questions of policy.

In the following discussion of the Services of Supply the subjects of coordination of supply at the front, ocean tonnage, and replacements are included for convenience, though they were largely or entirely under the direct control of General-Staff Sections at my headquarters.

### Coordination of Supply at the Front

2. Our successful participation in the war required that all the different services immediately concerned with the supply of combat troops should work together as a well-regulated machine. In other words, there must be no duplication of effort, but each must perform its functions without interference with any other service. The Fourth Section of the General Staff was created to control impartially all these services, and, under broad lines of policy, to determine questions of transportation and supply in France and coordinate our supply services with those of the Allies.

This section did not work out technical details but was charged with having a general knowledge of existing conditions as to supply, its transportation, and of construction affecting our operations or the efficiency of our forces. It frequently happened that several of the supply departments desired the same site for the location of installations, so that all plans for such facilities had to be decided in accordance with the best interests of the whole.

3. In front of the advance depots, railroad lines and shipments to troops had to be carefully controlled, because mobility demanded that combat units should not be burdened with a single day's stores above the authorized standard reserve. Furthermore, accumulations at the front were exposed to the danger of destruction or capture and might indicate our intentions. Each combat division required the equivalent of 25 French railway car loads of supplies for its daily consumption to be delivered at a point within reach of motor or horse-drawn transportation. The regular and prompt receipt of supplies by combatant troops is of first importance in its effect upon the morale of both officers and men. The officer whose mind is precequied by the question of food, clothing, or ammunition, is not free to devote his energy to training his men or to fighting the enemy. It is necessary that paper work be reduced to an absolute minimum and that the delivery of supplies to organizations be placed on an automatic basis as far as possible.

4. The principle of flexibility had to be borne in mind in planning our supply-system in order that our forces should be supplied, no matter what their number, or where they might be called upon to enter the line. This

high degree of elasticity and adaptability was assured and maintained through the medium of the regulating station. It was the connecting link between the armies and the services in the rear, and regulated the railroad transportation which tied them together. The regulating officer at each such station was a member of the Fourth Section of my General Staff,

acting under instructions from his chief of section.

Upon the regulating officer fell the responsibility that a steady flow of supply was maintained. He must meet emergency shipments of ammunition or engineering material, sudden transfers of troops by rail, the hastening norward of replacements, or the unexpected evacuation of wounded. All the supply services naturally clamored to have their shipments rushed through. The regulating officer, acting under special or secret instructions, must declare priorities in the supply of things the Army needed most. Always informed of the conditions at the front, of the status of supplies, and of military plans and intentions, nothing could be shipped to the regulating station or in front of the advance depots except on his orders. The chiefs of supply services fulfilled their responsibilities when they delivered to the regulating officer the supplies called for by him, and he met his obligation when these supplies were delivered at the proper railheads at the time they were needed. The evacution of the wounded was effected over the same railroad lines as those carrying supplies to the front, therefore, this control had also to be centralized in the regulating officer.

The convenient location of the regulating stations was of prime importance. They had to be close enough to all points in their zones to permit trains leaving after dusk or during the night to arrive at their destinations by dawn. They must also be far enough to the rear to be reasonably safe from capture. Only two regulating stations were actually constructed by us in France, Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand, as the existing French facilities were sufficient to meet our requirements beyond the reach of those stations.

As far as the regulating officer was concerned, supplies were divided into four main classes. The first class constituted food, forage and fuel, needed and consumed every day; the second, uniforms, shoes, blankets and horse shoes, which wear out with reasonable regularity; the third, articles of equipment which require replacement at irregular intervals, such as rolling kitchens, rifles and escort wagons; the fourth class covered articles, the flow of which depended upon tactical operations, such as ammunition and construction material. Articles in the first class were placed on an automatic basis, but formal requisition was eliminated as far as possible for all classes.

5. In order to meet many of the immediate needs of troops coming out of the line and to relieve to some extent the great strain on the railheads during active fighting, a system of army depots was organized. These depots were supplied by bulk shipments from the advance depots through the regulating stations during relatively quiet periods. They were under the control of the chiefs of the supply services of the armies and required practically no construction work, the supplies being stored in open places protected only by dunnage and camouflaged tarpaulins.

6. The accompanying diagram illustrates graphically the supply system which supported our armies in France. The Services of Supply can be likened to a great reservoir divided into three main parts—the base depots, the intermediate depots and the advance depots. The management of this

reservoir is in charge of the commanding general, Services of Supply, who administers it with a free hand, controlled only by general policies outlined to him from time to time. Each of the supply and technical services functions independently in its own respective sphere; each has its share of storage space in the base depots, in the intermediate depots, and in the advance depots. Then comes the distribution system, and here the control passes to the chief of the Fourth Section of the General Staff, who exercises his powers through the regulating stations.

# Purchasing Agency

7. The consideration of requirements in food and material led to the adoption of an automatic supply system, but, with the exception of food-stuffs, there was an actual shortage, especially in the early part of the war, of many things, such as equipment pertaining to land transportation and equipment and material for combat. The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at the beginning was serious. Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage from the States reached about seven and one-half million tons to December 31, 1918, which was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

The supply situation made it imperative that we utilize European resources as far as possible for the purchase of material and supplies. If our Services of Supply departments had entered the market of Europe as purchasers without regulation or coordination, they would have been thrown into competition with each other, as well as with buyers from the Allied armies and the civil populations. Such a system would have created an unnatural elevation of prices, and would have actually obstructed the procurement of supplies. To meet this problem from the standpoint of economical business management, directions were given in August, 1917, for the creation of a General Purchasing Board to coordinate and control our purchases both among our own services and among the Allies as well. The supervision and direction of this agency was placed in the hands of an experienced business man, and every supply department in the American Expeditionary Forces was represented on the board. Agents were stationed in Switzerland, Spain, and Holland, besides the Allied countries. character of supplies included practically the entire category of necessities, although the bulk of our purchases consisted of raw materials for construction, ordnance, air equipment, and animals. A total of about 10,000,000 tons was purchased abroad by this agency to December 31, 1918, most of which was obtained in France.

The functions of the Purchasing Agency were gradually extended until they included a wide field of activities. In addition to the coordination of purchases, the supply resources of our Allies were reconnoitered and intimate touch was secured with foreign agencies; a Statistical Bureau was created which classified and analyzed our requirements; quarterly forecasts of supplies were issued; civilian manual labor was procured and organized; a Technical Board undertook the coordination, development, and utilization of the electric power facilities in France; a Bureau of Reciprocal Supplies viséed the claims of foreign governments for raw materials from the United States; and a general printing plant was established. Some of these activities were later transferred to other services as the latter became ready to undertake their control.

The principles upon which the usefulness of this agency depended were extended to our Allies, and in the summer of 1918 the General Purchasing Agent became a member of the Interallied Board of Supplies. This Board undertook, with signal success, to coordinate the supply of the Allied armies in all those classes of material necessities that were in common use in all the armies. The possibility of immense savings were demonstrated, but the principles had not become of general application before the Armistice.

### Ocean Tonnage

8. Following a study of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent to Washington in December, 1917, with a general statement of the shipping situation in France as understood by the Allied Maritime Council. In March, 1918, tonnage requirements for transport and maintenance of 900,000 men in France by June 30 were adopted as a basis upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation of tonnage.

In April the Allied Maritime Transport Council showed that requirements for 1918 greatly exceeded the available tonnage. Further revisions of the schedule were required by the Abbeville Agreement in May, under which American infantry and machine-gun units were to be transported in British

shipping, and by the Versailles Agreement in June.

In July, a serious crisis developed as the allotment for August made the American Expeditionary Forces by the Shipping Control Committee was only 575,000 dead-weight tons, afterwards increased to 700,000, whereas 803,000 tons (not including animals) were actually needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping be diverted from trades and that a larger percentage of new shipping be placed in transport service.

9. Early in 1918, a scheme had been proposed which would provide priority for essential supplies only, based upon monthly available tonnage in sight. Although it was the understanding that calls for shipping should be based upon our actual needs, much irregularity was found in tonnage allotments, as shown by the following cables sent September 14, 1918.

"The following variations from cable orders are noticeable:

"Q. M. supplies cabled for, for August delivery, 182,287 short tons.

"Q. M. supplies actually received during August, 231,850 short tons.

"T. D. supplies (rolling stock, etc.) called for, for August delivery, 113,482 short tons.

"T. D. supplies actually received during August, 67,521 short tons."

"You must prepare to ship supplies we request, instead of shipping excessive amounts of supplies of which we have a due proportion."

"An increase in the allotment of tonnage must be made, even for September. It is imperative. I cannot too strongly urge that the allotment be reconsidered in the light of the above showing of our deficiencies \* \* \* \* " "At the present time our ability to supply and maneuver our forces depends largely on motor transportation \* \* \*. We are able to carry out present plans due to fact that we have been able to borrow temporarily large numbers of trucks and ambulances from the French \* \* \*. The shortage of ambulances to move our wounded is critical \* \* \*. We have reached the point where we can no longer improvise or borrow. The most important plans and operations depend upon certainty that the home Government will deliver at French ports material and equipment cabled for. It is urged that foregoing be given most serious consideration and that tonnage allotted for supply of Army in France be sufficient to deliver material and equipment, properly proportioned in kinds and amount, to meet the needs of our troops \* \* \*."

The following is a brief summary of the tonnage asked for and the amount actually received in France during the critical period from July to October, 1918:

Month	Cabled for by American Expeditionary Forces	Received in France from United States	Shortage
July August September. October Total.	869,438	438,047 511,261 539,018 623,689 2,112,015	42,844 189,266 330,420 398,446 960,976

<sup>1</sup> Tons of 2,000 pounds.

### Replacement of Personnel

10. Under the orginal organization project there were to be two divisions in each corps of six divisions which were to be used as reservoirs of replacements. One half of the Artillery and other auxiliaries of these two divisions were to be utilized as corps and army troops. They were to supply the first demands for replacements from their original strength, after which a minimum of 3,000 men per month for each army corps in France was to be forwarded to them from the United States. It was estimated that this would give a sufficient reservoir of personnel to maintain the fighting strength of combat units, provided the sick and wounded were promptly returned to their own units upon recovery.

The Thirty-second and Forty-first Divisions were the first to be designated as replacement and depot divisions of the First Army Corps, but the situation soon became such that the Thirty-second Division had to be employed as a combat division. For the same reason all succeeding divisions had to be trained for combat, until June 27, when the need for replacements made it necessary to designate the Eighty-third as a depot division.

11. By the middle of August we faced a serious shortage of replacements. Divisions had arrived in France below strength, and each division diverted from replacement to combat duty increased the number of divisions to be supplied and at the same time decreased the supply.

On August 16 the War Department was cabled, as follows:

"Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent in preference to new divisions."

At this time it became necessary to transfer 2,000 men from each of three combat divisions (the Seventh, Thirty-sixth, and Eighty-first) to the First Army, in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive.

By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive was initiated the replacement situation had become still more acute. The Infantry and Machine-gun units of the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-sixth Divisions, then in the vicinity of Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leaving only a cadre of two officers and twenty-five men for each company. To provide immediate replacements during the progress of the battles new replacement organizations were formed in the Zone of Operations; at first, as battalions, and later, as regional replacement depots.

12. On October 3, a cable was sent the War Department, reading as follows:

"()ver 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August, and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the replacement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the Eighty-fourth and Eightysixth Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due, including 55,000 requested for October, be shipped early in October. If necessary, some divisions in United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as replacements at once."

Altogether seven divisions had to be skeletonized, leaving only one man per company and one officer per regiment to care for the records. As a further measure to meet the situation, the authorized strength of divisions was reduced in October by 4,000 men, thus lowering the strength of each Infantry company to approximately 174 men. The 30 combat divisions in France at that time needed 103,513 Infantry and Machine-gun replacements, and only 66,490 were available.

Attention of the War Department was invited on November 2 to the fact that a total of 140,000 replacements would be due by the end of November,

and the cable closed by saving:

"To send over entire divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for, is a wasteful method, and one that makes for inefficiency; but as replacements are not otherwise available, there is no other course open to us. New and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have had battle experience. The latter must be kept up numerically to the point of efficiency \* \* \*."

#### Remounts

13. The shortage of animals was a serious problem throughout the war. In July, 1917, the French agreed to furnish our forces with 7,000 animals a month, and accordingly the War Department was requested to discontinue shipments. On August 24, however, the French advised us that it would be impossible to furnish the number of animals originally stated, and Washington was again asked to supply animals, but none could be sent over until November, and then only a limited number.

Early in 1918, after personal intervention and much delay, the French Government made requisition on the country, and we were able to obtain 50,000 animals. After many difficulties, the Purchasing Board was successful in obtaining permission, in the summer of 1918, to export animals from Spain, but practically no animals were received until after the Armistice.

Every effort was made to reduce animal requirements—by increased motorization of artillery and by requiring mounted officers and men to walk-but in spite of all these efforts, the situation as to animals grew steadily worse. The shortage by November exceeded 106,000, or almost one-half of all our needs. To relieve the crisis in this regard, during the Meuse-Argonne battle, Marshal Foch requisitioned 13,000 animals from the French Armies and placed them at my disposal.

# Reclassification of Personnel

14. An important development in the Services of Supply was the reclassification system for officers and men. This involved not only the physical reclassification of those partially fit for duty, but also the reclassification of officers according to fitness for special duties. A number of officers were found unfit for combat duty, and many in noncombatant positions were found unsuited to the duties on which employed. An effort was made to reassign these officers to the advantage of themselves and the Army. A total of 1,101 officers were reclassified in addition to the disabled, and 270 were sent before efficiency boards for elimination. 962 wounded or otherwise disabled officers were reclassified, their services being utilized to release officers on duty with the Services of Supply who were able to serve with combat units.

## Construction by Engineer Corps

15. Among the most notable achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces was the large program of construction carried out by our Engineer troops in the Services of Supply and elsewhere. The chief projects were port facilities including docks, railroads, warehouses, hospitals, barracks, and stables. These were planned to provide ultimately for an army of 4,000,000 men, the construction being carried on coincident with the growth of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The port plans contemplated 160 new berths, including the necessary facilities for discharge of cargo, approximately one-half of which were completed at the time of the Armistice. Construction of new standardgauge railroad track amounted to 1,002 miles, consisting mainly of cut-offs, double tracking at congested points, and yards at ports and depots. Road construction and repair continued until our troops were withdrawn from the several areas, employing at times upward of 10,000 men, and often

using 90,000 tons of stone per week.

Storage requirements necessitated large supply depots at the ports and in the intermediate and advance sections. Over 2,000,000 square feet of covered storage was secured from the French, but it was necessary to construct approximately 20,000,000 square feet additional. The base hospital centers at Mars and Mesves, each with 4,000-bed convalescent camps, are typical of the large scale upon which hospital accommodations were provided. The hospital city at Mars, of 700 buildings, covered a ground space of 33 acres and included the usual road, water, sewerage, and lighting

facilities of a municipality.

16. Advantages of economy and increased mobility caused the adoption of the system of billeting troops. Billeting areas were chosen near the base ports, along the line of communications, and in the advanced zone, as strategical requirements dictated. The system was not altogether satisfactory, but with the number of troops to be accommodated no other plan was practicable. Demountable barracks were used for shelter to supplement lack of billets, 16,000 barracks of this type being erected, particularly at base ports where large camps were necessary. Stables at remount stations were built for 43,000 animals. Other construction included refrigerating plants, such as the one at Gievres with a capacity of 6,500 tons of meat and 500 tons of ice per day; and mechanical bakeries like that at Is-sur-Tille with capacity of 800,000 pounds of bread per day. If the buildings constructed were consolidated, with the width of a standard barrack, they would reach from St. Nazaire across France to the Elbe River in Germany, a distance of 730 miles.

In connection with construction work, the Engineer Corps engaged in extensive forestry operations, producing 200,000,000 feet of lumber, 4,000,-000 railroad ties, 300,000 cords of fuel wood, 35,000 pieces of piling, and

large quantities of miscellaneous products.

# Transportation Corps

17. The Transportation Corps as a separate organization was new to our Army. Its exact relation to the supply departments was conceived to be that of a system acting as a common carrier operating its own ship and rail terminals. The equipment and operation of port terminals stands out as a most remarkable achievement. The amount of tonnage handled at all French ports grew slowly, reaching about 17,000 tons daily at the end of July, 1918. An emergency then developed as a result of the critical military situation, and the capacity of our terminals was so efficiently increased that, by November 11, 45,000 tons were being handled daily.

The French railroads, both in management and material, had dangerously deteriorated during the war. As our system was super-imposed upon that of the French it was necessary to provide them with additional personnel and much matériel. Experienced American railroad men brought into our organization, in various practical capacities, the best talent in the country, who, in addition to the management of our own transportation, materially aided the French. The relation of our Transportation Corps to the French railroads and to our own supply departments presented many difficulties, but these were eventually overcome and a high state of efficiency established.

18. It was early decided, as expedient for our purposes, to use American rolling stock on the French railroads, and approximately 20,000 cars and 1,500 standard-gauge locomotives were brought from the United States and assembled by our railroad troops. We assisted the French by repairing with our own personnel 57,385 French cars, and 1,947 French locomotives. The lack of rolling stock for Allied use was at all times a serious handicap, so that the number of cars and locomotives built and repaired by us was no small part of our contribution to the Allied cause.

#### Quartermaster Corps

19. The Quartermaster Corps was able to provide a larger tonnage of supplies from the States than any of the great supply departments. The operations of this corps were so large and the activities so numerous that they can best be understood by a study of the report of the commanding

general Services of Supply.

The Quartermaster Corps in France was called upon to meet conditions never before presented, and it was found advisable to give it relief. Transportation problems by sea transport and by rail were handled by separate corps organized for that purpose, and already described. Motor transport was also placed under an organization of its own. The usual routine supplies furnished by this department reached enormous proportions. the delay early in 1918 in obtaining clothing and the inferior quality of some that was furnished, and an occasional shortage in forage, no army was ever better provided for. Special sevices created under the Quartermaster Corps included a Remount Service, which received, cared for, and supplied animals to troops; a Veterinary Service, working in conjunction with the remount organization; an Effects Section and Baggage Service; and a Salvage Service for the recovery and preparation for reissue of every possible article of personal equipment. Due to the activities of the Salvage Service, an estimated saving of \$85,000,000 was realized, tonnage and raw material were conserved, and what in former wars represented a distinct liability was turned into a valuable asset.

The Graves Registration Service, also under the Quartermaster Corps, was charged with the acquisition and care of cemeteries, the identification and reburial of our dead, and the correspondence with relatives of the deceased. Central cemeteries were organized on the American battle fields, the largest being at Romagne-sous-Montfaucon and at Thiaucourt in the Woevre. All territory over which our troops fought was examined by this service, and, generally speaking, the remains of our dead were assembled in American cemeteries and the graves marked with a cross or six-pointed star and photographed. A few bodies were buried where they fell or in neighboring French or British cemeteries. Wherever the soldier was buried, his identification tag, giving his name and Army serial number, was fastened to the marker. A careful record was kept of the location of each grave.

# Signal Corps

20. The Signal Corps supplied, installed, and operated the general service of telephone and telegraphic communications throughout the Zone of the Armies, and from there to the rear areas. At the front it handled radio, press, and intercept stations; provide a radio network in the Zone of Advance; and also managed the meteorological, pigeon, and general photographic services. Our communication system included a cable across the English Channel, the erection of 4,000 kilometers of telephone and telegraph lines on our own poles, and the successful operation of a system with 215,500 kilometers of lines.

# Motor Transport Corps

21. The quantity and importance of gasoline-engine transportation in this war necessitated the creation of a new service known as the Motor Transport Corps. It was responsible for setting up motor vehicles received from America, their distribution, repair, and maintenance. Within the Zone of the Services of Supply, the Motor Transport Corps controlled the use of motor vehicles, and it gave technical supervision to their operation in the Zone of the Armies. It was responsible for the training and instruction of chauffeurs and other technical personnel. Due to the shortage of shipments from America, a large number of trucks, automobiles, and spare parts had to be purchased in France.

# Renting, Requisition, and Claims Service

22. A Renting, Requisition, and Claims Service was organized in March, 1918, to procure billeting areas, supervise the quartering of troops with an organization of zone and town majors, and to have charge of the renting, leasing, and requisitioning of all lands and buildings required by the American Expeditionary Forces. Under the provisions of an act of Congress, approved in April, 1918, the Claims Department was charged with the investigation, assessment, and settlement of all claims "of inhabitants of France or any other European country not an enemy or ally of an enemy" for injuries to persons or damages to property occasioned by our forces. The procedure followed was in accordance with the law and practice of the country in question. The efficient administration of this service had an excellent effect upon the people of the European countries concerned.

23. The various activities of the Services of Supply which, at its heighth on November 11, 1918, reached a numerical strength in personnel of 668,312, including 23,772 civilian employees, can best be summed up by quoting the telegram sent by me to Major General James G. Harbord, the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, upon my relinquishing personal command of the First Army:

"I want the S. O. S. to know how much the First Army appreciated the prompt response made to every demand for men, equipment, supplies, and transportation necessary to carry out the recent operations. Hearty congratulations. The S. O. S. shares the success with it."

#### MUNITIONS

### Ordnance

24. Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. The task of the Ordnance Department in supplying artillery was especially difficult. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French Government to supply us with the artillery equipment of 75's, 155 mm. howitzers and 155 G. P. F. guns from their own factories for 30 divisions. The wisdom of this course was fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of American manufacture of the calibres mentioned on our front at the date of the Armistice. The only guns of these types produced at home which reached France before the cessation of hostilities were one hundred and nine 75 mm, guns. In addition, twenty-four 8-inch howitzers from the United States reached our front and were in use when the Armistice was signed. Eight 14-inch naval guns of American manufacture were set up on railroad mounts, and most of these were successfully employed on the Meuse-Argonne front under the efficient direction of Admiral Plunkett of the Navy.

### Aviation

25. In aviation we were entirely dependent upon our Allies, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own program could be set under way. From time to time we obtained from the French such planes for training personnel as they could provide. Without going into a complete discussion of aviation materiel, it will be sufficient to state that it was with great difficulty that we obtained equipment even for training. As for upto-date combat planes, the development at home was slow, and we had to rely upon the French who provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing machines. The first aeroplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we received 1,379 planes of the De Haviland type. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including aeroplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918. As to our aviators, many of whom trained with our Allies, it can be said that they had no superiors in daring and in fighting ability. During the battles of St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne our aviators excelled all others. They have left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page in the annals of our Army.

#### Tanks

26. In the matter of tanks, we were compelled to rely upon both the French and the English. Here, however, we were less fortunate for the reason that our Allies barely had sufficient tanks to meet their own requirements. While our Tank Corps had limited opportunity, its fine personnel responded gallantly on every possible occasion and showed courage of the highest order. We had one battalion of heavy tanks engaged on the English front. On our own front we had only the light tanks, and the number

available to participate in the last great assault of November 1 was reduced to 16 as a result of the previous hard fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.

### Chemical Warfare Service

27. The Chemical Warfare Service represented another entirely new departure in this war. It included many specialists from civil life. With personnel of a high order, it developed rapidly into one of our most efficient auxiliary services. While the early employment of gas was in the form of clouds launched from special projectors, its use later on in the war was virtually by means of gas shells fired by the light artillery. One of the most important duties of the Chemical Warfare Service was to insure the equipment of our troops with a safe and comfortable mask, and the instruction of the personnel in the use of this protector. Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.

#### ADMINISTRATION

# Medical and Sanitary Conditions

28. The general health of our armies under conditions strange and adverse in many ways to our American experience and mode of life was marvelously good. The proportionate number of men incapacitated from other causes than battle casualties and injuries was low. Of all deaths in the American Expeditionary Forces (to September 1, 1919) totaling 81,141, there were killed in action, 35,556; died of wounds received in battle, 15,130; other wounds and injuries, 5,669; and died of disease, 24,786. Therefore, but little over two-sevenths the total loss of life in the American Expeditionary Forces was caused by disease.

Our armies suffered from the communicable diseases that usually affect troops. Only two diseases have caused temporarily excessive sick rates, epidemic diarrhea and influenza, and of these influenza only, due to the fatal complicating pneumonia, caused a serious rise in the death rate. Both prevailed in the armies of our Allies and enemies and in the civilian popu-

lation of Europe.

Venereal disease has been with us always, but the control was successful to a degree never before attained in our armies, or in any other army. It has been truly remarkable when the environment in which our men lived is appreciated. The incidence of venereal disease varied between 30 and 60 per thousand per annum, averaging under 40. Up to September, 1919, all troops sent home were free from venereal disease. The low percentage was due largely to the fine character of men composing our armies.

29. Hospitalization represented one of the largest and most difficult of the medical problems in the American Expeditionary Forces. That the needs were always met and that there was always a surplus of several thousand beds, were the results of great effort and the use of all possible expedients to make the utmost of resources available. The maximum number of patients in hospital on any one day was 193,026, on November 12, 1918.

Evacuation of the sick and wounded was another difficult problem, especially during the battle periods. The total number of men evacuated in the Zone of the Armies was 214,467, of whom 11,281 were sent in hospital trains to base ports. The number of sick and wounded sent to the United States up to November 11, 1918, was 14,000. Since the Armistice, 103,028 patients have been sent to the United States.

30. The Army and the Medical Department were fortunate in obtaining the services of leading physicians, surgeons, and specialists in all branches of medicine from all parts of the United States, who brought the most skillful talent of the world to the relief of our sick and wounded. The Army Nurse Corps deserves more than passing comment. These women, working tirelessly and devotedly, shared the burden of the day to the fullest extent with the men, many of them submitting to all the dangers of the battle front.

\*\*Passarda Revenuel and Mail Services\*\*

Records, Personnel, and Mail Service

31. New problems confronted the Adjutant General's Department ir France. Our great distance from home necessitated records, data, and executive machinery to represent the War Department as well as our forces in France. Unusually close attention was paid to individual records. Never before have accuracy and completeness of reports been so strictly insisted upon. Expedients had to be adopted whereby the above requirements could be met without increasing the record and correspondence work of combat units. The organization had to be elastic to meet the demands of any force

maintained in Europe.

A Statistical Division was organized to collect data regarding the special qualifications of all officers and to keep an up-to-date record of the location, duties, health, and status of every officer and soldier, nurse, field clerk, and civilian employee, as well as the location and strength of organizations. The Central Records Office at Bourges received reports from the battle front, evacuation and base hospitals, convalescent-leave areas, reclassification camps, and base ports, and prepared for transmission to the War Department reports of individual casualties. Each of the 299,599 casualties was considered as an individual case. A thorough investigation of the men classed as "missing in action" reduced the number from 14,000 at the signing of the Armistice to 22 on August 31, 1919.

32. In addition to printing and distributing all orders from General Head-quarters, the Adjutant General's Department had charge of the delivery and collection of official mail and finally of all mail. The Motor Dispatch Service operated 20 courier routes, over 2,300 miles of road, for the quick dispatch and delivery of official communications. After July 1, 1918, the Military Postal Express Service was organized to handle all mail, official and personal, and operated 169 fixed and mobile post offices and a railway post-office

service.

While every effort was exerted to maintain a satisfactory mail service, frequent transfers of individuals, especially during the hurried skeletonizing of certain combat divisions, numerous errors in addresses, hasty handling, and readdressing of mail by regimental and company clerks in the Zone of Operations, and other conditions incident to the continuous movement of troops in battle, made the distribution of mail an exceedingly difficult problem.

Inspection—Discipline

33. The Inspector General's Department, acting as an independent agency not responsible for the matters under its observation, made inspections and special investigations for the purpose of keeping commanders informed of local conditions. The inspectors worked unceasingly to determine the manner in which orders were being carried out, in an effort to perfect discipline and team play.

The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forces in the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposed discipline

among our soldiers which must be regarded as an unusual development of this war, a fact which materially aided us to organize and employ in an incredibly short space of time the extraordinary fighting machine developed in France.

Our troops generally were strongly imbued with an offensive spirit essential to success. The veteran divisions had acquired not only this spirit, but the other elements of fine discipline. In highly trained divisions, commanders of all grades operate according to a definite system calculated to concentrate their efforts where the enemy is weakest. Straggling is practically eliminated; the Infantry, skillful in fire action and the employment of cover, gains with a minimum of casualties; the battalion, with all of its accompanying weapons, works smoothly as a team in which the parts automatically assist each other; the Artillery gives the Infantry close and continuous support; and unforseen situations are met by prompt and energetic action.

This war has only confirmed the lessons of the past. The less experienced divisions, while aggressive, were lacking in the ready skill of habit. They were capable of powerful blows, but their blows were apt to be awkward—teamwork was often not well understood. Flexible and resourceful divisions can not be created by a few maneuvers or by a few months' association of their elements. On the other hand, without the keen intelligence, the endurance, the willingness, and enthusiasm displayed in the training area, as well as on the battle field, the successful results we obtained so quickly would have been utterly impossible.

# Military Justice

34. The commanders of armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades, and certain territorial districts, were empowered to appoint general courts-martial. Each of these commanders had on his staff an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, whose duty it was to render legal advice and to assist in the prompt trial and just punishment of those guilty of serious infractions of discipline,

Prior to the signing of the Armistice, serious breaches of discipline were rare, considering the number of troops. This was due to the high sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the seriousness of the situation. In the period of relaxation following the cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline were naturally more numerous, but not even then was the number of trials as great in proportion to the strength of the force as is usual in our service.

35. It was early realized that many of the peace-time methods of punishment were not the best for existing conditions. In the early part of 1918, it was decided that the award of dishonorable discharge of soldiers convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, would not be contemplated, except in the most serious cases. To remove these soldiers temporarily from their organizations, division commanders were authorized to form provisional temporary detachments to which such soldiers could be attached. These detachments were retained with their battalions so that offenders would not escape the dangers and hardships to which their comrades were subjected. Wherever their battalion was engaged, whether in front-line trenches or in back areas, these men were required to perform hard labor. Only in emergency were they permitted to engage in combat. Soldiers in these disciplinary battalions were made to understand that if they acquitted themselves well, they would be restored to full duty with their organizations.

All officers exercising disciplinary powers were imbued with the purpose of these instructions and carried them into effect. So that nearly all men convicted of military offenses in combat divisions remained with their organizations and continued to perform their duty as soldiers. Many redeemed themselves by rendering valiant service in action and were released from the further operation of their sentences.

36. To have the necessary deterrent effect upon the whole unit, courtsmartial for serious offenses usually imposed sentences considerably heavier than would have been awarded in peace times. Except where the offender earned remission at the front, these sentences stood during hostilities. At the signing of the Armistice, steps were at once taken to reduce outstand-

ing sentences to the standards of peace time.

# Provost Marshal General's Department

37. On July 20, 1917, a Provost Marshal General was appointed with station in Paris, and later the department was organized as an administrative service with the Provost Marshal General functioning under the First Section, General Staff. The Department was developed into four main sections—the Military Police Corps which served with divisions, corps, and armies and in the sections of the Services of Supply; the Prisoner of War Escort Companies; the Criminal Investigation Department; and the Circulation Department. It was not until 1918 that the last-mentioned department became well trained and efficient. On October 15, 1918, the strength of the Corps was increased to 1 per cent of the strength of the American Expeditionary Forces, and provost marshals for armies, corps, and divisions were provided.

The military police of the American Expeditionary Forces developed into one of the most striking bodies of men in Europe. Wherever the American soldier went, there our military police were on duty. They controlled traffic in the battle zone, in all villages occupied by American troops, and in many cities through which our traffic flowed; they maintained order, so far as the American soldiers were concerned, throughout France and in portions of England, Italy, Belgium, and occupied Germany. Their smart appearance and military bearing and the intelligent manner in which they discharged their duties left an excellent impression of the typical American

on all with whom they came in contact.

## PART IV.—MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

### PRISONERS OF WAR

1. All prisoners taken by the American troops were kept at least 30 kilometers behind our lines under guard by the Provost Marshal General's Department, except wounded or sick prisoners who were immediately sent to hospitals for treatment. Arrangements were made with the French and British that prisoners taken by our units operating with them should be sent to American enclosures. The Provost Marshal General was instructed to follow the principles of The Hague and the Geneva conventions in the treatment of prisoners, although these were not recognized by the United States as binding in the present war. Prisoners were organized into labor companies, and were employed on work which had no distinct bearing on military operations. The officer prisoners of war were accorded the same treatment as received by American officers confined in Germany. A Prisoner

of War Information Bureau was established in the Central Records Office. Under a mutual understanding with the German Government, payments were made to prisoners in the form of credits, and, subject to censorship, they were allowed to send and receive letters and packages. Religious meetings were held by prisoner chaplains, assisted by our Army chaplains and welfare workers.

2. From June, 1918, to the end of March, 1919, a total of 48,280 enemy prisoners were handled by the Provost Marshal General's Department, of whom 93 died and 73 escaped and were not recaptured. At the request of the French Government, 516 prisoners, natives of Alsace-Lorraine, were released after examination by a French commission. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva convention, 59 medical officers and 1,783 men of the sanitary personnel, including 333 members of the German Red Cross, were repatriated. On April 9, 1919, we commenced to repatriate enemy prisoners who were permanently unfit for further military duty and those who could not perform useful labor.

3. Through the Berlin Red Cross and the International Red Cross at Geneva, an American Red Cross committee at Berne received lists of all American prisoners taken by the German troops, to each of whom, when located, was sent a package containing food, tobacco, clean underclothing and toilet articles, and thereafter two packages a week. By a system of return post cards, it was determined that 85 per cent of these packages

were received.

As soon as the Armistice was signed the Germans released large numbers of Allied prisoners who immediately started toward the Allied lines. Four American regional replacement departments were established, to which all returning Americans were sent until proper records could be made. Those in good physical condition were sent to their commands, while the others

were sent to hospitals or to leave areas for a rest.

An Allied commission was formed in Berlin early in December, 1918, for the repatriation of Allied prisoners, with representatives from each of the American, British, French, and Italian Armies. American prisoners were evacuated through Switzerland in fully equipped trains, including hospital cars, provided by the Swiss Government and paid for by our Government. These were met by American trains at the Swiss border. It was planned to withdraw all our prisoners by this route, but a number had already been withdrawn through the northern ports and taken to England in British ships.

The Allied Commission obtained a statement of moneys paid Americans while in German prisons; investigated complaints concerning treatment of Americans: obtained possession of effects of prisoners who had died in captivity, or which had been left behind by those repatriated; and also

located the graves of the American dead.

4. On November 11, 1918, there were 248 American officers and 3,302 men in the hands of the Germans, all of whom were evacuated by February 5. 1919. None of our prisoners were condemned to death, although 1 officer

and 20 men died in captivity.

5. An Inter-Allied agreement on January 13, 1919, created a commission for the control of Russian prisoners in Germany. The British and American representatives, aided by small unarmed detachments, were charged with the administration of the Russian prison camps, and succeeded in discharging their duties despite the civil disorders in Germany.

Early in January, 1919, the Red Cross outlined a plan to send a commission to Germany to assist in caring for and feeding Russian prisoners, and an American officer was detailed to assist and accompany this commission. The Red Cross being financially unable to furnish the necessary food, arrangements were finally made with the French Government to furnish funds for its purchase from our Army stores, without any responsibility being assumed by the Army, as was desired by the Allied Food Commission. Such supplies as could be spared by the Army were sold to the French, and American officers were detailed to assist in their distribution. On April 10, 1919, the Supreme Allied War Council decided to give the German Government complete freedom in repatriating Russian prisoners of war, stipulating only that none should be repatriated by force, and that all who left must be provided with sufficient food for the journey.

#### CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY

6. To insure law and order, it was necessary that an American civil administration be created in the occupied territory. Different policies were adopted toward Luxemburg and occupied Germany, the former being a disarmed neutral and the latter occupied enemy territory. In both regions we issued proclamations defining our attitude toward the inhabitants.

In accordance with the precedent of our Government under similar circumstances, the local civil government remained in full possession of its former power, and retained jurisdiction over all civil matters. The organization of our civil administration in occupied territory provided for the control of civil affairs by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory, under whom Army, corps, and division commanders detailed suitable officers in local charge of civil matters. In the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, civil affairs were regulated by a corresponding representative with an office in the city of Luxemburg.

7. The principle of requisitioning supplies was exercised extensively throughout the area, always under central control and without abuse of the privilege. Under a board of appraisal payment was made for all property requisitioned, the money being obtained from the German Government under the terms of the Armistice. Food and forage were not requisitioned, and during most of the period of occupation our officers and men were not allowed to purchase any German food and were forbidden to eat in the

restaurants and cafés.

In Luxemburg, billeting arrangements and payment therefor were provided for by an agreement with the Government of Luxemburg.

Under instructions from the State Department, the interests of American citizens found in occupied Germany were referred to the American Embassy

in Paris; in Luxemburg to the American Legation at The Hague.

8. We insisted upon the Germans maintaining all public utilities. After being inspected, measures were taken to assure priority of fuel supply in case of coal shortage due to strikes in the Ruhr and Saar districts or other causes. One of our chief problems was the maintenance and repair of roads and highways, and this at first necessitated the employment of soldier labor. As soon as possible a satisfactory system of road preservation and improvement was inaugurated, utilizing German civil labor.

To control and supervise the movement of funds and securities, all banks and banking houses were required to submit monthly reports. Trade and blockade regulations were controlled through the American Section of the

Inter-Allied Economic Committee.

9. The Civil Administration issued instructions relative to courts. Army, corps, and divisional commanders were authorized to convene military com-

missions and appoint superior provost courts for their respective districts; and commanding officers of each city, town or canton, appointed an inferior provost court. All of these courts were for the trial of offenses against the laws of war or the Military Government. Our legal machinery was simple, and successful results in maintaining law and order were due to uniform and strict enforcement of such few regulations as proved necessary.

Strict censorship was maintained over postal, telephone and telegraphic communications. Passes and circulation were first handled by the Department of Civil Affairs, but on January 24, 1919, the Third Army took charge

of those matters.

In connection with the reconstruction work in France and Belgium, the Department of Civil Affairs prepared a record of all recovered stolen property and measures were taken to protect it against deterioration or unauthorized removal.

10. The fraternization problem was sharply raised by the sudden transition from the rigors of war conditions in France to the comforts of undisturbed German cities and homes, but a realization by our troops of their position in enemy territory and of their duty to maintain the dignity of their own country reduced infractions of rules on the subject to a minimum.

#### EXECUTION OF ARMISTICE TERMS

11. The first Armistice agreement provided for supervision by a Permanent International Armistice Commission to function under the authority of the Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies. The United States, Great Britain, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany were represented on the Permanent International Armistice Commission. The chairman of this commission and of the five main committees were French. These committees were organized to care specifically for the work in connection with material, transportation, prisoners of war, entretien, and restitution. The United States was represented on each of these main committees.

12. The Germans unsuccessfully attempted to enter the Permanent International Armistice Commission on the basis of negotiation. Many adjustments were made because of the difficulties under which the German authorities were working, but, in general, they were held strictly to the spirit of the terms of the Armistice agreement. Time of delivery was often extended, but penalties were imposed for failure to comply with the conditions. All aeroplanes were not obtained until a penalty was imposed of 20 horses for each undelivered plane. Evacuation of occupied territory, and repatriation of civilian inhabitants and of prisoners of war, were begun immediately and carried out promptly.

13. In the distribution among the Allied Armies of ordnance and aeroplanes surrendered by the enemy, the Belgian Army received one-tenth, American Army two-tenths, British Army three-tenths, and French Army four-tenths. Our share was 720 field guns, 534 heavy guns, 589 trench mortars, 10,356 machine guns and 340 aeroplanes. Railway rolling stock was divided according to the needs of the railway systems serving the

different armies.

14. The question of expense of maintenance of the armies of occupation caused considerable discussion among the Allies and protests from the Germans. This was due to the diversity of opinion as to the items properly chargeable to the expense of an army of occupation. My policy was that, pending final settlement by the Peace Conference, Germany would be liable

for all expenses of the American Army of Occupation; that any payments made by Germany for this purpose were to be considered as partial payments on account of the whole sum, and not as a liquidation of any specific expenses. Money was deposited in Coblenz banks to the credit of the United States, in amounts notified as necessary, to cover all expenditures made in the occupied area. The total expense as calculated by the different Allied Armies, before any of our troops were withdrawn, was based on the effective strength as shown by their Tables of Organization, and appears as follows:

Armies	Officers	Men	Horses	Cost per month in francs
French	12,000	35,500 39,430 240,000 275,617	116,100 11,600 70,000 58,755	175,948,815.00 30,195,142.60 127,935,000.00 269,068,184.10 603,147,141.70

#### UNITED STATES LIQUIDATION COMMISSION

15. In February, 1919, upon my recommendation, the Secretary of War appointed the United States Liquidation Commission, War Department, which had charge of the liquidation of our affairs in France, the sale of our property and installations and the settlement of claims exclusive of those arising out of torts, which were handled by the Renting, Requisition and Claims Service. While not under my supervision, the Liquidation Commission played such an important part in the closing chapter of our activities that some mention of it should be made in this report. With the dissolution of the American Expeditionary Forces we were confronted with the problem of disposing of large port and other installations and immense quantities of transportation, matériel, supplies and equipment. Much of this was of an immovable nature and the shipping situation forbade the transfer to the United States of most of the movable effects. There was little or no demand for many of the articles to be disposed of, and the expense of maintaining a force of caretakers until the market improved would have been prohibitive. The successful negotiations of the Commission led to the liquidation of our affairs with France by the payment of a lump sum to the United States by the French Government.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES

16. Our troops arrived in Europe after France and Great Britain had been fighting desperately for nearly three years, and their reception was remarkable in its cordiality. The resources of our Allies in men and material had been taxed to the limit, but they always stood ready to furnish us with needed supplies, equipment and transportation when at all available. We were given valuable assistance and cooperation in our training program by both the French and British armies, and when the shortage of labor personnel in our forces became acute the French Government rendered material assistance in the solution of this problem.

It was our good fortune to have a year in France to organize and train our forces. When our troops entered the battle the veteran soldiers of France and England gave them moral and physical support. The Artillery of our Allies often supported the advance of American troops; British and French tanks frequently cooperated with our Infantry; and their aviators

fought in the air to assist the American soldier.

Throughout France our troops have been intimately associated with the French people, particularly the French peasant, and the relations growing out of these associations assure a permanent friendship between the two peoples. The small force of Americans serving in Italy was accorded a warm welcome and established with the Italian people the most friendly relations. The hospitable reception of those of our forces who passed through England has impressed upon us how closely common language and blood have brought together the British and ourselves.

The cooperation of our soldiers with the French, British, Belgians and Italians was decisive in bringing the war to a successful conclusion, and will have an equally decisive effect in welding together the bonds of sympathy and good will among the peoples of these nations and ourselves,

#### WELFARE WORK

### Allied Food Commission

17. At the request of the Allied Food Commission a selected personnel of 320 officers and 464 men was placed at the disposal of the Commission. There was no other American personnel in Europe or elsewhere available for this necessary work. Our officers were sent to various countries in charge of food distribution, and were everywhere received with the utmost friendliness. These officers and men, by their executive and administrative ability and their energetic resourcefulness, were in a large measure responsible for the manner in which these food supplies were delivered to the various peoples in central Europe during a period of civil unrest or complete disorder. By their disinterested conduct of this charitable work, they won for the American Army the admiration of the populations whom they served.

Societies

18. In their respective spheres of activity the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. undertook the burden of supplying the needs of the entire American Expeditionary Forces. Their efforts were in many respects limited by a lack of tonnage. But shortage in tonnage, transportation, or personnel, meant inability to carry out completely their appointed tasks; whereas with the smaller societies it meant inability to expand. In order to avoid duplication of effort, it was directed in August, 1917, that the Red Cross confine its activities to relief work, and the Y. M. C. A. to amusement and recreation. The Knights of Columbus and the Salvation Army were later given official recognition. The Y. W. C. A., Jewish Welfare Board and American Library Association conducted their activities through one of the established societies.

19. The American Red Cross maintained within our zones a system of "Line of Communication Canteens," which furnished refreshments and relief to troops in transit and became a valuable feature of the Red Cross work. The statistical work of the searchers attached to statistical sections and to hospitals obtained much information for relatives. This society also aided in locating American prisoners to whom it sent food from

Switzerland.

20. To avoid depleting our personnel, the Y. M. C. A. agreed to operate our canteens and was at first allotted 208 ship-tons per 25,000 men per month to bring supplies from the United States, but the requirements of

other services later made it necessary to reduce this allotment to 100 tons. This materially reduced the valuable service the Y. M. C. A. might have rendered in this work. The termination of hostilities made it possible to

relieve the society of this responsibility.

21. The need of greatly expanded welfare work after hostilities, such as athletics and education was at once recognized, and the cooperation of the welfare societies in all these activities was of inestimable value. Immediately after the Armistice steps were taken to provide diversion and entertainment for our troops. Entertainment officers were appointed in all units and the Y. M. C. A. Entertainment Department furnished professionals and acted as a training and booking agency for soldier talent. Approximately 650 "soldier shows" were developed, which entertained hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who will remember this as one of the pleasant and unique enterprises of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The athletic program in the spring of 1919 culminated in the Inter-Allied games in June, held in the concrete stadium erected by our Engineers near Paris, the necessary funds being contributed by the Y. M. C. A. In number of participants and quality of entry, these games probably surpassed any

of the past Olympic contests.

### Leaves and Leave Areas

22. A leave system announced in general orders provided for a leave of seven days every four months, but it was necessary to suspend the privilege during active operations. In the leave areas free board and lodging at first-class hotels were provided for soldiers, and the Y. M. C. A. furnished recreational and amusement facilities. A number of new areas were opened by the Services of Supply immediately after the Armistice, improved transportation accommodations were eventually secured, and arrangements were made whereby men could visit England, Belgium and Italy.

It was my desire that every man in the American Expeditionary Forces should be given an opportunity to visit Paris before returning to the United States, but the crowded condition of the city during the Peace Conference, transportation difficulties, and other reasons, made it necessary to limit the

number of such leaves.

Religious Work

23. Religious work in our Army before the war was carried on by chaplains, one to each regiment. To meet the greatly increased size of regiments, legislation was recommended by me to provide not less than one chaplain for each 1,200 men. Although such act was passed in June, 1918, there was a continuous shortage of chaplains with the fighting units and in the hospitals and camps in the rear areas. This was largely met through the ready cooperation of the Welfare Societies who sent ministers and priests where most needed. Religious workers in the Y. M. C. A. and Knights of Columbus and Red Cross also aided in the work, the Red Cross sending chaplains to the States with units in many instances.

The religious work was directed and coordinated by a Board of Chaplains at general headquarters, of which Bishop Charles H. Brent was the head. With great devotion to duty this work was maintained despite a lack of transportation and other facilities. Chaplains, as never before, became the moral and spiritual leaders of their organizations, and established a high standard of active usefulness in religious work that made for patriotism, discipline and unselfish devotion to duty.

### Educational Work

24. Prior to the Armistice, educational work was conducted through the organization of voluntary classes under the Y. M. C. A., the popular subjects studied being French language, French history, and the causes of the war. After the Armistice, measures were taken for a systematic organiza-

tion of non-military educational training.

The formal school work began January 2, with post schools. Then divisional educational centers gave the equivalent of high-school instruction and specialized on vocational training. The American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune carried on undergraduate work for the technical professions, while postgraduate work was provided by the entrance of our officers and soldiers into French and British universities. Special schools were organized to meet demands, such as the Practical Agricultural School at Allery and the Art Training Center at Paris, for painting, sculpture, architecture and interior decoration, advanced students being entered in the best ateliers of Paris. Active instruction was carried on in the base hospitals and convalescent camps.

An important branch of the educational work was the field institute of short courses and educational extension lectures, organized to meet conditions due to the rapid repatriation of our soldiers and the constant movement of troops. At least half of our forces were reached by this means with brief intensive courses in business, trades, engineering, agriculture, occupational

guidance, and in citizenship.

25. On April 15 all educational work came under the complete control of the Training Section of the General Staff. The advantage of this change in management was at once apparent in the better coordination of the work of an excellent body of educators. The total attendance in the organized school system of the American Expeditionary Forces was 230,020, of which number 181,475 attended post schools, 27,250 educational centers, 8,528 the American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune, 367 Art Training Centers, 4,144 Mechanical Trade Schools, 6,300 French universities and 1,956 British universities. The attendance upon the institute short courses totaled 690,000 more, and at the extension lectures 750,000, giving a grand total of attendance at all educational formations of 1,670,020.

The educational work in the American Expeditionary Forces was of undoubted value, not only in improving morale, but in concrete benefit to the individual officer and soldier. It demonstrated satisfactorily that a combined military and educational program can be carried out in the Army with little detriment to pure military training and with decided advantage to the

individual.

### Stars and Stripes

26. The Stars and Stripes was a weekly newspaper conceived with the idea of increasing the morale of American troops by providing a common means of voicing the thought of the entire American Expeditionary Forces. Edited and managed by enlisted men who declined promotion, preferring to remain in the ranks in order better to interpret the spirit of the Army, it was a great unifying force and materially aided in the development of an esprit de corps. It lent loyal and enthusiastic support to Army athletics and to the educational program. In leading the men of our Army to laugh at their hardships, it was a distinct force for good and helped to create a healthy viewpoint. The campaign it conducted for the benefit of French orphans resulted in a fund of 2,250,000 francs.

#### APPRECIATION

27. In this brief summary of the achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces it would be impossible to cite in detail the splendid ability, loyalty and efficiency that characterized the service of both combatant and non-combatant individuals and organizations. The most striking quality of both officers and men was the resourceful energy and common sense employed, under all circumstances, in handling their problems.

The highest praise is due the commanders of armies, corps and divisions, and their subordinate leaders, who labored loyally and ably toward the accomplishment of our task, suppressing personal opinions and ambitions in the pursuit of the common aim; and to their staffs, who developed, with battle

experience, into splendid teams without superiors in any army.

To my Chiefs of Staff, Major General James G. Harbord, who was later placed in command of the Services of Supply, and Major General James W. McAndrew, I am deeply indebted for highly efficient services in a post of

great responsibility.

The important work of the staff at General Headquarters in organization and administration was characterized by exceptional ability and a fine spirit of cooperation. No chief ever had a more loyal and efficient body of assistants.

The officers and men of the Services of Supply fully realized the importance of their duties, and the operations of that vast business system were conducted in a manner which won for them the praise of all. They deserve their full share in the victory.

The American civilians in Europe, both in official and private life, were decidedly patriotic and loyal, and invariably lent encouragement and help-

fulness to the armies abroad.

The various societies, especially their women, including those of the theatrical profession, and our Army nurses, played a most important part in brightening the lives of our troops and in giving aid and comfort to our sick and wounded.

The Navy in European waters, under command of Admiral Sims, at all times cordially aided the Army. To our sister service we owe the safe arrival of our armies and their supplies. It is most gratifying to record that there has never been such perfect understanding between these two branches of the service.

Our armies were conscious of the support and cooperation of all branches of the Government. Behind them stood the entire American people, whose ardent patriotism and sympathy inspired our troops with a deep sense of obligation, of loyalty, and of devotion to the country's cause never equaled in our history.

Finally, the memory of the unflinching fortitude and heroism of the soldiers of the line fills me with greatest admiration. To them I again pay the supreme tribute. Their devotion, their valor and their sacrifices will live

forever in the hearts of their grateful countrymen.

In closing this report, Mr. Secretary, I desire to record my deep appreciation of the unqualified support accorded me throughout the war by the President and yourself. My task was simplified by your confidence and wise counsel. I am, Mr. Secretary, Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING, General, Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.







